1、 外文翻译 原文 The Challenge for Multinational Corporations in China: Think Local, Act Global Material Source: MIT Sloan Management Review Author: Seung Ho Park and Wilfried R. Vanhonacker To succeed in China, multinational corporations must turn the aphorism “think global, but act local” on its head. Alt
2、hough they have to master the art of local operation, their behavior must match their global standards, as expected by the Chinese. Adapting the MNCs Behaviour to Chinas Expectations The Factors Determining an MNCs Face The Behavioral Mistakes of MNCs in China The view of multinational corporations
3、in China has changed dramatically since the late 1970s, when the nation opened its economy and welcomed foreign direct investment, and global players such as Volkswagen, Coca Cola and 3M began exploring the market. During the 1980s, other MNCs such as Motorola, Philips and NEC were received with ope
4、n arms. They enjoyed corporate tax rates half those imposed on local companies, and they paid no duties on their capital goods imports. In general, they were revered by government and consumers alike. Even into the 1990s, as China and its people developed a better understanding of MNCs, the foreign
5、companies were the objects of awe and admiration. At that time, Chinese consumers exhibited an almost unconditional preference for MNCs products and services. However, beginning in 2000, when per capita GDP climbed above US$1,000, and especially since 2001, when China joined the World Trade Organiza
6、tion, both the Chinese government and consumers have changed their perceptions of MNCs drastically. MNC projects now are scrutinized much more for their fit with national interests. Furthermore, MNCs increasingly are getting local treatment. The coming equalization of the corporate tax rates (to be
7、phased in as of January 1, 2008) between local and foreign companies attests to this. MNCs are now held to the same, if not stricter, standards than local competitors in terms of areas such as employment standards and environmental standards. And they are finding that those standards are enforced mu
8、ch more rigorously. Chinese consumers also have become more demanding. As a rule, shoppers no longer see much difference between products made by Chinese companies and those made by MNCs. Indeed, their expressed purchase choices often are cast as negative reflections of how much more they had expect
9、ed of MNCs. In some ways, Chinas consumers feel let down. The cachet of the MNC is no longer there; savvy shoppers now emphasize objective details and product quality. MNCs clearly have made significant contributions to Chinas development. In 2004, 28% of Chinas industrial output and 19% of its tax
10、revenue was accounted for by MNCs. Furthermore, MNCs produced 57% of all exports from China in that year. By the end of 2004, 400 of the FORTUNE 500 companies had offices in China. Technology transfer and managerial knowledge are less tangible, but they represent other areas in which MNCs have had a
11、n impact, even though a recent government report declared that roughly 85% of intellectual property rights used in China are owned by MNCs. When China opened up, the initial expectation was that MNCs would bring cash, know-how and skills. But the nations economy has shifted very rapidly more rapidly
12、 than many outsiders have appreciated. As such, much of what the MNCs first contributed is prized less. At its current stage of economic development, China has plenty of cash and has benefited from technology and management transfer (although the government remains concerned about the lack of intell
13、ectual property in Chinese hands). The current expectations of MNCs are much more qualitative and behavioral: They are supposed to be teachers and role models. (See “Adapting the MNCs Behavior to Chinas Expectiatons.”) And it is in those roles that they often fall short. Indignation and Losing Face
14、Making mistakes can be particularly costly in China. News travels quickly, and consumers can get surprisingly involved in the discussion. Their general admiration for foreign MNCs translates into high expectations, which quickly can turn into disappointment and disapproval. There are already more th
15、an 100 million “netizens” in China, many of them busily filling online billboards and chat rooms with comments, opinions and their own misconceptions and exaggerations. MNCs must become more closely attuned to the role they are expected to play at this stage of the development of Chinas economy. The
16、y are under increasing scrutiny by the Chinese government, so it is all the more important for them to understand their “face,” or status, in China how they are perceived and thus how they should act. In China, few things are worse than losing face. The concept has two bases: social prestige and mor
17、al integrity. This applies as much to organizations as to individuals. Although MNCs still are very well placed, their lofty status brings with it high expectations about their integrity. The higher they are in the hierarchy of corporations, the higher the expectations. China expects to benefit from
18、 the MNCs positive influence on the nations business environment and practices. (See “The Factors Determining an MNCs Face.”) A loss of face casts a long shadow over the MNCs competitiveness and hence their future in China. To gain respect and face, global behavioral standards must be pursued. Think
19、 Local Act Global Put simply, MNCs in China must turn the familiar mantra is “think global, act local” on its head. They must “think local,” which means fitting business models and approaches to the local reality with respect for the local culture and norms. Local managerial talent and input clearly
20、 are important factors. Local managers instinctively know the subtleties of the Chinese market and how to navigate the often murky environment. MNCs not only need to have their hands and feet in China they must have their heads there too, in all senses of the word. However, MNCs in China must also “
21、act global” that is, they must ensure that their behavior in China is in line with their behavior around the world. Localized behavior can come in many forms and can be disastrous. The following examples illustrate the kind of ill-advised localized behavior in which some MNCs have engaged. (See “The
22、 Behavioral Mistakes of MNCs in China.”) For any company wishing to succeed in China, they provide some lessons in what to avoid. Know the Law and Follow It Many MNCs undermine their local credibility with their ignorance of regulations. Samsung Corp. ran afoul of Chinese regulators in just this way
23、. When the South Korea-based consumer electronics giant was ranked as 2004s top consumer electronics brand in terms of brand equity, a local distributor promptly included this information in its in-store promotional materials. Government authorities were not amused, however: Strict laws prohibit the
24、 use of “No. 1,” “best” and similar status-oriented references in any advertising in China. Avoid Making “Symbolic” Acquisitions These involve the purchase of local brands, sometimes with the promise of strengthening them, but instead diminishing their presence or killing them off. Chinese observers
25、 often view such acquisitions as deliberate attempts to keep local companies at bay or to liquidate them altogether. For example, in 1994, Unilever acquired a five-year lease for Maxam, at that time Chinas leading toothpaste brand, through a joint venture with a local company. Three years later, it
26、stopped advertising the brand. A Shanghai business acquired Maxam from Unilever in 2001 and spent more than RMB500 million to revive it. But its move came too late; the damage had been done. Guard Against Management Insensitivity With restructuring going on in many MNCs in China, some companies have
27、 been labeled as having particularly insensitive management styles. In the restructuring process that followed the June 2005 sale of Siemens AGs mobile phone unit to Taiwanese electronics company BenQ Corp., laid-off employees accused Siemens of following improper legal processes and of discriminati
28、on and unfair salary differences between German and Chinese managers. They took their grievances to the streets, garnering ample media attention. Dont Use China As a Lab S Inc., a popular Internet service provider in China, ran an online survey of its users in June 2005.23 Half of the participants f
29、elt that MNCs had been changing in a negative way. No specific companies were named, but two views were common. One was that MNCs had been undermining their credibility and public image with their practices and behavior. The other view was that many MNCs treated the Chinese marketplace as a lab. Thi
30、s is supported by arguments that new technologies are tested in China because it is cheap to do so, but very little of that technology is transferred to China or integrated into the nations developing industrial base. What Managers Must Do The question is whether local managers understand the need f
31、or behavioral standards and, indeed, whether they know what those standards are. Localization naturally implies that managers and management should move away from a global posture and perspective. Although local managers have an intuitive feel for the local market and know how to get things done in
32、China, they might be less familiar with what a global company really is and, more important, what is expected of those companies at this stage of Chinas development. Local managers might not be the best at understanding and appreciating how important it is for MNCs to act global rather than trying t
33、o appear Chinese. Furthermore, “acting global” might conflict with what they feel needs to be done to get results on the ground. Local ad agencies and other service providers also might not be familiar with what is required. In essence, MNCs are being held to a behavioral standard that changes as Ch
34、ina evolves. The “think local, act global” strategy implies a need for seemingly contradictory management skills. Managers do need to be local in their understanding, but they also must be global in their behavior. They must have real global experience and a mature understanding of (and appreciation
35、 for) MNCs global business conduct. Such managerial talent is in very short supply in China, and unfortunately it is not nurtured by the MNCs current localization drive. For its part, the Chinese government is concerned most about the gap it sees between MNCs expected behavior and how they behave in
36、 practice. Beijing has been looking to MNCs to set global standards in China a particularly important contribution at this stage in the development of the countrys economy. Interestingly, guanxi with high government officials viewed by many MNCs as the best way to protect their interests is an unrel
37、iable tool. Although guanxi does play a role, it is a very poor protector against some MNCs localization practices. Since so many MNCs have fallen short of expectations so frequently, the government has felt it necessary to crack down, monitoring the behavior of foreign companies more actively. Mult
38、inational corporations in China can succeed over the long term only if they show they have acute awareness of and sensitivity to local laws and cultural imperatives and demonstrate that they deeply understand the concept of face. They must demonstrate they understand their exemplar roles and can pol
39、ice their own behavior effectively. If they do not, they can surely expect Beijing and the provincial governments to do it for them. In China, one gets prestige from who one is, but one easily can lose it from what one does. 译文 对于跨国公司在中国面临的挑战：着眼本地 ，全球化发展 资料来源 : 麻省理工学院斯隆管理评论 作者：升何园和维尔弗里德河 为了在中国取得成功，跨
40、国公司必须把“放眼全球，本土化发 展”放在首要位置。虽然他们不得不掌握本地操作的艺术，他们的行为必须同中国人期盼的一样，与他们的全球化的标准相符合。 使跨国公司的行为符合中国人的期望 决定跨国公司形象的因素 在华跨国公司的行为误区 在中国对跨国公司的看法自 20 世纪 70 年代末，国家开放经济，欢迎外国直接投资，全球化的大众，可口可乐， 3M 公司开始探索市场，发生了巨大变化。 在 20 世纪 80 年代，中国张开双臂迎接了摩托罗拉，飞利浦和 NEC 等跨国公司。他们享受着比当地公司所得税率减半的优惠，并且对其资本货物进口免除关税。总体说来，他们受到政府的尊敬 和消费者的一致好评。一直到 2
41、0 世纪 90 年代，中国人民对跨国公司才有了更好的了解，外国公司被作为敬畏和羡慕的对象。 当时，中国的消费者几乎是无条件的偏好跨国公司的产品和服务。 然而，从 2000 年开始，当人均国内生产总值上涨 $ 1,000 美元以上，尤其是 2001 年以来，中国加入世界贸易组织，中国政府和消费者都已大大改变了对跨国公司的看法。现在跨国公司项目的审议更多的是为了契合国家的利益。此外，跨国公司越来越多地得到局部治疗。本地与外国公司的所得税税率的均衡（分阶段截至 2008 年 1 月 1 日）证明了这一点。跨国公司现 在一样，如果不严格要求，诸如在就业标准和环保标准领域方面的标准就会比本地竞争者低。并
42、且，他们发现，这些标准正在被更加严格地执行。 中国消费者也变得更加苛刻。消费者再也发现不了中国企业制造和跨国公司制造的产品间多少的区别，已经成为一个规律。的确，他们表示自己的消费选择往往是投向曾经期待过的经过负面思考的跨国公司。在某些方面，中国的消费者感到失望。跨国公司产品的优良品质不再存在 ;精明的消费者现在强调客观的细节和产品质量。 很明显，跨国公司对中国的发展作出了重大贡献。 2004 年，跨国公司占了28%的中国工业产值和 19%的税收收入。此外，当年跨国公司生产的产品数占中国全部出口产品的 57%。到 2004 年底，世界 500 强企业中 400 名甲企业在中国设有办事处。尽管技术
43、转让和管理知识很抽象，但他们代表跨国公司曾经对另一些领域的影响，甚至在最近的一个政府报告中也有宣布，在中国行驶的知识产权大约有 85%归跨国公司所拥有。 当中国开放，最初的期望是跨国公司会带来现金，专业知识和技能。但是，国家的经济转变非常快 - 速度超过了很多外人曾经所赞赏的。因此，跨国公司的第一个贡献没得到多少重视。在其经济发展的现阶段，中国已拥有大量现金并受 益于技术和管理转移（虽然政府仍关注在中国手中的知识产权缺少的问题）。现在对跨国公司的期待变得更加明确可行：他们应该被当作老师和榜样。 在这些角色中，他们往往还有不足。 愤慨、破坏形象 在中国犯错的代价特别高。新闻传播很快，消费者可以参
44、与到激烈的讨论之中。他们对外国跨国公司普遍的高度期望赞赏可以很快转变成失望和不满。 中国现在已有 100 多万“网民”，其中学多忙着用自己的评论、观点、他们的误解和夸大来灌满线上的宣传和聊天室。 跨国公司要在中国经济发展的舞台上更加切合地发挥预期的作用。他们受到中国政府更加频繁地 审查，因此，对他们来说更加重要的是理解“形象”，或者说地位，在中国 -他们是如何被理解和因此他们应该采取什么行动。 在中国，没有比失去形象更糟糕的了。这个概念有两个基础：社会威信和道德操守。虽然跨国公司仍然被很好地安置，但他们崇高的地位也使他们产生了很高的目标。企业的层次越高，目标越高。中国希望国家的商业环境和实践生
45、产从跨国公司的积极影响中获益。（见“影响跨国公司形象的因素”。）形象的损失会给跨国公司的竞争力和今后在中国未来的发展蒙上很长的阴影。 着眼本地 - 全球化策略 简单地说 ，在华跨国公司必须牢记“放眼全球，本土化发展”的口号。他们必须“着眼本地”，这意味着合适的商业模式和与当地实际的本土文化、规则符合的策略。本地管理人才和投入显然是重要因素。当地管理人员本能地了解中国市场的微妙和如何度过阴暗的局面。跨国工作在中国不仅需要有自己的手足，也必须有对所有事物感官的头脑。 然而，在华跨国公司也必须“全球发展” 也就是说，他们必须确保它们在中国发展的行为是符合他们在全世界的发展。本地化的行为可以有多种形式
46、，也可以是破坏性的。下面的例子说明一些跨国公司在中国所采取的不明智的本土化行为。 （见“跨国公司在中国的错误行为。”）对任何想在中国取得成功的公司提供一些经验教训。 懂法守法 很多跨国公司因为不了解当地的法规而削弱了他们的本地信誉。三星公司就是这样与中国监管部门发生了冲突。当韩国的电子产品销售巨头位于 2004年电子产品销售品牌品牌价值排行榜上时，当地的分销商及时地将这一信息在其店内公布。政府当局不满，但是：在中国法律严格禁止“第一”“最佳”和类似性质的为导向的任何广告。 避免出现“象征性”收购 “象征性”收购包括购买本土的品牌，打着承诺要强化企业的旗子，反而是削弱其存在或将其封杀 。中国观察
47、者常常眼看着这种可以保留海湾地区的公司或通通一起清算的收购。举个例子， 1994 年，联合利华通过合资企业和本地公司，收购了当时中国领先的牙膏品牌马克斯姆的五年租赁。三年后，他停止了该品牌的广告。 2001 年，上海一家企业花了 50 万元以上人民币从联合利华收购了马克斯姆，来恢复它。但这一举措来得太迟，损失已经造成了。 预防管理滞后 随着许多在华跨国公司的重组，一些公司已经对特别敏感的管理风格做了标记。紧接 2005 年 6 月西门子公司的手机部门出售给台湾明基电子公司的重组之后，下岗职工指责西门子以下不当法律过程 ，德国和中国管理者间带歧视性不公平的薪资差异。他们把自己的不满公诸于众，赢得
48、了相当部分媒体的关注。 不要将中国当成实验室 在 2005 年 6 月网络用户的在线调查中显示，搜狐公司是一家在中国受欢迎的网络服务提供商。一半的参与者认为，跨国公司过去一直以一种消极的方式改变着。没有具体名称的公司，但有两个观点相同。一种观点是，跨国公司的做法和行为过去一直在破坏他们的信誉和公众形象。另一种观点是，许多跨国公司将中国市场当成一个实验室。新技术在中国的测试可以证明。因为这样成本低，并且很小的技术转移到中国或者纳入国家工业基地 发展之中。 管理者必须做什么 问题关键在于当地管理人员是否理解行为准则的需求，进一步讲，他们是都知道这些标准是什么。本土化自然意味着管理者和管理应该摆脱全
49、球的视角。虽然当地的管理者对当地市场有直观感受，了解如何在中国做事，但探秘可能会不了解什么是真正的全球公司，更重要的是，在中国发展的现阶段这些公司预期的是什么。当地的管理者未必最了解最明白，相对吸引中国人，跨国公司全球发展更加重要。此外，“全球发展”可能与他们感觉必须做来得到结果的相冲突。本地广告公司和其他服务提供商也可能对他们真正所需要的不熟悉。从本质 上讲，跨国公司正在示范一个变化的行为准则，中国也参与其中。 “着眼本地，全球化发展”战略意味着对看似相互矛盾的管理技能的需要。管理者们应该理解本土化，但也必须做到行为全球化。他们必须拥有真正的全球化经验和对跨国公司全球业务行为成熟的认识。这样的管理人才在中国非常短缺，而且不幸的是，它不是跨国公司目前本土化驱动而培训的。 就其本身而言，中国政府最关心的是关于跨国公司的预期行为以及如何在实践中落实行为的差距。北京一直希望跨国公司在中国设立全球标准 对现阶段国家经济发展是一个尤为重要的贡献。有趣的是，与政府高级 官员的关系 被许多跨国公司视为保护他们利益最好的方式 是一个不可靠的工具。尽管这种关系起到了一定
