1、 外文翻译 原文 Are there positive spillovers from direct foreign investment? Material Source:Journal of Development Economics 42(1993) 51-74 Author: Mona Haddad , Ann Harrison Many developing countries now actively solicit foreign investment, offering income tax holidays， import duty exemptions?and subsid
2、ies to foreign firms. One reason for subsidizing these firms is the positive spillover from transferring technology to domestic firms. This paper employs a unique firm-level dataset to test for such spillovers in the Moroccan manufacturing sector. We find evidence that the dispersion of productivity
3、 is smaller in sectors with more foreign firms. However, we reject the hypothesis that foreign presence accelerated productivity growth in domestic firms during the second half of the 1980s. Using detailed information on quotas and tariffs, we also reject the possibility of a downward bias in estima
4、ting technology spillovers because foreign investors may be attracted to protected domestic markets. 1. Introductiou The disappearance of non-equity sources of foreign capital in the 1980s has created a renewed interest in direct foreign investment (DFI). Despite the controversies surrounding the be
5、nefits and costs of DFI, a number of developing country governments have now changed their policies from restricting towards promoting foreign Investment. Some countries have actually tilted the balance towards foreign firms by offering special incentives: in Mexico, the maquiladora firms pay no inc
6、ome taxes; in much of the Caribbean, foreign firms receive income tax holidays, import duty exemptions, and subsidies for infrastructure. Are these subsidies justified? One benefit often cited in the literature on the gains from DFI, apart from the capital often inflows and additional employment, is
7、 the new technology brought in by foreign firms, it could justify some type of subsidy. This may be the rationable for goverment policies in economices as diverse as Taiwan and Bulgaria, which target special treatment for foreign firms in high technology sectors. Technology transfer occurs through m
8、any different avenues -new technology is embodied in imported inputs and capital goods, sold directly through licensing agreements, or transmitted to exporters who learn about new techniques from their foreign buyers. In other cases, learning by doing among domestic firms, combined with investments
9、in formal education and on-the-job training, is critical. No individual source of technology is likely to be the best; country experience suggests that the most effective diffusion of new ideas and processes probably involves a combination of all these factors. Foreign investment plays an unusual ro
10、le in several respects, however.First, new technology may not be commercially available and innovating firms may refuse to sell their technology via licensing agreements. Mansfield and Romeo (1980), for example, found that the technology transferred via multinationals was much newer than the technol
11、ogy sold through licensing agreements. Second, foreign investment may provide the competition necessary to stimulate technology diffusion, particularly if local firms are protected from import competition. Third, foreign investors may provide a form of worker training which cannot be replicated in d
12、omestic firms or purchased from abroad. The theoretical literature on foreign investment suggests that foreign investors possess some sort of intangible asset which cannot easily be sold - such as managerial skills. Technology diffusion may occur through labor turnover as domestic employees move fro
13、m foreign to domestic firms. Existing case studies of multinational behavior do suggest that foreign investment could be an important source of spillovers. Rhee and Belot(1990) present a number of detailed cases where foreign investors have acted as export catalysts, in some cases fueling domestic e
14、xport industry where there were no domestic exports at all. Mansfield and Romeo, however, found that only a small share of the 15 multinationals in their survey believed that foreign investment hastened access to process technology for host country competitors. Mansfield and Romeo suggested that mor
15、e important gains from foreign investment were likely to be through cost savings to downstream users of new products or technology transferred to upstream supplier. A number of empirical studies have attempted to directly measure the so-called spillovers from foreign investment. In an early study, C
16、ave(1974) tested for the impact of foreign presense on value-added per worker in Australian domestically-owned manufacturing sectors. Caves found that the diparity between(higher) foreign and domestic value-added disappears as the foreign share of sectoral labor rises, which is consistent with posit
17、ive spillovers from foreign presence. Globerman(1979) replicated Caves findings(1974) using sector-level, cross-section data for Canadian manufacturing industries in 1972. Globerman, however, was able to control explicity for capital intensity in his estimation of value-added per worker. The results
18、 indicate only a weak effect-none of the proxies for foreign presence in the sector are significant at the 5 percent level. Most of the empirical work on spillovers from foreign investment in developing countries has focused on Mexico, which gathers manufacturing data b y ownership type. Blomstrom a
19、nd Persson (1983) reproduce Globermans study using 1970 census data for 215 Mexican manufacturing industries. Controlling for capital intensity, scale effects, and worker quality, Blomstrom and Persson find that labor productivity is significantly higher in sectors where foreign firms employ a highe
20、r share of the labor force. Blomstrom (1986) and Wolff(1989) find faster productivity growth and faster convergence of productivity levels in sectors which higher levels of foreign ownership. This paper, which examines the impact of foreign investment on firms in Moroccos manufacturing sector from 1
21、985 through 1989, contributes to this existing literature in two respects. This is the first-sepecific attributes such as size. The panel nature of the data (which combine cross-section and time series) allows us to go beyond cross-section analysis comparing partial productivity measures (such as la
22、bor productivity) across different firms. Our results suggest that foreign firms exhibit higher levels of total factor productivity, but their rate of productivity growth is lower than that for domestic firms. At first glance, this would appear to support the catch-up hypothesis domestic firms, at l
23、ower initial levels of productivity, are able to increase efficiency at a faster rate. However, our tests on the presence of any spillovers from foreign presence show that although domestic firms exhibit higher levels of productivity in sectors with a larger foreign presence, they do not exhibit hig
24、er productivity growth in those sectors. Second, we are able to use detailed information on the level of quota and tariff protection to test whether the lack of any spilbvers stems from a tendency of foreign firms to move towards protected sectors. We do not find evidence of such positive spillovers
25、 in either the protected or unprotected sectors. Section 2 discusses the trade and foreign investment policies in Morocco before and during regulatory reform in the 1980s. Section 3 examines the relative performance of domestic firms and foreign firms. Section 4 measures the spillovers from foreign
26、presence on the level, growth rate, and dispersion of productivity for domestically-owned firms. This section also extends the analysis to examine whether technology spillovers are related to the degree of import protection. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings
27、 for policies towards multinationals. 2. The regulatory framework: Foreign investment and trade policy 2.1. Foreign investment polocies The first major action against foreign investment in Morocco took place in 1973, when the government passed the Moroccanization Decree, which restricted foreign own
28、ership of cer6n industrial, commercial, and service activities to no more than 49 perr;nt. The main purpose of this policy was political rather than economic -to reduce the dominant role of French firmsin the Moroccan economy. Activities falling under the Moroccanization law ilycluded textiles, clot
29、hing, footwear, leather products, travel goods, toys, fish canriing and preserving, fertilizers, edible oils, vegetable fibers, and processed fruits acd vegetables. The negative impact of this law on foreign investment is evident from the fact that even enterprises not subject to the law voluntarily
30、 handed over their capital share to their Moroccan partners. A major reform uf the investment code was undertaken in 1983. It allowed full foreign ownership of Moroccan companies in certain sectors (especially manufacturing), eased restrictions on the repatriation of capital and divi-dends, and intr
31、oduced fiscal and other incentives for direct foreign invest-ment. The code guaranteed (i) foreign investment against the risks of nationalization and expropriaaion; (ii) unlimited transfer of dividends and profits to foreign investors; and (iii) the repatriation of foreign investors capital and rel
32、ated caoital gains. By 1985, the Moroccan majority-owners restrion no longer applied to any segment in the industrial sector, which meant that foreign firms could have an equity participation fo more than 49 percent. The investment code was further liberalized in 1988, administrative procedures gove
33、rning the approval of direct foreign investment were simlifide, and rules similar to those granted to nonresident foreigners were extended to nonredident Moroccans. 2.2. Trade polocies Following independence in 1956, Moroccos economic development strategy was primarily based on import-substituting i
34、ndustrialization and agricultural self-sufficiency in a ighly protected domestic market. For more than two deeades, trade and in ustrial policies in Morocco were based on high tariffs and on quantitative restrictions in imports. Furthermore, during the 1970s, the Moroccan government expanded growth
35、through high levels of pub!ic spending, financed through foreign borrowing and rising receipts from phosphate exports. This culminated in a major payment crisis in 1983. As a result, the government introduced outward-oriented structural adjust-ment measures designed to eliminate the bias against exp
36、ort activites, liberalized the import regime, and enhanced the allocative role of the financial sector. The trade reform introduced in 1983 called for the eventual elimination of the Special import Tariff (SIT), a uniform tariff levied on the c.i.f. value of imports, the lowering of the maximum cust
37、oms duty from 400 percent in 1983 to 60 percent in 1984 and 45 percent in 1985, and a reduction in quantitative restrictions. Changes in the industrial code were also undertaken to promote exports. In January 1988, the SIT and the customs stamp duty were merged into what was called a fiscal levy on
38、imports, set at 12.5 percent. Contrary to the declining maximum tariff trend observed since 1983, the fiscal levy actually exceeded the sum of the two abolished taxes. This was intended to generate additionnal fiscal revenue rather than to provide prtection. 译文 外商直接投资能否带来溢出效应？ 资料来源 ： 发展经济学杂志 42（ 199
39、3） 51-74 作者： 莫纳哈达德， 安哈里森 许多发展中国家现在正积极争取外国投资，提供假期所得税，进口关税减免，补贴给外国公司。其中一个原因是这些企业补贴，从国内企业转让技术，以积极的 外溢。 本文采用了独特的企业级数据集，测试在摩洛哥制造业等溢出效应。发现的证据表明，许多外国公司在部门的生产分工会更细。然后，有人产生了这样的假设： 1980 年后半期，外国公司加速了国内企业生产率的增长。对此，我们是反对的。利用配额和关税上的详细信息，我们不能低估技术溢出效应，因为外国投资者可能倾向于保护国内市场。 1.绪论 在上个世纪八十年代 ， 外资来源的非股权化 ， 重新掀起了外商直接投资的兴趣。
40、尽管对外商直接投资的效益和成本有诸多的争议，但是许多发展中国家政府已经改变限制外商投资的政策。 实际上 ， 一些国家 已经 倾 斜 于 外国公司 ，提供 他们特别的优惠。 在墨西哥边境加工企业 ， 不用支付所得税税款 ； 在大部分加勒比地区 ， 外国公司 享受免缴 所得税节日 ， 进口关税豁免 ， 和基础设施 补贴。 这些补贴是正确的吗 ?外商直接投资， 除了资本流入和 增加 就业 这些好处外，常常被文献引用的好处 ， 是 外国企业可以带来先进的新技术 ， 这可以看作是 某种类型的补贴 。这可能是政府政策的地区差异，就像台湾和保加利亚，对外国企业的高科技领域的特殊待遇。 技术转让是通过许多不同
41、的途径 -新的技术体现在进口和资本货物、直接卖通过技术许可 ， 或 通过 从国外买家学习新的技术传递给出口商 。 在 其他情况下 ，在国内企业 边做边学 并结合 正规教育和在职培训 ， 是至关重要的 。 个人资料来源的技术 不 可能是最好的 ， 国家经验表明 ， 新观念及流程最有效的扩散可能需要 将这几个因素结合起来。 然后，外国投资在一些方面发挥着不寻常的作用。首先 ， 新科技不会商用和创新公司也许会拒绝销售他们的技术经许可协议。例如 ， 曼斯菲尔德 ， 罗密欧 (1980)， 新的技术转让是通过跨国公司进行的，而不是靠买卖技术许可。 第二 ， 外国投资会提供必要的竞争 ， 刺激技术扩散 ，
42、特别是当本国企业受进口保护。 第三 ， 外国投资者可以提供一种 员工 培训 ，而这种培训 不能在国内的公司复制或从国外购买回来。外商投资的理论文献表明 ， 外国投资者具有某种不容易被卖 的 无形资产 ， 如管理技术 。当本国员工从外国企业回到国内企业的时候， 技术扩散 可以通过人员流动实现。 现有对跨国行为的研究案例表明 外商投资可以成为重要的溢出效应的来源。 让夫和贝勒特（ 1990）表明：在许多情况下， 外国投资者 都担当 出口催化剂 的角色；甚至， 在某些情况下 ，刺激本没有出口的加工企业加速出口。 然而 ，曼斯菲尔德 和 罗密欧 发现，在他们调查的 15 个跨国公司中，只有一小部分认为
43、，外商直接投资的进入刺激东道国技术的提高。 曼斯菲尔德 和 罗密欧 表明： 更重要的外商投资收益可能通过节约成本 从下游 新产品 、 或技术 的使用者 转移到上游供应商。 一些实证研究已经试图被用于估测外商直接投资所带来的溢出效应。 在早期的研究中，凯夫（ 1974 年）在澳大利亚国内拥有的制造业部门中，对因为外资存在而产生的每个工人增加值的影响进行了测试。凯夫发现，随着劳动部门资本的增加，外资和国内资本增值的差距将会逐渐消失，这与外资存在的溢出效应是一致的。歌罗伯门（ 1979）与凯夫在 1974 年的发现一脉相承，运用了加拿大制造业在 1972 年的同部门，跨部门的数据。然而，歌罗伯门能够
44、对 在资本密度里的每个员工增值准确的估测控制。结果表明，只有在 5 个百分点的，因外资存在的代理而产生的微弱影响能力，是具有重要意思的。 大部分关于发展中国家的外资溢出效应的实证研究主要集中在墨西哥，它集中了所有制类型的制造业数据。布罗姆斯托和佩尔森（ 1983）复制了歌罗伯门的研究，利用了 1970 年 215 个墨西哥制造企业的普查数据。布罗姆斯托和佩尔森还发现，除了对资本密集度，规模效应和员工素质控制很重要外，劳动生产率在外国公司雇佣较高份额的劳动力的部门，会更高。布罗姆斯托（ 1986）和沃尔夫（ 1989） 发现在外资持股的水平较高时，生产率提高和行业生产率收敛会更快。 本文，通过对
45、摩洛哥 1985 年到 1989 年制造业部门外商投资对企业影响的研究，主要有两个方面的成果。这是第一个具体贡献，如大小等。该面板性质的数据（结合了横截面和时间序列）使我们能够横向分析比较一部分不同公司的生产率措施（比如劳动生产率）。研究结果表明，外国公司的全要素生产率水平较高，但是其生产率增长速度比国内企业低。乍一看，这似乎支持这样一个假说：国内企业初始生产率较低，能够以更快的速度提高效率。然后，对外国存在溢出效应的研究表明，尽管国内企业 与外国存在结合使部门生产率水平得到提高，但是他们并没有带来这些部门生产率的增长。 第二个成果是，我们能够使用配额和关税保护的详细资料，去测试从外商企业这个趋势变成保护部门会不会减少外资溢出效应。我们还没发现任何受保护或不受保护部门而产生的积极溢出效应的证据。
