1、 外文翻译 原文 Foreign Direct Investment in China: Reward or Remedy？ Material Source: The World Economy， 2007(11) Author: Olen Havrylchy and Sandra Poncet From being an economy with virtually no foreign investment in the late1970s, China has become the largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI)
2、among developing countries. FDI inflows exploded from$2 billion to $53.5 billion between 1985 and 2003 and China has overtaken the US as the worlds largest recipient of FDI. Since 1994, China has attracted about one-third of total FDI to emerging markets each year and about 60 per cent of flows to A
3、sian emerging markets (Prasad and Wei, 2005). Economists usually agree that FDI flows to countries having a stable macro-economic environment and commitment to market reforms as well as high productivity, low costs of labor and good infrastructure among other favorable conditions. In the case of Chi
4、na, Huang (2003) argues that the large inflow of FDI is not only the consequence of good policies, but also results from certain distortions in the Chinese banking market and in state investment policies. He states that Primary benefits of Chinas FDI inflows have less to do with the provision of mar
5、keting access and know-how transfers, technology diffusion, or access to export channels, the kind of firm-level benefits often touted in the literature. Instead, the primary benefits associated with Chinas FDI inflows have to do with the privatization functions supplied by the foreign firms in a co
6、ntext of political opposition to an explicit privatization program, venture capital provisions to private entrepreneurs in a system that enforces stringent credit constraints on the private sector. The above argument is consistent with Harrison et al. (2004), according to which firms in countries wi
7、th greater FDI inflows suffer less from financial constraints, as incoming foreign investment provides additional sources of capital. At the same time, it is crucial to stress that the Chinese context differs dramatically from the general case investigated by Harrison et al. (2004).The main reason w
8、hy FDI may serve as a way to alleviate credit constraints in most developing countries is capital scarcity. Indeed, the capital scarcity channel is at odds with Chinas specific case. The problem in China is not the lack of savings but their inefficient allocation. After the opening of the market for
9、 foreign investors, the discrimination against Chinese private firms continued, leading to the weak protection of property rights and a lack of market opportunities. As early as 1982, the adopted Chinese constitution protected the legal rights of foreign enterprises. Only in 1999 was there an amendm
10、ent made to acknowledge that the Chinese private sector was an integral part of the economy, putting it on an equal footing with state-owned enterprises. A major problem in Chinas corporate sector is a political pecking order of firms which leads to the allocation of Chinas financial resources to th
11、e least efficient firmsstate-owned enterpriseswhile denying the same resources to Chinas most efficient firmsprivate enterprises. Private firms are discriminated against in terms of access to external funding, property rights protection, taxation and market opportunities. Park and Sehrt (2001) show
12、that lending by state banks is determined by policy reasons, rather than by commercial motives. Such distortions may force private Chinese firms to look for a foreign investor. Another reason for high FDI in China is the participation of foreign investors in the privatization process of state-owned
13、enterprises (SOEs).Very often, public enterprises that are privatized possess good technology, human capital, extensive distribution networks and access to finance. However, due to the repeated interventions of state authorities in the investment process and other types of misman-agement, SOEs are u
14、nprofitable and have to be privatised. As for the choice of potential buyers, private enterprises are again discriminated against, as state bureaucrats favour foreign owners over private Chinese ones. Such insolvency- induced FDI also raises the share of foreign investment in China. In both cases de
15、scribed above, the benefits of foreign investment are not associated with technology transfer, managerial skills or access to finance. In many cases, the role of foreign owners could be played by local Chinese entrepreneurs if they were given economic freedom and incentives. Hence, if there were a l
16、evel playing field for companies of all types of ownership, then the scale of FDI would be smaller. In this context, we can talk about the economic costs of foreign investment, namely forgone revenues by private Chinese enterprises and government budgets, and, more generally, about misallocation of
17、funds in the world economy. We propose to analysis determinants of FDI in Chinese provinces to test the hypotheses of Huang (2003).The literature on FDI determinants in China is large (Cheng and Kwan,2000;Coughlin and Segev,2000;and Sun et al.,2002).It finds that the most important determinants that
18、 attract FDI are market size, output growth, education, productivity, infrastructure and preferential treatment of FDI in special economic zones. Among the deterring factors, these papers emphasis the role of high wages and political risks. In our study, we analysis determinants of FDI in 26 Chinese
19、 provinces and three municipalities between 1990 and 2003.Our work contributes to the FDI literature by including factors that capture the distortions and inefficiencies of economic policies and institutions across Chinese provinces, namely restrictions on credit access for private enterprises, and
20、the persistent mismanagement of state enterprises due to state interventions into investment planning. We start our econometric estimation with a fixed-effects model, controlling for province-and time-specific effects. Since a modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity rejects the null hypo
21、thesis of homoscedasticity, we rely on robust standard errors to infer about the significance of our results. The results are presented in columns 14 of Table 4.The model estimated in column 1 closely follows the literature on determinants of FDI. It includes such explanatory variables as ratio of F
22、DI to total investment, market potential, wage, productivity of labor, density of infrastructure, and a proxy for the lack of market reforms. In column 2,we add control variables to account for developments in the banking sector in our baseline equation. Indicators of the restricted access of privat
23、e enterprises to credit(proxied by the share of SOCBs in credit)and of the size of the banking sector are included. Column 3 additionally controls for central bank fundsredistribution, while column 4 further introduces the indicator of seasonality in investment spending. All explanatory variables ar
24、e lagged. Because of high correlation between the last two variables, we do not introduce them simultaneously in the regression. Such a simple econometric estimation does not take into account potential problems of endogeneity. This could lead to some of our variables being insignificant or having t
25、he wrong sign. For example, FDI is known to increase wages and improve productivity. Furthermore, we can also hypothesise that high FDI might postpone reforms of the banking sector, since the problem of credit access for private enterprises would be partly alleviated. Therefore, we additionally esti
26、mate our model with instrumental variables(IV),which are lags of our explanatory variables. In order to test the validity of our instruments with the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, we have included one more extra instrumentspecial economic zones, constructed as the sum of the number o
27、f special economic zones, coastal open cities and economic and technological development zones in each province. This indicator is constructed based on the chronology provided by Dmurger et al.(2002). Columns 58 report results of IV estimation with robust standard errors. We also test our models for
28、 autocorrelation of residuals with Wooldridges(2001)test for serial correlation the statistics obtained indicate that there is autocorrelation of order one(i.e.an AR1 process)in the residuals. Consequently, we choose the IV estimation with NeweyWest standard errors and an AR1 process in the error te
29、rms. The findings are shown in columns 912. In order to test the appropriateness of relying on the IV estimator, we perform the DurbinWuHausman test, which tests the endogeneity in a regression estimated with IV. The rejection of the null hypothesisthat an ordinary least squares estimator of the sam
30、e equation would yield consistent estimatesmeans that the endogeneity of the regressors has a meaningful effect on the estimated coefficients and we have to rely on the IV estimation. Our next step is to check the validity of our instruments with the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions. The
31、 test statistics obtained do not reject the orthogonality of the instruments and the error terms, and thus we can conclude that our choice of instruments was appropriate. The results of our estimation are mostly in line with the literature. The results estimated with IV succeed in correcting endogen
32、eity problems and therefore we focus our discussion on IV findings. First of all, we find that low labor costs attract foreign direct investments, but this result has a correct sign only when we use IV estimation. Second, we confirm the existence of a very strong agglomeration effect. Third, we obse
33、rve that FDI is market seeking since the magnitude of the market potential exerts a significant and positive attraction for foreign investments. Increased productivity of labor also turns out to foster FDI .In addition, our proxy of poor business environment and lack of market reforms, namely the ra
34、tio of state investment, enters negatively and significantly in the regression, attesting to the crucial role of market climate in order to attract FDI .Also in line with the existing literature, we find a positive impact of infrastructure development, but only in the IV estimations. This paper cont
35、ributes to the literature on the determinants of FDI in China by including a number of new factors, such as the availability of external funding to private enterprises, the redistribution of central bank funds and investment planning by state authorities. Our findings are in line with the existing l
36、iterature, which shows the positive impact of agglomeration, high labor productivity and low labor costs, market size, infrastructure density and market reforms on FDI. In addition to the traditional FDI determinants, we show the distortive impact of some imperfections in the banking sector and stat
37、e investment policies. As suggested by Huang(2003),we try to see beyond the positive sides of FDI in China. Unlike other developing countries, where FDI is associated with improvements in management, better technology and access to finance, in China FDI does not always bring the above-mentioned bene
38、fits, and high level of FDI in China can be explained, inter alia, by the market distortions. We find support for the following two hypotheses. First, private enterprises are forced to look for a foreign investor in order to escape constraints imposed by the state-dominated banking sector. Ideally,
39、these enterprises could have taken a loan from a bank, but despite the large size of the banking sector in China, private companies only recently gained access to credit from SOCBs. Second, foreign investors acquire SOEs if there are frequent interventions by state bureaucrats into the investment de
40、cisions. Again, state enterprises could have been saved from insolvency by local entrepreneurs, had they been given more freedom in decision making. Therefore, further state disengagement from credit allocation and investment decisions should diminish the demand for FDI in China and free part of it
41、for more efficient use in other regions. REFERENCES Berthlemy,J.-C.and S.Dmurger(2000),Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: Theory and Application to China,Review of Development Economics,4,2,14055. Boyreau-Debray,G.(2003),Financial Intermediation and Growth:Chinese Style,World Bank Policy
42、 Research Working Paper No.3027(Washington,DC:World Bank). Brandt,L.and H.Li(2003),Bank Discrimination in Transition Economies:Information,or Incentives?,Journal of Comparative Economics,31,387413. Cheng,L.K.and Y.K.Kwan(2000),What are the Determinants of the Location of Foreign Direct Investment?Th
43、e Chinese Experience,Journal of International Economics,51,379400. Coughlin,C.C.and E.Segev(2000),Foreign Direct Investment in China:A Spatial Econometric Study,World Economy,23,1,123. Cull,R.and L.C.Xu(2000),Bureaucrats,State Banks,and the Efficiency of Credit Allocation: The Experience of Chinese
44、State-Owned Enterprises,Journal of Comparative Economics,28, 131. Cull,R.and L.C.Xu(2003),Who Gets Credit?The Behavior of Bureaucrats and State Banks in Allocating Credit to Chinese State-Owned Enterprises,Journal of Development Economics,71, 53359. Dayal-Gulati,A.and A.M.Husain(2002),Centripetal Fo
45、rces in Chinas Economic Takeoff,IMF Staff Papers,42,3,36494. Dmurger,S.,J.D.Sachs,W.-T.Woo,B.Shuming,G.Chang and A.Mellinger(2002),Geography, Economic Policy and Regional Development in China,Asian Economic Papers,1,1,14697. Gong,H.(1995),Spatial Patterns of Foreign Investment in Chinas Cities,19801
46、989,Urban Geography,16,198209. Gong,Y.,H.G?rg and S.Maioli(2006),Employment Effects of Privatisation and Foreign Acquisition of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises,IZA Discussion Paper No.2453(Bonn,Germany:IZA). Guo,K.and Y.Yao(2005),Causes of Privatization in China,Economics of Transition,13,2, 21138.
47、Harris,C.(1954),The Market as a Factor in the Localization of Industry in the United States. 译文 外商直接投资在中国的奖励或补救 资料来源 : 世界经济 2007（ 11） 作者： 奥莱纳 阿 ， 桑德拉 鹏塞特 从 70 年代末几乎没有一个外商投资经济，到目前中国已成为外国直接投资（ FDI）在发展中国家的最大 接受 国。 从 1985 年 到 2003 年外国直接投资爆炸性的流入从 20 亿美元到 535 亿美元。中国已经超过美国成为世界上最大的外国直接投资接受国。自 1994 年以来， 中国每年
48、大约吸引外国直接投资 在新兴市场总额 的三分之一 和流入亚洲新兴市场总额的百分之六十。 （普拉萨德， 魏， 2005）。 经济学家通 常赞成，除其他有利条件外，外国直接投资流入国有一个稳定的宏观经济环境和对于市场改革 的承诺 ，比如高生产率，低劳动成本和良好的基础设施。在中国的情况， 黄（ 2003）认为，外国直接投资大量 流入，不仅是良好 政策的原因，也是 中国银行业市场有一定的扭曲 和地区的投资政策的结果。他 指出，对 于 中国的外国直接投资流入的主要 好处 是 可以较少做 提供 市场营销的知识获取， 专有技术的转让， 对出口渠道的扩散或者进入供应 ， 这种 企业层次的好处 在文献中 经常
49、 被 吹捧。相反， 中国的外国直接投资流入 所带来的主要好处与 在我国政治上反对一个明确的私有化方案， 风险投资规定了对在一个系统中的民营企业家在私营部门强制进行执行严格的信贷限制 的背景下 对外国公司 提供的私有化功能。 上述论点与 哈里森等人是一致的（ 2004）， 根据 大量的外国直接投资的流入减少财政拮据，为引入外资的投资提供额外的资金来源。与此同时， 关 键的 要强调的是，由哈里森等人（ 2004）从一般的情况下调查中国方面显示的不 同。 外国直接投资可以作为一种方法来缓解大多数发展中国家资金短缺引起的信贷紧缩。事实上，“资本稀缺”频道是与中国的具体情况大相径庭。在中国的问题不是储蓄不足，而是他们的低效率分配。 在市场为 外国投 资者开放之后，对中国民营企业的歧视继续，导致 薄弱的产权保护 和缺乏市场 的 机会。早在 1982 年，通过 中国宪法保护外国企业的合法权益。只是在 1999 年曾经有一项修正案作出承认，中国的私营部门是经济的一个组成部分，将它放在在与国有企业平等的地位。一个在中国的企业部门的主要问题
