1、1本科毕业论文外文翻译题目THEEFFECTSOFENVIRONMENTALREGULATIONONTHEPRODUCTIVITYOFLARGECOMPANIESANEMPIRICALANALYSISOFSPANISHCASE出处JOURNALOFMANAGEMENTANDGOVERNANCEVOLUME5,NUMBER2,129152,DOI101023/A1013061723180作者CONCHITAGARCSAYERBEANDCARMENGALVEGRRIZ原文ABSTRACTTHISARTICLEPROVIDESEVIDENCETOTHEDEBATEABOUTWHETHERORNOTI
2、NVESTMENTSDESIGNATEDFORCOMPLIANCEWITHENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEANDTECHNOLOGYSTANDARDSFAVORORHARMTHEWORKPRODUCTIVITYOFCOMPANIESAPANELDATAMODELISANALYZED,WHICHPANELREFERSTO53LARGESPANISHCOMPANIESQUOTEDONTHESTOCKEXCHANGEANDTHATHAVEPARTICIPATEDINASUBSIDIZEDENVIRONMENTALPROTECTIONPROGRAMDURINGTHE19901995PE
3、RIOD,SPECIFICALLYINTHEINDUSTRIALANDTECHNOLOGICALPROGRAMFORTHEENVIRONMENTPITMAACOBBDOUGLASPRODUCTIONFUNCTIONISUSEDTORELATETHEWORKPRODUCTIVITYTOAMEASUREOFTHEPOLLUTIONABATEMENTINVESTMENTDEDICATEDTOCOMPLIANCEWITHSTANDARDSTHERESULTINGNEGATIVECOEFFICIENT,ALTHOUGHCLOSETOZERO,SHOULDNOTBEINTERPRETEDASARESULT
4、DERIVEDFROMJUSTANYKINDOFREGULATION,BUTRATHERARESULTOFTHEKINDOFREGULATIONANALYZEDINTHISWORK,MEANINGTHECOMMANDANDCONTROLREGULATIONTHATOFTENBINDSCOMPANIESTOMAKEENVIRONMENTALINVESTMENTSTHATARENOTPRODUCTIVEINTHECONVENTIONALECONOMICSENSE,ALTHOUGHTHEYAREPRODUCTIVEINTERMSOFENVIRONMENTALQUALITYINADDITION,AND
5、INORDERTOSPECIFYTHEKINDOFCOMPANYTOWHICHTHECONCLUSIONSOFTHISPAPERAREAPPLICABLE,THECHARACTERISTICSOFTHECOMPANIESTHATPARTICIPATEDINPITMAAREANALYZEDCOMPARATIVELYWITHCOMPANIESTHATDIDNOTPARTICIPATEKEYWORDSENVIRONMENTALREGULATIONPOLLUTIONABATEMENTINVESTMENT,PORTERHYPOTHESIS,PRODUCTIVITY2THEORIESABOUTTHEEFF
6、ECTOFENVIRONMENTALREGULATIONONTHEPRODUCTIVITYOFCOMPANIESTHEMOSTGENERALIZEDBELIEFEVIDENTINCONVENTIONALLITERATUREINDICATESTHATENVIRONMENTALREGULATIONIMPROVESTHEOVERALLECONOMICWELLBEINGATTHEEXPENSEOFBUSINESSPRODUCTIVITYTHELITERATURETHATARGUESTHISPOINTOFVIEWAROSEINTHESEVENTIES,APERIODINTHEUNITEDSTATESWH
7、ENAPROCESSOFENVIRONMENTALREGULATIONININDUSTRYCOINCIDEDWITHANOTABLEDECREASEINTHEINDICATORSOFPRODUCTIVITYGROWTH2CHRISTAINSENANDHAVEMAN1981,ANDSUBSEQUENTLYJAFFEETAL1995,PRESENTAREVIEWOFEMPIRICALSTUDIESTHATFINDACAUSALRELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHETWOEVENTSFOREXAMPLE,BARBERAANDMCCONNELL1986,1990,DENISON1979,GOLL
8、OPANDROBERTS1983,GRAY1987,HAVEMANANDCHRISTAINSEN1981,ANDNORSWORTHYETAL1979USEASERIESOFDATAATTHEINDUSTRYLEVELINORDERTODETERMINEWHATPROPORTIONOFTHEDECREASEINTHEGROWTHOFUNITEDSTATESPRODUCTIVITYINDICATORSGENERALLYTOTALFACTORPRODUCTIVITYMAYBEATTRIBUTEDTOTHECOSTSFORCOMPLYINGWITHENVIRONMENTALREGULATIONSINO
9、RDERTOCONSIDERTHEIMPACTOFTHEENVIRONMENTALREGULATIONONTHEPRODUCTIVITYGROWTH,THEMODELSINCLUDE,INADDITIONTOTHECONVENTIONALINPUTSLABOR,CAPITAL,ENERGY,ANDMATERIALS,THEINTENSITYOFTHEENVIRONMENTALREGULATION,EITHERTHROUGHTHEPOLLUTIONABATEMENTINVESTMENTINPUTSORTHROUGHTHEVARIABLEDUMMIESTHATINCLUDETHEEXISTENCE
10、OFSTANDARDSTHATRESTRICTPRODUCTIONTHERESULTSATTRIBUTEAPERCENTAGEDECREASETHATVARIESBETWEEN8AND16PERCENTTOENVIRONMENTALREGULATIONSWHENTHESCOPEOFTHEANALYSESREFERSTOTHETOTALITYORTHEMAJORITYOFTHEMANUFACTURINGSECTORSTHEREISAMUCHMORESIGNIFICANTDIVERGENCEOFRESULTSBETWEENSECTORSTHUS,WHILEA10PERCENTDECREASEINT
11、HEGROWTHOFTHEPRODUCTIVITYINDICATORSISATTRIBUTEDTOENVIRONMENTALREGULATIONSINTHECHEMICALINDUSTRY,THEPERCENTAGERISESTO30PERCENTINTHEPAPERINDUSTRYANDTO44PERCENTFORELECTRICFACILITIESWITHASIMILAROBJECTIVETOPREVIOUSWORKS,GRAYANDSHADBEGIAN1993,1995EXAMINEDATAFROM1979TO1990ATTHEPLANTLEVEL,WHICHDATAREFERTOTHR
12、EEUNITEDSTATESMANUFACTURINGINDUSTRIESPAPER,OIL,ANDSTEELTHERESULTSALSOFINDANEGATIVERELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHECOSTSOFPOLLUTIONREDUCTIONANDTHETOTALFACTORPRODUCTIVITYLEVEL,WHICHISCALCULATEDASTHEDIFFERENCEBETWEENTHEOUTPUTANDTHEWEIGHTEDAVERAGEOFTHREEINPUTSLABOR,MATERIALSANDENERGYEXPENDITURES,ANDCAPITALSTOCKAN
13、OTHEROUTSTANDINGSTUDYWASPERFORMEDBYCONRADANDMORRISON1989,WHICHSTUDYCONSIDERSHOWTHEEMISSIONORDISCHARGESTANDARDS,ANDTHERESULTINGINVESTMENTINPOLLUTIONABATEMENTCAPITALINORDERTOSATISFYTHESESTANDARDS,AFFECTTHEMEASUREMENTOFPRODUCTIVITYGROWTHFORTHEMANUFACTURINGSECTORSOFTHEUS,CANADA,ANDGERMANYTHERESULTSATTRI
14、BUTETHEGREATERRELATIVEDECREASEINUSANDCANADIANPRODUCTIVITY,INCOMPARISONWITHTHEGERMANPRODUCTIVITY,TOTHERESPECTIVEREGULATIONSAPPLIEDDURINGTHESEVENTIESAMONGTHEARGUMENTSTHATWEFINDMOSTOFTENHIGHLIGHTEDINTHELITERATUREFORJUSTIFYINGTHERESULTSINTHEAFOREMENTIONEDWORKSARETHEUSEOFACONVENTIONALPRODUCTIVITYMEASUREM
15、ENTFORMEASURINGTHEIMPACTOFTHEENVIRONMENTALREGULATIONTHEOPPORTUNITYCOSTOFTHEINVESTMENTSDESIGNATEDFORCOMPLIANCEWITHTHEENVIRONMENTALREGULATION,ANDTHEVERYNATUREOFTHEENVIRONMENTALREGULATIONITSELFTHEFIRSTOFTHEARGUMENTSISINCLUDEDINTHEWORKOFJAFFEETAL1995,WHOINDICATETHAT“THEMEASUREDPRODUCTIVITYOFTHEAFFECTEDI
16、NDUSTRYWILLFALLBECAUSEMEASUREDINPUTSOFCAPITAL,LABOR,ANDENERGYAREBEINGDIVERTEDTOTHEPRODUCTIONOFANADDITIONALOUTPUTENVIRONMENTALQUALITYTHATISNOTINCLUDEDINCONVENTIONALMEASURESOFOUTPUTANDHENCEPRODUCTIVITY”INACCORDANCEWITHTHISARGUMENT,REPETTO1990INDICATESTHATECONOMISTSUSEPRODUCTIVITYINDICATORSTHATARESTRIC
17、TLYLIMITEDTOTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHEMARKETEDINPUTSANDOUTPUTSINTHISWAY,3IMPROVEMENTSINPRODUCTIVITYCANONLYBECAPTUREDINTERMSOFTHEVARIATIONSINTHEPRODUCTIONOFOUTPUTSORINTHECONSUMPTIONOFTHEINPUTSTHATAREDIRECTLYQUANTIFIABLEINMONETARYUNITSNEVERTHELESS,LIKESTEWART1993INDICATES,THEBENEFITSOFANAPPROPRIATEENVI
18、RONMENTALREGULATIONDONOTONLYCONSISTOFTHEMONETARYBENEFITS,BUTALSOOFNONMONETARYBENEFITSTHEENJOYMENTOFCLEANAIRORANONDEGRADEDLANDSCAPE,FOREXAMPLEINSPITEOFTHEDRAWBACKSTHATACCOMPANYTHEAPPRAISALOFTHEEXTRAECONOMICBENEFITSANDENVIRONMENTALCOSTS,SOMEAUTHORSPROPOSEINDICATORSTHATALLOWTHESEKINDSOFEXTERNALITIESTOB
19、EINCLUDEDTHESECONDARGUMENTTHATJUSTIFIESTHENEGATIVEEFFECTSONPRODUCTIVITYPOINTSOUTTHEPOSSIBILITYTHATCAPITALINVESTMENTSFORPROTECTINGTHEENVIRONMENTCANBESHIFTEDTOOTHERINVESTMENTSTHATAREDIRECTLYPRODUCTIVEINTHECONVENTIONALSENSEJAFFEETAL,1995THISHYPOTHESISHASBEENCONTRASTEDEMPIRICALLYBYSOMEAUTHORSSUCHASROSE1
20、983,WHOSETIMATESTHATTHEINVESTMENTSINENVIRONMENTALCAPITALREDUCETHEINVESTMENTSINOTHERKINDSOFCAPITAL,ALTHOUGHTHERATIOOFTHEREDUCTIONISLESSTHANONETOONEDENISON1979ANDNORSWORTHYETAL1979ALSOFINDTHATTHEINVESTMENTTARGETEDFOR“NONENVIRONMENTAL”CAPITALDECREASESTOTHEEXTENTTHATTHEINVESTMENTINPOLLUTIONABATEMENTCAPI
21、TALINCREASESGRAYANDSHADBEGIAN1993,1998,NEVERTHELESS,DISAGREEWITHTHEPREVIOUSWORKS,ANDTHEYFINDTHAT,INSOMESECTORSSUCHASTHEPAPERSECTOR,THEREISAPOSITIVECORRELATIONBETWEENTHE“DIRECTLYPRODUCTIVE”INVESTMENTSANDTHOSEINVESTMENTSDIRECTEDATPROTECTINGTHEENVIRONMENTTHERESTOFTHEARGUMENTSPRESENTEDINTHELITERATUREFOR
22、JUSTIFYINGTHENEGATIVEIMPACTOFENVIRONMENTALREGULATIONAREDIRECTLYRELATEDTOTHENATUREOFSAIDREGULATIONINTHISSENSE,FOURASPECTSINPARTICULARHAVEBEENCONSIDEREDRIGIDITY,UNCERTAINTY,PERMISSIVENESS,ANDVOLUNTARISMREGARDINGRIGIDITY,WHICHREFERSTOTHEDEGREETHATTECHNOLOGY,COMPONENTS,ANDSPECIFICMETHODSAREREQUIRED,GRAY
23、ANDSHADBEGIAN1995INDICATETHATTHESAIDRIGIDITYMAYCONSTITUTEANOBSTACLEWHENCHOOSINGTHEOPTIMUMCOMBINATIONOFINPUTSTHISDRAWBACKACQUIRESSPECIALIMPORTANCEWHENTHECOMPLIANCEPERIODISNOTSUFFICIENTLYFLEXIBLEANDWHENNOSUITABLEENVIRONMENTALOFFEREXISTS,GIVENTHATTHEADOPTIONOFNEWCLEANTECHNOLOGIESMAYBECARRIEDOUTBEFORETH
24、ESETECHNOLOGIESARESUFFICIENTLYDEVELOPEDFROMTHEPOINTOFVIEWOFPRODUCTIONEFFICIENCYREGARDINGUNCERTAINTY,ASHFORDETAL1985AFFIRMTHATTHEALLTOOFREQUENTCHANGESINREGULATIONREQUIREMENTSMAYEVENTUALLYFRUSTRATETECHNOLOGICALDEVELOPMENTTHEREASONISFOUNDINTHEFACTTHATCOMPANIESMAINTAINTHEEXPECTATIONOFANEWREGULATION,ANDT
25、HEYPOSTPONETHEINVESTMENTINNEWPLANTSVISCUSI,1983ORTHEDEVELOPMENTOFNEWPRODUCTSHOERGERETAL,1983SOMEAUTHORSALSOFINDAPROBLEMWITHTHEPERMISSIVENESSOFCERTAINENVIRONMENTALREGULATIONSTHATEXEMPTTHEMOSTOBSOLETEPRODUCTIONPLANTSFROMTHEREQUIREMENTSTHISPERMISSIVENESSMAYCAUSESOMELOWPRODUCTIONPLANTSTODELAYINVESTMENTI
26、NNEW,MOREEFFICIENTPLANTSINORDERTOMAINTAINAPRIVILEGEDPOSITIONGRAYANDSHADBEGIAN,1995JAFFEETAL,1995FINALLY,SINCETHEBEGINNINGOFTHENINETIES,EXTENSIVELITERATUREHASEMERGEDTHATANALYZESTHERELATIVEEFFICIENCYOFDIFFERENTENVIRONMENTALINSTRUMENTSACCORDINGTOTHEIRVOLUNTARISMINGENERAL,THEAUTHORSDEDICATEDTOSTUDYINGTH
27、ISQUESTIONESTABLISHABASICDISTINCTIONBETWEENTHECONVENTIONALCOMMANDANDCONTROLAPPROACHANDTHE4MARKETBASEDAPPROACHHAHNANDSTAVINS,1992THECONVENTIONALAPPROACHCONSISTSOFESTABLISHINGPERFORMANCEANDTECHNOLOGYSTANDARDSWITHWHICHINDUSTRYMUSTCOMPLYTHISAPPROACHREPRESENTSTHESOLUTIONTHATPOLICYMAKERSHAVETRADITIONALLYP
28、REFERREDNEVERTHELESS,DUEITSVERYCHARACTERISTICS,ITISMUCHMORERIGIDANDMUCHMOREINCLINEDTOWARDSBOTHUNCERTAINTYANDPERMISIVENESSTHISISTHEREASONWHYMANYAUTHORSPRESENTARGUMENTSTHATAREFAVORABLETOTHEADDITIONALUSEOFMARKETBASEDINSTRUMENTSTHAT,INCONTRASTTOTHETRADITIONALCOMMANDANDCONTROLAPPROACH,USEINCENTIVESYSTEMS
29、THATGRANTINDUSTRYACERTAINFLEXIBILITYINTHEENVIRONMENTALADAPTATIONPROCESSSTEWART1993CONSIDERSFOURKINDSOFINCENTIVEBASEDINSTRUMENTSTHEFIRSTCONSISTSOFESTABLISHINGANENVIRONMENTALTAXORFEES,WHICHFORCEPOLLUTINGCOMPANIESTOPAYTHEGOVERNMENTAUTHORITIESINPROPORTIONTOTHEPOLLUTIONTHATTHEYEMITORTHEENVIRONMENTALDEGRA
30、DATIONTHATTHEYCAUSETHESECONDKINDOFINSTRUMENTISTHETRANSFERABLEPOLLUTIONPERMIT,WHICHPERMITSAREISSUEDORAUCTIONEDBYTHEAUTHORITIESINAQUANTITYCORRESPONDINGTOTHEMAXIMUMPOLLUTIONESTABLISHEDASTHEOBJECTIVEATHIRDENVIRONMENTALREGULATIONINSTRUMENTOFAVOLUNTARYNATURECANBEFOUNDINTHEDEPOSITANDRETURNSYSTEMSTHATAREAPP
31、LICABLETOCERTAINKINDSOFWASTE,ESPECIALLYCONTAINERSFINALLY,STEWART1993CONSIDERSTHEUSEOFINFORMATIONSTRATEGIESASINSTRUMENTSTHATALLOWTHEAUTHORITIESTOMAKECONSUMERSAWAREOFTHEENVIRONMENTALIMPACTOFCERTAINPRODUCTSANDSERVICES,THEREBYPROMOTINGADEMANDFOR“GREEN”PRODUCTSTHATARECAPABLEOFINCENTIVIZINGINDUSTRYTOADOPT
32、ECOLOGICALLYRESPONSIBLEMEASURESJAFFEANDSTAVINS1995,INACCORDANCEWITHTHECONTRIBUTIONSBYBAUMOLANDOATES1988ANDBOHMANDRUSELL1985,SETFORTHTWOPRINCIPALDIMENSIONSINWHICHTHECOMMANDANDCONTROLANDMARKETBASEDAPPROACHESAREDIFFERENTFIRST,MARKETBASEDPOLICIESALLOWACHIEVINGAGIVENLEVELOFENVIRONMENTALPROTECTIONINAMORE“
33、COSTEFFECTIVE”COSTMINIMIZINGWAYTHANTHECONVENTIONALSTANDARDSSECOND,MARKETBASEDSYSTEMSPROVIDECONTINUOUSDYNAMICINCENTIVESFORTHEADOPTIONOFENVIRONMENTALLYSUPERIORTECHNOLOGIES,GIVENTHATTHEYESTABLISHCONDITIONSTHATAREMUCHMOREFAVORABLEFORINVENTIONTHEDEVELOPMENTOFNEWIDEAS,INNOVATIONTHEINCORPORATIONOFTHENEWIDE
34、ASINTOTHEPRODUCTSANDSERVICES,ANDDIFFUSIONAGRADUALPROCESSOFADOPTIONANDUSEOFTHEIMPROVEDPRODUCTSANDSERVICESBYTAKINGINTOACCOUNTTHESEDIFFERENCES,ITISREASONABLETOSUPPOSETHATWHILETHEAPPLICATIONOFACOMMANDANDCONTROLREGULATIONMAYDAMAGETHEPERFORMANCEOFCOMPANIES,THEAPPLICATIONOFAMARKETBASEDREGULATIONESTABLISHES
35、COMPLIANCECONDITIONSTHATNOTONLYDONOTDAMAGETHERESULTSOFTHECOMPANY,BUTRATHERTHEYCOULDEVENIMPROVETHEMNEVERTHELESS,ANDINSPITEOFTHEECONOMICADVANTAGESDERIVEDFROMTHEMARKETBASEDENVIRONMENTALREGULATIONSYSTEMS,ONOCCASIONSSAIDSYSTEMSARERELATIVELYINEFFICIENTATRESTRICTINGCERTAINPOLLUTINGACTIVITIESHANNANDSTAVINS,
36、1992THISPOSESAFUNDAMENTALDILEMMAFORPOLICYMAKERSWHO,INACCORDANCEWITHWUANDBABCOCK1999,MUSTAPPRAISETWOASPECTSIWHETHERORNOTTHEVOLUNTARYAPPROACHISCAPABLEOFPROVIDINGADEQUATEENVIRONMENTALPROTECTIONANDIIWHATLEVELOFEFFICIENCYDOESTHEVOLUNTARYAPPROACHGUARANTEEINCOMPARISONWITHTHECONVENTIONALAPPROACHALTHOUGHTHER
37、EARESTILLNOTENOUGHEMPIRICALSTUDIESTHATALLOWREACHING5GENERALIZEDCONCLUSIONSABOUTTHEBESTENVIRONMENTALPOLICY,THECHANGESTHATENVIRONMENTALREGULATIONSYSTEMSHAVEEXPERIENCEDSINCETHENINETIESINDICATETHATPOLICYMAKERSHAVESTARTEDTOCONTEMPLATETHEUSEOFPERFORMANCEANDTECHNOLOGYSTANDARDSTOGETHERWITHINCENTIVESYSTEMSFO
38、RENVIRONMENTALADAPTATIONTHUS,THEVOLUNTARYAGREEMENTSBETWEENREGULATORSANDPOLLUTERSHAVEBECOMETHEENVIRONMENTALPOLICYTOOLMOSTCOMMONLYUSEDBYTHEMEMBERSTATESOFTHEEUROPEANUNIONSINCETHEBEGINNINGOFTHENINETIESSEGERSONANDMICELI,1998INTHEUNITEDSTATESALSO,AFTERTHEMANDATORYREGULATIONSAPPLIEDINTHESEVENTIES,ENVIRONME
39、NTALPOLICYHASBEENACQUIRINGANATURETHATISBASEDMOREANDMOREONVOLUNTARISMWUANDBABCOCK,1999SINCLAIRDESGAGNANDGABEL,1997NEVERTHELESS,THESEVOLUNTARYAPPROACHESSHOULDBEINTERPRETEDASCOMPLEMENTARYTO,ANDNOTINREPLACEMENTOF,CONVENTIONALAPPROACHESINFACT,LIKEPATON2000POINTSOUT,INTHEABSENCEOFCOERCIVEMEASURESOREXPLICI
40、TLYARTICULATEDMARKETBASEDMEASURES,THEVOLUNTARYINITIATIVESMAYBELESSEFFICIENTTHANTHEMORECONVENTIONALPOLICYALTERNATIVES6译文环境规制对大公司生产的影响以西班牙为例的实证分析摘要这个例子提供了证据以证明投资环境和技术标准的下降是否会降低公司的工作效率。依据面板数据模型进行分析，这些数据主要来自西班牙的53家公司在19901995期间的上市股票交易报价和参与环境保护的资金投入情况，特别是工业和技术环境（PITMA）的情况。一个柯布道格拉斯生产函数是用来联系工作效率与投资治理污染标准之间
41、的关系的。由此产生的负面系数，虽然接近于零，但解释其结果的来源不应只是来源于某些类型的规定，而应该对一种规制的结果进行分析工作，这就意味着从传统的经济意义上来看的公司将环境投资没有生产力这点与别的因素捆绑在一起看待，虽然他们也都是从生产环境的质量的观点出发，提出适合公司特点的详细分析，只是PITMA项目的公司并没有参与其中。关键词环境规制，污染改善投资，波特假说，生产力二、环境规制对于公司生产力影响的理论最广义的概念是在一般文献中描述的环境规制能够从整体上提高整体经济的福利当然以之为代价就是生产效率的降低。70年代的文献中的观点认为，在一段时期内当美国一个工业进行环境的管制，而与此同时，生产率
42、增长的指标明显下降。CHRISTAINSEN和HAVEMAN1981,还有随后的JAFFE（1995）以及很多其他人，均通过实证研究提出论证报告来寻找这两个事物之间的因果关系。这一时期持这种观点的有，BARBERA和MCCONNELL1986,1990，DENSION（1979），GOLLOP和ROBERTS1983,GRAY1987,HAVEMAN和CHRISTAINSEN1981,还有NORSWORTHY（1979）等等，他们使用一系列的数据资料来论证环境规制在减少美国产业水平上的生产率增长起了多大的作用使用一般的全要素生产率指标，这些可能是因为相关公司遵守规定而投入费用。为了研究环境规制
43、对于生产力增长的影响，使用的模型之中除了传统的外来劳动力、资金、能源、原材料、环境规制措施实施力度等之外，还包括为了减轻污染进行的投资或者是通过变量来限制生产效率的提高。结果就是因为环境规制的存在而使得816的生产效率的降低，这个的适用范围在几乎全部或者是大部分生产行业中存在。还有很多具有意义的差异化行业的结论，在化学工业中7造成10的生产率下降，而在造纸行业中则会30下降，在电力行业中则会使生产效率下降44。GRAY和SHADBEGIAN1993,1995通过调查1979年到1990年的计划投入水平，使用三个制造行业的数据（造纸、石油、炼钢）来论证，这些是与以前的文献资料类似的。结果就是找到
44、成本与减少污染排放量之间的负相关关系，这种全要素生产率水平上的差值和输出之间的加权平均数在三个方面得以体现劳动力、原材料与能源支出，还有并的股本。另一个卓有成效的研究是由CONRAD和MORRISON1989做出的，他们的研究方向是如何降低允许排放的标准，并由此产生投资资本的污染减少，来满足这些标准，这影响了美国、加拿大还有德国的大公司生产率的下降标准的测度。这些措施主要是应用于七十年代，使得美国、加拿大的生产效率与德国的生产效率大大降低。我们从各种文献所阐述的观点之中得知上述所有的结论都是从传统生产力测定影响环境管制投资的机会将成倍增长出发的，而非自然环境规制本身。第一种观点的结论包括在JA
45、FFE（1995）等的“生产率表明，因为投入的资金，劳动力，能量还有外部环境的制约等要素都会使企业的生产效率下降。”根据这种观点，REPETTO（1990）提出了，经济学家通过利用生产力指标来研究市场之间的关系，在投入和产出方面的这些关系是被严格限制的。然而，就像STEWART（1993）的文章中表明，舒适的环境所带来的好处不仅能带来货币收益，同时也能带来非货币性的利益例如，清新的空气与没有被污染的外部景观。虽然这个观点还是有缺陷，并不能界定除经济利益以外的好处和环境成本，但是许多的指标表现出，这些外部性的因素已经包含其中了。第二个争论观点证明了环境规制所带来的负面效应，指出对环境保护的投资可
46、能转移到其他投资上面，是对传统生产力的进行判断（JAFFEET1995）。一些学者比如ROSE（1983）提出用实证类比来进行比较，谁的现实环境投资减少而增加其他种类资本的相关投入，虽然肯定会一个比一个少。DENISON（1979）和NORSWORTHY（1979）等还发现，以“不需要美好环境”为投资目标的资本在减少，这表明在一定程度上使改善资本污染环境的投资有所增加。不过，GRAY和SHADBEGIAN（1993,1998）并不同意这些文献的观点。他们认为，在某些领域如本文中所提及的部门中，必有一个正向关联性的“直接生产力”的投资，当然这些投资的目标是针对于保护环境而言的。当前还有其余的文献
47、定义了环境规制的负面效应，这直接关系到自然学说8的规制。在这个意义上，有四个方面是一直都被大家一致认可的力度、不确定性、纵容、自愿性。关于实施力度，所谓的程度，技术、原件，还有具体的措施都是必要的，GRAY和SHADBEGIAN1995的学说表明，在对实施规制的期间对于所说的障碍而选择的投入优化组合的弊端是足够灵活的，但是当没有合适的环境投资存在时，从这些新处理污染的及时的充分发展的角度来看，生产效率是得以提高的。对于不确定性，ASHFORDETAL1985确认所有这些过于频繁的调节机制的变化都有可能是技术的发展受到阻碍。其实这是一个已经成立了的事实，即公司为了遵守新的环境规制的规定，而推迟新
48、计划（VISCUSI,1983）或者是新产品的开发HOERGERETAL,1983。一些文献作者也发现这样的现象，因为某些环境规制条例使得生产工厂去寻找新的机会。这种效应使得一些高产出的工厂推迟新的更有效率的计划以维持其固有的行业垄断特权地位GRAYANDSHADBEGIAN,1995JAFFEETAL,1995最后，从九十年代开始的大量文献，依据他们的权利意识赖论证，并分析了不同环境的相对结构。总的来说，学者们大多致力于研究建立在传统区分基本指导和控制方法还有市场化的方式这个问题上（如HAHN和STAVINS,1992）。传统的方法包括建立必须遵守的性能指标和技术工业标准。这种具有代表性的解
49、决方法，被政策制定者还有那些拥有丰富经验者优先使用。然而，由于他本身具有明显特点还有实施过程严格和更大的不确定性和具有倾向性的许可性。这就是为什么那么多提出的论点，在与传统的指导和控制方法比较中，会用激励的机制给予一些行业一些弹性环境适应过程，这有利于政府使用另外的以市场为基础的工具。STEWART（1993）认为有四种具有诱导性的工具能进行指导。第一个是建立绿色税收或绿色费用制度，就会迫使污染企业向政府或者是有关部门为自己的污染买单。第二种工具是由拥有许可证发证的主管部门在进行审核后对污染排放权的批准或者是拍卖，当然这是以减少污染排放为目标的。第三个为资源性的环境管制工具，使用存款监管系统，可以减少出现各种形式的浪费，这被发现是行之有效的，不过主要是针对于污染企业。最后，STEWART1993认为当局利用信息舆论作为工具，可以是消费者的环境保护意识提高从而影响一定的产品和服务意识，比如让学生要求“绿色环保”的产品，能对工业生产而采取有一定的物质刺激的有利于生态环境的措施。JAFFE和STAVINS1995,依照BAUMOL和OATES1988还有BOHM和RUSELL（1985）都为这个观点所做出的贡献，提出在两个主要的维度上，指导与9控制市场化的方法是不尽相同的。首先，以市场为导向的政策能够使环境保护的措施在给定水平上更划算（减少花费），不过这是与传统标准相
