1、“专利投机者”或“市场创造者”？非专利实施实体的实证分析Sannu K. ShresthaNPEs 公司(NPEs)很少或从不实施他们的专利，将注意力集中在获得许可使用费。NPEs 可能有自己专利的发明或购买其他发明家的专利。NPEs 在过去几年一直存在许多争议。有些公司的评论者为他们贴上“专利投机者”的标签,宣称他们使用虚弱的和模糊的专利提取过分的许可费或者为轻微的侵权对制造商提起诉讼。另一方面, NPEs 和他们的支持者 声称这些公司通过给独立发明家提供资金以及在技术信息中创造一个有效率的贸易市场来提高创新能力和竞争能力。这篇文章使用从美国专利和商标局(PTO)获得的专利数据和来自斯坦福法
2、学院的知识产权诉讼票据交易所(IPLC)侵权诉讼信息来测试一些观点和反对 NPEs 的理由来决定是否这些公司利于或伤害创新。介绍2001 年，NTP 股份有限公司，一个小维吉尼亚公司，控告黑莓装置的制造商 RIM 在五个有关电子邮件的专利方面侵权。 1专利方面的问题是授予 NTP的创始人之一 Thomas J. Campana，但是该公司没有专利诉讼方面的经历。 2地区法庭认为 RIM 有侵权的嫌疑，下令该公司支付 5370 万美元的损失，并且授予 NTP 一个永久的禁令，保留上诉，这可能使 RIM 关闭它黑莓的电子邮件服务。 3尽管 RIM 将案件上诉到美国联邦法院，并且挑战美国专利和商标局
3、（PTO）的正确性，其最终尝试都是不成功的。 4面对禁令对其业务带来的可能的破坏，RIM 在 2006 年 3 月解决了诉讼，并同意支付 NTP6.125 亿美元来交换后者专利使用许可权利。 51 See Complaint at 2, NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 2d 423 (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 3:01CV767); Michelle Kessler, High Court Refuses to Hear BlackBerry-Maker Case, USA Today, Jan. 24, 2
4、006, at 1A.2 See Teresa Riordan, Patents; A Canadian Company Appeals in Court for the Right to Keep Selling Blackberries in the U.S., N.Y. Times, June 7, 2004, at C2 (“NTP does not make anything from the patents.”).3 NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., No. 3:01CV767, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26837,
5、at *1*3, *5 (E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2003).4 See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 132526 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding the case back to the district court);NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 2d 785, 78689 (E.D. Va. 2005) (describ
6、ing RIMs efforts to challenge validity of NTP patents before the PTO and refusing to stay remand proceedings pending PTO reexamination).5 Yuki Noguchi, Patent Dispute Is Settled, Wash. Post, Mar. 4, 2006, at A1.轰动的处理引发了一场批评 NTP 的风暴，为原本已经很激烈的有关 NPEs公司扮演的角色的争论火上浇油。 6NPEs 是很少或从不实践他们的专利、关注收入而不是许可使用费的公司。
7、NPEs 可能已经把这些发明作为自己的专利，或者可能已经从发明者手中买下了专利。 7批评家已经为 NPEs 贴上了“专利蟑螂”的标签，并且宣称他们使用微弱的模糊的专利来威胁产品制造商、提取过高的许可费、提起诉讼。 8另一方面，这些公司和他们的支持者宣称 NPEs 通过为独立发明人提供资本、在技术信息中创造一个有效率的市场来提高创新和竞争。 96 See, e.g., Ian Austen William M. Bulkeley, Aggressive Patent Litigants Pose Growing Threat to Big Business, Wall St. J., Sept.
8、 14, 2005, at A1 (same). The tone of the criticism was also unusually vituperative, with onecommentator comparing NPEs to “patent system bottom feeders.” Patent QualityImprovement, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, Jason Kirby, Patent Troll or Producer?, Fin. Post, Jan. 14, 2006,
9、available at http:/www.financial (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Companies who do the costly grunt work of actually developing and marketing new technologies are being held ransom by tiny outfits whose only assets are kooky and vague patents . . . .”); Joe Beyers, Rise of the Patent Trolls
10、, CNET N, Oct. 12, 2005, at http:/ 5892996.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Patent Trolls seek to quietly acquire significant patent portfolios with the intent of threatening lengthy and costly patent infringement lawsuits against operating companies.”); Maggie Shiels, TechnologyIndustr
11、y Hits Out at Patent Trolls, BBC News, June 2, 2004, at http:/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3722509.stm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“An added problem isthe growth of so called patent trolls who can be likened to modern day highwayrobbers . . . .”).9 See, e.g., Spencer Hosie, Patent Trolls
12、 and the New Tort Reform: A PractitionersPerspective, 4 I/S: J.L. James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: AnAlternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 Emory L.J. 189,190 (2006) (“Patent trolls provide liquidity, market clearing, and increased efficiency t
13、othe patent marketsthe same benefits securities dealers supply capital markets.”); MarcMorgan, Stop Looking Under the Bridge for Imaginary Creatures: A Comment ExaminingWho Really Deserves the Title Patent Troll, 17 Fed. Cir. B.J. 165, 165 (2008) (“Manylegitimate businesses play a positive role by e
14、ncouraging innovation, increasing liquidity,and providing market clearing.”).关注 NPEs 引起司法机关和国会的强烈反应。在一个被广泛认为是为了遏制 NPEs 滥用权力的行为的决定中,美国最高法院抛弃了联邦巡回法院 20 年来在侵权救济的先例 ,为申请禁止侵权建立新的指南. 10国会也已经表现出对 NPEs 所扮演角色的关心，目前正在考虑多项专利改革法案 11，如果付诸实施，将会导致美国专利系统自从 1952 年专利法案以来最大的变化。 12这些改革努力一直伴随学者之间有关 NPES的优点和缺点的激烈辩论。 13支持
15、者和反对者简述了 NPEs 可能会伤害或促进创新的各种途径，但是他们的论据绝大部分是理论，并且只被轶事类的证据所支持。 14考虑到专利改革带来的深远意义和 NPE 争10 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); see also SteveSeidenberg, Troll Control: The Supreme Courts eBay Decision Sets Back Pesky PatentTrolls or American Innovation, Depending Upon Which Side Y
16、oure On, A.B.A. J., Sept.2006, at 51, 52 (discussing ramifications of the eBay case).11 See Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006); Patents Depend onQuality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. (2006); Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795,109th Cong. (2005); see also infra Part I.C (d
17、iscussing proposed legislative reform of U.S.patent system).12 See McDonough, supra note 9, at 195 (describing Patent Reform Act of 2005 as “the most substantial legislative reform to the patent system since 1952”).13 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licen
18、ses, Patent Pools,and Standard Setting, in 1 Innovation Policy and the Economy 119, 125 (Adam B. Jaffe etal. eds., 2001) hereinafter Shapiro, Patent Thicket (noting burden on manufacturersfrom improperly granted patents). But see Vincenzo Denicol o et al., Revisiting InjunctiveRelief: Interpreting e
19、Bay in High-Tech Industries with Non-Practicing Patent Holders, 4 J.Competition L. John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 2111, 2116 (2007)(questioning conclusion of Lemley b)向制造商索要许可23 547 U.S. 388 (2006).费用增加了产品的成本；c）恶化了专利问题，使问题错综复杂。本节依次探讨了每个言论，并阐明了他们的优势和劣势。a.NPEs 使用劣
20、势专利来从事轻佻的诉讼。其中一个对NPEs 最突出的批评是获取薄弱和模糊的专利，并使用他们来进行毫无根据的诉讼。 24批评者认为 NPEs 带来的没有价值的侵权诉讼不仅仅压倒了法律制度, 也使产品制造商花费宝贵的时间和资源来捍卫侵权索赔，进而抬高生产成本。 25此外，他们认为通过恶劣的诉讼抬高目标公司的生产成本，NPEs 增加了商品的成本，因为他们的目标公司将增加的成本转嫁给了消费者。 26作为证据，他们指出公司的立场，公司不得不抵御 NPEs 带来的法律诉讼。 27举例来说，Jay Monaham，易趣的副总法律顾问，被引述说：NPE 的法律诉讼已经抬高了易趣的成本，他们把时间和资源转向建设
21、世界上最大的电子商务平台。大量的钱花费在聘请律师上，对内部法律人员，工程师和各级生产工作人员都有影响。我们已经对这一点进行大力辩护，如果你们这样下去，我们将不会支付赎金。 2824 See Chuang, supra note 16, at 232 (“Because of a patent trolls approach to generating revenue, a trolls charges of infringement and litigation can often be baseless and thus clog the legal system.” (citation o
22、mitted); see also Hosie, supra note 9, at 78 (“Perhaps the most common refrain in the patent debate is that plaintiffs will bring frivolous cases to extort unjustified settlements.”); Kirby, supra note 8 (“Critics argue that patent trolls, or patent holders who threaten companies with costly court b
23、attles unless theyre offered licensing fees, are a serious threat to legitimate businesses.”); Beyers, supra note 8 (“Patent trolls seek to quietly acquire significant patent portfolios with the intent of threatening lengthy and costly patent infringement lawsuits against operating companies.”).25 C
24、huang, supra note 16, at 234 (“For many companies, dealing with patent trolls is simply a business expense that drives up costs by diverting time and resources away from business development.” (citation omitted).26 Id. at 235 (arguing NPE lawsuits result in a “hidden tax” on software products);Davis
25、, supra note 8, at 438 (noting patent trolls “drive up the price of new consumer technology because manufacturing corporations . . . often pass the costs of royalty payments and patent litigation along to consumers”).27 See, e.g., Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts: Lets Build a PIT to C
26、atch the Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. J.L. Gwendolyn G. Ball Patent Freedom, Current Research: Litigations Over Time, at https:/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2009) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting NPEs initiated about twelve percent of all infringement suits in 2008).33 Colleen V. Chien, Of Tro
27、lls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 1571, 1572, 1600 (2009).实践自己专利的公司占了专利诉讼案的 76%。 34这些估计表明了NPE 诉讼在所有侵权诉讼中所占比例较小，因此可以怀疑 NPE诉讼是否造成了这个国家的企业的显著的成本的增加。最后，NPE 发起的诉讼的一个统计结果,这个结果在文中第三部分 C.出现，它表明了 NPEs 获胜率与通常的侵权原告没有显著的差异。 35这表明对 N
28、PE 毫无根据的诉讼声明应该持怀疑态度。b、NPEs 从制造商那边提取高额的许可费用来抬高产品成本。另一个对 NPEs 的控告是他们从产品生产商那边提取高额的许可费用提高了商品的价格。 36批评人指出类似 NTP 有限公司的情况，并且宣称高昂的特许费用和审判后支付给 NPEs 的费用使那些通过涨价的形式将成本转嫁给消费者的厂商蒙受巨大的损失。37然而，这种观点仅仅从整体上对专利系统做出了回应。美国的专利系统通过使他们的发明在一段有限的时间内保持垄断来回报发明者。 38因此，专利通常有垄断所拥有的效率降低的特点。 39从理34 Id. at 1600.35 See infra Part III.
29、C, Table 5 (comparing success rate of NPEs and plaintiffs from random sample).36 See, e.g., FTC, Innovation Report, supra note 7, ch. 3, at 40 (“Commentators have also observed that companies seeking to hold up rivals can set the licensing fees below thecost of litigation, including the managerial d
30、istraction, so as to make the taking of a licensethe only economically sensible alternative, regardless of the strength of the patent.”);Davis, supra note 8, at 438 (“Patent trolls licensing practices drive up the price of new consumer technology because manufacturing corporations forced to take lic
31、enses on atrolls patents often pass the costs of royalty payments and patent litigation along toconsumers.”).37 See, e.g., Lemley Chuang, supra note 16, at 235 (“End users of software products are subjected to a hidden tax on software technology of companies that have been targeted bypatent trolls.”
32、).38 U.S. Const. art. I, 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress power to “promote the progress ofscience and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusiveright to their respective writings and discoveries”).39 See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23
33、J. LegalStud. 247, 248 (1994) (“Since patent law gives the patentee the power to exclude others论上看，一个特殊的发明的专利是否属于一个 NPE 类型的或者一个整合的公司没有什么区别，例如，一个同时进行产品研发和制造的公司，因为后者可能会收取比最优福利价格更高的最大垄断价格。 40一些学者已经注意到，NPEs 构成了一项特殊的危险：在制造商已经投资开发和营销所谓的侵权产品的时候，他们控告制造商侵权。 41面对因为一项禁令而失去所有的投资前景，制造商可能同意支付高昂的许可使用费，然后以更高的价格转嫁给消
34、费者。 42NPEs 相对于垂直整合公司更可能会从事这样的战略，因为，不像后者，一个 NPE 类型的公司不利用自己的发明，也不会生产产品。43制造商基于专利技术生产的公司可以用它的发明来从产品中获得利润。因此，这样的公司相对于 NPE 有更少的动机来等待其他的制造商来侵犯其专利权，然后提起诉讼。 44另外，即使另一方侵犯from practicing the invention, a monopoly may be created, leading to restriction ofproduction, a supracompetitive price, and what economist
35、s call an efficiency ordeadweight loss.”).40 See id. at 250 (discussing “economic rents” received by patentee when it creates product based on its patent).41 See Lemley Shapiro,Patent Thicket, supra note 13, at 125 (discussing danger of infringement litigation in context of the “holdup” problem).42
36、See Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup, supra note 13, at 1993 (“Royalty overcharges act as a tax on new products incorporating the patented technology, thereby impeding rather than promoting innovation.”). The authors cite the BlackBerry case as an example of this effect. Id. at 2009. It is important
37、to note, however, that royalty payments to NPEs will not always raise the prices of the affected products. For example, in a competitive product market, the manufacturer may be hesitant to raise prices for fear of losing market share. In this case, there would simply be a shift of surplus from the m
38、anufacturer to the NPE and consumers would be unaffected.See Daniel J. McFeely, An Argument for Restricting the Patent Rights of Those Who Misuse the U.S. Patent System to Earn Money Through Litigation, 40 Ariz. St. L.J. 289, 297 (2008) (“In many cases, patent trolls operate as intellectual property
39、 or patent holding companies, purposefully acquiring patents for which they then seek to findinfringers.”).43 See Daniel J. McFeely, An Argument for Restricting the Patent Rights of Those Who Misuse the U.S. Patent System to Earn Money Through Litigation, 40 Ariz. St. L.J. 289, 297 (2008) (“In many cases, patent trolls operate as intellectual property or patent holding companies, purposefully acquiring patents for which they then seek to findinfringers.”).44 The problem of the stranded manufacturer can occur even without a deliberate “wait and see” approach to
