1、外文翻译CORPORATERESTRUCTURINGMATERIALSOURCEHTTP/SPRINGERLIBTSINGHUAEDUCNAUTHORGIULIANOIANNOTTATHEHOLDOUTPROBLEMWHENCLAIMANTSAREUNABLETOFINDANAGREEMENT,THEYMIGHTNOTAPPROVETHERESTRUCTURINGPLAN,EVENWHENTHISWILLPRODUCEASUBOPTIMALOUTCOME,SUCHASALIQUIDATIONWHICHWILLWASTETHEVALUEOFTHEFIRM“ASAGOINGCONCERN”ORAF
2、ORMALBANKRUPTCYPROCEDUREWHICHISMOREEXPENSIVEANDPOSSIBLYLEADSTOINFERIORRESULTFORCREDITORSTHISISTHEHOLDOUTPROBLEMTHELIKELIHOODOFAPPROVALOFTHERESTRUCTURINGPLANWILLDEPENDONSEVERALFACTORS,SUCHASTHENUMBERANDSOPHISTICATIONOFTHECLAIMANTS,THERELATIVECOSTOFTHEPLANRELATIVETOOTHERSOLUTIONS,ETCFOREXAMPLE,INTHEPR
3、ESENCEOFMANYSMALLBONDHOLDERSITMIGHTBEVERYDIFFICULTTOGETTHERESTRUCTURINGPLANAPPROVED,ASSOMEOFTHEMMIGHTBELIEVETHEYWILLBEBETTEROFFNOTAPPROVINGTHEPROPOSEDPLANINOTHERTERMS,WHENTHEREISPUBLICDEBTIE,BONDSOUTSTANDINGTHEHOLDOUTPROBLEMCANBEPARTICULARLYSEVERESCALEDOWN,MATURITYEXTENSION,ORDEBTFOREQUITYSWAPMIGHTB
4、EVERYDIFFICULTIFEVERYBONDHOLDERHASTOAGREETOTHETERMCHANGESCONSIDERFOREXAMPLEANEXCHANGEOFFERWHEREOUTSTANDINGDEBTISEXCHANGEDWITHEQUITYDEBTFOREQUITYSWAPINOTHERWORDS,CREDITORSTAKEOVERTHEDISTRESSEDFIRMINSUCHASITUATION,THEBONDHOLDERSWHODONOTTENDERMIGHTBENEFITATTHEEXPENSEOFTHOSEWHODOSUPPOSETHEFIRMSASSETVALU
5、EIS100,WITHPUBLICDEBTOUTSTANDINGFOR12010BONDHOLDERS,EACHHOLDINGONEBONDWITHFACEVALUE12THEFIRMSASSETLIQUIDATIONVALUEISONLY80THEREISTHEREFOREANINCENTIVETOKEEPTHEFIRMDOINGBUSINESSSUPPOSETHEEXCHANGEOFFERISCONTINGENTONACHIEVINGA50TENDERINGRATEIFALLBONDHOLDERSTENDER,THEFIRMWILLHAVETHEBALANCESHEETREPORTEDIN
6、TABLE101THEVALUETOEACHBONDHOLDERWILLBE10,WITHALOSSOF2UNDERLIQUIDATIONEACHBONDHOLDERSWOULDRECEIVEJUST8NOWSUPPOSETHATONLYFIVEBONDHOLDERSTENDERTHEEXCHANGEOFFERWOULDSUCCEED,BUTTHEFIVE“HOLDOUT”BONDHOLDERSWILLBEBETTEROFFINDEED,THEBALANCESHEETOFTHEFIRMWOULDBETHATREPORTEDINTABLE102THEFIVEHOLDOUTBONDHOLDERSW
7、ILLSTILLHAVEONEBONDEACH,WITHFACEVALUE12INCONTRASTTHEFIVETENDERINGBONDHOLDERSWOULDEACHRECEIVEEQUITYWORTH8,WHICHCORRESPONDSTOTHELIQUIDATIONVALUEOFCOURSE,RATIONALBONDHOLDERSWILLANTICIPATETHISOUTCOME,ANDNONEOFTHEMWILLTENDERTHEEXCHANGEOFFERWILLFAIL,UNLESSTHEBONDHOLDERSAREABLETOCOORDINATETHESUCCESSOFTHEEX
8、CHANGEOFFERALSODEPENDSONTHEDIFFERENCEBETWEENTHEFIRMVALUE“ASAGOINGCONCERN”ANDUNDERLIQUIDATIONASWEWILLSEEINTHENEXTSECTION,THINGSCANBECOMEEVENMORECOMPLEXWHENOTHERCLASSESOFCREDITORSAREINVOLVEDPRIVATEANDPUBLICDEBTABENEFITOFBORROWINGFROMBANKSISTHATPRIVATEDEBTISMUCHEASIERTORESTRUCTUREINFINANCIALDISTRESSTHA
9、NPUBLICDEBTINDEEDBANKSARESOPHISTICATEDANDNORMALLYFEWERTHANBONDHOLDERSHOWEVER,SINCEBANKLENDERSAREUSUALLYSECURED,THEYHAVELITTLEINCENTIVETOMAKECONCESSIONSWHENAFIRMALSOHASUNSECUREDPUBLICDEBTOUTSTANDINGBANKSAREGENERALLYLIMITEDINTHEIRSTOCKHOLDINGSINNONFINANCIALFIRMS,WITHAREMARKABLEEXCEPTIONINCASEOFFINANCI
10、ALDISTRESSINMANYJURISDICTIONSWHETHERABANKWILLDECIDETOTAKEANEQUITYPOSITIONINAFINANCIALLYDISTRESSEDFIRM,WILLDEPENDONSEVERALVARIABLESAGAINTHECOSTOFRESTRUCTURINGRELATIVETOLIQUIDATION,BUTALSOTHEAMOUNTOFPUBLICDEBTANDTHEBONDHOLDERSWILLINGNESSTORESTRUCTURETHEIRCLAIMSTOUNDERSTANDHOWTHEFINANCINGMIXMIGHTAFFECT
11、THEOUTCOMEOFTHERESTRUCTURINGPROCESSCONSIDERAVERYSIMPLEMODEL2FIG102AMODELOFDISTRESSRESOLUTIONATTIME0AFIRMISINFINANCIALDISTRESSASDEBTOUTSTANDINGD120ISLARGERTHANBOTHTHELIQUIDATIONVALUEK80ANDTHEVALUEASGOINGCONCERNM100LIQUIDATIONISNOTNECESSARILYTHEOPTIMALSOLUTIONASTHEVALUE“ASAGOINGCONCERN”ISHIGHERTHANLIQ
12、UIDATIONLETSCALLTHISDIFFERENCE“GROWTHPOTENTIAL”NOWSUPPOSETHATMANAGEMENT/SHAREHOLDERSPROPOSETORESTRUCTUREDEBTBYEXTENDINGTHEMATURITYTOTIME1THEFIRMCANUNDERTAKETWOALTERNATIVEPROJECTSAASAFEPROJECTTHATWILLPRODUCEACASHFLOWEQUALTO100WITHOUTUNCERTAINTYANDBARISKYPROJECTWHICHMIGHTRESULTIN300OR0WITHEQUALPROBABI
13、LITYNOTETHATTHERISKYPROJECTISNOTINEFFICIENTASTHEEXPECTEDVALUEIS150WITHRISK,WHILETHEEXPECTEDCASHFLOWOFTHESAFEPROJECTISONLY100WITHNORISKFIGURE102PROVIDETHETIMESTRUCTUREOFTHEMODELWITHOUTSPECIFYINGTHECOMPOSITIONOFDEBTITISCLEARTHATCREDITORSWILLFORCELIQUIDATION,LOSINGTHEGROWTHPOTENTIALINDEED,IFTHEYACCEPTT
14、HEMATURITYEXTENSION,MANAGERS/SHAREHOLDERSWILLOPTFORTHERISKYPROJECT,WHICHINTURNISSUBOPTIMALTOCREDITORSTABLE103,REPORTSTHEPAYOFFTOCREDITORSANDSHAREHOLDERSUNDERTHETWOPROJECTSIFCREDITORSACCEPTTORESTRUCTURETHEDEBTBYEXTENDINGTHEMATURITY,MANAGERS/SHAREHOLDERSCANKEEPRUNNINGTHEFIRMIFTHEYCHOOSETHESAFEPROJECT,
15、THEPAYOFFTOCREDITORSWILLBE100MORETHANLIQUIDATION,WHILESHAREHOLDERSWILLRECEIVENOTHINGINCONTRAST,IFTHERISKYPROJECTISUNDERTAKEN,THEEXPECTEDPAYOFFTOCREDITORSISONLY60LESSTHANLIQUIDATIONWHILESHAREHOLDERSEXPECTEDPAYOFFIS90ITISTHEREFORERATIONALFORSHAREHOLDERSTOCHOOSETHERISKYPROJECTCREDITORSWILLANTICIPATETHE
16、SHAREHOLDERSINCENTIVE,THUSREJECTINGTHERESTRUCTURINGPROPOSALANDFORCINGLIQUIDATIONITISANUNDERINVESTMENTPROBLEM,ASTHEFIRMISLIQUIDATEDEVENIFKEEPINGITONBUSINESSWOULDGENERATEMOREVALUETHEREALLIFEINTUITIONISSIMPLECREDITORSDONOTACCEPTCHANGESINTERMS,ASTHEYBELIEVETHATMANAGERS/SHAREHOLDERSWILLGO“FORBROKE”SINCET
17、HEYHAVE“NOTHINGTOLOOSE”ANALTERNATIVETOLIQUIDATIONISTHEUSEOFSOMESORTOF“EQUITYKICKER”EG,CONVERTIBLEBONDSORWARRANTSWHICHALIGNTHEINCENTIVEOFSHAREHOLDERSWITHTHATOFCREDITORSFOREXAMPLE,SUPPOSETHATCREDITORSAREOFFERED60OFTHEEQUITYPAYOFFCASHFLOWLESSDEBTINADDITIONTOTHEIRCREDITUNDERTHISAGREEMENT,CREDITORSWOULDG
18、ET114WITHTHERISKYPROJECTVERSUS100WITHTHESAFEPROJECTDEPENDINGONTHEIRRISKAPPETITETHEYMIGHTPREFERTHERISKYPROJECTASTHESHAREHOLDERSDOTABLE104REPORTSTHEPAYOFFSWITHANEQUITYKICKERSUPPOSETHATCREDITORSARENOTWILLINGTOACCEPTANYEQUITYKICKERBECAUSETHERISKYPROJECTISINEFFICIENTFOREXAMPLE,THERISKYPROJECTWOULDBECLEAR
19、LYINEFFICIENTIFTHERESULTINGCASHFLOWCOULDBEEITHER140OR0WITHEQUALPROBABILITYTABLE105SHOWSTHEPAYOFFTOSHAREHOLDERSANDCREDITORSUNDERTHISASSUMPTIONEVENWITHA100EQUITYKICKERIE,CREDITORSGET100OFTHEEQUITYPAYOFFCREDITORSWOULDSTILLPREFERTHESAFEPROJECTSINCESHAREHOLDERSWOULDOPTFORTHERISKYONE,CREDITORSWOULDFORCELI
20、QUIDATIONALTERNATIVELY,CREDITORSMIGHTCONSIDERTOTAKEOVERTHEFIRMIE,ACCEPTINGADEBTFOREQUITYSWAP,INWHICHCASETHEYCOULDUNDERTAKETHESAFEPROJECTREALIZINGTHEGROWTHPOTENTIALTHATWOULDBETHEOUTCOMEIFTHEDEBTSTRUCTUREISCOMPOSEDBYASINGLENONNAIVELENDERIE,ABANKORAGROUPOFBANKSALSO,IFTHEWHOLEDEBTOUTSTANDINGISPUBLICIEBO
21、NDSTHEDEBTFOREQUITYSWAPWOULDBEAFEASIBLEOUTCOME,PROVIDEDTHEHOLDOUTPROBLEMISRESOLVEDANINVESTMENTBANKMIGHTHELP,ASWEWILLSEEINTHENEXTSECTIONHOWEVER,THINGSAREMORECOMPLEXWHENTHEDEBTCOMPOSITIONISMIXEDIFDBDB,IE,MDBUTINTHISCASEEXTERNALFINANCEWOULDBEFEASIBLE,THUSVIOLATINGTHEDEFINITIONOFDISTRESSONLYIFPUBLICDEBT
22、HOLDERSSCALEDOWNTHEIRCLAIMSTOO,THEBANKWILLACCEPTTHEOFFERIFITISIMPOSSIBLETORESTRUCTURETHEPUBLICDEBTDUETOTHEHOLDOUTPROBLEM,THEBANKWILLNEVERACCEPTEQUITYINEXCHANGEFORITSUNIMPAIREDSECUREDCLAIMCONSIDERANUMERICALEXAMPLESUPPOSEDB30,DP90,ANDK80THEBANKDEBTISUNIMPAIREDDB30DB30IFITISIMPOSSIBLETOCONVINCETHEBONDH
23、OLDERS,THEFIRMISLIQUIDATEDTHISMODELTRIESTOEXPLAINWHATHAPPENSINTHEREALLIFEJAMES1995EMPIRICALLYINVESTIGATESWHICHFACTORSAFFECTTHELIKELIHOODTHATABANKTAKESEQUITYINEXCHANGEFORSOMECONCESSIONOFPRINCIPALHEFINDSTHATTHISLIKELIHOODINCREASESWITHTHEMARKETTOBOOKVALUERATIOWHICHISAPROXYOFGROWTHPOTENTIAL,WITHTHEDEBTT
24、OASSETRATIO,ANDWHENPUBLICDEBTHOLDERSALSOACCEPTEQUITYINCONTRASTTHEPROBABILITYTHATBANKSACCEPTEQUITYDECREASESWITHTHEWEIGHTOFPUBLICDEBTTOTOTALDEBTCONCLUSIONTHISCHAPTERHASDESCRIBEDTHEMAINRESTRUCTURINGTRANSACTIONSRESTRUCTURINGISUSUALLYASSOCIATEDTOACONDITIONOFFINANCIALDISTRESS,BUTISNOTNECESSARILYSOINDEED,A
25、FIRMMIGHTUNDERTAKEARESTRUCTURINGTRANSACTIONSIMPLYTOENHANCEVALUECREATIONORTOPREVENTASITUATIONOFDISTRESSINADISTRESSCONDITIONTHEREAREMAINLYTWOALTERNATIVESEITHERRESTRUCTURINGORLIQUIDATION,BOTHOFWHICHCANBEREALIZEDEITHERWITHAFORMALBANKRUPTCYPROCEDUREORWITHANOUTOFCOURTWORKOUTWORKOUTSARENORMALLYLESSEXPENSIV
26、EANDTHEREFORESHOULDBEPREFERREDTOFORMALPROCEDURESNONETHELESS,ITOFTENHAPPENSTHATDIFFERENTCLAIMANTSOFTHEDISTRESSEDCOMPANYCANNOTFINDANAGREEDSOLUTIONASARESULTTHEONLYSOLUTIONISGOINGTOCOURTTHESOLUTIONOFADISTRESSEDSITUATIONNORMALLYINVOLVESRESTRUCTURINGTHEFIRMSDEBTCONTRACTSINVESTMENTBANKCANPLAYANIMPORTANTROL
27、EINDEBTRESTRUCTURING,BYCOORDINATINGTHEDIFFERENTCLAIMANTSANDCERTIFYINGTHEQUALITYOFTHEPROPOSEDRESTRUCTURINGPLANALSOTHEASSETSIDEOFAFIRMCANBERESTRUCTUREDBESIDEDIVESTURESIE,SALEOFASUBSIDIARYORDIVISION,THETYPICALASSETRESTRUCTURINGISASTOCKBREAKUPSTOCKBREAKUPSCONSISTINSEPARATINGASUBSIDIARYORADIVISIONFROMTHE
28、PARENTCOMPANYWITHTHEPURPOSEOFCREATINGVALUETOTHEPARENTSSHAREHOLDERSBYMEANSOFENHANCEDINFORMATIONORBETTERMANAGERIALINCENTIVESTHEEXTANTEMPIRICALEVIDENCESUGGESTSTHATSTOCKBREAKUPSDOCREATEVALUE译文企业重组资料来源HTTP/SPRINGERLIBTSINGHUAEDUCN作者詹姆斯兰诺抵抗问题当申索人无法达成共识，他们可能不批准重组计划,即使这将产生一个最优的结果,如清算会浪费企业的价值“为赢利”或者是一个正式的破产程
29、序这更贵,并可能导致劣质的结果给债权人这是在抵抗问题。重组计划批准的可能性将取决于几个因素,如申请人的数量和完善程度,计划的成本相对于其他的解决方案等。例如，在许多小债券持有人中存在可能很难获得批准的重组计划，因为其中有些人可能会相信不批准拟议计划他们也会好起来的。在其他方面，当有公共债务（即债券）突出坚持自己的问题尤其严重。缩小，到期延长或债务换股权掉期可能会很困难，如果每一个债券持有人不得不同意将长期变化。例如，考虑一个交换要约在未偿债务与股权交换（债务换股权掉期）换言之，债权人接管困难的企业。在这种情况下，债券持有人谁不同意那些开销可能会受益于那些同意的股东。假设公司的资产价值为100美
30、元，同时等同于120美元的公共债务余额（10美元债券，每持有一份等于债券面值12美元）。该公司的资产清算价值只有80元有一个诱因，因此该公司继续营业。假设汇率价格必须达到50的招标率队伍。如果所有债券持有人招标，该公司将拥有资产负债表内表中报告。每个股东的价值将以10,造成的损失2欧元在清算时，每个公司债券存根簿上载明只有8欧元会收到。现在,假设只有五个股东交流提供成功,但是五个“抵抗”股东就不会不好。事实上,资产负债表的报告将会报告在102表。五个债权没有的人仍然会每个人有一个债券面值12欧元，相比之下,那5个新的债权持有人将每个人收到股权价值8欧元的清算价值。当然,公司债券持有人已经合理预
31、计这个结果,没有人会妥协。交流提供将失败,除非债券持有人能够去合作。有很高的能协调。成功的交流的提议之间的差异还取决于公司价值”因为赢利”在清算。当我们在下一个部分中所见到的,事情会变得更复杂其它类型的简单债权人参与。私人和公共债务向银行借钱的其中一个利益是在财政危机时私人债务比公共债务更容易重组。事实上银行是复杂的和通常少于债券持有人。然而,由于银行贷方通常有担保的,他们有足够的动力来作出让步当一个公司也已无担保的公开债务。银行通常在债权上也被那些公共事业单位限制,以一种显然例外万一财政危机在很多辖区。银行将决定是否采取产权位置在经济上的资助财政危机的公司,将取决于一些因素再次重组的成本关于
32、清算,而且相对于公共债务的金额和债券持有人有意愿去重组他们的公司。理解这样的融资组合的结果能影响结构调整的过程考虑一个非常简单的类型2。在时间0一公司作为财务危机未偿债务（D_120）均大于清算值（K80），和持续经营（M100）值。清算在价值上不一定是最佳的解决方案，持续经营价值比清算价值高让我们把这种差别称为“增长潜力”。现在假设管理层/股东提出重整通过延长债务到期时间1。该公司可承接两个备选项目（一）安全项目，将产生的现金流量不确定性和等于100（二）有风险的项目，可能会导致300或0的概率相同。请注意该项目不是低效的风险与预期值150（有风险），而安全项目的预期现金流是唯一的无风险_1
33、00。图102提供了该模型的时间结构。而不指定债务的组成清楚贷方都能的力量清算,失去了增长的潜力。事实上,如果他们接受成熟伸展,经理/股东会选择风险的项目,然后不适合债权人。收益表,报道了103,向债权人和股东在这两个计画。债权人的债务重组接受通过扩展和成熟的经理/股东们能够继续运营公司如果他们选择了安全工程、回报债权人将100超过清算,而股东将会收到什么也没有。相反,如果承担风险的项目,预期收益债权人也只有60小于清算而股东的预期回报是90。因此,合理选择为股东风险项目债权人能够预见到股东激励,从而拒绝这项重组方案吗迫使清算。这是一个滞后问题,因为公司平仓即使保持它的业务会产生更多的价值。现
34、实生活中直觉是简单债权人不接受条件的变化,因为他们认为经理/股东将“破裂”,因为他们有“无松散”。另一种方法来清算是使用某种“股票磁铁“例如,可转换债券或权证的股东和激励,对齐的债权人。例如,假设债权人提供60的股权支付现金流量减少债务除了他们的信用。在此协议下,债权人与风险会114工程与100,安全项目根据他们的风险偏好他们可能更倾向于风险的项目为股东做。桌子上有104报告股权启动机制的支付。假设债权人不愿接受任何由于股权启动机制危险的项目是效率不高。例如,风险的项目将被明确低效率的如果结果现金流可能140或0以同样的概率。表105显示回报给股东和债权人在这个假设。即使有100股权启动机制即
35、、债权人得到100的股权收益债权人还是会选择安全项目。因为股东将会选择有风险性、债权人将迫使清算。另外,债权人可以考虑接管这家公司例如,接权益性债务交换,在这种情况下他们可以进行安全工程实现人口的增长。如果结果是对债务融资结构组成由一个单一的贷方到多个贷方例如,银行或一群银行。同时,如果整个债务突出的是公众的例如债券权益性债券交换将是一个可行的结果,提供了在抵抗着解决问题一家投资银行是有帮助的,正如我们所看到的,在接下来的章节。然而,情况更复杂当债务组成可谓喜忧参半。如果DBDB，即MD，但在这种情况下，外部资金是可行的，从而抵御了公司危机。只有当公共债务持有人也缩减其债权，银行将接受这一提议
36、。如果它是不可能的公共债务重组（由于抵抗问题），银行绝不会接受在其权益受到损害担保债权的交流。考虑一个数值例子假设DB30，DP90和K80。该银行债务不受影响（DB30DB30。如果无法说服债券持有人，该公司将被清算。该模型试图解释发生在现实生活中。詹姆斯1995哪个因素作了实证研究影响银行作为的可能性股权,以换取一些让步的主他发现这可能性的增长与市场预订价值比这是一个代理的增长潜在的,资产负债比,公共债务持有者还接受股权。相比之下,这种可能性,银行接受公平而减小重量的公共债务占总负债。结论本章描述了主要的重组交易。重组通常的一个条件是与财政危机有关,但并不一定都是这样。的确,进行重组交易的
37、公司或许只是为了提升价值创造或防止财政危机状况。在遇到危机条件下主要有两种选择方式要么重组或者清算,两者都可以实现要么以正式破产程序或庭外解决。债务重组通常更便宜,但是也应该走正常程序。然而,困境公司的不同索赔人不能找到一个相互同意的解决方案。最后唯一的解决办法就是去法院。解决一个困境情况下的公司方法一般是重组公司的债务合约。投资银行在债务重组中可以发挥重要的作用,协调不同的债权人和债务人关于质量和认证提出的重组计划。公司的部分资产也都能被重新调整了。资产剥离例如,销售分支机构或部门,典型的资产重组是股票的分立。股票分立在于分离分支机构或以创造价值为目的的主要股东从母体公司分离，主要股东通过提高信息或更好的管理激励。摘要现存的实证研究表明,股票分立创造价值。
