1、外文题目ACUSTOMERVIEWONTHEMOSTPREFERREDALLIANCESTRUCTUREBETWEENBANKSANDINSURANCESTRUCTURE出处ZEITSCHRIFTFRBETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFT作者PEKKAKORHONEN,LASSEKOSKINENANDRAIMOVOUTILAINEN原文OVERVIEWINTHISPAPER,WEHAVESTUDIEDALTERNATIVEALLIANCESTRUCTURESBETWEENBANKSANDINSURANCECOMPANIESFROMTHEPOINTOFVIEWOFFINNISHCUSTOMERRE
2、PRESENTATIVESSEVENCRITERIAWEREINTRODUCEDFORTHEEVALUATIONOFSIXALTERNATIVESTRUCTUREMODELSFORSUCHALLIANCESTHEEVALUATIONWASCARRIEDOUTBYANEXPERTPANELCONSISTINGOFCUSTOMERREPRESENTATIVESASASUPPORTINGTOOL,WEUSEDTHEANALYTICHIERARCHYPROCESSAHPTHEALLIANCEMODELSBASEDONPLAINCROSSSELLINGAGREEMENTSWERECONSIDEREDMO
3、STPREFERREDWEALSOSTUDIEDHOWFAMILIARTHECUSTOMERREPRESENTATIVESWEREWITHTHEALLIANCEPROBLEMFROMTHEPOINTOFVIEWOFTHEBANKANDINSURANCEEXECUTIVESANDTHATOFTHESUPERVISORYAUTHORITIESWEOBSERVEDTHATTHECUSTOMERREPRESENTATIVESDIDNOTRECOGNIZETHEPROBLEMASWELLFROMTHEPOINTOFVIEWOFTHESUPERVISORSASTHATOFTHEEXECUTIVESINAD
4、DITION,ITWASINTERESTINGTONOTETHATTHECUSTOMERREPRESENTATIVESDIDNOTCONSIDERARISKASPECTINTHECONTROLBYOWNERSHIPALTERNATIVESASCRITICALASTHEEXECUTIVESCOMPARINGTHERESULTSINTHISSTUDYTOOURPREVIOUSSTUDIES,WEMAYCONCLUDETHATTHEBESTCOMPROMISEMODELFROMALLTHREEPOINTSOFVIEWCOULDBETHEFINANCIALCONGLOMERATEONTHECONDIT
5、IONTHATCERTAINSUPERVISORYANDCUSTOMERCRITERIAARESATISFIEDTOASUFFICIENTDEGREEAINTRODUCTIONALLIANCEFORMATIONINTHEFINANCIALINDUSTRYHASBEENAGROWINGTRENDDURINGTHELASTDECADEINSURERSINANALLIANCEBETWEENBANKSANDINSURANCECOMPANIESAREMOSTOFTENLIFEINSURANCECOMPANIES,BUTALSONONLIFECOMPANIESCANBEFOUNDFINANCIALALLI
6、ANCESOFTENINCLUDEUNITSLIKEMUTUALFUNDMANAGINGCOMPANIES,ASSETMANAGEMENTCOMPANIES,SECURITIESBROKERAGESANDCORPORATEFINANCECOMPANIESINMOSTEUROPEANCOUNTRIES,BANKSAREALLOWEDTOBE“UNIVERSAL”ITISCUSTOMARYTHATTHEYINCLUDETHEABOVEMENTIONEDFUNCTIONSTHESAMEHOLDSMOREANDMOREOFTENFORINSURANCECOMPANIESASWELLSEE,EGSKIP
7、PER2000THATSWHYTHEVARIOUSTYPESOFALLIANCESONTHERETAILMARKETBETWEENBANKSANDINSURANCECOMPANIESAREOFSPECIALINTERESTINOURPREVIOUSPAPERSVOUTILAINEN2005,KORHONENANDVOUTILAINEN2005ANDKORHONEN,KOSKINEN,ANDVOUTILAINEN2005,WEHAVESTUDIEDALLIANCESTRUCTUREALTERNATIVESFROMDIFFERENTPERSPECTIVESINVOUTILAINEN2005,WEI
8、NTRODUCEDSIXDIFFERENTALLIANCESTRUCTUREALTERNATIVESANDNINECRITERIARELEVANTFOREVALUATINGTHOSEALTERNATIVESFROMTHEPERSPECTIVEOFTHEEXECUTIVESOFTHEBANKSANDINSURANCECOMPANIESTHEALTERNATIVESANDTHECRITERIAWEREINTRODUCEDTOGETHERWITHBANKANDINSURANCEEXPERTSEACHEXPERTWASINTERVIEWEDINDIVIDUALLYTHEEXPERTSWEREREPRE
9、SENTATIVESOFTHETOPMANAGEMENTOFFINNISHBANKSANDINSURANCECOMPANIESINTHESECONDPAPERKORHONENANDVOUTILAINEN2005,THESAMEGROUPOFEXPERTSWEREUSEDASAPANELTOFINDTHEMOSTPREFERREDMODELFORAFINANCIALALLIANCEASADECISIONSUPPORTSYSTEMWEUSEDTHEANALYTICHIERARCHYPROCESSAHPDEVELOPEDBYSAATY1980THEPROBLEMWASATYPICALAHPPROBL
10、EMFEWALTERNATIVESANDFEWQUALITATIVECRITERIATHEUSEOFTHEAHPFOCUSEDTHEDISCUSSIONSONTHERELEVANTASPECTSOFTHECHOICEPROBLEMTHEFINALSOLUTIONWASFOUNDINTWOMEETINGSTHESECONDMEETINGWASTHEINITIATIVEOFTHEPANELTHEPANELFELTTHATTHEPROBLEMREQUIREDMORECONSIDERATIONSTHEPANELPREFERREDTHECONTROLBYOWNERSHIPMODELSONTHEOTHER
11、HAND,ARISKAVERSEMANAGERMIGHTALSOPREFERLOOSERALLIANCEALTERNATIVESINTHETHIRDPAPERKORHONENETAL2005,OURAIMWASTOFINDTHEBESTFINANCIALALLIANCECOMPROMISESTRUCTUREBETWEENTHEEXECUTIVESOFTHEBANKSANDINSURANCECOMPANIESANDTHEBANKANDINSURANCESUPERVISORYAUTHORITIESINFINLAND1FIRST,WESEARCHEDFORTHEBESTALLIANCESTRUCTU
12、REFROMTHEPOINTOFVIEWOFSUPERVISORYAUTHORITIESTOGETHERWITHLEADERSANDEXPERTSOFTHESUPERVISORYAUTHORITIES,WEINTRODUCEDEIGHTCRITERIAFORTHEEVALUATIONOFTHEPREVIOUSLYDEFINEDSIXALTERNATIVEALLIANCESTRUCTURESTHEEVALUATIONWASCARRIEDOUTBYANEXPERTPANELCONSISTINGOFTHEREPRESENTATIVESOFTHESUPERVISORYAUTHORITIESTHEALL
13、IANCEALTERNATIVESBASEDONPLAINCROSSSELLINGAGREEMENTSRECEIVEDTHEHIGHESTRANKSINTHEEVALUATIONOFSUPERVISORYAUTHORITIESUNDERCERTAINCONDITIONS,THEFINANCIALCONGLOMERATEMIGHTBEANACCEPTABLECOMPROMISEALTERNATIVEFORTHESUPERVISORYAUTHORITIESASWELLINTHISPAPER,WEHAVEAPPROACHEDOURPROBLEMFROMTHEPOINTOFVIEWOFCUSTOMER
14、STHEIMPORTANCEOFTHISPERSPECTIVEHASBEENEMPHAZISEDBYEGBELTH2000CUSTOMERPERSPECTIVETOMERGERSISTAKENINBANKMARKETINGINTERNATIONAL2004WEDIDNOTTAKEASAMPLEFROMTHEPOPULATIONOFCUSTOMERS,BECAUSEMOSTCUSTOMERSARENOTFAMILIARWITHTHEPROBLEMATALLWEWEREINTERESTEDINTHEOPINIONSOF“ADVANCEDORWELLINFORMED”CUSTOMERSTOREPRE
15、SENTTHOSECUSTOMERS,WEUSEDLEADERSANDEXPERTSOFFINNISHCUSTOMERORGANIZATIONSANDLABOURMARKETORGANIZATIONSSEE,ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSATTHEENDOFTHEPAPERASBEFORE,EACHCUSTOMERREPRESENTATIVEWASINTERVIEWEDINDIVIDUALLYBASEDONTHEINTERVIEWS,WEINITIALLYINTRODUCEDSEVENRELEVANTCRITERIATHEFINALEVALUATIONWASCARRIEDOUTWITHFOU
16、RCRITERIAINTHEEVALUATIONMEETING,THREEOUTOFTHOSESEVENCRITERIATURNEDOUTTOBEINSIGNIFICANTWEHAVEALSOSTUDIEDHOWWELLTHECUSTOMERREPRESENTATIVESKNOWTHEALLIANCEPROBLEMFROMTHEPOINTOFVIEWOFTHEBANKANDINSURANCEEXECUTIVESANDTHATOFTHESUPERVISORYAUTHORITIESWEASKEDTHEMTOPLAYTHEROLEOFEXECUTIVESANDSUPERVISORYAUTHORITI
17、ESANDTOMAKETHEEVALUATIONSBYUSINGTHEIRMOSTIMPORTANTCRITERIAWEALSOASKEDTHEMWHICHTHEYWOULDTHINKWERETHEMOSTIMPORTANTEXECUTIVEANDSUPERVISORYCRITERIATHISPROVIDEDUSWITHINTERESTINGINFORMATIONABOUTTHEKNOWLEDGEOFTHEPROBLEMOFTHECUSTOMERREPRESENTATIVESFROMTHEPERSPECTIVESOFTHEOTHERPARTIESTHEANALYSISREVEALEDUSWHI
18、CHASPECTSARENOTYETWELLKNOWNTOTHECUSTOMERREPRESENTATIVESFINALLY,WECOMPARETHEPRIORITIZATIONSOFALLTHREEDECISIONMAKERGROUPSCONSIDEREDINTHISANDTHEEARLIERPAPERSTHEPAPERISORGANIZEDASFOLLOWSSECTIONBREVIEWSOURMAINPREVIOUSRESULTSINSECTIONC,WEPROVIDEABRIEFINTRODUCTIONTOTHETHEORYOFTHEAHPTHEDECISIONCRITERIAFROMT
19、HECUSTOMERPOINTOFVIEWAREGIVENINSECTIOND,ANDINSECTIONE,THERESULTSAREGIVENANDDISCUSSEDINSECTIONF,WEPRESENTTHERESULTSOBTAINEDWHENASKINGTHEEXPERTSTOASSUMETHEROLESOFEXECUTIVESANDSUPERVISORSINSECTIONG,WECOMPARETHECRITERIAANDTHEPRIORITIZATIONSOFALLTHREEDECISIONMAKERGROUPSFINALLY,INSECTIONH,WECONCLUDETHEPAP
20、ERWITHGENERALREMARKSBREVIEWOFOUREARLIERRESEARCHONALLIANCESTRUCTURESSINCETHISPAPERISFOUNDEDONOUREARLIERRESEARCHONALLIANCESTRUCTURES,WESUMMARIZEHEREOURKEYRESULTSISTRUCTURINGTHEPROBLEMVOUTILAINEN2005STUDIEDALLIANCESBETWEENBANKSANDINSURANCECOMPANIESHISPERSPECTIVEWASTHATOFTHETOPMANAGEMENTOFAFINANCIALENTE
21、RPRISEINTHERETAILMARKETALLIANCESTRUCTURESWERECLASSIFIEDINTOTHREEMAINCATEGORIESDEPENDINGONTHEDEGREEOFCOOPERATIONOFTHEPARTNERSTHESECATEGORIESWEREDERIVEDTOGETHERWITHREPRESENTATIVESOFTHEEXECUTIVEMANAGEMENTOFFINNISHBANKSANDINSURANCECOMPANIESTHECATEGORIESINTHEINCREASINGORDEROFCLOSENESSOFTHEPARTNERSWERECRO
22、SSSELLINGAGREEMENTSTHEPARTIESAGREETOSELLEACHOTHERSPRODUCTSTOTHEIROWNCUSTOMERSTHECROSSSELLINGISFREQUENTLYONESIDEDMOSTOFTENABANKSELLSANINSURANCECOMPANYSPRODUCTSTOITSCUSTOMERSINPRINCIPLE,ITCOULDBEVICEVERSAASWELLTHEALLIANCECATEGORYCANSTILLBEDIVIDEDINTOTWOSUBCATEGORIESDEPENDINGONWHETHERTHEPARTIESSERVICEC
23、HANNELSAREOVERLAPPINGORNOTNONOVERLAPPINGSERVICECHANNELSCANBEACHIEVED,FOREXAMPLE,IFTHEPARTIESACTIVELYTRYTOORGANIZECROSSSELLINGINSUCHAWAYTHATTHEREISNOCOMPETITIONBETWEENTHEPARTIESHEREASERVICECHANNELCANBEABRANCHOFFICENETWORK,BUTALSOACONTACTCENTER,SUBSIDEETCESPECIALLYINTHECASEOFOVERLAPPINGBRANCHNETWORKSO
24、NEEASILYFACESCHANNELCONFLICTTHEALLIANCEMEMBERSDONOTCOOPERATEEFFECTIVELYINTHEFEAROFLOSINGTHEIRCUSTOMERSTOTHEOTHERPARTYANDCONSEQUENTLYTHESALESPROVISIONSETCNONOVERLAPPINGSERVICECHANNELSOFTENMEANSTHATTHEOTHERPARTYHASNOSERVICECHANNELATALLTHUSTHETWODIFFERENTSUBMODELSARECROSSSELLINGAGREEMENT,NOOVERLAPPINGS
25、ERVICECHANNELSABBREVIATEDCSA1CROSSSELLINGAGREEMENT,OVERLAPPINGSERVICECHANNELSCSA2ALLIANCEOFINDEPENDENTPARTNERSTHEALLIANCETYPEISASPECIALCASEOFACROSSSELLINGAGREEMENTWHERETHEALLIANCEISTIGHTENEDBYCROSSOWNERSHIPAND/ORJOINTOWNERSHIPINTHIRDPARTIESCROSSOWNERSHIPMEANSAMINORITYSTAKEOFTHEOTHERPARTYSSHARESIFTHE
26、OWNERSHIPWEREONESIDED,ITWOULDPROBABLYBEASIGNOFASYMMETRYANDONEPARTYSDOMINANCEOFTHEALLIANCEANEXAMPLEOFJOINTOWNERSHIPISAMUTUALFUNDMANAGEMENTCOMPANYOWNEDJOINTLYBYABANKBANKSANDANINSURANCECOMPANYINSURANCECOMPANIESONECOULDALSOTHINKABOUTCROSSOWNERSHIP/JOINTOWNERSHIPWITHOUTACROSSSELLINGAGREEMENT,BUTSUCHAMODE
27、LSELDOMOCCURSINPRACTICETHEDEGREEOFOVERLAPPINGISALSOUSEDTODIVIDETHISCATEGORYINTOTWODIFFERENTSUBGOALSALLIANCEOFINDEPENDENTPARTNERS,NOOVERLAPPINGSERVICECHANNELSAIP1ALLIANCEOFINDEPENDENTPARTNERS,OVERLAPPINGSERVICECHANNELSAIP2CONTROLBYOWNERSHIPINBOTHTHEPREVIOUSMODELS,EARNINGSANDCOSTSAREDIVIDEDTHETHIRDCAT
28、EGORYMEANSTHEMODEL,WHEREALLTHECONTROLISINTHEHANDOFONEPARTYABANKCANSIMPLYOWNACONTROLOFANINSURANCECOMPANYORVICEVERSA,ORATHIRDPARTYOWNSTHEBOTHONESTHISCATEGORYISDIVIDEDINTOTWOSUBMODELSDEPENDINGONTHECONTROLLERCONTROLBYOWNERSHIP,WHENABANKOWNSANINSURANCECOMPANYORVICEVERSACBO1CONTROLBYOWNERSHIPFINANCIALCONG
29、LOMERATEAHOLDINGCOMPANYOWNSONEORSEVERALBANKSANDONEORSEVERALINSURANCECOMPANIESFCWECANNOTICETHATTHECLASSIFICATIONOFTHEDIFFERENTALTERNATIVESISBASEDONTHECLOSENESSOFTHEALLIANCEANDTHEDEGREEOFTHEOVERLAPPINGOFTHESERVICECHANNELSCRITERIATHEALLIANCEMODELSWERECOMPAREDANDEVENTUALLYPRIORITIZEDACCORDINGTOTHEFOLLOW
30、INGCRITERIATHECHOICEOFTHECRITERIAWASALSOBASEDONTHEMANAGEMENTVIEWS1PRODUCTDEVELOPMENTMAXIMIZEEFFICIENCY,2ONEDOORPRINCIPLEIMPLEMENTASEFFECTIVELYASPOSSIBLE,3EARNINGSLOGICSAVOIDCONFLICTS,4CUSTOMERRELATIONSHIPMANAGEMENTMAXIMIZEEFFICIENCY,5COSTANDREVENUESYNERGIESMAXIMIZE,6CHANNELCONFLICTSMINIMIZE,7REQUIRE
31、DSOLVENCYCAPITALOPTIMIZETHEBALANCE,8INVESTORPOWERMAXIMIZE,9SALESMANAGEMENTMAXIMIZEEFFICIENCYACCORDINGTOTHEINTERVIEWSTHEOVERALLIMPORTANCEOFEARNINGSLOGICS,SYNERGIESANDCHANNELCONFLICTSWASTHEGREATESTONEIIEVALUATINGWITHMANAGEMENTCRITERIAKORHONENANDVOUTILAINEN2005STUDIEDTHEABOVEDEFINEDSIXDIFFERENTPOSSIBLE
32、STRUCTUREMODELSFORALLIANCESANDTHENINECRITERIASEARCHINGFORTHEMOSTPREFERREDALLIANCEMODELISAMULTIPLECRITERIADECISIONMAKINGMCDMPROBLEMTOSOLVETHEPROBLEM,THEANALYTICHIERARCHYPROCESSAHPWASUSED,SEESAATY1980THEUSEOFTHEAHPFOCUSEDTHEDISCUSSIONSONPAIRWISECOMPARISONSTHEPANELTHESAMEMEMBERSASINVOUTILAINEN2005WASAL
33、SOWILLINGTOCONSIDERITSEVALUATIONSINCASETHEINCONSISTENCYWASTOOHIGHTHESECONDMEETINGWASTHEINITIATIVEOFTHEPANELTHEPANELMEMBERSFELTTHATTHEPROBLEMREQUIREDMORECONSIDERATIONSDURINGTHESECONDMEETINGTHEPANELFIRSTEVALUATEDCRITICALLYTHEORIGINALCRITERIAANDREVISEDSOMEOFTHEMTHERESULTINGCRITERIAWERE1EARNINGSLOGICSAV
34、OIDCONFLICTS,2CUSTOMERRELATIONSHIPMANAGEMENTMAXIMIZEEFFICIENCY,3COSTANDREVENUESYNERGIESMAXIMIZE,4CHANNELCONFLICTSMINIMIZE,5REQUIREDSOLVENCYCAPITALOPTIMIZETHEBALANCE,6SALESMANAGEMENTMAXIMIZEEFFICIENCY,7ECONOMIESOFSCALEMAXIMIZE,8ECONOMIESOFSCOPEMAXIMIZE,9RISKTHEPANELPREFERREDTHECONTROLBYOWNERSHIPMODEL
35、SACTUALLY,THEFINANCIALCONGLOMERATEWASTHEMOSTPREFERREDONTHEOTHERHAND,ARISKAVERSEMANAGERMIGHTALSOPREFERCROSSSELLINGAGREEMENTWITHNOOVERLAPPINGSERVICECHANNELSOREVENALLIANCEOFINDEPENDENTPARTNERSWITHNOOVERLAPPINGSERVICECHANNELSTOFINANCIALCONGLOMERATEIIICOMPROMISEWITHSUPERVISORSINTHETHIRDPAPER,KORHONENETAL
36、2005BROADENTHEANALYSISTOINCLUDETHESEARCHFORTHEBESTALLIANCECOMPROMISESTRUCTUREBETWEENTHEEXECUTIVESOFTHEBANKSANDINSURANCECOMPANIESANDTHEBANKANDINSURANCESUPERVISORYAUTHORITIESFIRST,THEALTERNATIVEALLIANCESTRUCTURESWERESTUDIEDFROMTHEPOINTOFVIEWOFSUPERVISORYAUTHORITIESTHELEADERSANDEXPERTSOFTHESUPERVISORYA
37、UTHORITIESINTRODUCEDEIGHTCRITERIAFORTHEEVALUATIONOFTHEABOVEPRESENTEDALTERNATIVEALLIANCESTRUCTURES1EQUALITYOFTHEMEMBERCOMPANIESOFTHEALLIANCE,2SYSTEMRISKMANAGEMENT,3CAPABILITYOFTHEAUTHORITIESTOSUPERVISETHEALLIANCEASWELLASPOSSIBLE,4FLEXIBILITYOFTHEALLIANCEWITHRESPECTTOCHANGESINITSENVIRONMENT,5OPTIMALFU
38、NCTIONINGOFINSURANCEANDFINANCEMARKETS,6SYNERGIESBROUGHTABOUTBYTHEALLIANCE,7SUFFICIENCYOFCAPITAL,8DEPENDENCYOFTHEALLIANCEONTHECOMPETENCEOFEXECUTIVEMANAGEMENTTHEULTIMATEGOALWASTOSEARCHFORTHEALTERNATIVEWHICHBANKANDINSURANCESUPERVISORYAUTHORITIESANDBANKANDINSURANCEEXECUTIVEMANAGEMENTMIGHTACCEPTASASOLUTI
39、ONTOTHEALLIANCEPROBLEMTHEANALYTICHIERARCHYPROCESSAHPWASAGAINUSEDTHELOOSELYCONNECTEDALLIANCEMODELSCROSSSELLINGAGREEMENTSRECEIVEDTHEHIGHESTOVERALLPRIORITIESLARGELYBECAUSETHEYGOTVERYHIGHPRIORITIESACCORDINGTOTHEIMPORTANTCRITERIASYSTEMRISKMANAGEMENTANDCAPABILITYOFTHEAUTHORITIESTOSUPERVISETHEALLIANCEASWEL
40、LASPOSSIBLETHECONTROLBYOWNERSHIPMODELSWERENOTCONSIDEREDDESIRABLEWITHRESPECTTOTHESECRITERIATHERESULTDIFFERSSHARPLYFROMTHEPRIORITIZATIONMADEABOVEBYTHEBANKANDINSURANCEEXECUTIVESTHEYFAVOUREDVERYCLEARLYTHECONTROLBYOWNERSHIPMODELSIFTHERISKFACTORWASNOTSPECIALLYEMPHASIZEDTHEEXECUTIVEPOINTOFVIEWISINMANYWAYSO
41、PPOSITETOTHESUPERVISORYPOINTOFVIEWALSOTHECRITERIAWEREDIFFERENTINSEVENCASESOUTOFEIGHTBUSINESSDRIVENCONSOLIDATIONSEEMSTOBEINCONFLICTWITHTHESUPERVISORYINTERESTSSUPERVISORSSEEMTOTHINKTHATBROUGHTSYNERGIESDONOTOUTWEIGHTHERISKTHATENTERSINTOLARGEANDCOMPLEXFINANCIALINSTITUTIONSHOWEVER,THEDIFFERENCESBETWEENTH
42、EPRIORITIESOFTHEDIFFERENTALLIANCEMODELSINTHISSTUDYWEREESSENTIALLYSMALLERTHANINTHEPREVIOUSSTUDYWITHTHEEXECUTIVESTHEREFOREITWOULDBEDEFINITELYINTERESTINGTOOBTAINACOMPROMISESOLUTIONACCEPTABLEFORBOTHTHEEXECUTIVESANDTHESUPERVISORS译文客户角度下的最优选择银行与保险公司联盟概述在本文中，作为芬兰客户代表，我们研究了银行与保险公司之间可选择的合作方式。在对可选择的6种合作方式的评估中
43、我们提供了7个标准。此项评估是由客户代表组成的专家委员会，借助层次分析法这个辅助工具来进行的。经过评估，我们认为基于简单的交叉销售的协议合作方式是最优的。我们同时研究了客户代表、银行和保险公司高层、监管机构三个不同立场对于这个问题的不同看法，发现三者之间存在着差异。此外，很有趣地发现客户代表在所有者管控风险方面的考虑明显少于管理层。此次研究结果与我们前期的研究结果相比，我们认为从三方角度来看，最优的组建方式是在一定程度上满足监管层和客户要求下所进行的金融合作。一、引言在过去的十年中，金融行业的相互合作是个大趋势。大多数银行与保险公司的合资公司是人寿保险公司，但非人寿保险的公司也是可以组建的。金
44、融合作包括组建共同基金管理公司，资产管理公司，证券交易行。在大多数的欧洲国家，银行可以经营多种业务，包括上述公司与保险公司的功能。因此此类金融合作机构能在零售市场上获取高利润。在我们前期的文章中，已经从不同角度研究了合作方式。在第一篇文章中，我们从银行及保险公司高层角度提出了6种不同方式和9种评估标准，这些都是由银行和保险公司的专家提出来的，这些专家都是芬兰银行和保险公司的管理高层的代表。在第二篇文章中，同一批专家组成了委员会来选出最佳的融资合作方式。我们选用了萨蒂的层次分析法来进行分析。这是一个典型的层次分析法问题由少数联盟方式和合理标准组成。层次分析法集中讨论该问题的相关方面。专家召开了两
45、次会议，在第二个会议中成立了委员会，认为所有权管控方式是最优的联盟方式。不愿承担风险的专家可能会选择松散的联盟方式。在第三篇文章中，我们的目标是找到适用于银行及保险公司高层与芬兰监管机构的金融合作方式。首先，我们找到对于芬兰监管者来说最合适的合作方式，同时8个可以用来评估之前所确定的6种可供选择的合作框架。监管机构专家代表组成的委员会对此进行评估，公认基于这种简单的交叉销售协议是最佳的合作方式。在特定条件下，这种金融合作方式将同样为这些监管机构所认可。在这篇文章中，我们将从客户的角度来解决这个问题。之前的文章已强调过此角度研究的重要性。银行国际市场学（2004）中已经从客户角度提出过金融兼并问
46、题，我们之所以没有提出具体案例，是因为很多人对于这个问题都不了解。我们很想把这些概念提前让客户更好地了解。为了能够更好地反映客户需求，我们邀请了芬兰消费者协会和工人协会的领导人和专家作为客户代表。前期先对这些客户代表进行了单独采访，基于这些采访内容，我们提炼出相关的7个标准，最终评估时我们共提出4个相关的标准，剔除了另外3个重要性相对较低的标准。我们还研究了客户代表若作为银行高层或监管机构，他们将如何看待金融合并问题。我们要求他们假设自己为银行高层或监管机构，选出自己认为的最重要的考量标准来评估金融合作问题。二、对联盟结构早期研究的回顾由于本文是基于我们对联盟结构的早期研究开展的，在这里先总结
47、我们的主要成果。（一）建构问题沃特莱恩从零售市场的金融企业的角度研究了银行和保险公司的合作方式，通过芬兰的银行和保险公司高管代表的讨论，根据合作程度，我们将合作形式分为三种。第一种是交叉销售协议，它代表双方的合作密切。在这种合作方式中，双方同意出售各自的产品给对方，而交叉客户往往是片面的，最常见的是银行对自己的客户销售保险公司的产品，原则上，它可以同时进行。该联盟仍然可以分为两类，取决于双方的服务渠道是否重叠。非重叠服务渠道可以实现。若当事各方之间没有任何竞争，它们可以尝试这种交叉模式。这种服务渠道可以作为一个分支结构网络，也可以作为结构中心。当存在交叉分支网络时，容易引起渠道冲突一双由于害怕
48、被对方抢去原有的客户而取消合作。因此无交叉渠道往往意味着对方没有任何的服务渠道。以下是两种不同的模式交叉销售原则，无交叉服务；交叉销售原则，有交叉服务。第二种是独立机构的合作。这种合作形式与交叉所有制和第三方参与所有制紧密相关，是交叉销售协议的特殊情况。交叉所有制意味着对方持有少数股权，如果所有权只属于一方，则表示双方地位的不平等，控股方在合作中有绝对控制地位。基金管理公司就是参与所有制的一个例子，它是银行和保险公司合作的产物。还有另外一种合作形式，在交叉所有制实行过程中不使用交叉销售协议，这种情况虽然可行，但实际操作中很少采用。这种合作方式按合作的交叉程度分为两种独立合作方的合作，无交叉服务
49、；不独立合作方的合作，有交叉服务。第三种是所有权管控。前面两种合作形式中的收益和成本都是按比例分配的，而在这种形式中控制权在一方的手里银行或者保险公司或者是第三方享有全部控制权。又分为两种所有权管控，银行拥有保险公司或是保险公司拥有银行；所有权管控，一个公司拥有一个或多个银行或是一个或多个保险公司。由此可以看出，以上三种合作方式是根据合作程度和服务渠道的交叉渠道程度划分的。我们通过各种合作方式的比较，总结得出以下有关管理方面的标准1产品发展原则（最大效率）2单方面原则（最有效实施）3盈利原则（避免冲突）4客户关系管控原则（最大效率）5成本与收益协同管控原则（最大效率）6渠道冲突减免原则（最小值）7资本偿付原则（收支平衡）8投资能力提升原则9销售管理原则（最大效率）其中最重要的是盈利原则、协同原则和渠道冲突减免原则。（二）管理标准的评估科尔霍宁和沃特莱恩研究了可选择的六种合作方式提出了九项标准。在不同标准下寻找一个最优的合作模式是很困难的。为此，我们用萨特的层次分析法来讨论不同模式下通用的合作原则。基于此项研究的重要性，委员会同意展开第二次会议，委员会由之前的成员组成。第二次会议对第一次会议的标准进行了修改和延续。以下就是二次会议的标准1盈利原则（避免冲突）2客户关系管控原则（最大效率）3成本与收益协同管控原则（最大效率）4渠道冲突减免原则（最小值）5资本偿付原则（收支
