1、 外文翻译 原文 Financial Restatement: Update the Public Company Trends, Market Impact, and Regulatory Enforcement Activities Material Source: http:/www.gao.gov Author: GAO Public confidence in financial reporting is critical to the effective functioning of the securities markets. However, restatements hav
2、e resulted in billions of dollars of lost market capitalization, as markets react to news that companies plan to restate their prior financial statements or earnings reports. For example, in a 2002 report, we estimated that restatements of financial statements or other financial information resulted
3、 in approximately $100 billion decline in market capitalization in the days surrounding the restatement announcement. Moreover, we found that from January 1997 through June 2002, 845 public companies announced the need to restate their financial information because of financial reporting fraud and/o
4、r accounting errors. To determine the immediate impact on stock prices, as in our prior report, we used the standard event study methodology, which is widely accepted in the academic literature. We were able to analyze 1,061 of the 1,390 restatements that were announced from July 1, 2002, through Se
5、ptember 30, 2005; we also collected information on other characteristics of restatement trends. We were unable to include 329 in our primary analysis because (1) they involved stocks not listed on NYSE, Nasdaq or Amex; or (2) they were missing data for the relevant period for causes including tradin
6、g suspensions, bankruptcies, and mergers. For the 1,061 cases, we analyzed the companys stock price from the trading day before through the trading day after the announcement date to assess the immediate impact and calculate the change in market capitalization. We analyzed the intermediate impact (2
7、0 trading days before and after the restatement announcement date) for 991 of the 1,390 restatements to capture any potential information leakage concerning potential restatements. We also analyzed the longer-term impact (60 trading days before and after the restatement announcement date) for 928 of
8、 the 1,390 restatements to gauge whether the companys stock prices rebounded over time. In the immediate-, intermediate-, and longer-term calculations, we adjusted for overall market movements. Additionally, we performed a separate immediate impact analysis of the 329 announcements that we were unab
9、le to analyze in the primary event study, which was limited to a simple assessment of any changes in unadjusted market capitalization. To analyze the impact of restatements on investor confidence, we identified a number of indexes, reviewed quantitative research on the issue, conducted structured in
10、terviews with (and collected information) from experts in accounting and financial markets, and collected data on a variety of proxy measures. While the number of companies announcing financial restatements from 2002 through September 2005 rose from 3.7 percent to 6.8 percent, restatement announceme
11、nts identified grew about 67 percent over this period. Of the restatements identified, cost- or expense-related issues were the primary reason for restatements during this period and most were prompted by internal parties, such as management or internal auditors. Some industry observers commented th
12、at increased restatements were the expected byproduct of the greater focus by company management, audit committees, external auditors, and regulators on the quality of financial reporting. The cumulative totals were 919 restatements over a 66-month period that ended June 30, 2002, and 1,390 restatem
13、ents over the 39-month period that ended September 30, 2005. Over the period of January 1, 2002, through September 30, 2005, the total number of restating companies (1,084) represents 16 percent of the average number of listed companies from 2002 to 2005, as compared to almost 8 percent during the 1
14、997-2001 periods. The median size (by market capitalization) of restating companies increased from $277 million in 2002 to $682 million in 2005. For the July 2002 through September 2005 period, the 1,121 restating companies we identified (accounting for 1,390 restatement announcements) announced tha
15、t they would restate their financial information for many reasons for example, to adjust revenue, costs or expense, or address securities-related issues. Cost- or expense-related issues were the primary reason for restatements, which included numerous lease accounting issues in early 2005; overall c
16、ost- or expense related issues accounted for 35 percent of the 1,390 announced restatements during this period. Internal parties (e.g., management or internal auditors) prompted a majority (58 percent) of the announced restatements, while external parties (e.g., external auditors or regulators) prom
17、pted nearly one-quarter (24 percent) of them; we were unable to identify the prompter in the remaining 18 percent. The market capitalization of the companies those we were able to analyze from among the listed companies that we identified as announcing restatements of previously reported information
18、 between July 2002 and September 2005 decreased an estimated $36 billion when adjusted for overall market movements (nearly $18 billion unadjusted) in the days around the initial restatement announcement. For the restating companies we analyzed, stock prices fell almost 2 percent on average (market
19、adjusted) from the trading day before through the trading day after an initial restatement announcement. This short-term impact ($36 billion), if realized, may have been significant for the companies and shareholders involved, but represents about 0.2 percent of the combined total market capitalizat
20、ion of NYSE, Nasdaq, and Amex, which was $17 trillion in 2005. Although capturing the impact of a restatement announcement over intermediate and longer periods (20 and 60 trading days before and after the event, respectively) is more difficult, our analyses suggest that restatement announcements hav
21、e had a somewhat negative effect on stock prices beyond their immediate impact. The announced reasons for restatements also were a factor in how great an impact a restatement announcement had on stock prices. In a change from our previous report, cost- or expense-related issues were the most frequen
22、tly cited reasons for restating and had the greatest impact on market capitalization in dollar terms, but as was the case in our previous report, restatements involving revenue issues and financial reporting fraud and/or accounting errors generally led to greater market losses than restatements for
23、other reasons. Although researchers generally agree that restatements can have a negative effect on investor confidence, the surveys, indexes, and other proxies for investor confidence that we reviewed did not indicate definitively whether investor confidence increased or decreased since 2002. To il
24、lustrate, some researchers noted that, since 2002, investors may have had more difficulty discerning whether a restatement represented a response to: aggressive or abusive accounting practices, the complexity of accounting standards, the remediation of past accounting deficiencies, or technical adju
25、stments. However, several survey-based indexes and other proxies for investor sentiment did not indicate a consensus on the direction of investor confidence since 2002. For example, a periodic UBS/Gallup survey, aimed at measuring investor confidence indicated that while concerns over corporate acco
26、unting practices still existed, overall investor confidence remained low primarily because of concerns such as high energy prices and the federal budget deficit. In contrast, the Yale confidence indexes, which found investor confidence levels were largely unaffected by the accounting scandals prior
27、to 2003, more recently showed that institutional investors have slightly more confidence in the stock market but results for individual investors were unclear. Finally, other measures and proxies for investor confidence indicated that increased financial restatements may not have had a negative impa
28、ct on overall confidence or, if they had, any negative impact had been counterbalanced by other, more positive forces. The number of SEC enforcement cases involving financial fraud and issuer reporting issues increased from 79 in fiscal year 1998 to 185 in fiscal year 2005 a more than a 130 percent
29、increase. Moreover, in fiscal year 2005, cases involving financial fraud and issuer reporting issues constituted the largest category of enforcement actions. The resources SEC devoted to enforcement grew as well. The financial debacles of the late 1990s and early 2000s spurred Congress to increase S
30、ECs resources to help SEC better manage its increased workload. This resulted in a 22 percent increase in SECs enforcement resources between fiscal years 2002 and 2003. Of the enforcement actions SEC resolved between March 1, 2002, and September 30, 2005, SEC brought about 90 percent against public
31、companies or their directors, officers, and employees; the other 10 percent of the cases involved accounting firms and individuals affiliated with accounting firms. To address such violations, SEC sought a variety of penalties against these companies and individuals, including monetary sanctions, ce
32、ase-and-desist orders, and bars on individuals appearing before SEC or serving as officers or directors in public companies. In addition, the newly created PCAOB also has broad investigative and disciplinary authority over public accounting firms that have registered with it and persons associated w
33、ith such firms; PCAOB has initiated several enforcement actions since its inception. This report includes recommendations to SEC to help ensure compliance with its Form 8-K reporting requirements and make consistent existing SEC guidance on public company disclosures of restatements that result in n
34、on-reliance on previously issued financial statements. This would include investigating the instances of potential noncompliance that we identified and take any necessary actions to correct them. Moreover, to improve the consistency and transparency of information provided to markets about restateme
35、nts, we recommend that SEC harmonize existing instructions and guidance concerning Item 4.02 by amending the instructions to Form 8-K and other relevant periodic filings to clearly state that an Item 4.02 disclosure on Form 8-K is required for all determinations of non-reliance on previously issued
36、financial statements (Item 4.02), irrespective of whether such information has been disclosed on a periodic report or elsewhere. We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Chairmen of SEC and PCAOB. SEC and PCAOB provided written comments. In response to our recommendations, SEC noted
37、that it would (1) continue its practice of examining instances of potential noncompliance and take appropriate actions, and (2) carefully consider our recommendation that it harmonize certain instructions and guidance related to restatements. PCAOB noted that as the overseer of the audit of public c
38、ompanies, it is very interested in the trends in financial restatements identified in the report and the impact on public companies and investors and thinks that the report will advance an understanding of this important issue. 译文 财务重述：上市公司最新趋势、市场影响和监管活动 资料来源 : http:/www.gao.gov 作者：美国会计总署 公众对财务报告的信心
39、 对于 证券市场 的有效运作至关重要 。 然而，当公司计划重述他们以前的财务报表或损益表时，市场对此消息作出反应，将会造成数十亿美元市值的损失 。 例如，在 2002 年的报告中，在重述公告发布的这几天我们估计财务报表或其他财务信息重述导致了大约 1000 亿美元市值的下降。此外，我们发现从 1997 年 1 月到 2202 年 6 月， 845 家上市公司因为财务报告欺诈或会计差错而宣布要重述其财务信息。 为了确定对股票价格的直接影响 因素 ，如我们事先报告 所言 ，我们使用了被学术界广泛接受的 标准的事件研究方法。我们能够分析 1390 份 从 2002 年 7月 1 日 到 2005 年
40、 9 月 30 日之间发布的重述报告中的 1061 份 ，我们 同时 还收集重述趋势 的 特点 等信息 。我们无法 将其他 329 分包括在我们的初步分析中，因为 ：（ 1）它们涉及的不是在纽约证券交易所，纳斯达克，美国证券交易所上市的股票 ；或 （ 2）他们丢失 了停牌、破产、合并期间的有关数据 。对于 1061 个案例 ，我们分析了公司股票价格从交易日之前 到交易 日 之 后 公告数据对评估的直接影响并 计算市值的变化。我们为 1390份重述中的 991份 分析了 间接 影响（重述公布之前和之后的 20 个交易日） ，捕捉任何会泄露潜在重述的隐藏信息。 我们还 为 1390 份重述中的 9
41、28 份 分析了长期影响（ 重述公布之前和之后的 60 个交易日 ） ，测量 是否该公司的股票价格 是否会随时间回升。通过短期、中期、长期的计算 ，我们对整体市场走势 进行了 调整。 此外，我们对 329 份无法再主要事件中分析的公告进行了一项独立的直接影响分析，这是仅限于对于未经调整市值变化的简单评估。 为了分析 重述对投资者信心的影响 ，我们确定了 许 多指标 ， 综述了关于这问题的定量研究 ， 对会计和金融市场方面的专家进行结构性的采访（收集信息），并对不同代理措施的数据进行收集。 虽然公布财务重述的公司数量 自 2002 年 到 2005 年 9 月 从 3.7 上升到6.8 ， 已确
42、定的 重述公告 在 此期间增长了约 67 。已确定的重述，成本或费用相关的问题是在这期间重述的主要原因，且大部分 是被内部人员如管理者或者内部审计员所提示 。一些行业观察 人士评论说 ，增加 的 重述是 公司管理者、 审计委员会 、 外部审计和监管 加大 对财务报告的质量 关注的预期产物 。 累计的总数包括 截至 2002 年 6 月 30 日超过 66 个 月时间的 919 份重述和截至 2005 年 9月 30 日 超过 39 个月时间的 1390 份重述。在过去的 2002 年 1 月 1 日到 2005年 9 月 30 日，重申公司的总数 （ 1084） 是上市公司从 2002 年到
43、2005 年平均数量的 16 ，相比之下， 1997 年 -2001 年期间重申公司占当时上市公司总数的 8左右 。重申公司 市值的中位数从 2002 年 的 2.77 亿美元增至 2005 年 的 6.82 亿美元。 2002 年 7 月到 2005 年 9 月期间，我们确定的 1121 家重申公司 （ 包括 1390份重述公告 ） 宣布，他们因为多方面的原因将重述其财务报表，例如调整收入、成本或费用，或者一些与证券有关的问题。 成本或费用有关问题 是 进行重述 的主要原因 ，其中包括 大量 在 2005 年初租赁会计 的 问题 ；在此期间 整体的成本或费用有关问题的 占 1390 份重述公
44、告的 35 。内部 人士（例如 管理或内部 审计员）促使 大部分 重述的宣布（ 58 ）， 而外部各方（例如 外部审计师或监管机构）促使 近四分之一 （ 24 ） 的 重述 ，我们无法确定在其余 18 是谁促成的 。 在最初重述公告公布后的几天内， 这些公司的市值 （ 那些我们能够分析 的，被 我们 确定为 2002 年 7 月到 2005 年 9 月间发布公告重述其先前的报告信息的上市公司）因为整体市场的走势调整而减少 360 亿美元 （近 180 亿美元 未经调整）。对于我们所分析的重申公司，股价从交易日的前一天到发布财务重述公告后的交易日下降了平均 2 个百分点（由于市场调整） 。 这种
45、短期影响（ 360 亿美元）一旦实现，对于相关公司和股东有着重要的意义，但是 2005 年纽约证券交易所，纳斯达克和美国证交所的总市值高达 17 万亿美元，而这种影响只占据了总市值的 0.2 。 虽然抓住一个重述 公告 中期和 长期 的影响（ 分别为交易日前后20 天和 60 天 ）的影响是比较困难，我们的分析表明， 重述公告 对股票价格有一些负面影响超出了他们的直接影响 。 发布重述公告的原因也是重述公告对股价影响的重要因素 。 和我们早期的报告不同 ，成本或费用相关的问题是最 频繁提到的 重述 原因， 同时对按美元计算的市值影响最大 ，但是在 我们 以前的报告中，重述 报告涉及 收入的问题
46、和财务报告欺诈或会计错误通常 会比其他原因导致更大的市场损失 。 尽管研究人员普遍认为， 重述对于投资者的信心是一个负面影响 ， 然而自2002 年以来的调查、指标和其他能代表投资者信心的数据没有明确表示重述让投资者的信心增加还是减少 。为了说明这一点 ， 一些研究人员指出自 2002 年以来，投资者可能有更多的困难 去辨别重述公告是否是对攻击性侮辱性会计实务、复杂的会计准则、过去会计的不足、技术性调整的回应 。然而 自 2002 年来我们调查的几个指标和代表投资者情绪的数据没有显示出对投资者的信心趋势达成共识 。 例如，一个旨在衡量投资者信心的周期瑞银 /盖洛普调查表示，企业会计实务仍存在问
47、题，整体投资者的信心仍然很低，这主要是因为如能源价格高、联邦预算赤字等问题造成的。 与此相反， 那个发现了在 03 年之前投资者信心水平在很大程度上受会计丑闻影响的 耶鲁大学信心指数，最近 表示 ， 机构投资者对于股票市场略微有 信心些 ，但对个人投资者的结果 尚不清楚。 最后， 其他对投资者信心的措施和代理显示增加的财务重述可能不会对整体信心产生负面影响，即使有，任何负面的影响都已经被其他更积极的力量平衡。 美国证券交易委员会 执法案件中 涉及金融诈骗和发行人报告问题的 案件 数量 从 1998 财政年度的 79 个增加至 2005 财政年度的 185 个 ， 增长了 1.3 倍 。此外，
48、2005 财政年度 ，涉及金融诈骗和发行人报告问题 的案件 构成了执法行动 的大类。美国证券交易委员会 致力于 执法 的 资源 也增长了 。 90 年代末 21 世纪初的金融危机促使国会增加美国证券委员会的资源来帮助美 国证券委员会更好的管理增加的工作量 。这导致了美国证券交易委员会的执法资源 在 02、 03 财政年度增加了 22 。 在 2002 年 3 月 1 日到 2005 年 9 月 30 间，美国证券委员会执法行动解决的案件中， 90 的案件是针对上市公司或者其董事，高级职员和雇员的，其余的 10 案件涉及会计师事务所或者隶属于会计师事务所的个人。为了解决这种违规行为，美国证券委员
49、会寻求各种针对这些公司和个人的处罚办法，包括金钱的制裁、停止和禁止令、和禁止个人出庭美国证券委员会及任职上市公司高级管理员和董事。此外，新成立的美国上市公司会计监管委员会对于 那些和上市公司一起注册成立的会计师事务所及与这些公司有关的人有广泛的调查和惩戒权。美国上市公司监管委员会自成立以来已经进行了几次执法行动。 这份报告包括美国证券交易委员会的建议以帮助确保其报告符合 8-K 表的要求，并使美国证券交易委员会对于上市公司不依赖已发布的财务报表进行重述披露的指导保一致。这将包括调查那些我们已经确定的潜在不遵守的情况，并采取任何必要措施意义纠正。此外为了改善那些提供给市场的重述信息的一致性和透明度，我们建议美国证券交易委员会协调现有的说明，通过修订 8-K表的说明和其他相关的定期文件指导 有关项目 4.02 清楚的表述 8-K 表的披露被要求完全不依赖已发布的财务报表，不管这些信息是否已披露在一些定期报告上或其他地方。 我们要求美国证券交易委员会和美国上市公司会计监管委员主席对于此报告的评论意见。美国证券交易委员会和美国上市公司会计监管委员会提供了书面意见。在回应我们的意见中，美国证券交易委员会指出他们将会： （ 1） 继续审
