1、 外文翻译 Pricing of Payment Cards, Competition, and Effciency: A Possible Guide for SEPA Material Source: Springer Link Author: Wilko Bolt， Heiko Schmiedel Abstract This paper analyzes equilibrium pricing of payment cards and welfare consequences of payment card competition. In particular, we model com
2、petition between debit and credit cards. The paper argues that optimal consumer and merchant fees must take safety, income uncertainty, default risk, and the merchants handling cost of cash into account. Market segmentation where debit and credit cards serve different segments of merchants yields a
3、preferred “payment mix“. However, when markets are segmented, payment card fees do not necessarily reach their socially effcient levels. Hence, thoughtful regulatory intervention regarding merchant fees may be necessary to raise total surplus. Key Words: Payment card competition, equilibrium pricing
4、, economic effciency JEL Codes: L11, G21, D53 1 Introduction The rapid growth of payment cards usage is a striking feature in many economies. Today, payment cards are indispensable for the way consumers buy and merchants sell goods and rvices. In Europe, the number of debit card transactions per cap
5、ita increased by more than factor of five across 13 countries during the period 1990-2005 (Amromin and Chakravorti,2009), and payment cards have now become the most used non-cash payment instrument.Furthermore, payment cards have also been proven to be a simple, safe, and cost-eficient ayment instru
6、ment. Despite this surge in popularity of payment cards, questions about price determination, surplus extraction, and competitiveness of payment card markets remain. The present paper studies equilibrium pricing of payment cards and welfare consequences of payment card competition. Unlike most payme
7、nt models, where card benefits are exogenous, our model is among the first to analyze payment network competition by explicitly incorporating consumers liquidity constraints and security concerns from which payment cards derive their intrinsic value. Consumers and merchants tradeoff increased consum
8、ption possibilities and cost savings against payment fees for using cards. This interplay between cards versus cash determines the ability of card networks to extract surplus from consumers and merchants which is reflected in the level of the payment fees. We analyze both monopolistic and competitiv
9、e payment card pricing arrangements. Competitive pressures dampen the merchant fee and increase merchant acceptance which in turn raises consumers willingness to pay for payment cards. Payment card competition may take different forms. We focus on two stylized competitive scenarios. In the first sce
10、nario a debit card network competes with a credit card network for different segments of the merchant side of the market (“market segmentation“). In the second competitive scenario two identical debit card networks -each other for market share (“market integration“). Our analysis may provide a usefu
11、l benchmark for market design and policy options regarding the realization of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA). SEPA represents a major step towards closer European -nancial integration and may bring substantial economic benefits and opportunities as it will foster competition and innovation, an
12、d improve conditions for consumers and merchants. However, the European cards market continues to be very fragmented along national borders regarding payment habits, rules and infrastructures. There is an actual risk of decreased competition when only a few payment schemes are likely to survive as c
13、ommercial banks are withdrawing their participation from (small scale) national payment card schemes. These observations have called for the need of an European-led initiative to create at least one additional European payment card scheme to increase the competitiveness in the payment market. The va
14、lue added of this paper lies in the analysis of the various monopolistic and competitive market outcomes regarding pricing decisions by card networks, merchant acceptance, and overall economic effciency. Our paper contributes to the growing theoretical payment card literature that started with Baxte
15、r (1983). He argued that the interchange fee-a transfer to reallocate funds between the two sides of the market| balances the demands of consumers and merchants for payment services and improves consumer and merchant welfare. Many other contributions in the academic literature have followed and addr
16、essed key issues surrounding card payment networks in general and payment pricing in particular (e.g., Carlton and Frankel, 1995, Frankel, 1998; Chang and Evans, 2000; Balto, 2000; Schmalensee, 2002; Rochet and Tirole, 2002, 2003a; Wright, 2003, 2004; Chakravorti and To, 2007; Guthrie and Wright, 20
17、07; Bolt and Chakravorti, 2008; Bedre and Calvano, 2009). Many formal models have recently stressed the “two-sidedness“ of payment markets (Rochet, 2007). That is, the consumption of card payment services involves two sides of the transaction|a consumer and a merchant-each of whom takes actions, enj
18、oys benefits, and incurs costs. As a result, setting the right price structure (e.g., the ratio of the consumer fee and merchant fee) is crucial for card adoption and usage, and resulting levels of economic effciency. Although a number of important findings has emerged from this payment literature,
19、the issue of payment competition and market segmentation has mostly been overlooked. This paper attempts to start filling this gap. Competition in payment markets is difficult to analyze without imposing further restrictions on users behavior (e.g. Armstrong, 2006; Chakravorti and Roson, 2006; Guthr
20、ie and Wright, 2007). First, since most policy and antitrust action has been geared towards the merchant fee, we only consider heterogeneity on the merchant side. This keeps the model tractable, while introducing consumer heterogeneity would not change the qualitative results of our model as long as
21、 a positive fraction of consumers would adopt payment cards (see Rochet and Tirole, 2002, for one-sided heterogeneity in a two-sided payment card model). Second, we critically assume that consumers “multihome“ in the sense that they subscribe to both networks and holding both cards, but that merchan
22、ts “singlehome“ in the sense that they only accept one card-debit or credit. Our price predictions serve as a lower bound on merchant fees as multihoming merchants are likely to show less “merchant resistance“ to higher fees. Moreover, while competitive pressures favor merchants in our specific set-
23、up, it is also noted that merchants could always strategically opt out from their least preferred card network knowing that all (or most) consumers have both cards in their wallet (Hermalin and Katz, 2006). Our analysis shows how the payment price structure is determined by income uncertainty, safet
24、y, default risk, processing cost and the merchants handling cost of cash. Due to payment externalities, socially optimal merchant fees and profit-maximizing merchant fees need not be equal. More competition between card networks substantially decreases merchant fees for debit and credit cards, boost
25、ing merchant acceptance and card usage. Interestingly, market segmentation where debit and credit cards serve different segments of merchants yields an optimal “payment mix“ and may lead to the most preferable market outcome in terms of total economic surplus. Market segmentation thus allows differe
26、nt merchant fees for debit and credit cards, as long as the price differential is a fair reflection of the additional functionalities that credit cards offer to consumers and merchants. However, when markets are segmented, payment card fees do not fully reach their socially effcient levels. Hence, t
27、houghtful regulatory intervention regarding merchant fees may be necessary to raise total surplus. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model of payment cards. Section 3 focuses on monopolistic pricing of payment cards, while section 4 analyzes competitiv
28、e card pricing arrangements. Section 5 studies welfare comparisons.The final section contains a summary and conclusions. 2 A model of payment cards The model considers three types of agents-consumers, merchants, and payment card networks. All agents are risk neutral. There is a (mass one) continuum
29、of (ex ante identical) consumers and a (mass one) continuum of merchants that have (some) market power. Merchants in each country are differentiated by the type of good they sell and the profit margin.they realize when serving each customer. There are two card networks in our model. One network offe
30、rs debit cards, the other network offers credit cards. In our model, we have combined the issuer and acquirer into one entity (i.e. the card network) so as to abstract from the interchange fee decision between issuers and acquirers. In planning their payment activities, consumers need to decide whet
31、her to subscribe to a card network and pay a fixed fee, while merchants need to decide whether to accept a payment card and pay a per-transaction merchant fee. We will analyse both monopolistic and competitive payment card pricing arrangements. 支付卡的定价、竞争和有效性： 欧洲独立支付体系 地区的可行性 研究 资料来源 : Springer Link
32、作者： Wilko Bolt Heiko Schmiedel 摘要 本文分析了支付卡定价的均衡态势和由支付卡竞争带来的一系列福利政策。我们尤其以借记卡和信用卡的竞争作为模型来研究。本文讨论的焦点在于必须确保最优客户和 商人的手 续费安全收取 、 收入的不确定性 、 违约的风险性和商人用账户支取现金的交易费 之间的关系 。借记卡和信用卡服务不同的客户群体导致的市 场细分产生出了一种更优的支付方式：“混合支付”。然而，当市场细分出现之后，支付卡收益并没有必然的达到它产生的社会效益的水平。因此，就客户交易手续费而言，成熟的体制进行干预对提高总产能来说是必要的。 关键词：支付卡竞争 定价态势 经济效率
33、 引入 支付卡使用的快速增长在很多经济体中是一个很引人注目的现象。现在，消费者购买和商人买卖物品和服务中使用支付卡是不可 避免 的。在欧洲 的 13个国家 ，从 1990 年到 2005 年之间支付卡交易人均使用数量增长 高于 1/5（ Amromin and Chakravorti,2009） , 而且支付卡现在已经成为了使用率最高的非现金交易工具。 不仅如此，支付卡也逐渐被升级成为更简洁 、 更安全和更经济的支付工具。尽管支付卡普及速度如此的惊人，但是有关定价，剩余价值抽取和支付卡剩余市场的竞争始终存在问题。 现有的论文研究了支付卡定价态势和由支付卡竞争带来的一系列福利政策。不像很多其他支
34、付卡的利益是外生的支付模型，我们研究的模型是在于首先研究通过明确地组建消费者资产流动性的约束和安全的网络支付竞争源于支付卡内在价值的获得。消费者和商人的交易增加了消耗可能、成本结余与使用支付卡之间产生的 费用的矛盾。支付卡和现金的相互作用决定了支付卡在网络业务中提取消费者和商人的剩余价值的能力，这种能力已经在手续费中反映出来。我们也同时分析研究了垄断性和竞争性支付卡定价的策略。竞争压力减少了商人支付的手续费，但同时增加了商人对支付卡付费的主动接受度。支付卡竞争有可能形成不同的形式。我们重点关注两种竞争方式。第一种形式是借记卡网络服务对信用卡网络服务在商人角度的不同市场的竞争（“市场分割”）。第
35、二种竞争形式是两种相同的借记卡网络服务由于市场共享产生的竞争 (“市场一体化” )。 就欧洲独立支付系统区域而言 ， 我们 的研究可以为市场布局和政策选择提供有用的基准。欧洲独立支付系统区域代表了向欧洲金融一体化靠近的一大步 ，并且可能带来可持续的经济利益和机遇，由此可以促进竞争和创新，提高改善消费者和商人之间的关系。然后，欧洲支付卡市场在国家边境地区的支付习惯、规则和基础设施方面还是一如既往的比较分散。 由于 商业银行撤回他们（小规模）参与国家的支付卡计划 ，使得 只有一小部分支付计划有可能实施 ， 这是一个实际存在的降低竞争性的风险因素。这些观察值需要欧洲主动性的支持去创造只售一个额外附加
36、的欧洲支付卡计划来增加在支付市场中的竞争力。本文增加的价值在于对多样的垄断性和竞争市场的结构的研究，主要在于支付卡网络服务的定价，商人的接受度和总的经济效率。 本文不断增加的关于支付卡理论文献的资料均来自于 Baxter（ 1983）。他表明了交易费 一 一种支付服务的再分配资金的转移和提高商人和消费者的优惠的 政策。很多其他的捐献给学院的文献资料已经证实了关于支付卡网络服务的一般性和手续费定价的特殊性的关键问题 (e.g., Carlton and Frankel,1995, Frankel, 1998; Chang and Evans, 2000; Balto, 2000; Schmale
37、nsee, 2002; Rochet and Tirole, 2002, 2003a; Wright, 2003, 2004; Chakravorti and To, 2007; Guthrie and Wright,2007; Bolt and Chakravorti, 2008; Bedre and Calvano, 2009)。 很多正式的模型最近在为“两极化”的收费市场施加压力(Rochet, 2007)。 也就是说，支付卡服务的消耗包括两方面的交易 一个消费者一个商人 他们各自产生行为，利益享受和由此引起的成本。结果是，设定合理的价格制度（比如：消费者收费和商人收费的比例）对卡的市场
38、适应性和使用度是至关重要的，也决定了经济效率的水平。尽管有一些重要的发现已经从这个支付文献中提到，但是支付竞争和市场细分的问题还是被大部分忽略了。本文将试着填补这一空白。如果没有对支付卡使用者习惯上的进一步限制，那么研究支付市场的竞争是很困难的 (e.g. Armstrong, 2006; Chakravorti and Roson, 2006; Guthrie and Wright, 2007)。 首先，因为大部分的政策和反垄断行动已经朝着商人手续费开展，我们只能认为混乱的一方在于商人。这使得模型比较容易建立，因为引入消费者的多样混杂性将不会改变我们建立的模型的结果，因为消费者的积极的一部分
39、将会适应支付卡的存在（参见 Rochet and Tirole, 2002, 单边多样混杂性在两种支付卡模型中）。其次，我们 过度地假设消费者“复合型生活”的情境，认为他们都需要网络服务和持有两张卡，但是商人的“单一生活”在某种程度上认为他们只接受一张卡 借记卡或者信用卡。我们的价格预期适用于商人交易费比较低 的范围，就像复合生活的商人可能想要展示较少的“商人阻力”对抗较高的手续费。此外，当竞争压力在我们具体的建立中偏爱于商人时，它也说明了商人可以总是有策略的从他们最少的比较好的支付卡网络业务中挑选出大部分同时拥有两张卡在他们的钱包中的 消费者 (Hermalin andKatz, 2006)
40、. 我们的研究显示出通过收入的不确定 、 安全性 、 违约风险 、过程中 产生的成本和商人手持现金的支出来决定支付系统的价格结构。由于支付手段的外部性， 社会上的最优商人手续费和利润最大化的商人手续费不需要相对等。更多的支付卡网络服务的竞争大大的降低了商人对借记卡和信用卡 的 手续费，增加了商人的接受程度和卡的使用情况。有趣的是，借记卡和信用卡对不同的商人领域进行服务而产生的市场细分，衍生出了一种最优的 “混合支付”，并且有可能产生更多的更好的市场结果就总经济剩余 而言。因此，市场细分允许不同的借记卡和信用卡收费标准存在，价格不一是为消费者和商人提供的信用卡这一附加功能的一种反应。然而，当市场
41、被细分之后，支付卡收费不再完全满足他们社会性的效率水平。因此，成熟的制度干 预以增加总的社会剩余就商人手续费而言是必要的。 本文的 其余 部分结构如下 ： 第二部分展示的是一个简单的支付卡的模型 ；第三部分主要关注支付卡垄断性定价 ； 第四部分研究了竞争中的卡定价原则 ；第五部分研究了优惠政策的比较 ； 最后一部分是概括和总结。 2、 支付卡模型 这个模型考虑了三个部分 消费者，商人和支付卡服务。每一个部分都是中立的。一个消费者的（大的部分）连续统一体和一个商人的连续统一体构成了市场力量。商人因为他们卖的货物的不同和服务于客户所获利润差额的不同导致他们在每一个国家都是不同的。这里有两个支付卡的模型。一个 是借记卡的模型，另外一个是信用卡的模型。在我们建立的模型中，我们结合了这个问题（支付卡业务）的提出者和问题的解决者，所以才能从提出者和解决者决定交易费中提取。在计划他们的支付行为时，消费者需要决定是否同意支付卡业务和混合手续费，与此同时，商人需要决定是否接受一张支付卡和一种交易费。我们将研究两种垄断性和竞争的制度卡定价策略。
