1、 外文翻译 原文 Competition and Cooperation in Industrial Cluster Material Source： European Planning Studies Author ： David 2. Industrial Clusters: A Critical Reading of Different Theories 2.1Standard Agglomeration Theory, From Marshall Onwards Marshall, in his writings on Sheffield, Lancashire and other B
2、ritish regions, viewed the main source of external economies as the commons, the infrastructure and other services from which each individual firm in an industrial district might draw (Marshall, 1921). Examples include, in modern terminology, improved job search and job matching, more favorable acce
3、ss to capital finance and inter-firm labor migration. The availability of such common resources to a number of firms then enhances their size and diversity as both capital and labor are attracted to such areas to exploit the larger markets for their services. This in turn leads to reductions in fact
4、or prices and/or increases in factor productivities. These are the ways in which the external benefit to firms of a location in the industrial district manifests itself. Unit production costs will be lower within the industrial district than out with it. Parallel to his studies of industrial organiz
5、ation, in the various editions of his Principles of Economics, Marshall (1890, 1920) helped develop what was to become standard agglomeration theory. This was then built upon subsequently by a number of writers. For example, Scitovsky (1954) identified a further category of pecuniary external econom
6、ies, Perroux (1955) contributed his famous theory of growth poles, and Chinitz (1961) applied the notion of agglomeration economies to the economic development of New York and Pittsburgh. More recently, Krugma (1991, 1995) has emphasized the importance of increasing returns as a favorable condition
7、for the development of external economies. Porter (1990) can also be understood as belonging to this lineage in the sense that external economies make up many of the key relationships within his famous diamond. Standard agglomeration theory provides an explanation of why firms might cluster together
8、, sharing a commons of business services and a diversified labour force, and forming extensive local linkages with other firms. However, it conforms to neo-classical theory in that local economies are viewed as collections of atomistic businesses, aware of one another solely through the intermediati
9、on of price/cost signals. Firms continue to compete with each other although Marshall was keen to warn of the risks that firms collaboration, in the development of shared inputs, risked blunting competitive forces. 2.2 Transaction Costs: The Californian School In the writings of the Californian scho
10、ol, the disintegration of productive systems leads to an increase in firms transaction costs (Scott Scott, 1988; Storper, 1989). Changes in market and technological conditions have led to increased uncertainty and greater risks of over capacity (of labour and capital) and of being locked into redund
11、ant technologies. The response of deepening the organizational division of labour leads to an increase in the number of formal market transactions external to the firm. There may also be an increase in the unpredictability and complexity of transactions. The costs of carrying out certain types of tr
12、ansactionespecially those where tacit knowledge is important or trust is required and thus complete contracting is impossiblevaries systematically with distance. Thus, agglomeration is the result of the minimization of these types of transactions costs in a situation where such minimization outweigh
13、s other production cost differentials. The Californian school sought to explain observed agglomerations of economic activity. The argument centered on the localization of traded interdependenciesor simple inputoutput relationsbut this is at best only a partial explanation, not least in being unable
14、to distinguish convincingly between good and bad agglomerations. Agglomerations have been found in high wage, technologically advanced industries and low wage technologically stagnant ones alike while there are technologically dynamic agglomerations which lack the dense inter-firm linkages and coord
15、inating institutions of a new industrial district. Nor is it clear whether markets will succeed in coordinating transactions within clusters (Cooke Castells Storper, 1993). Another direction of research has been in pursuit of the notion of an innovative milieu, the key theoretical concept of the GRE
16、MI (Groupement Europeen des Milieux Innovateurs) group of regional economists (Aydalot Camagni, 1995). Clustering enables firms to benefit from a collective learning process, operating through skilled labor mobility within the local labor market, customersupplier technical and organizational interch
17、ange, imitation processes and informal cafeteria effects (Camagni, 1991, p. 130). This process draws upon an intricate network of mainly informal contacts among local actors made up of personal face -to-face encounters, casual information flows, customersupplier cooperation and the like (Camagni, 19
18、91, p. 131). However, there is a certain ambiguity as to what precisely milieux are. By some readings, a milieu is a set of institutions, practices and rules which provide a framework for development which guides and coordinates the activities of innovators. By other readings, a milieu is a network,
19、 of firms, research institutes and policy-makers, which provides the necessary coordination for successful innovation. These different interpretations, together with the very intangibility of milieux, are the sources of major intellectual problems. Thus, the GREMI group has never been able to identi
20、fy the economic logic by which a milieu fosters innovation. There is circularity: innovation occurs because of a milieu, and a milieu is what exists in regions where there is innovation they do not specify the potential mechanis ms and processes by which such milieux function (Storper, 1995, p. 203)
21、. 2.5 Institutional and Evolutionary Economics A further approach derives from institutional and evolutionary economics (Nelson Amin Amin, 1999). Technological change is seen as path dependent since it involves sequenced, and not simultaneous, choices which are often irreversible. There is a spatial
22、 dimension to such choices with interdependencies between organizations being both traded and untraded. The latter include rules and conventions which shape the development and communication of knowledge between local actors. Given that there are strong irreversibilities, observed clusters are to so
23、me extent accidents of history, reflecting the impact of past choices, although their development is also influenced by the appearance and growth of reinforcing institutions. This approach is potentially very fruitful in understanding the nature of competition in contemporary capitalism (Dosi et al.
24、, 1987). Standard economic theory conceptualizes competition as the location on a production possibility frontier that maximizes a firms comparative advantage given an existing set of factor prices. Competition is a state, characterized by the absence or minimization of monopoly rents (Nickell, 1996
25、). Thus, if innovation is the driver of competition, a firm (or locality) may possess technologies which are superior to those of others regardless of the level of factor prices. This distinction has come to be known as that between weak competition and strong or Schumpeterian competition (Hudson, 1
26、999). Weak competition involves the search for lower cost means of producing existing goods with existing technologies. Strong competition is a strategy which involves the creation of new goods or of new technologies to produce existing goods. 译文 产业集群中的竞争和合作 资料来源： 欧洲策略研究 作者： David 2.产业集群：对不同理论的批判性解读
27、 2.1标准的集聚理论 从马歇尔（ Marshall） 开始 马歇尔在他关于 Sheffield, Lancashire等其他英国地区的著作中认为外部经济的主要来源是共同的，即个体企业在一个产业地区可能享有的基础设施和其他服务等 （ Marshall, 1921） 。用现代术语来阐述，例如增加的工作寻找和匹配机会，更加便捷的融资渠道和企业之间的 劳动力转移。因为被吸引到这些地区的资本和劳动力开拓了更广阔的市场，所以对大量的企业而言，这些共享资源的可获得性提高了企业的规模和多样性。这些反而导致了要素价格的减少或者要素生产效率的增加。这就是在一个地区产业集群内，企业获得外部利益的方式。单位生产成本
28、在一个产业区内将低于在产业区之外。 与他的产业组织理论类似的，马歇尔在他的各种版本的经济学原理书中，发展了标准的集聚理论。之后的很多理论发展都是基于这个标准集聚理论。例如， Scitovsky（ 1954） 进一步认证了无偿劳动的外部经济的种类， Perroux（ 1955） 发表了著名的增长极理论， Chinitz（ 1961） 将集聚经济设想应用于了纽约和匹兹堡的经济发展中。更近地， Krugman（ 1991, 1995） 开始强调增加收益的重要性 外部经济发展的有利条件。 Porter（ 1990） 也被理解在其著名的钻石理论中，认为外部经济占有极其重要的位置。 标准的集聚理论试图解释
29、为什么企业会集聚在一起，分享共同的商业服务和多样化的劳动力，与当地企业建立广泛联系。然而，与新古典主义一致的是， 二者都认为当地经济只是由很多微型商业所组成的集合体，彼此之间通过价格或成本信号为 媒介机制来观察。尽管马歇尔已经预警在投入共享的发展过程中，企业合作将面临日益钝化的竞争力风险，但是企业之间还是不断地进行竞争，在发展共同投入时，风险将减弱竞争的力量。 2.2交易成本 加州学派 在加州学派的著作中，生产力系统的分散性导致了企业交易成本的提高（ Scott Scott, 1988; Storper, 1989） 。市场和技术条件的变化增加了不确定性，加大了劳动力和资本过剩以及被过剩技术锁
30、定的风险。对深化劳动力组织分散的反映导致企业外正常市场交易数量的增加，甚至会 增加交易的不确定性和复杂性。实施特定交易类型 特别是那些需要默契或相互信赖，因此完全合同又是不可能的交易成本，会随着距离不同而出现系统性差异。因此集聚是最小化此类交易成本的产物，因为此类最小化超过了其它生产成本的差异。所以，在交易成本的最小化超过其它生产成本差异时，集聚就是最小化这些交易成本类型的结果。 加州学派试图对现存的经济集聚活动寻求解释。他们争论的焦点集中于贸易依赖（或者仅仅是投入和产出关系）的本地根植性，但最多也只是部分解释，至少能很信服地给出好和坏集群之间的区别。有高工资、技术先进的产业，低工 资且技术停
31、滞的产业，同时也存在技术上很有活力但却缺乏新产业区应有的企业间联系和协调机构的产业。 然而市场是否会在协调集群内交易方面获得成功，仍然是不明显的 （ Cooke Castells Storper,1993）。 另外一个研究方向则致力于创新环境设想，既以区域经济学家（ Aydalot Camagni,1995）为代表的欧洲创新环境小组 GREMI （ Groupement Europeen des Milieux Innovateurs）的核心理论概念。集群使企业从“集体学习”过程中受益，通过“有技能劳动力在当地劳动力市场的流动，消费者 供给者在技术和组织上的相互交换、模仿过程等和非正式的咖啡店
32、效应”（ Camagni,1991, p.130）。这个过程依赖于内在的当地经济主体间的非正式接触 组成了私人的面对面的相遇、随机信息流，消费者 供给者合作等（ Camagni,1991, p.131）。 然而，对环境的精确定义至今存在一定的模糊性。一些著作认为环境即是一系列的机构、操作和指导、协调创新活 动发展框架的法律法规。另一些专著则认为，环境是企业、研究机构和政策制定机构组成的，为成功的创新提供必要协调的网络。 这些不同的阐释，同抽象的环境定义一起，是主要的问题来源。因此，欧洲创新环境小组“总是不能确认环境促进创新的经济逻辑”，反之陷入了一个循环：创新由于环境发生，而环境则存在于有创新
33、行为的区域 他们并没有具体阐述这种环境运行的潜在机制和过程 （ Storper,1995, p. 203）。 2.5 制度和演化经济学 一个更进一步的方法是来自于制度和演化经济学 （ Nelson Amin Amin,1999）。技术变化被视为路径依赖因为其涉及到连续的但不是同时的，而且通常是不可逆转的抉择。关于贸易和非贸易机构间的相互依赖选择存在多维空间。后者包括促使当地经济主体之间知识发展和交流形成的法规和传统。考虑到存在很强的不可逆性，被观察到的集群在一定程度上产生于历史的偶然，反映了过去抉择对现在的影响，尽管它们的发展受到了压力机构出现和成长的影响。 这种方法在理解现代资本主义竞争性质
34、方面取得了很多潜在成果 （ Dosi et al.1987）。标准的经济理论将竞 争定义为在既定的一系列要素价格条件下，最大化公司比较优势的生产可能性边界上的位置。竞争是一种最小化或缺少垄断租的状态 （ Nickell,1996）。相反的，以奥地利学派的观点为依托，制度和演化经济学认为竞争是由一贯的技术变化所促进的经济变化过程。因此，如果创新是竞争的动力，一个企业可能拥有比其它企业更先进的技术而不用考虑要素价格水平。 这种差别以弱竞争和强竞争或者熊彼特竞争而著称 （ Hudson,1999）。弱竞争涉及到在现有技术条件下，生产现有产品寻求更低的成本。而强竞争则是一种试图创造新的产品或开发新技术去 生产现有商品的战略。
