1、 外文翻译 原文 Bank Credit Cards:Consumer Irrationality versus Market Forces Materia Source： Winter Author: Thomas F. Cargill, Jeanne Wendell The credit card industry evolved from relatively small beginnings following World War I1 to the current position where credit cards represent a major financial serv
2、ice used by the majority of households across all income classes (Table 1). (See Canner and Luckett (1992) and Kennickell and Shack-Marquez (1992) for more detail.) This growth accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s as part of the dramatic increase in the variety of financial assets and services that ac
3、companied deregulation (Cargill and Garcia 1985). The rigidity of explicit bankcard interest rates, in the face of variations in other interest rates, raises controversial policy issues. The rate rigidity suggests to some observers significant noncompetitive elements in the credit card industry, req
4、uiring enhanced regulatory oversight and constraints on the bankcard industry. In 1985 and again in 1991,Congress considered legislation to impose a national ceiling on credit card interest rates and/or require credit card interest rates to vary in response to a specific index such as the cost of fu
5、nds to banks or an open market interest rate such as the Treasury bill rate. These legislative proposals did not receive sufficient support to be enacted. At least five factors can be identified that influenced the decision not to impose interest rate constraints on bank credit cards. First, as fina
6、ncial deregulation led to dramatic increases in competition throughout the financial system, it was difficult to accept the hypothesis that the credit card industry was characterized by noncompetitive pricing. Second, the structural characteristics of the industry, with almost 6,000 depository insti
7、tutions issuing cards, suggest that price fixing would be difficult at best. Third, economic theory and some empirical work on the characteristics of the industry provide market-based explanations for much, if not all, of the credit card interest rate rigidity. Fourth, the disruptive effects of usur
8、y limits and Regulation Q during the 1970s were still fresh in the minds of policy makers. Fifth, credit card interest rates started to decline in late 1992 and the credit card industry became noticeably more competitive (Canner and Luckett 1992, 665-666). The policy debate over bankcard regulation
9、has not ended for two reasons. First, the spread between credit card interest rates and the cost of funds will likely remain larger than the spread observed for other forms of bank credit. Second, the debate is likely to expand from sticky interest rates and high spreads to issues of discrimination,
10、 judged by other discrimination-related concerns in the banking industry in recent years. Further, the controversy over the need for government intervention in the credit card industry reflects two opposing views in the academic literature regarding the strength of market forces in the industry. The
11、 inefficient-market view is detailed in a recent contribution by Ausubel (1991), while the efficient-market view is explained by Canner and Luckett (1992) and Pozdena (1991). Life-Style Analysis of Major Bank Credit Card Users The use of commercial bank credit cards is rising tremendously and is bec
12、oming a “way of life“ with many American consumers. In 1970, the two major bank credit cards, Master Charge and Visa, were reported to be issued by well over 6,000 banks. Moreover, each of the major card institutions claimed slightly more than 20 million cardholders, with both predicting major incre
13、ases by the 1980s. With the trend toward increased credit card purchasing, banks and retailing institutions must become increasingly concerned with identifying the credit card user segment of the market. Perhaps the first attempts to segment the credit market were made by Slocum and Mathews in the l
14、ate 1960s and early 1970s. Specifically, they examined the relationship between social class and income as an indicator of credit card usage. In both studies, credit card holders demonstrated different shopping behavior/credit card usage patterns with respect to social class membership. For example,
15、 members of the lower social classes were more likely to use their cards for installment purposes while upper classes used their cards more often for convenience. These differences were observed to be related to social class values, which may be applicable in segmenting the credit card market. Ausub
16、el (1991, 71) argues that the bankcard market does not operate as a competitive spot market because credit card holders are irrational. They do not search for low credit card interest rates because they expect to use the cards only for transaction convenience, not as a source of credit. In doing so,
17、 according to this theory, they substantially underestimate the probability they will accrue outstanding balances and pay unnecessarily high rates of interest on these unanticipated balances. Ausubel further hypothesizes that credit card consumers do not learn from experience and therefore do not se
18、arch for lower interest rate cards once they discover they do indeed carry balances. Thus, Ausubel essentially hypothesizes a model in which demand for credit card revolving debt includes a significant random term. In this model, consumers view the random term as a random walk variable, rather than
19、using Bayesian “learning”to continually update estimates of the mean of a probability distribution. Credit card holders that continually expect to carry zero balances are, of course, indifferent to bankcard interest rates. This indifference insulates bank credit card firms from interest rate competi
20、tion. Ausubel tests the hypothesis of consumer irrationality by comparing data from two sources. (1) Data from a survey of 21 bankcard issuers conducted by Ausubel indicate that 75 percent of these firms accounts carry outstanding balances, averaging over $1,000 at any point in time. (2) Data from t
21、he 1983 Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances indicate that 47 percent of bank and retail cardholders report they nearly always pay monthly balances in full (and, therefore, 53 percent report carrying balances). Thus, the bank survey evidence indicates that 75 percent of cardholders actually c
22、arry balances, while the household survey evidence indicates that 53 percent of cardholders report carrying balances. Ausubel interprets the discrepancy as evidence that the Federal Reserve survey respondents are not knowledgeable or truthful about their own finance. “Unless this is evidence of a ba
23、d consumer survey, it suggests that a sizeable proportion of consumers who borrow on credit cards are unaware of how frequently they do it or, more likely, deny (to themselves and others) that they do it” (Ausubel 1991, 72). Calem and Mester (1995) provide additional evidence on three noncompetitive
24、 aspects of the bankcard market: consumer search costs, consumer switch costs, and adverse selection faced by firms. Analyzing the same data set used in this paper, Calem and Mester conclude that the evidence is consistent with both Ausubels hypothesis of consumer irrationality and the hypothesis of
25、 imperfect competition. Canner and Luckett (1 992) theorize that market forces, operating on unique characteristics of the credit card industry, create the observed stickiness of bankcard rates which leads to a larger spread between bank card rates and the cost of funds than for other forms of bank
26、credit. They suggest that operating costs moved through a high-cost start-up phase into a phase of increasing efficiency during the 1960s and 1970s. The increasing efficiency phase coincided with strong demand for credit card services in the 1970s and early 1980s. Further, Canner and Luckett employ
27、information theory to explain that credit card holders may be rationally insensitive to interest rates if convenience and service quality are more important than the cost of funds. These conditions hold when the majority of card holdersuse the instruments for convenience rather than as a source of b
28、orrowed funds. Finally, they criticize Ausubels “certain peculiarity of card holder psychology” as an unlikely explanatory factor as it implies households persistently err in predicting how they will use their credit cards, without learning from experience. Pozdena (1 991) offers an alternate market
29、-based explanation for the observed insensitivity of bankcard interest rates to changes in other market rates. Pozdena notes that the majority of cardholders only use credit cards for transaction convenience and the household decision to use bankcard debt is characterized by moral hazard because car
30、dholders choose to borrow at high bankcard interest rates primarily when the household financial condition is relatively weak. Credit card interest rates are insensitive to changes in market low-risk rates because these loans are priced “as if the lender perceived the debt as poorly collateralized o
31、r costly to service, and the variance of the borrowers net worth is high” (Pozdena 1991,3). Thus, Canner and Luckett (1992) as well as Pozdena argue that consumer insensitivity to bankcard interest rates may be rational if consumers primarily view bankcards as a means to attain transaction convenien
32、ce. In addition, Pozdena (along with Calem and Mester (1995) considers the potential role of moral hazard in the bankcard market. Thus, sticky bankcard interest rates could result from consumer irrationality, rational consumer focus on nonmarket characteristics of bankcards, rational lender response
33、 to moral hazard and adverse selection, and/or market power created by search and switch costs. The relative importance of these causal factors has clear policy implications. Government intervention designed to reduce bankcard interest rates could benefit consumers if consumer irrationality and/or m
34、arket power are major factors in this market; such intervention could yield negative unintended consequences, however, if consumers respond rationally to market conditions. The authors focus on Ausubels hypothesis (1991) that bankcard holders are largely irrational. The same data set analyzed by Cal
35、em and Mester (1995) is used, and empirical results similar to their findings are presented. A different conclusion is reached, however, because the results are explicitly interpreted in light of the fact that the majority of households with bankcards report zero balances. While Calem and Mester foc
36、us on the question-why are interest rates sticky? -This paper uses the same data set to address the question of whether the evidence supports the hypothesis of consumer rrationality. 译文 银行信用卡：非理性消费和市场力量 资料来源 : Winter 作者： Thomas F. Cargill, Jeanne Wendell 信用卡是一个薄的塑料卡，通常 3-1/8 英寸至 2-1/8 英寸大小，其中包含识别信息，
37、如签名或图片，并授权人的姓名，它收取购货或服务他的账户 -收费，为此他将账单定期。今天，信息卡阅读的自动柜员机 （ ATM），商店的读者，以及银行和上网电脑。 根据大英百科全书，信用卡产生于上世纪初的美国，经过几十年的发展已经成为消费信贷领域不可或缺的金融工具。在美国每年有超过 4000 万张的发卡量，每年零售消费额的 1/4 由信用卡完成。 第二次世界大战后，信用卡业界 开始从相对较小的发展，以目前的情况下信用卡被大多数收入阶层所使用，它代表了主要的家庭金融服务。 20 世纪 70年代和 80 年代，伴随着信用卡管制的放松，作为金融资产和各种服务的急剧增加的一部分，信用卡快速增长。明确银行卡
38、利率刚性问题，成为在其他利率变化面前，引起争议的政策性问题。刚性率是索姆认为是评定信用卡行业有没有竞争力的重要组成部分，要求加强管理监督，增加对银行卡产业的限制。 1985年，以及在后来的 1991 年的大会审议的立法中，都对信用卡利率和国家天花板或需要信用卡利率在响应特定指数变化，如提供给银行的资金 成本或一个开放的市场利率如国库券利率。然而这些立法建议并没有得到足够的支持。决定不实行银行信用卡利率限制，其影响因素至少有以下五个： 首先，金融管制急剧放宽，导致整个金融体系中的竞争加剧，这是难以接受的信用卡行业是没有竞争力的价格为特征的假说。 第二，行业的结构特点，拥有将近 6000 个存款机
39、构发行信用卡，从而表明价格操纵将是难以实现的。 第三，经济理论和一些行业特点的实证研究提供以市场为基础的解释为多，如果不是全部的信用卡都具有利率刚性。 第四，高利贷的限制，并且在 70 年代瓦特 Q 条例的破坏性，影响了 埃雷犹在决策者的心中。 第五，信用卡利率开始下降， 1992 年末信用卡行业变得更有竞争力。 对银行卡的监管政策辩论并没有结束，原因有两点。首先，与信用卡利率和资金成本继续蔓延的可能大于扩散银行信贷的其他形式的观察。二是辩论很可能会从粘利率和高利差扩大到歧视问题，判断其他歧视有关的银行业近年来的关注。 此外，对政府在信用卡行业需要干预的争论反映了两种对立的学术，关于在产业低效
40、率情况下，市场认为市场力量的文学是由奥苏贝尔（ 1991）提出了最近的详细意见，而高效率的市场观点的解释是坎纳、奥利佛（ 1992）和波 兹杰纳（ 1991）提出的。 奥苏贝尔（ 1991）认为，银行卡市场没有竞争力作为现货市场运作，因为信用卡持有人是不合理的。他们没有使用信用卡的低利率功能，因为他们使用信用卡仅为交易的便利，而不是作为信贷来源的卡。这样，根据这一理论，他们大大低估的可能性，他们会产生未偿还余额和支付这些不必要的意外结余利息率高。奥苏贝尔进一步猜 测，信用卡消费者不从经验中学习，因此不低利率卡搜索一旦发现他们做工业进给携带余额。因此，奥苏贝尔的模式基本上是推测，其中信用卡周转性
41、信贷需求包括一个重要的随机术语。在这个模型中，消费者则认为，一个随机变量的随机行走来看，而不是使用贝叶斯 “学习 ”，不断更新的概率分布均值的估计。 信用卡持有人将继续保持零余额，同时也漠不关心银行卡利率。这种冷淡的态度从利率中隔离了银行和信用卡公司的竞争。 奥苏贝尔测试通过两个不同的数据 对消费者不合理的假设进行了比较。（ 1）奥苏贝尔从 21 家银行卡发卡机构进行调查得到的数据表明 ， 75%的公司帐目期末未进行余额清算，平均在任何时候超过 1000 美元。（ 2）从 1983 年联邦储备消费者财务状况调查的数据表明，百分之四十七的零售银行卡持有人报告，他们几乎都是全额支付每月结余（因此，
42、百分之五十三的报告账面结余）。 因此，银行调查的证据表明，百分之七十五的持卡人实际进行平衡，而家庭调查的证据表明，百分之五十三的持卡人进行 balances.Ausubel 报告解释为证据表明，美国联邦储备受访者不熟悉或真实的差距对自己的资金。 “ 除非这是一个坏消费者调查的证据，它表明的是，谁对消费者的信用卡贷款的相 当一部分不知道如何做到这一点，他们经常或更可能的是，否定（对自己及他人），他们这样 做 ” （奥苏贝尔 ， 1991）。 Calem 和迈什泰尔（ 1995）提供非竞争性的三个方面的银行卡市场：消费者搜寻成本，转换成本，消费者，以及 firms.Analyzing 集合本文中使
43、用相同的数据面临逆向选择更多的证据， Calem 和迈什泰尔得出这样的结论与证据都奥苏贝尔的假设消费者的不合理和不完全竞争的假设。 罐头制造商和奇特（ 1 992）推论说，市场力量，对信用卡行业特色经营，创造了银行卡率观察粘性，这导致了银行卡之间的价格， 比其他形式的资金成本较大的蔓延银行信贷。他们认为，经营成本进入了提高效率的阶段，通过一个高成本的起始阶段，在 60 年代和 70 年代。在提高效率阶段恰逢在 20 世纪70 年代和 80 年代初的信用卡服务的强烈需求。此外，坎纳和奇特运用信息理论解释说，该卡持有人可以合理利率不敏感，如果便利和服务质量是较重要的资金成本。这些条件成立时，多数卡
44、 holdersuse 方便的工具，而不是作为一个借来的资金来源。最后，他们批评奥苏贝尔的 某些特点持卡人心理学 作为一种不太可能的解释因素，因为它意味着在坚持家庭预测他们将如何使用没有从经 验中学习他们的信用卡，犯错。 波兹杰纳（ 1991）提供了一种替代市场为基础的银行卡利率不敏感的观察，在其他市场利率变动的说明。波兹杰纳指出，信用卡持有人多数只用于交易的方便和家庭决定使用银行卡信用卡债务的特点是道德风险，因为卡持有人选择贷款高利率的银行卡主要是在家庭的经济条件比较薄弱。信用卡利率不敏感，在市场变化的低风险，因为这些贷款的利率定价仿佛被视为不良贷款的抵押或昂贵的服务的债务，以及借款人的净资
45、产差异高 。 （波兹杰纳， 1991）。 因此，坎纳和奥利佛（ 1992）以及波兹杰纳认为，消费者不敏感的银行 卡利率可能是理性的，如果消费者认为主要是作为一种手段实现银行卡交易的便利。此外，波兹杰纳（连同 Calem 和迈什泰尔（ 1995）认为，在银行卡市场的道德风险的潜在作用。 因此，粘银行卡利率可能会导致消费者的非理性，非市场特征的银行卡，贷款人应理性道德风险和逆向选择，合理的消费重点 /或市场力量搜寻创建和交换机这些相对重要性因果关系的因素有明确的政策影响。政府的干预旨在减少银行卡利率可能对消费者有利，如果消费者非理性和 /或市场力量的主要因素，在这个市场上，这种干预可能会产生消极的后果，但是，如果消费者作出理性的反应市场情况。 关于奥苏贝尔的假说（ 1991）作者的焦点，银行卡持有人，主要是不合理的。同样的数据集和分析 Calem 美斯特（ 1995）使用的，也和他们的调查结果实证结果。一个不同的结论后，因为这一研究结果明确解释的是鉴于与银行卡的报告零余额户占多数。虽然 Calem和迈什泰尔关于这个问题，为什么利率粘性，本文的重点使用的设置，以解决是否有证据支持消费者 rrationality 假设的问题相同的数据。
