1、1 外文翻译 原文 Trade in Services Material Source: JOURNAL OF TRANSLATION FROM FOREIGN LITERATURES OF ECONOMICS, 2007 Author: Philippa Dee What is special about services? These days, a trade theorist might say there is surprisingly little that is special about Services.Even early papers largely dismissed
2、concerns that the determinants of comparative advantage in services might differ from those in goods (Hindley and Smith 1984,Deardorff 1985). A few papers in the late 1980s examined some of the important characteristics of services, and highlighted the role of factors such as knowledge intensity (eg
3、 Markusen 1989, Melvin 1989). These same factors were subsequently central to new trade theory treatments of trade in manufactures (eg Grossman andHelpmann 1991).It is now commonplace to treat both manufactures and services as having increasing returns to scale, firm-level product differentiation an
4、d Dixit-Stiglitz preferences among firms (eg the survey by Markusen 1995, Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr1999, Brown Deardorff and Stern 2000),1 with only the interpretations sometimes differing about the source of the firm-level product differentiation and the nature of the fixed costs producing the
5、economies of scale. Only the agricultural sector is routinely treated, in theoretical models at least, as being a constant returns to scale, homogeneous product industry. But perhaps this has as much to do with needing a simple mechanism to pin down returns to sectorally mobile factors as it has to
6、do with reality in a world where agricultural policy issues now include genetic engineering, varietal property rights and geographical indications. What is special about services trade? There is one characteristic of services trade policy that is special, and is starting to Influence the way that se
7、rvices trade itself is modelled. That characteristic is the formal recognition within the WTO of commercial presence as a method by 2 whichservices are traded. Foreign direct investment occurs in all sectors. Dee and Hanslow (2001) used UN and APEC data to estimate that about 20 per cent of world FD
8、I stocks were in the primary sector (agriculture, mining and food processing), with about 40 percent each in the secondary and tertiary (service) sectors. Using very rough methods to estimate the output being generated from these FDI stocks, they estimated that the world output of outward FDI firms
9、in the primary sector was about 80 percent as big as the conventional exports of that sector, with comparable proportions being 40 percent for the secondary sector and 60 percent in services.If the output of FDI firms is recognised as a method by which goods and services can be traded, then trade by
10、 commercial presence is significant in all sectors, eventhough it is not captured in conventional balance of payments statistics. By the same token, conventional trade is also significant in all sectors.So there is nothing special about trade in services via commercial presence (except perhaps that
11、some services can be traded only via commercial presence). What is special is that, although there has been little progress in achieving multilateral or plurilateral agreement on liberalising barriers to FDI generally, there has been progress in setting up a multilateral mechanism to liberalise FDI
12、in services. That mechanism is the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)under the WTO. The GATS is set up to liberalise trade in services, and it formally recognises commercial presence, along with three other modes (cross-border trade,consumption abroad, and the movement of natural persons)
13、, as a method by which services are traded. Regional Trade Agreements are also increasingly including provisions to liberalise services and FDI.So comprehensive modelling of services trade policy now needs to take into account liberalisation of FDI in services as well as liberalisation of other mode
14、s ofservices delivery. At a theoretical level, this means that models need to distinguish the ownership of services activity from the location of that activity. The remainder of this section discusses some of the theoretical, data and parameter issues involved in modelling that distinction, while th
15、e next section looks at the issue of getting credible Measures of the extent of barriers to FDI and conventional trade in services.Theoretical issues in modelling ownership and location By happy coincidence, many of the features required to model the location ofeconomic activity were already being b
16、uilt into both analytical and empirical models of services trade via the recognition of 3 increasing returns to scale and firm-level product differentiation. Indeed, some of us who built such features intoconventional CGE models that already had international capital mobility and anextensive treatme
17、nt of tariffs and transport costs were unaware that we were addingeconomic geography to our models until Paul Krugman (1998) told us so!But in models that differentiate the ownership and location of economic activity, a number of seemingly innocuous modelling choices can sometimes have alarming effe
18、cts on model results. Are economies of scale regional? One early choice is whether the economies of scale in services are regional or global. In treatments that assume large group monopolistic competition, where the equilibrium mark-up of price over marginal cost is directly related to the extent of
19、 product differentiation, this boils down to the same thing (although Neary (2001)argues that perhaps it shouldnt) as whether domestic and foreign firms, although differentiated, are perfect substitutes at the margin. Equivalently, do all firms appearin a single nest in the preference functions, or
20、are there multiple nests with different elasticities of substitution at each node? If economies of scale are global, they will obviously be much stronger than if they are regional.Francois, McDonald and Nordstom (1995) argued that for manufactures, economiesof scale should be seen as global. Althoug
21、h a Honda Civic may not be a perfectsubstitute for a Ford Laser, consumers the world over would feel equally better off whether it was a Civic or a Laser that was added to their choice set. And the extentt o which economies of scale in production could be exploited would depend on theglobal, not reg
22、ional, sales of Civics or Lasers. One way to rationalise this is to see the fixed costs of production, such as R&D and other headquarters services, asbeing incurred at a single, global headquarters. Increased sales anywhere in theworld could help to defray the centralised fixed costs.As Ethier and H
23、orn (1991) noted, services are often customised to the needs of individual purchasers. Although this appears never to have been modelled explicitly, it is easy to think of service firms who want to do this as needing to incurfixed costs to learn about either the regional characteristics of the indiv
24、iduals they are serving, or the regional regulatory frame works in which they are operating. Forexample, accounting firms would need to invest in learning about the tax laws in the countries in which they were operating. In models where accounting firms could set up regional offices, and where those
25、 regional offices operated as separate profitcentres, the fixed costs of acquiring regional knowledge would be off set against 4 regional, not global sales. And from a customers perspective, accounting firms that had not invested in regional knowledge would not be viewed as being perfect substitutes
26、 at the margin.This was the thinking behind treating economies of scale as regional rather than global in Dee and Hanslow (2001). Similar thinking seems to have been at play in Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr (1999). What is special about services trade barriers? Hoekman and Primo Braga (1997) noted t
27、hat because service delivery often needs to take placeface to face, tariffs are not a feasible means of trade protection because customs officials are unable to observe the transaction. Instead, services trade barriers are primarily regulatory, and like other non-tariff barriers, therefore difficult
28、 to quantify.The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) under the WTO outlines the sorts of trade barriers that will be negotiated. As noted, the GATS agreement recognises commercial presence as a mode of service delivery. Thus it recognises that services are often traded by firms establishin
29、g a permanent commercial presence in another country. So some of the important barriers to services trade are those that impede FDI by service firms. The GATS also distinguishes barriers to market access and derogations from national treatment. Under the latter, foreign service firms are treated dif
30、ferently from (typically less liberally than) domestic firms. Findlay and Warren (2000) argue that barriers to market access can be interpreted as being non-discriminatory barriers that affect the entry of any new firms, be they domestic or foreign, while derogations from national treatment are thos
31、e barriers that discriminate against foreign firms.These distinctions have two important implications for trade policy modelling.Modellers have to be prepared to recognise the activities of offshore affiliates and barriers to FDI flows, otherwise they are ignoring an important channel by which servi
32、ces are delivered. And they need to recognise that barriers to services trade are not purely discriminatory against foreign firms, but also affect domestic new entrants. Dee, Hanslow and Phamduc (forthcoming) discuss how these features of services trade barriers affect the applicability of conventio
33、nal trade theorems such as the Stolper-Samuelson and Rybczynski theorems. But modellers who simply treat services barriers as tariff equivalents on cross-border trade will miss two very important components of the trade policy action. Dee and Hanslow (2001) demonstrate just how important the additio
34、nal components are empirically.For modelling purposes, Dee and Hanslow (2001) adapted the GATS framework slightly to distinguish barriers to establishment (a subset of barriers to commercialpresence) 5 and barriers to ongoing operation. The former were modelled as applying to capital and the latter
35、as applying to final services either the output of FDI firms or the exports of services delivered via other means. The barriers could affect both domestic and foreign suppliers, though not necessarily equally. Trade in Services 资料来源 ： JO U RN A L O F TR AN S L AT IO N F RO M F O R EI GN LITERATURES
36、OF ECONOMICS, 2007 作者： Philippa Dee 服务有什么特别之处吗 ? 现今，贸易理论家可能会说服务贸易的特殊性有点少得惊人。就算是早期的论文基本上解除了在服务中的比较优势的决定因素可能有别于货物的决定因素 (辛德利和史密斯 1984年 , 迪尔道夫 1985)。 20世纪 80年代中后期的一些文件，审查了服务的一些重要特征， 并强调了知识密度等 (如马 库森 1989年，梅尔文1989年 )因素的作用。随后，这些同样的因素对新贸易理论 (如格罗斯曼和赫尔普曼 1991)在制造贸易中产生了中心作用。现在制造和服务规模报酬递增是司空见惯的，企业级产品差异化和迪克西特 -
37、斯蒂格利茨意愿的公司（如由马库森1995年的调查，马库森，卢瑟福和 塔尔 1999，布朗迪尔多夫和斯特恩 2000年）的解释是，有时对企业级产品差异化的来源和产生的固定费用的不同性质规模经济。只有在农业部门常见，至少在理论模型上是这样的。但是这或许已经和一个简单的机制有很大关系，由此来牵制返回到部门的流动因素 ，因为它是有现实意义在农业政策问题那里 , 现在农业政策包括遗传 工程，品种产权和地理标志。 服务贸易有何特别之处 ? 有一个服务贸易政策的特点是特殊的，并开始影响服务贸易的方式，它本身就可以作为蓝本。这个特点是指通过服务贸易在世贸组织商业存在中正式承认的一种方法。 外国直接投资发生在所
38、有部门。 迪和汉斯罗（ 2001），用于联合国 和亚太经合组织的数据来估计，全世界约有百分之二十外国直接投资是在第一产业（农业，采矿和食品加工），约百分之四十在第二和第三（服务）部门。粗略估计形成对外直接投资股票中，全 世界对外直接投资企业对初级产业的投资多达百分之八十，作为对比，第二产业和服务业分别占了百分之四十和百分之六十。对外直接投资公司通过商品和服务贸易作为一种对外输出的方式，然后通过商业存在的形式在所有产业中进行贸易，虽然它不计入在一般的国际收支平衡中。同样的，一般贸易在所有产业中占有重要地位。所以通过商业存在的方式服务贸易也没有什么特别之处（也许除了一些只能以商业存在进行的服务贸易
39、）。 6 特别的是，虽然在对外直接投资开放障碍中没有获得多边协议，但是建立开放的服务业对外直接投资多边机制已经有了进展。 这一机制就是世贸 组织下的服务贸易总协定。 服务贸易总协定的成立，旨在服务贸易自由化，并正式承认商业存在，随着（跨境贸易，境外消费和自然人流动）其他模式作为其中服务贸易的方法。区域贸易协定的规定也越来越多，包括开放服务和对外直接投资。所以服务贸易政策的综合规模模现在需要考虑到外国直接投资自由化参与服务以及其他方式提供服务的自由化。 在理论层面，这意味着模式需要区分服务活动从该活动的地点的所有权。本节的剩余部分将讨论的理论，数据和模型参数的区别涉及的一些问题，而下一节着眼于获
40、得可信的问题。对外国直接投资的障碍和服务业一般贸易。理 论上，传统贸易问题在建模所有权和愉快的采取巧合位置程度的措施，所需模型的经济活动地点的许多功能已被建设成为既可以对服务贸易进行分析又可以通过经验模型，得到规模收益递增和企业产品差异化的认可。事实上，我们经常提到的常规 CGE 模型已经具有国际资本流动和关税及运输成本等功能，以及我们不知道的经济地理，直到保罗克鲁格曼 (1998)的模型告诉我们。 但是，模型在区分所有权和经济活动的位置方面，看似无关痛痒的造型选择号码有时可以对模型的结果产生令人震惊的效果。 什么是区域规模经济？ 一个早期的选择是，服务的经济规模是区域性还是全球性的。假定在处
41、理大集团垄断竞争的时候，其中超过边际成本的价格平衡，直接关系到产品的差异程度，这可以归结为同样的事情（虽然尼尔里（ 2001）认为，也许不应该）无论是国内和国外企业，虽然有区别，但都是在边缘的完美替代品。等价地，所有的公司是优先呈现开放单一功能的巢，还是有不同的替代弹性与各节点的多个巢？如果经济规模是全球性的，他们当然比区域性的更具竞争力。 弗朗索瓦 ，麦当劳， 诺德汤姆 （ 1995）认为，对于生产，规模效益应该是在全球化看到。虽然本田可能不是一个完美的 福特激光的替代品，世界各地的消费者会觉得更好，是否也同样是一个公民或一个被添加到他们选择的激光设置。 而何种程度上可能会被利用将取决于全球
42、公民学或激光，而非地区，销售于一体的生产规模经济。合理化的方法之一就是看这是不是在作为一个单一的全球总部发生的固定生产成本，如研发和其他总部的服务。 在世界任何地方增加销售，有助于集中支付固定成本。就像西尔和非洲之角（ 1991）指出，服务往往是个性化的个人购买者的需要。 虽然这似乎从来没有被明确作为蓝本，很容易想到服务公司谁想要做需要承担的固定费用，无论是了解他们所服务的个人或 地区的监管框架工程中，他们经营的地域特征的。比如，会计师事务在投资时同时学习国家税收法律。 在模型的会计师事务所中，可以在那里设立地区办事处，并7 在财务管理信息系统中心作为单独的操作区域办事处，区域知识获取的固定费
43、用将关闭抵销区域，不是全球性的销售。 而从客户的角度来看，那些没有会计知识的区域投资企业将不会被视为是在边缘的完美替代品。这是区域经济思维而不是迪和汉斯罗（ 2001）的全球经济。 相似思维似乎已经在马库森，卢瑟福和塔尔（ 1999）发挥了。 服务贸易壁垒有何特殊之处？ 霍克人 和普里莫布拉加（ 1997）指出， 由于提供服务往往需要采取面对面，关税作为贸易保护的一种方式不是一个可行的手段，因为海关官员无法观察交易。相反，服务贸易障碍主要是监管和其他非关税障碍，因此难以确定。服务贸易总协定概述了在 WTO 贸易谈判下的各种壁垒。如前所述，服务贸易总协定承认商业存在提供服务的方式。因此，认识到服
44、务往往是通过建立一个永久性的另一国的商业存在的公司进行交易。因此，对服务贸易的重要障碍，有些是那些阻碍外国直接投资服务公司。 服务贸易总协定也从市场准入的壁垒，国民待遇和减损方面进行区别。根据后者，外国服务企业跟国内企业是不同的。 芬德利和沃伦（ 2000）认为，市场准入壁垒可以被视为是非歧视性的障碍，影响到任何新的企业进入，无论是国内还是国外，这些减损国民待遇是的障碍，是对外国公司的歧视。这些区别受到两个贸易政策的重要影响，必须准备承认境外分支机构和对外直接投资流量的活动，否则他们忽视其中的一个重要渠道将不能提供服务。他们必须认识到服务的贸易壁垒也并非纯粹针对外国公司的歧视，而且也影响国内新进入者。迪伊，汉斯罗和 范德 （即将出版）讨论了什么样的服务贸易壁垒影响了这些功能，如斯托尔帕，萨缪尔森定理一般贸易定理的适用性。但是如果建模者只考虑 关税等服务的障碍，跨境贸易将错过两个非常重要的贸易政策。迪和汉斯罗（ 2001）证明这个组件的重要性。对模拟而言，迪和汉斯罗（ 2001）改编的服务贸易总协定的框架，就建立持续经营的障碍和壁垒略有区别。前者作为蓝本适用于资本，后者适用于最终服务。无论是通过外国直接投资的公司输出或通过其他方式提供服务的出口。 这些障碍可能会影响到国内和国外供应商，虽然不一定平等。
