1、外文文献翻译原文ALTERNATIVEINTERNALCONTROLSASSUBSTITUTESOFTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSCARLOSFERNNDEZRUBNARRONDOEMPIRICALLITERATUREONCORPORATEGOVERNANCEOFTENASSUMESINDEPENDENCEAMONGDIFFERENTCONTROLMECHANISMSHOWEVER,DIFFERENTSTUDIESINTHEANGLOSAXONCONTEXTFINDTHATCONTROLMECHANISMSAREINTERRELATEDTHESPANISHCORPORATEGOVERN
2、ANCESYSTEM,UNLIKETHEANGLOSAXONONE,ISCHARACTERISEDBYTHEDOMINANCEOFINTERNALCONTROLS,MAINLYTHESTOCKOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONANDTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSINTHISINTERNALCONTROLCONTEXT,WESPECIFICALLYANALYSETHEPOSSIBLESUBSTITUTIONOFTHESUPERVISORYPOTENTIALOFTHEBOARDOUTSIDERSBYTHEINCENTIVEEFFECTSDERIVEDFROMMANAGERIALS
3、TOCKOWNERSHIPANDTHESUPERVISORYROLEOFLARGESHAREHOLDERSOURMAINRESULTSSHOWANEGATIVERELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHEPROPORTIONOFOUTSIDEDIRECTORSANDMANAGERIALANDLARGEBLOCKHOLDERSOWNERSHIPSTAKETHESEFINDINGSSUPPORTTHESUBSTITUTIONAMONGINTERNALCONTROLSANDSUGGESTTHATSPANISHFIRMSFORMANEFFICIENTCONGLOMERATEOFMANAGERIALCO
4、NTROLS,INWHICHDEFICIENCIESINASINGLEMECHANISMCANBECOMPENSATEDBYTHEACTIONOFANALTERNATIVEONEARECENTGROUPOFSTUDIESINTHEAREAOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCERECOGNISETHEPOSSIBLEEXISTENCEOFINTERACTIONSAMONGTHEDIFFERENTCONTROLMECHANISMSINTHISSENSE,WILLIAMSON1983STATESTHESUBSTITUTIONHYPOTHESISBETWEENINTERNALANDEXTERNAL
5、CONTROLMECHANISMS,ACCORDINGTOTHAT,WHENTHETAKEOVERMARKETISWEAK,ASINTHECASEOFTHESPANISHMARKET,THEREISAGREATERROLEFORINTERNALCONTROLMECHANISMSTHEALTERNATIVECONTROLMECHANISMSAREGROUPEDFORMINGTHECORPORATEGOVERNANCESYSTEMTRADITIONALLYTHESESYSTEMSHAVEBEENCLASSIFIEDASEXTERNALMARKETORIENTEDANDINTERNALNETWORK
6、ORIENTEDTHEEXTERNALSYSTEMS,DOMINANTINANGLOSAXONECONOMIES,AREBASEDONTHECONTROLEXERTEDBYTHEMARKETSTHESESYSTEMSARECHARACTERISEDBYTHEEXISTENCEOFAHIGHLYDEVELOPEDANDLIQUIDCAPITALMARKET,WITHAHIGHAMOUNTOFLISTEDCOMPANIESINTHESEMARKETSTAKEOVERSAREFREQUENT,CROSSEDSHAREHOLDINGSARENOTIMPORTANTANDSHARESAREMAINLYI
7、NTHEHANDSOFINDIVIDUALSDIRECTLYORTHROUGHINSTITUTIONALINVESTORSFRANKSANDMAYER,1994ONTHECONTRARY,INTERNALSYSTEMSPREVALENTINCONTINENTALEUROPEANECONOMIESANDJAPANPRESENTALOWERDEGREEOFCONTROLBYTHEMARKETFORCORPORATECONTROLANDAREDOMINATEDBYINTERNALMECHANISMSINTHESEECONOMIES,THECONTROLOFMANAGERIALACTIONSISMAI
8、NLYBASEDONTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSANDTHELARGESHAREHOLDERSTHESPANISHECONOMYISCHARACTERISEDBYALOWPROPORTIONOFLISTEDCOMPANIESCOMPAREDTOTHEUSORTHEUKMOREOVER,THESTOCKOWNERSHIPISHIGHLYCONCENTRATEDINTHEHANDSOFNONFINANCIALCOMPANIES,FINANCIALINSTITUTIONSANDFAMILIESTHISLOWERDEVELOPMENTOFTHEFINANCIALMARKETSANDTHEST
9、ABILITYANDCONCENTRATIONOFSTOCKOWNERSHIPSUGGESTSTHATTHESPANISHCORPORATEGOVERNANCESYSTEMISANINTERNALONEBASEDONTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSANDTHESUPERVISORYROLEOFLARGESHAREHOLDERSINTHISINTERNALCONTROLCONTEXT,WEANALYSEDTHEINFLUENCEOFTHEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREONTHEDEMANDOFOUTSIDEDIRECTORSBEINGTHEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREANON
10、CONTROLLEDVARIABLEBYTHEFIRM,THESUBSTITUTIONHYPOTHESISSHOULDBETESTEDBYSTUDYINGTHEBOARDSCOMPOSITIONASTHEONLYVARIABLEDETERMINEDINTERNALLYINTHECOMPANYIFANINTERACTIONEXISTSAMONGTHEDIFFERENTCONTROLS,THEBOARDSCOMPOSITIONSHOULDDEPENDONTHESETOFALTERNATIVECONTROLSAVAILABLETHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSISTHEINTERNALCONTR
11、OLMECHANISMINWHICHTHESHAREHOLDERSDELEGATETHEIRDECISIONPOWERTOCONTROLMANAGERIALDECISIONSTHISMECHANISMISCOMPOSEDOFINSIDEANDOUTSIDEMEMBERSTHEMAINTASKOFTHEINSIDEDIRECTORSISMANAGEMENTDECISIONS,WHILETHEMAINTASKOFOUTSIDERSISMANAGEMENTCONTROLTHISMONITORINGACTIVITY,PERFORMEDBYBOARDOUTSIDERS,ISSUPPORTEDBYDIFF
12、ERENTSTUDIESROSENSTEINANDWYATT1990FOUNDPOSITIVESTOCKPRICEEFFECTSWHENANEWOUTSIDERDIRECTORISAPPOINTEDTHISPOSITIVEREACTIONSIGNALSTHEDISCIPLINARYANDSUPERVISORYROLEPLAYEDBYTHEOUTSIDERSMANYAUTHORSHAVEALSODOCUMENTEDAPOSITIVERELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHEPROPORTIONOFOUTSIDERSINTHEBOARDANDFIRMSPERFORMANCEBAYSINGERAN
13、DBUTLER,1985RECHNERANDDALTON,1986SCHELLENGERETAL,1989DAILYANDDALTON,1992PEARCEANDZAHRA,1992BEATTYANDZAJAC,1994GOODSTEINANDBOEKER,1991THESESTUDIESSUGGESTTHATTHECOMPANYISBETTERMANAGEDUNDERTHECONTROLOFABOARDTHATINCLUDESINDEPENDENTOUTSIDERSADDITIONALLY,WEISBACH1988,GILSON1989,DHERMENTFEREREANDRENNEBOOG2
14、000ANDSUCHARDETAL2001HAVEFOUNDEVIDENCEREVEALINGTHEEXISTENCEOFSPECIFICACTIONSPERFORMEDBYTHEOUTSIDERSAIMEDATPROTECTINGTHESHAREHOLDERSWEALTHTHEEMPIRICALEVIDENCESUGGESTSTHATTHEQUALITYOFTHESUPERVISORYACTIVITYPERFORMEDBYTHEBOARDDEPENDSONTHEWEIGHTOFTHEOUTSIDERSINTHEBOARDINTHISSENSE,THEPROPORTIONOFOUTSIDEME
15、MBERSOFTHEBOARDCANBEUSEDASAPROXYOFTHECAPABILITYOFTHEBOARDTOCONTROLMANAGERIALACTIONSITISGENERALLYACCEPTEDTHATMANAGERSSTOCKOWNERSHIPCONTRIBUTESTOTHEALIGNMENTOFMANAGERIALANDSHAREHOLDERSINTERESTSTHEINCENTIVEEFFECTSCAUSEDBYMANAGERIALSTOCKOWNERSHIPIMPLYANALLEVIATIONOFTHEAGENCYCONFLICTSINTHEFIRMINTHISWAY,M
16、ANAGERIALSTOCKOWNERSHIPREDUCESTHENEEDFORACONTROLACTIVITYBYTHEOUTSIDEDIRECTORSACCORDINGTOTHAT,ZAJACANDWESTPHAL1994ANDDENISANDSARIN1999FINDANEGATIVERELATIONSHIPBETWEENMANAGERIALSTOCKOWNERSHIPANDTHEPROPORTIONOFOUTSIDEBOARDMEMBERSBESIDESTHEALIGNMENTEFFECTSDERIVEDFROMMANAGERIALSTOCKOWNERSHIP,ITSDISPERSIO
17、NAMONGSTTHEMEMBERSOFTHEMANAGERIALTEAMCANALSOAFFECTTHEIRINCENTIVEFORMUTUALMONITORINGACTIVITIESACCORDINGTOFAMA1980,THEREAREINCENTIVESFORTHEMANAGERSTOCONTROLTHERESTOFTHEMANAGERIALTEAMMEMBERSONTHEONEHAND,THEREISCOMPETITIONAMONGTHETOPMANAGERIALTEAMTOACHIEVETHEHIGHESTANDMOSTPRESTIGIOUSPOSITIONSINTHECOMPAN
18、YTHISCOMPETITIONENCOURAGESMONITORINGAMONGSTMANAGERS,SINCENONVALUEENHANCINGACTIVITIESBYOTHERMEMBERSOFTHEMANAGERIALTEAMCOULDGIVESOMEADVANTAGETOTHERESTOFTHEMANAGERSTOACHIEVETOPPOSITIONSONTHEOTHERHAND,THEMANAGERIALLABOURMARKETMOTIVATESMANAGERSTOSUPERVISEEACHOTHERSACTIONSNONVALUEMAXIMISINGACTIVITIESBYAME
19、MBEROFTHEMANAGERIALTEAMCANHAVEANEGATIVEIMPACTONTHEFIRMSMARKETVALUE,WHICHINTURNCANREDUCETHEVALUEOFTHEWHOLEGROUPOFMANAGERSINTHEMANAGERIALLABOURMARKETTHEEXPANSIONOFTHENEGATIVECONSEQUENCESOFANINDIVIDUALSOPPORTUNISTICACTIONSTOTHERESTOFTHEMANAGERIALTEAMENCOURAGESMUTUALMONITORINGAMONGSTMANAGERSTHECAPABILIT
20、YOFTHEMANAGERSTOPERFORMMUTUALMONITORINGDEPENDSONTHEDISPERSIONOFMANAGERIALPOWER,AMUTUALMONITORINGSYSTEMBEINGMOREDIFFICULTTOESTABLISHWHENTHEREISACLEARCONCENTRATIONOFPOWERINTHEHANDSOFASINGLEMANAGERIFASINGLEMEMBEROFTHEMANAGERIALTEAMCLEARLYDOMINATESTHEOTHERS,THERESTOFTHEMANAGERSCOULDLACKTHEPOWEROREVENTHE
21、INFORMATIONTOCONTROLTHEHEADOFTHEORGANISATIONIFTHEMANAGERIALSTOCKOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREFACILITATESMUTUALSUPERVISIONINTHEMANAGERIALTEAM,THEREISALOWERPROBABILITYOFINCURRINGWEALTHDESTROYINGACTIONS,ANDTHEREFORE,ITISLESSNECESSARYFORABOARDOFDIRECTORSTOPERFORMACONTROLACTIVITYTHUS,ACCORDINGTOTHEWEALTHEFFECTSRELA
22、TEDTOMANAGERIALSHAREHOLDINGSANDTHEPROPENSITYTOESTABLISHAMUTUALSUPERVISORYSYSTEM,WEPROPOSETHEFOLLOWINGHYPOTHESISTHEALIGNMENTEFFECTLINKEDTOMANAGERIALSTOCKOWNERSHIPANDTHEMONITORINGPOTENTIALAMONGSTMANAGERSREDUCETHEDEMANDFOROUTSIDEDIRECTORSTHELITERATUREONOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREISNOTONLYFOCUSEDONMANAGERIALSTOC
23、KOWNERSHIPBUTALSOONNONEXECUTIVESHAREHOLDERS,WHOHOLDSIGNIFICANTEQUITYSTAKESTHEPRESENCEOFLARGESHAREHOLDERSHELPSTOMODERATETHEFREERIDERPROBLEMANDINCREASESTHEINTENSITYOFDIRECTSUPERVISIONONMANAGERIALACTIONSSHLEIFERANDVISHNY,1986DIFFERENTAUTHORSHAVECORROBORATEDTHESUPERVISORYACTIVITYPERFORMEDBYLARGESHAREHOL
24、DERSKAPLANANDMINTON1994,KANGANDSHIVDASANI1995ANDFRANKSETAL1997CONFIRMTHEPOSITIVEINFLUENCEOFLARGESHAREHOLDERSONMANAGERIALTURNOVERINUNDERPERFORMINGFIRMSINTHESAMEWAY,THEREISEVIDENCEOFAHIGHERMODERATIONINMANAGERIALREMUNERATIONINTHEPRESENCEOFLARGESHAREHOLDERSDYL,1988HAMBRICKANDFINKELSTEIN,1995ADDITIONALLY
25、,THELARGESHAREHOLDERSINCREASETHEDISCIPLINARYPOTENTIALOFTHEMARKETFORCORPORATECONTROLSHLEIFERANDVISHNY,1986HIRSHLEIFERANDTITMAN,1990CHOWDHRYANDJEGADEESH,1994ACCORDINGTOTHAT,WALKINGANDLONG1984ANDJENNINGSANDMAZZEO1991FOUNDEVIDENCEOFANEGATIVERELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHESIZEOFEQUITYSTAKESHELDBYLARGESHAREHOLDERS
26、ANDTHEPROBABILITYOFMANAGERIALOPPOSITIONTOTAKEOVERATTEMPTSSIMILARLY,SHIVDASANI1993FOUNDAPOSITIVERELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHOSEEQUITYSTAKESANDTHEPROBABILITYOFAFIRMBEINGTAKENOVERTHUS,THEDIRECTSUPERVISIONPERFORMEDBYTHELARGESHAREHOLDERSANDTHEIRPOSITIVEINFLUENCEONTHEDISCIPLINARYROLEOFTHEMARKETFORCORPORATECONTRO
27、LREDUCESTHENEEDFORALTERNATIVECONTROLSCONSEQUENTLY,WEPROPOSETHEFOLLOWINGHYPOTHESISTHECONTROLACTIVITYPERFORMEDBYOUTSIDEBLOCKHOLDERSSUBSTITUTESTHESUPERVISORYPOTENTIALOFTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSRESULTSFORTHESETOFPANELDATALINEARREGRESSIONSARESHOWNINTABLE3THESERESULTSCORRESPONDTOASETOFFIXEDEFFECTSPANELDATAMODEL
28、S,ASTHESEHAVEBEENVALIDATEDBYTHEHAUSMANTESTWEHAVEOBTAINEDNEGATIVEANDSTATISTICALLYSIGNIFICANTCOEFFICIENTSFORALLVARIABLESMEASURINGTHEMANAGERIALSTOCKOWNERSHIPINOWNANDTOPOWNTHEVARIABLESREPRESENTINGTHEDISPERSIONOFTHEMANAGERIALSTOCKOWNERSHIP,DISINOWN1ANDDISINOWN2,ENTEREDSIGNIFICANTLYINALLREGRESSIONSEXCEPTT
29、HESECONDONEFINALLY,THECOEFFICIENTSOBTAINEDFORTHELARGESHAREHOLDERSSTOCKOWNERSHIPLARGE3HAVEALSOBEENNEGATIVEANDSTATISTICALLYSIGNIFICANTINALLREGRESSIONSALLTHESERESULTSSUPPORTTHEEXISTENCEOFASUBSTITUTIONBETWEENTHESUPERVISORYPOTENTIALOFTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSANDALTERNATIVEINTERNALCONTROLMECHANISMSTHENEGATIVEAN
30、DSIGNIFICANTRELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHEPROPORTIONOFBOARDOUTSIDERSANDTHEMANAGERIALSTOCKOWNERSHIP,BOTHESTIMATEDBYTHEJOINTSTOCKOWNERSHIPOFTHEBOARDINSIDERSINOWNANDTHESTOCKOWNERSHIPOFTHEPRESIDENTANDTHECEOTOPOWN,VALIDATESOURFIRSTHYPOTHESISTHESERESULTSSUGGESTTHATTHEALIGNMENTEFFECTSORIGINATEDFROMTHEMANAGERSSTOCK
31、OWNERSHIPREDUCESTHEIRPROPENSITYTOTAKEPARTINNONVALUEENHANCINGACTIVITIES,WHICHLOWERSTHENEEDFORASUPERVISORYACTIVITYPERFORMEDBYTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSTHENEGATIVEANDSIGNIFICANTRELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHEDISPERSIONOFINSIDERSSTOCKOWNERSHIPDISINOWN1ANDDISINOWN2ANDTHEPROPORTIONOFBOARDOUTSIDERSPOUTCORROBORATESTHATWHEN
32、THEINSIDERSSTOCKOWNERSHIPISDISPERSEDAMONGTHEMEMBERSOFTHEMANAGERIALTEAM,THEREISAPOTENTIALSUPERVISIONBETWEENTHEMANAGERSTHATREDUCESTHEINTENSITYOFAGENCYCONFLICTSTHEREISNONEEDINTHATCASETOINCLUDEAHIGHPROPORTIONOFOUTSIDERSINTHEBOARDTOPERFORMACONTROLACTIVITYTHENEGATIVEANDSIGNIFICANTRELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHENON
33、EXECUTIVELARGESHAREHOLDINGSANDTHEPROPORTIONOFOUTSIDEDIRECTORSCORROBORATESTHEEXISTENCEOFASUBSTITUTIONBETWEENTHESUPERVISORYACTIVITYBYTHESESHAREHOLDERSANDTHEMONITORINGPOTENTIALOFTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSASTHELARGESHAREHOLDERSHAVEINCENTIVESANDCAPABILITYTOPERFORMADIRECTCONTROLOVERTHEMANAGERSACTIVITIES,THEREISN
34、ONEEDTOINCLUDEOUTSIDERSINTHEBOARDTOEXERTAMONITORINGACTIVITYWEHAVEOBTAINEDNEGATIVECOEFFICIENTSFORTHEVARIABLETHATESTIMATESTHEINTENSITYOFTHECONTROLEXERTEDBYTHETAKEOVERMARKETTHISRELATIONSHIPINDICATESTHATWHENTHEMARKETFORCORPORATECONTROLTHREATENSMANAGERIALOPPORTUNISTICACTIONS,ITISLESSNECESSARYTOINCLUDEOUT
35、SIDERSINTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSHOWEVER,THISRELATIONSHIPISNOTSTATISTICALLYSIGNIFICANTTHISCOULDBEDUETOTHELOWINTENSITYOFTHEACTIVITYINTHESPANISHTAKEOVERMARKETIFTHEBOARDDONOTPERCEIVETHETAKEOVERMARKETASANACTIVECONTROL,ITISPROBABLETHATITISNOTTAKENINTOACCOUNTWHENDECIDINGTHECOMPOSITIONOFTHEBOARDINTHESAMEWAY,WEHA
36、VEFOUNDANEGATIVEANDNONSTATISTICALLYSIGNIFICANTRELATIONSHIPBETWEENFINANCIALLEVERAGERATIOANDTHEPROPORTIONOFOUTSIDERSINTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSTHISFINDINGSUGGESTSTHATDEBTFINANCINGDOESNOTEXERTANACTIVECONTROLONMANAGERIALACTIONSALTOGETHEROURRESULTSPOINTTOALOWINTENSITYINTHEEXTERNALCONTROLSEXERTEDBYTHEMARKETS,AS
37、THESPANISHCORPORATEGOVERNANCESYSTEMISDOMINATEDBYINTERNALMECHANISMSOFCONTROLOURRESULTSJOINTLYSUGGESTTHATTHEINTERNALCONTROLMECHANISMSAREINTERRELATEDINTHESENSETHATTHEINTENSITYOFCONTROLSDERIVEDFROMTHESTOCKOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREAFFECTSTHEWAYINWHICHCOMPANIESFORMTHEIRBOARDOFDIRECTORSWEOBTAINEVIDENCESUPPORTINGT
38、HEEXISTENCEOFASUBSTITUTIONBETWEENTHESUPERVISORYACTIVITYOFTHEBOARDOUTSIDERSANDTHECONTROLANDALIGNMENTDERIVEDFROMNONEXECUTIVELARGESHAREHOLDINGSANDMANAGERIALSTOCKOWNERSHIPRESPECTIVELYTHISFINDINGSUGGESTSTHATTHECOMPANIESFORMTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSTAKINGINTOACCOUNTTHECAPABILITYOFOTHERAVAILABLEINTERNALCONTROLME
39、CHANISMSTOMODERATEMANAGERIALPROPENSITYTOINDULGEINOPPORTUNISTICBEHAVIOURTHEREARENUMEROUSCONTROLMECHANISMSCAPABLEOFALLEVIATINGTHEAGENCYCONFLICTSBETWEENSHAREHOLDERSANDMANAGERSTHEEXISTENCEOFMULTIPLEALTERNATIVESOFCONTROLIMPLIESTHATTHEACTIONOFASINGLEMECHANISMCANREDUCETHEINTENSITYOFAGENCYCONFLICTS,THEREFOR
40、E,THENEEDFORANALTERNATIVECONTROLCOMINGFROMADIFFERENTMECHANISMTHISPAPEREXAMINES,INTHEFRAMEWORKOFTHEINTERNALCORPORATEGOVERNANCESYSTEMOFTHESPANISHMARKET,THEPOSSIBLESUBSTITUTIONAMONGDIFFERENTINTERNALCONTROLMECHANISMSOURRESULTSSHOWTHATTHECOMPOSITIONOFTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSISAFFECTEDBYTHEINTENSITYOFTHECONTRO
41、LPROVIDEDBYOTHERINTERNALCONTROLMECHANISMS,NAMELY,THEINCENTIVEEFFECTSLINKEDTOMANAGERIALSTOCKOWNERSHIP,THEMUTUALMONITORINGAMONGMANAGERSANDTHESUPERVISIONPROVIDEDBYLARGEBLOCKHOLDERSCONSIDERINGTHEPROPORTIONOFBOARDOUTSIDEMEMBERS,ASAPROXYOFTHEBOARDSMONITORINGPOTENTIAL,THERESULTSOBTAINEDSUGGESTTHEEXISTENCEO
42、FASUBSTITUTIONRELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHESUPERVISORYACTIVITYOFTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSANDTHEOTHERINTERNALCONTROLSTHESERESULTSSUGGESTTHATTHEFIRMSFORMANEFFICIENTSETOFCONTROLSINTERNALLY,MEANINGTHATTHEREDUCTIONINTHEUSEOFACONTROLMECHANISM,WHENTHEUSEOFOTHERSMAKESITUNNECESSARY,AVOIDSTHEDUPLICATIONOFCONTROLSTHATDONOT
43、BENEFITTHESHAREHOLDERSBESIDES,THEINTERDEPENDENCEAMONGTHESEMECHANISMSOFCONTROLSUGGESTSTHATTHEIREFFICIENCYHASTOBEEVALUATEDFROMAGLOBALPERSPECTIVE,INTEGRATINGATTHESAMETIMEALLTHEDIFFERENTMECHANISMSTHATCANAFFECTMANAGERIALDISCRETIONACCORDINGTOTHIS,THEANALYSISOFTHEJOINTEFFECTOFTHECONGLOMERATEOFCONTROLMECHAN
44、ISMSONTHEFIRMSPERFORMANCECONSTITUTESANATURALEXTENSIONOFTHEPRESENTPAPERSOURCECARLOSFERNANDEZ,RUBENARRONDOALTERNATIVEINTERNALCONTROLSASSUBSTITUTESOFTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSJCORPORATEGOVERNANCEANINTERNATIONALREVIEW,2005,136856866译文选择性内部控制可以替代董事会的监督作用卡洛斯梵楠鲁贝艾伦度有关公司治理的实证文献一般假设不同的控制机制存在独立性。然而,针对盎格鲁撒克逊环境的许多研究发现
45、控制机制是相互联系的。西班牙公司治理体系,与盎格鲁撒克不同，由内部控制主要是股权集中的股东和董事会主导是它的特点。在这个内部控制背景下，我们从管理股权和大股东监督产生的刺激性作用方面来具体分析董事局外人的监督潜力被代替的可能性。我们的主要成果显示公司外部董事的比例与经理层和大股东的奖金呈负相关性。这些研究结果支持内部控制的代替作用，并且表明西班牙公司形式可以形成有效实施管理控制的团体，在这个团体里，单一机制的缺陷可以通过一个替代措施来弥补。最近，一个研究公司治理的研究组认可公司治理与控制机制之间存在相互作用的可能。在这个意义上，威廉姆森（1983）陈述了内外部控制机制之间的替代假说，根据是当收
46、购市场疲软时，内部控制机制则会发挥更大的作用，如西班牙案件。另一种控制机制正分流形成公司治理制度。传统上这些系统已被列为外部系统（市场导向）和内部系统网络导向。外部系统，在盎格鲁撒克逊经济体发挥重要作用，是以由市场所施加的控制为基础的。这个系统的特点是存在一个高度发达的流动资本市场，并伴随着大量的上市公司。在这个市场中，收购频繁，交叉持股并不重要，股票主要通过直接或经机构投资者流入个人手中（弗兰克斯和梅尔，1994）。相反，内部系统盛行于欧洲经济体和日本，呈现出市场对企业控制程度较低，主要通过内部机制进行。在此经济体中，管理行为的控制，主要是由董事会和大股东实施。与美国或英国相比，西班牙经济的
47、特点是上市公司的比例比较低。此外，股权高度集中在非金融性机构、金融机构和家族手中。这种低发展程度的金融市场和稳定、集中的持股表明，西班牙的公司治理制度是一个以董事会和大股东的监督作用为基础的内部制度。在这个内部控制方面，我们分析了外部董事需求对所有制结构产生的影响。作为公司所有制结构的非控制变量，替代假说研究应把董事会作为公司内部唯一确定的变量进行测试。如果不同控制之间存在着相互作用，那么董事会的组成取决于这套控制的替代性。董事会属于内部控制机制，其中股东代表行使他们的决策权并制定管理控制决策。这个机制由内外部成员组成。该内部董事主要任务是管理决策，而外部董事的主要任务是管理控制。这种监测活动
48、应由外部董事执行，这得到许多研究的支持。罗森斯坦和悦（1990）发现任命一个新的外部董事会给股价带来积极影响。这种积极影响体现了外部董事发挥的维护纪律和监督作用。许多研究者还记录了外部董事的比例和企业经营情况之间的正相关关系。这些研究表明，公司在有外部董事的董事会控制下经营的更好。此外，魏兹巴赫（1988），吉尔森（1989）等得出的研究资料揭示了存在独立董事执行的旨在保护股东资产的具体行动。实验资料表明委员会执行的监督活动的质量取决外部董事在董事会的比例。这样，董事会的外部成员的比例可以起到委员会代理人控制管理活动的作用。人们普遍接受了管理者持股有助于管理者和股东的利益保持一致。由管理者持股
49、所造成的激励效应揭示了公司代理冲突的缓解。这样，管理者持股减少了对外部董事控制的需要。据认为，扎艾克、万斯夫（1994）和丹尼斯、沙林（1999年）发现经营者持股与外部董事比例呈负相关关系。此外，管理者持股会产生协同效应，其管理团队成员的分布也会成为影响他们相互监督的因素。根据法玛（1980）的研究，存在管理人员控制管理团队其余成员的因素。一方面，高层管理团队有跻身公司最高、最具名望的的职位之争。这种竞争增强了管理者之间的监督，因为管理团队其他成员的一些行为产生的优化作用，可以给其余成员登上最高职位提供一些帮助。另一方面，劳动力市场管理行为激励管理人员互相监督彼此的行动。一个管理团队成员的非价值最大化的活动可能对公司的市场价值产生负面影响，这反过来又会降低管理劳动力市场管理团体的整体价值。个人的机会主义行为给管理团队其余成员带来的负面影响扩大后,会增强管理者之间的监督。管理者执行相互监督的能力，取决于管理权的分散程度。当权力明确地集中在个别管理者手中时，相互监督制度建立比较困难。如果管理团队的某个成员（领导者）有权明确地支配其他人，其余的管理者可能缺乏权力，甚至缺乏信息去控制该组织的领导者。如果管理者持股结构有助于管理团队相互监督，则财产损失概率会处于一个低水平。从而，董事会执行控制活动的必要性会降低。因此，根据管理者持股带来的财富效应和建立相
