1、1硕士学位论文（20 届）股份同期所有权规则突破之探析姓 名学 科 、 专 业 经 济 法 （ 全 日 制 法 学 硕 士 ）研 究 方 向 商 法指 导 教 师论文提交日期2股份同期所有权规则突破之探析（硕士论文摘要）中小股东的股权在公司集团架构下被无形的限缩了，大股东往往利用自己的控制权，通过增设公司层级（如子公司）以规避法律。这就造成了在立体的公司架构下，中小股东股权受损时，常常无法救济。而这种股权限缩是因为某些股权的行使必须受到同期所有权规则的限制造成的。本文在吸收美国先进判例法基础上，提出了对股份同期所有权规则的突破理论。该种突破可以具体表现为：多重代表诉讼、穿越投票权、多层查阅权等
2、三项制度。2006 年公司法修订时，并未包含对于关联交易和集团公司的相关规定，也为控制公司中小股东的权利受到侵害埋下了隐患。笔者通过对于上述三个制度的细致研究，提出了具体的、符合中国情况的具体制度设计，以弥补法律的缺漏。本文共分四章：第一章股份同期所有权规则及其突破概述。首先就同期所有权突破规则进行了狭义和广义的界定，明确了本概念的内涵和外延。其具体含义是：某些股权行使的前提条件是，持续拥有一定数量公司股份的股东才能行使相应的股东权。继而以举例子的方式对于同期所有权规则的突破进行了解释，明确其突破的必要性。进一步，同期所有权规则的突破主要包括多重代表诉讼、穿越投票权、多层查阅权等三个制度。三者
3、分别从空间和时间上，对股份同期所有权规则进行了突破。第二章股份同期所有权规则突破的理论基础。本章在深入分析了集团法理基础、同期所有权规则的例外理论、中小股东保护的相关理论、董事会中心到股东会中心主义以及实质性损害理论等理论基础上，明确了同期所有权突破的部分法理依据。随后，笔者从历史发展的角度，对同期所有权规则的突破进行研讨。并且，在运用了成本收益分析方法之后，认为该同期所有权规则的突破在审慎适用的情况下符合法经济学的基本要求。在此基础上，笔者对搜集到的美国的相关案例、判决进行了梳理，剖析了其中不合理的因素，细化了其可以操作的成分，最后得出同期所有权突破所具有的补偿和威慑的双重功用。第三章股份同
4、期所有权规则突破的法律障碍剖析。纵观国内外立法，即便3在发达的英美法系国家，股份同期所有权规则的突破也是极为有限的。就我国而言，现行法律制度，对于同期所有权规则的突破未能涉及，相关法条所明示的含义也很难进行扩张解释。与多重代表诉讼、穿越投票权、多层查阅权相关的刺破公司法人面纱制度和关联交易制度，要么在适用范围上有所局限，要么适用条件过于严苛，都未能从根本上解决控制（控股）公司中小股东利益受损的难题。第四章股份同期所有权规则突破的制度设计及司法裁判。基于立体的公司架构的复杂性，股份同期所有权规则突破需要较为细致的制度设计。在制度构建方面，应在既有的公司法理论体系下进行创新，同时厘清特殊的规则。针
5、对不同的分类，设计不同的股份同期所有权突破规则，如将完全控股、部分控股等特殊情况加以区别对待等。而在司法裁判方面，则需要同公司法人格否认制度一样，审慎对待，并充分发挥法官的自由裁量权。 关键词 同期所有权规则 穿越投票权 多层查阅权 多重代表诉讼 股东权限缩1Legal Analysis on Breakthrough of Contemporary Ownership RuleAbstractUnder the structure of Group Company, the rights of minor and medium shareholders have been limited a
6、nd narrowed in an intangible way. With the control right, the majority shareholders usually evade laws and regulations through increasing the companys tiers (i.e. subsidiaries), which causes the lack of remedy when the rights of minor and medium shareholders have been damaged under tridimensional st
7、ructure. The reason of such limitation and narrowing to shareholders is that the exertion of certain shareholders rights must be regulated by contemporary ownership rule. Referring to the advanced case law of America, this paper puts forward theory breakthrough of contemporary ownership rule, which
8、contains the systems of multiple derivative suit, pass through voting right and multiple inspection right. In 2006 Amendment to Company Law, there are no relevant regulations on affiliated trade and Group Company, which is another reason of minor and medium shareholders rights in holding company bei
9、ng easily damaged. The author conducts an investigation to the three systems mentioned above, and designs a specific system that is in accordance with Chinas situation and can perfect the current law. This paper has four chapters.Chapter : Summary of shares contemporary ownership rule and its breakt
10、hrough. First the author respectively defines the connotation and extension of the breakthrough of shares contemporary ownership rule in a narrow and broad sense. This rule means the precondition of exerting certain shareholders rights is the shareholder must continually hold certain sum of companys
11、 shares. Then, to specify the necessity of breakthrough of contemporary ownership rule, the author gives a detailed explanation by giving some examples. Furthermore, such breakthrough 2mainly includes the systems of multiple derivative suit, pass through voting right and multiple inspection right, w
12、hich respectively breaks through the rule from space and time. Chapter : Theory foundation of the breakthrough of contemporary ownership rule. After further analyzing theories such as the jurisprudence, exceptional theory of contemporary ownership rule, theory of protecting minor and medium sharehol
13、ders, theory that changed from board of directors to shareholders meeting, and theory of substantial damage, the author defines part of theory foundation of the breakthrough of contemporary ownership rule. Moreover, the author also discusses breakthrough of contemporary ownership rule from the angle
14、 of history development. With the analysis method of cost-proceeds, it is concluded that the breakthrough of contemporary ownership rule is in accordance with the requirements of legal economics if such breakthrough is applied with prudence. Then, the author analyzes the relevant American cases, dis
15、cards their unreasonable parts, details their applicable parts, and concludes that the breakthrough of contemporary ownership has compensatory and deterring functions.Chapter : Legal obstacle of the breakthrough of contemporary ownership rule. Taking a view at the legislations of different countries
16、 in the world, the breakthrough of contemporary ownership rule is very limited even in some developed countries such as Britain and America. In current Chinese legislation, there is no regulation on the breakthrough of contemporary ownership rule. In addition, relevant articles cannot be broadly int
17、erpreted. The systems of piercing the corporate veil and affiliated trade, which are related to multiple derivative suit, pass through voting right and multiple inspection right, cannot settle the problem of the minor and medium shareholders interests being damaged because of their limited applicati
18、on scope and strict applicable conditions.Chapter : System design and judicial judgment of the breakthrough of shares contemporary ownership rule. Because of the complexity of companys tridimensional structure, the breakthrough system of shares contemporary ownership 3rule shall be more specifically
19、 designed. In the aspect of system design, innovation shall be made under the current theory system of Company Law. Special rules of shares contemporary ownership shall be designed according to different classifications. For example, the special conditions such as entirely holding and partly holding
20、 shall be treated distinctively. In the aspect of judicial judgment, it shall be treated with the same prudence as the disregard of corporate personality system. The judges discretion right shall also be given full change to exert.Key Words: Contemporary Ownership Rule Pass through Voting Right Mult
21、iple Inspection Right Multiple Derivative Suit Limitation and Narrowing of the Shareholders Rights1目 录导 言 .1一、选题缘起及研究意义 .1二、国内外现有文献综述 .2三、本文讨论范围的界定 .4四、本文主要研究方法 .5第一章 股份同期所有权规则及其突破概述 .7第一节 股份同期所有权规则的概念及内涵 .7一、股份同期所有权规则的概念 .7二、股份同期所有权规则的内涵及其突破 .9第二节 股份同期所有权规则突破的界定及表现 .10一、股份同期所有权规则突破的界定 .10二、股份同期所有权规
22、则突破的必要性及其表现 .12第三节 股份同期所有权规则突破的类型 .16一、多重代表诉讼 .16二、穿越投票权 .17三、多层查阅权 .18第二章 股份同期所有权规则突破的理论基础 .20第一节 股份同期所有权规则突破的法理基础 .20一、集团法理基础 .20二、同期所有权规则的例外理论 .20三、中小股东保护的相关理论 .21四、股东会中心主义与利益相关者理论的融合 .22五、实质性损害理论 .22第二节 美国相关判例对同期所有权规则突破的支持 .23一、与双重代表诉讼相关的判例 .23二、与多层查阅权相关的判例 .25三、与穿越性投票权相关的判例 .272第三章 股份同期所有权规则突破的
23、法律障碍剖析 .28第一节 股份同期所有权规则突破的公司法障碍及其剖析 .28一、同期所有权规则突破违反了股东平等原则 .28二、同期所有权规则突破的成本过高 .28三、同期所有权规则突破缺乏相应法理基础 .29第二节 对其他否定股份同期所有权规则突破理论的批判 .29一、其他否定股份同期所有权规则突破的若干理论 .29二、对上述理论的驳斥意见 .31三、对股份同期所有权规则突破的评析 .34第三节 股份同期所有权规则突破与传统制度的衔接 .35一、与刺破公司法人面纱制度的衔接 .35二、与关联交易制度的衔接 .38第四章 股份同期所有权规则突破的 制度设计及司法裁判 .41第一节 股份同期所有权规则突破的制度设计 .41一、多重代表诉讼的制度设计 .41二、穿越投票权的制度设计 .44三、多层查阅权的制度设计 .45第二节 不同分类、不同规则 .47一、纯粹控股、事业控股 .47二、完全控股、部分控股 .48三、不同权利、不同规则 .48第三节 股份同期所有权规则突破的司法裁判 .49一、司法介入股份同期所有权规则突破的范围和限度 .49二、审慎对待股份同期所有权规则突破 .50三、股份同期所有权规则突破的司法审判柔性化 .51结 语 .52参考文献 .53在读期间发表的学术论文与研究成果 .62后 记 .63
