1、 1 外文翻译 原文 Limits to the Privatization of Fishery Resources Material Source: Ebsco Author: Colin W. C l a r k , G o r d o n R . M u n r o , a n d U . R a s h i d S u m a i l a The increasingly widespread implementation of harvesting rights schemes (or limited access privilege programs LAPPs,to use A
2、merican terminology), such as individual transferable quota (ITQ)schemes, territorial use rights in fisheries,and fisher cooperatives, has steadily increased the opportunity for private sector groups to influence fisheries management policy. This development, in turn, has given rise to a debate over
3、 the extent to which private sector influence over fisheries management. should be encouraged, with some authors implying that private sector management of the resource should be allowed to expand to the point that public sector oversight ceases to be significant (see, e.g.,Hannesson 2004; Arnason 2
4、007). The private “individual,“ or entity, would then be the owner of the resource, de facto, if not de jure. Other authors, however, argue that there are, in fact, strict limits to socially. optimal privatization of these resources. Authors such as Copes (1986), Copes and Charles (2004), and Macink
5、o and Bromley (2002) have also addressed other weaknesses of privatizing fishery resources. In this paper, we focus sharply on the limits to socially optimal privatization of fishery resources, with the goal of contributing to the ongoing debate. To do this, we turn to the well-known result that, un
6、der certain circumstances, a private owner of a fishery resource could opt to drive there source to the brink of biological extinction, even in the absence of a positive minimum viable population (Clark 1973).This result is of particular interest, because a recent stimulating and provocative article
7、 in Science does, on the basis of empirical investigation of four fisheries, suggest that this result may be of little more than a theoretical curiosity, devoid of practical significance (Grafton, Kompas, and Hilborn 2007). The authors state: “A classic result Clark 1973 is that it may be optimal fo
8、r a private owner to over exploit to extinction a renewable resource with low productive capacity. . We show that under reasonable prices, costs, and discount rates it is not economic to exploit fisheries to 2 extinction even with very low growth rates“ (1601). Arid further: “Theoretically our ital.
9、, maximizing discounted economic profits may cause stock depletion or even extinction Clark 1973. Our results show, however, that in practice our ital. BMEY BMSY“ (1601). (Here BMEY is the economically optimal biomass level, and BMSY is the MSY biomass level.) These assertions are gaining widespread
10、 currency. Thus, for example, in an even more recent Science article on the effectiveness of catch shares in preventing stock collapses, the authors ask whether it would be optimal economically to heavily exploit fish stocks to the point of extinction and invest the proceeds elsewhere. They respond
11、by stating that “although this remains a theoretical our ital. possibilityClark 1973a recent study reports that under reasonable economic parameterization extinction is suboptimal (even with low growth rates) Grafton et al. 2007“ (Costello, Gaines, and Lynham 2008, 1678). We shall argue that Clarks
12、1973 result cannot,in fact, be safely dismissed as being no more than a theoretical possibility, but rather continues to have substantial practical relevance. If the Clark result does have practical relevance, there follows what we might call a “So what?“ question. If a private owner of a resource c
13、oncludes that it is economically optimal to fully deplete the resource, what is there to say that a public owner would not come to exactly the same conclusion? Hence, there is really nothing to be lost by placing the resource under private ownership . This “So what?“ question is also to be investiga
14、ted. Grafton, Kompas, and Hilborn (2007,1601) say, “In all cases, even at very high discount rates, fishery profits become negative long before biomass is fully depleted.“ While it is not entirely clear whether this statement applies only to the four fishery resources reported upon in the article, o
15、r whether it is meant to apply to all fishery resources, the reader might well gain the impression that a strong MSE is the norm, and that the answer to our test question about the resource being safe from extinction(or anything close to it) under pure open access is a firm “yes.“ The question now b
16、efore us is whether the answer to our test question is, or is not, generally “yes,“ as seems to be implied by Grafton, Kompas, Hilborn (2007). If it is, and if the cases of a negligible, or at least weak, MSE are rare exceptions, then it is true that Clarks result, and all that it implies, can be sa
17、fely treated as a mere curiosity. We have noted that the “strong“ MSE associated with the standard dynamic economic model of the fishery rests upon a strict linear relationship between CPUE 3 and the size of the biomass (Clark 2006). There is, in fact, no biological evidence that this is commonplace
18、 among fishery resources. Cooke and Beddington, in an article on the relationship between CPUE and fish stock abundance, state that “a linear relationship between CPUE and abundance has rarely been quantitatively demonstrated“ (Cooke and Beddington 1984, 401). One significant class of fishery resour
19、ces for which an absence of linearity has been clearly established is that of small schooling pelagics, such as herring, sardine, anchovy, and menhaden. Mackinson, Sumaila, and Pitcher (1997) report that studies have shown that CPUEs in such fisheries remain constant as the stocks decline. As is gen
20、erally known in these cases, the answer to our test question about the security of a resource under pure open access is a definite “no.“ The authors refer to the lengthy catalogue of examples of pelagic stock collapses (Mackinson, Sumaila, and Pitcher 1997,11). A striking example is provided by Norw
21、egian spring spawning herring in the North Atlantic. Historically one of the largest fishery resources in the region, the resource, due to over exploitation (and environmental factors), crashed in the late 1960s to early 1970s, and in doing so came perilously close to extinction (Arnason, Magnusson,
22、 and Agnarsson 2000). While it has been well recognized that the MSE can be expected to be weak in the case of small pelagics, we now have reason to worry about, or at least be suspicious about, the strength of the MSE in the case of demersals as well. We consider two specific examples, namely north
23、ern cod off Newfoundland and Labrador, and an orange roughy resource off Australia. In the case of northern cod, there is clear evidence that, in the late 1970s, marine biologists believed that there was a strong, although by no means perfectly linear, relationship between CPUE and stock abundance (
24、Munro 1980, Table 3-6, Chapter 3, n. 62). While the stock could be, and had been, excessively depleted under conditions of ineffective control, it seemed entirely reasonable to believe that the resource was in no danger of ever being driven to the brink of commercial, let alone biological, extinctio
25、n. Then, in the last half of the 1980s, something went horribly wrong. The government of Canada was compelled in 1992 to introduce a “temporary“ harvest moratorium, which remains in place to the present day. While there is much speculation about the causes of Canadas worst fisheries management disas
26、ter, 4 adequate explanations have yet to be forthcoming. The orange roughy case allows us to ask what would happen if a fishery based upon such a resource was characterized by something close to pure open access. The answer has been provided to us through an experiment performed by history, in the f
27、orm of the South Tasman Rise orange roughy stock. It is now well established that, if a shared fishery resource is managed non cooperatively, the result can be akin to pure open accessthe prisoners dilemma syndrome (Clark 1980; Sumaila 1997; Munro, Van Houtte, and Willmann 2004). The South Tasman or
28、ange roughy resource straddles the Australian Fishing Zone and the adjacent high seas. When the resource was discovered by Australia in 1997, it was believed that the only other state that might attempt to exploit the high seas segment of the resource would be New Zealand. Australia entered into a c
29、ooperative management arrangement with New Zealand at the end of 1997. The cooperative resource management arrangement did, however, prove to be flawed. 译文 对渔业资源私有化限制 资料来源 :Ebsco 作者： 科林克拉克瓦特，戈登河蒙罗和美国拉希德 Sumaila 收获权利方案的日益广泛实施 （或有限访问权限方案 拉普人 ，美国术语） ,例如个人可转让的配额 (ITQ)方案、领土使用权在渔业、渔民合作社 , 稳步增加了机会 私营部门团体，影
30、响了渔业管理政策 。这一变化 ,反过来 , 在一定程度上 ,催生了一个争论的问题 ,私营部门在渔业管理的影响力。应鼓励一些作者暗示 ,与私营部门管理的资源应该被允许扩大到如此地步 ,公共部门监督就不再是重要 (如 , 樊缪斯 2004; 阿纳森 2007) 。实际上 ,如果没有法理，私人 “个人 ”,或实体 ,就会因为资源的所有者。 然而其他作者对这一观点争论说 ,事实上 ,有严格的社会限制。对于这些资源的最优私有化。例如科普斯（ 1986），科普斯和查尔斯（ 2004），麦克和布罗姆利（ 2002）等一些作者文中，有其他的弱点的同 时也谈到私有化渔业资源。 在本文中 , 我们只专注于限制社会
31、最优私营化的渔业资源 , 其目标导致的辩论焦点。要做到这一点 ,我们求助于著名的结果，结果表明：在某些情况下 , 一个渔业资源的私有者可以选择去驱赶这些生物，让这些生物处于灭绝的边缘。即使在缺少积极的最小活力族群 (克拉克 1973) 。这个结果是特别有趣的，因为最近的刺激和挑战性文章科学的确这样，在完全根据经验对四大渔场调查的基础上，5 建议这个结果可能仅仅是一个理论的好奇心，缺乏现实的意义（格拉夫顿，孔帕斯， 希尔伯恩 2007）。 作者声明 :“一个经典的成绩 (克拉 克 1973 年 ),对于私人业主来说最优的，解决开发对于可再生资源的消失的办法，就是用低的生产能力。 我们的分析表明，
32、在合理的价格、低成本和折扣率下，利用渔业致使渔业灭绝是不经济的，即使有很低的增长率。 ”（ 1601）。更加深入提出： “理论上 我们需求面实证 ” 经济利润最大化的折扣可能会导致资源枯竭，甚至灭绝 克拉克 1973 然而 ,我们的研究结果显示 , 在实践中 我们需求面实证 BMEY BMSY。 ”（ 1601）。（这里 BMEY 是生物经济最优水平， BMSY 生物量是最大持续产量的水平。） 这些断言都得到广泛 的流通。因此 ,例如 ,实际上在一个最近期的科学文章中提到在防止渔业枯竭上有关有效性捕捞效率。作者问：过度开发渔业资源使它达到灭绝的边缘然后用这些资金区去投资别的方面，它是否会是最优
33、经济。他们回应的说： “虽然这仍然是一个理论 我们需求面证实 可能性 （克拉克 1973年 ) 最近的一项研究报告指出在合理经济参数化灭绝是不适合的（即使有低的增长率） 格拉夫顿等人。 2007” （科斯特洛 盖恩斯，与莱纳姆 2008年， 1678年）。我们都在争论克拉克的 1973年结果不行，事实上，在安全为由被撤销不超过一个理论上的可 能性更多，而是继续有重大的现实意义。 如果克拉克的结果确实具有实际意义，那么接下来我们称之为 “那又怎么样 ”的问题。如果资源的私人者得出结论 ,最优充分耗尽资源是经济的，还有什么说公有的资源所得者就不会到相同的结论呢？因此，在本章 , 通过将资源在私有制
34、基础上的，真的没有什么可失去。 “那又怎么样 ?”这个问题也应去调查。 格拉夫顿，罗盘和希尔伯恩（ 2007,1601）说： “在所有情况下，即使在非常高折扣率，在生物量完全枯竭之前的很长一段时间，渔业资源利润处于负值。 ”虽然现在还不是十分清楚在这声明仅适用于你四个渔业资源报告中的文章。或是否是为了适用于所有渔业资源，读者很可能得到的印象是， MSE为基准，而有关让渔业资源安全地从灭绝的边缘回来的问题的答案（或者任何接近的答案） ,完全开放是一个坚定的 “是的 ”。 现在在我们面前的问题是我们的测试问题的答案是，或不是一般 “是的 ”， 因为似乎是由格拉夫顿，罗盘，希尔伯恩（ 2007）暗示
35、。如 果是，如果是一个微不足道的情况下，或者是薄弱， MSE是罕见的例外，它是真实的克拉克的结果 ,和所有它所指出的那样 ,那些可以安全地视为一个纯粹的好奇心。 我们已注意到 “强 ”的 MSE与标准动态经济模型的渔业经济在单位捕捞力量渔获量和生物量的大小存在一个严格的线性关系 (克拉克 2006)。还有就是，事实上，没有证据表明这是渔业资源之间的渔业资源存在普遍性。库克和 伯丁顿 ， 在6 一次 单位捕捞力量渔获量 的关系和鱼类种群丰的文章中指出， “丰度之间的线性关系和 单位捕捞力量渔获量 的关系已经很少表现定量论证 “（库克和 伯丁顿 1984年， 401） 。 一个重要的渔业资源类其中
36、的线性度的情况下已明确规定，是归类的中上层鱼类，小如鲱鱼，沙丁鱼，凤尾鱼，和鲱鱼。 Mackinson, Sumaila, and Pitcher (1997)的报告研究表明：在这种单位捕捞力量渔获量继续下，库存将会不断下降。正如一般人都知道在这种情况下，回答我们的问题是关于测试的安全在纯开放存取资源是一个明确的 “不 ”。 笔者参阅了那份冗长的目录的例子 (Mackinson, Sumaila, and Pitcher 1997年 11)。 一个显著的例子验证了挪威鲱鱼春天产卵在北 大西洋。 从历史上看，是该地区最大的渔业资源之一，这个资源，由于过度开发（和环境因素），衰竭在 20世纪 70
37、年代后期到 20世纪 60年代初，而且现在正处于灭绝的边缘地带 (Arnason, Magnusson, and Agnarsson 2000年 )。 虽然已经很好地认识到， MSE被预期在小型中上层鱼是弱的情况，我们现在又理由担心，或者至少是可疑的，对案件中的 MSE实力及鱼卵沉入海底的原因。我们认为两个具体的例子，即北部鳕鱼纽芬兰和拉布拉多，澳大利亚和新西兰红鱼资源。 在北部鳕鱼的情况下，有明确的证据表明，在 20世纪 70年代后期，海洋生物学家认为，有一个强劲 ,尽管绝不完美的线性关系，在单位捕捞渔获量和丰富库存之间存在（蒙罗 1980年，表 3-6，第 3，注 62）。当库存已经被耗竭
38、、过度无效控制的情况下，似乎完全有理由相信，渔业资源历来都不是被商业驱赶到灭绝边缘的危险，更遑论生物灭绝的边缘。 然后，在 20世纪 80年代后半叶，发生了可怕的错误。加拿大政府被迫于 1992年推出 “临时 “丰收暂停，至今这在地方仍然存在。虽然是关于加拿大的渔业管理灾害最严重的原因有很多猜测，但是充足的解释还有待制定。 该金狮案件引发我们要问一下， 如果在这样的资源为基础的渔业受到了接近完全的开放破坏，会发生什么样的事情。答案已经提供通过一次历史实验告诉给我们：在南塔斯马尼亚崛起金狮股票的形式。 这是目前公认的是，如果一个共享渔业资源管理的非合作，结果可能是类似于完全开放访问的困境综合征 (Clark 1980; Sumaila 1997; Munro, Van Houtte, and Willmann 2004年 )。南塔斯曼金狮资源横跨澳大利亚捕鱼区和邻近的公海。当时渔业资源是澳大利亚在 1997年发现的，它被认为是唯一的其他国家可能试图利用公海资源，但 是这可能是新西兰的部分。澳大利亚在 1997年年底签订了一份与新西兰合作管理安排。合作资源管理安排是那样的，然而这份安排被证明是有缺陷7 的。
