1、1 外文翻译 原文 Salary affect how performance Material Source： Executive Compensation; 2010/2011 Supplement, Author： Modern Health The SEC has amended its disclosure rules to require, among other matters, a discussion about a companys compensation policies and practices for all employees if they create ri
2、sks that are “reasonably likely” to have a material adverse effect on the company, taking into account program features and other factors that mitigate or counteract such risks. The SEC referred in adopting the amendments, indicates that the “reasonably likely” is higher than “possible” but lower th
3、an “more likely than not.” That said, a conclusion that the disclosure trigger is not met necessarily rests on an assessment of the balance of risk and reward implied by the companys compensation program design and incentives, taken as a whole. As with many SEC rules in the post-SOX era, process wil
4、l be key. A predicate for analyzing the disclosure question will be an inventory and review of the operation of compensation programs for all employees, which should be undertaken promptly in light of the effective date of the rules. In light of regulatory and investor interest arising out of the tu
5、rbulent climate of 2009, we believe that a focus on the relationship between compensation and risk-at the executive and broad-based levelswill continue. Because this relationship may not always be obvious, even though it is implicit in virtually all significant compensation decisions, we suggest bel
6、ow practical considerations relevant to compensation committee deliberations about these matters. Core Compensation Committee Responsibilities and Risk Compensation committees have four principal responsibilities that intersect with risk, as discussed below. (1) Determining compensation program desi
7、gn. Diversity of compensation opportunities and metrics is the most effective tool to cabin risk implied by a companys compensation program. A balanced mix of short- 2 and long-term elements ties compensation to the companys performance, While reflecting the perspective that near-term actions are no
8、t only important in and of themselves, but also can have material long-term consequences. A combination of incentives to reward different aspects of the companys performance also avoids a myopic focus on a single aspect of performance at the expense of other considerations that concern and impact bu
9、siness risk. With in this framework, long-term compensation elements ( e.g. , plans with multi-year targets or performance vesting conditions) generally should have a horizon tied to the companys business planning cycle to ensure that the committee and management are driven by a common perspective a
10、bout the companys prospects and challenges within the context of a board-vetted business plan. In considering plan design, the compensation committee should take into account other features of the compensation program that mitigate the risk of management misconduct or inappropriately risky behavior.
11、 These include claw backs and long-term stock ownership requirements. These features of compensation programs have become common in recent years. They should be re-examined periodically and in connection with material changes in business circumstances or compensation plan design. Are the claw back t
12、riggers calibrated to the companys circumstances and business-rather than being a photocopy of another companys policy or someone elses idea of best practice? Are they clear in their operation, while preserving the committees ability to exercise its business judgment in determining whether to seek c
13、ompensation recoupment? Given the level of equity incentives granted or to be granted, should stock ownership guidelines be revised to include a “hold through retirement” provision? Moreover, the committee should consider whether the categories of employees covered by specific compensation programs
14、are appropriate in light of overall pay elements and job responsibility and function. For example, if authority to make decisions that may have material risk consequences for the business extends to a relatively broad group of employees, it may be appropriate to incorporate diverse company-wide perf
15、ormance criteria with respect to a similarly broad group of employees, as compared to relatively narrow business unit performance criteria, in order to mitigate the incentive of employees to take inappropriate business unit risks. The committee also should consider the role of its discretionary judg
16、ment in determining the amount of performance-based compensation to be paid, as contrasted with strict adherence to objective performance-based formulas. Focus on the 3 requirements of Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 generally has oriented committees towards a more formulaic appr
17、oach to compensation decisions. While such an approach arguably should result in a closer correlation of pay to performance, persuasive arguments can be made that the exercise of committee discretion can be consistent with a pay-for-performance program while at the same time mitigating inappropriate
18、 business risks that might otherwise arise from certain performance based compensation programs. In many circumstances, there are approaches to Section 162(m) compliance that permit committees significant discretion to adjust payouts, upwards or downwards relative to objective formulas, to reflect s
19、ubjective evaluations of performance. Committees also regularly exercise discretion to adjust final awards if the results of strictly formulaic metrics would be either too low or too high. Finally, in reviewing the risk- appropriateness of its compensation program, the committee should invite its co
20、mpensation consultant and other advisors to provide perspectives about whether and how well the companys compensation program operates to balance risk and reward and whether other design features are appropriate in light of the companys particular circumstances and peer group practices. (2) Setting
21、the performance matrix for incentive plans. The compensation committee may be charged with approving threshold, target, and maximum levels of performance and payout “curves” under the companys incentive plans, depending on their terms. Determining these plan design features is critical in translatin
22、g strategic goals into incentives that are calibrated to promote the right kind, and the right amount, of risk-taking by executives. Given the significance and complexity of this responsibility, we discuss setting the performance matrix in more detail below. (3) Understanding compensation-related ri
23、sk in the context of other mitigating controls and procedures. The compensation committee must reflect on risk implied by the companys compensation program through the lens of other risk-mitigating controls and procedures. While listed last, this may in fact be the best first step in the committees
24、process, so that the overall “risk lens” is in place on an early and ongoing basis. Other mitigating controls and procedures can include the boards own risk oversight mechanisms, whether in the form of “enterprise risk management” initiatives, an annual strategic review or the work of the boards oth
25、er key standing committees, 4 such as the audit committee or, if they exist, the risk, compliance, or finance committees. Also relevant are the operation and effectiveness of the companys internal control over financial reporting, financial policies( e.g. , those addressing leverage, capital allocat
26、ion, and use of derivatives), controls around areas of subjective judgment within the financial statements and dedicated management functions directed to risk. To the extent that this information is not available to the compensation committee either directly or through the work of the full board, it
27、 should consider other means to assure an appropriate ongoing understanding of these risk, such as through overlapping membership or other formal interaction among the board committees that bear responsibility for elements of risk oversight, or by those committees and the full board. 译文 管理层薪酬对公司绩效的研
28、究 资料来源： 薪酬补偿 2010/2011 增补 作者：摩登 .海瑟 美国证券交易委员会已修订其披露规则要求，关于 一个公司的薪酬政策和做法，对所有员工进行讨论，如果他们创造的是“合理地可能”有对公司造成重大不利影响，可以同时考虑到方案特征和其他因素，减轻或抵消这种风险。 美国证券交易委员会在通过该修正案中提到，“合理的可能”门槛高于“可能”，但是低于“可能没有。” 这就是说，披露一个不符合一定的结论风险和报酬由公司采取的补偿方案设计和采取激励措施作为一个整体，过程将是关键。一种分析的披露问题应及时在本规则生效日期的补偿方案的运作情况进行检讨。 监管和投资者的兴趣产生于 2009 年最动荡的
29、时候，我们认为，对关系中心的补偿和 风险，在执行和广泛基础的水平上将继续进行。因为这关系可能并不总是显而易见的，即使它在几乎所有的赔偿决定不能显隐式的，我们建议对这些事项的有关赔偿委员会的审议工作的实际考虑。 赔偿委员会的核心职责和风险补偿委员会的四个相交的风险，下面讨论的是主要职责。 （ 1）确定赔偿方案的设计。 补偿的机会和指标的多样性是最有效的工具，客舱风险由公司的赔偿短期和长期因素的关系补偿给公司的业绩均衡暗示短期行为不仅其本身重要，但也可以5 有很大的长期后果。结合的激励机制对公司的业绩方面也避免了在其他方面的考虑牺牲性能上的一个方面关注 的焦点，近视和影响业务这个框架内，长期补偿元
30、素（例如，多计划年目标或表现归属条件）一般应当具有绑在公司的业务规划周期，以确保委员会和管理是由对公司的前景，在一个板审核业务计划的范围内挑战的共同观点驾驶的视野。在考虑规划设计，薪酬委员会应考虑到补偿方案帐户的其他功能，减轻风险的管理失当行为或不适当的冒险行为。这些措施 包括长期股权的要求。补偿方案的这些特点，已成为近年来的普遍特点。他们应该重新审查并定期与商业环境或补偿方案设计重大变更的连接。是回补触发校准到公司的具体情况和业务，而不是被另一家公司的政策或别人的最佳实践理念复制。他们经营清晰，同时保持委员会的能力，决定是否行使追偿要求赔偿其商业判断？由于授出或将予授出股权激励，股权指引水平
31、应予以修订，用来包括“持有因退休”的规定。 此外，委员会应考虑是否由特殊补偿方案涉及雇员类别在整体薪酬和工作内容，作出适当的责任和作用。例如，如果有权做出决定，可能有重大风险的后果业务扩 展到较为广泛的员工群体，它可能是与尊重不同的人纳入全公司业绩标准的员工同样广阔组相比，相对狭窄的业务单位的绩效标准，以减轻员工的激励采取不适当的商业单位的风险。 该委员会还应该考虑在确定业绩为基础的补偿款额，与严格遵循客观表现为基础的公式对比其酌情判决的作用。对第 162 的规定对焦的 1986 年国内税收法典一般具有朝着更加面向赔偿委员会的决定。虽然这种做法可以说是应导致薪酬与业绩紧密相关的，有说服力的论据
32、是，可行使酌情权的委员会可以用付费的方式，而在同一时间减少不适当的商业风险相一致，否则可能会有来自某些其他的补偿方案。在许多情况下，有 162 条办法（米）的规定，允许委员会发挥着重要酌情调整支出，以性能等主观评价。 如果确实公式的度规的结果太低的或太高，委员会通常也行使谨慎调整最后的裁决。 最后，在检讨风险的补偿方案是否恰当，委员会应邀请其薪酬顾问和其他顾问，提供观点是否和如何做好公司的赔偿程序的运行，以平衡风险和回报，以及是否其它设计特点是轻适当该公司的具体情况和同侪团体的做法。 （ 2）设定绩效激励计划矩阵。 薪酬委员会负责审批，可根据本公司的激励计划的门槛，目标和工作表现和支出“曲线”
33、的最高水平的条件而定。确 定这些计划的设计特点是翻译成战略目标是正确的校准，以促进一种奖励，风险由管理人员承担。我们讨论的性能设定6 下面详细矩阵。 3）了解跟赔偿有关的其他程序中的控制和如何减少风险 薪酬委员会必须反映该公司的赔偿方案意味着通过其他风险控制措施和程序镜头减轻风险。 虽然列在最后，这可能是最好的，虽然列在最后，这可能是最好的，其实在该委员会的进程的第一步，使整体的“危险镜头”在对早期和持续的基础上进行的。其他缓解控制和程序可以包括董事会自身的风险监督机制，无论是在“企业风险管理”的倡议，一年度战略审查或董事会的其他重要 常设委员会的工作，如审计委员会，或者形式，如果他们存在的风险，合规或财务委员会。另外相关的运作和公司的财务报告内部控制的有效性，金融政策（例如，那些涉及杠杆，资本配置，以及衍生工具的使用），控制周围的主观判断领域内的财务报表和定向到专用的管理职能风险。 在某种程度上，这个信息不是直接或通过委员会的工作提供充分的赔偿委员会，但应考虑其他手段来确保适当的不断了解这些风险，如通过成员之间的重叠或其他正式的互动，董事会的委员会，承担责任的风险监督要素，通过这些委员会及董事会全体成员。
