1、1本科毕业论文外文翻译外文文献译文标题高管薪酬真的像官僚支付吗资料来源SSRN数据库作者霍尔，李普曼摘要对于CEO报酬的普遍看法是公司业绩和CEO报酬之间没有本质的相关性。这对公司的治理结构是否有效产生了质疑。这种“零相关”在被广泛引用（詹森和墨菲，1990后发现首席执行官财富每上升325增加1,000元，CEO薪酬与公司业绩的相关性只有01。研究的数据来源是近15年（作者写文章的期间前）美国大型公开上市公司的CEO们的相关数据CEO报酬变化包括首席执行官持有的股票和股票期权的价值变化。我们发现，首席执行官的薪酬是高度敏感的公司业绩。例如，只有在公司业绩适度调整后（从股票价格的中位数表现到第7
2、0百分性能），CEO补偿的中位数在我们的样本中增加了近50，它代表约150万美元。我们估计，1994年CEO报酬与公司价值的弹性为33（中位数）。现在这个值是以前的20到30倍在忽略了股票和股票期权的价值变化影响的情况下。我们还记录，在过去15年无论是CEO薪酬水平和与公司绩效的敏感程度都有显著的增长。在我们的样本中，首席执行官补偿的平均（中位数）从1980年的207增加到至1994的146。1简介在本文中，我们认为，CEO们不喜欢官僚支付。我们利用15年美国大型公开上市公司的CEO们的相关数据，其中首席执行官持有的股票和股票期权和文件在1980年和1994年之间大量增加。我们专注于一个广阔补
3、偿的措施，其中包括股票和股票价值的变化选项，来衡量薪酬的敏感性，我们报告的各种支付性能的敏感性，并发现是高度敏感的公司赔偿性能。虽然只有少量的CEO财富的变化与公司价值的变化有关，但这些变化非常大是受到公司规模的影响。我们认为，没有适当的基准有以下几个原因。首先，因为融资的限制一一对应的，是不是可行的。大多数老总根本就没有足够的财富买美国最大的公开上市的公司。第二，CEO的风险厌恶，导致财富理想的波动。合理地认为，财富的大幅波动会导致一个首席执行官规避风险，以避免高风险，高回报的项目需要良好的多元化的股东。第三，虽然一对一敏感性能有效解决一些机构问题，这样的敏感性还不足以让老总做出最优决策。2
4、这固然很重要但我们不否认，当前的老总合同是有效的甚至当前的薪酬支付对敏感性是足够的。这种声明会要求我们作出许多不容易测量的假设。事实上，我们的研究结果表明在当前的首席执行官合同有一些潜在的严重缺陷。但是我们相信，我们的结果相矛盾的说法，CEO薪酬与公司业绩之间基本上是没有相关性的。然而因为目前的薪酬与性能的灵敏度太低，我们的研究结果也仅仅是因为矛盾的说法。2高管激励SHLEIFER和VISHNY（1995）认为，企业的核心治理问题是如何将供应商的财务经理的利润返回给他们，在大型的公开交易公司的股东很难判断观察高管人员的决定是某有效，如何让股东促使高管最求公司价值的最大化而不是只求付出较少的努力
5、，产生更多的就业保障来追求较低回报率。21融资约束“出售该公司的首席执行官”仅限于老总有足够的财富来购买公司。由于个人破产法，它是不太可能的，合理的贷款人贷款大大低于CEO的财富。老总有多少财富虽然我们没有能够获得总CEO财富的数据，我们可以做一个典型的首席执行官财富数据估计。在我们的数据的首席执行官财富中位数约为75亿美元（股票和股票期权的价值的总和）在该公司投资。如果我们假设首席执行官财富中位数是这个数字得三倍，它会量几乎为2300万美元。另外，如果我们假设CEO的财富等于每年赔偿总额的十倍，我们得到的中位数估计约1500万美元。两者合计，我们怀疑20万美元，是首席执行官财富中位数的合理估
6、计。一个CEO的财富可能是公司的CEO可以购买量的上限。这将使一个CEO很难获得融资，购买无额外抵押品风险资产。由于这些公司的平均市场价值约为234亿美元，一个首席执行官拥有2000万美元的美元最多可以购买085的公司财富。因此，老总可以购买股票的金额上限是百分之一。在任何情况下，即使我们的总裁财富的估计太低，我们的基本点由两个或三个因素。22灵敏度和首席执行官决策相对于詹森和墨菲一对一的基准，融资约束和规避风险限制了大量的薪酬是可行的，这就提出了一个问题，CEO们需要作出正确的决策的灵敏度是多少。这个问题的答案上重要的是取决于我们正在研究哪些类型的活动。因此，给予融资约束和风险厌恶不可能实质
7、上把公司卖给首席执行官，可能会根据合同的监控与激励使用组合优化。可以进行激励合同使CEO在为数不多的大型离散项目中做出正确的决定。然后，可以用来检测机构存在的问题。总的来说，我们不对现任CEO的效率合同进行任何强大的索赔，移动公司价值中的一个的一个变化的CEO财富失败并不意味着首席执行官的合约一定效率低下。3值得注意的值得注意的是，CEO工作的动机是能够拥有财富和保持他们的工作良好的性能可赚取他们同行的尊重。增通过边际效用产生的财富可以使他们受到关注。3敏感性措施使用股票和股票期权的价值的变化现在我们估计到CEO薪酬总额的敏感性导致公司价值的变化。我们的重点是补偿股票和股票期权的价值产生的变化
8、。我们忽略敏感性工资和奖金的变化，这种变化主要是股票和股票期权的价值的变化误差。同时包括股票的价值的变化与股票期权代表广泛的补偿措施，它也是正确度量值。首席执行官们大概是关心他们的财富来自的变化源，不只是工资和奖金。事实上，增加薪酬和给CEO股票和股票期权，是相互限制的，我们的总薪酬包括工资、奖金、限制性的股票赠款，股票期权授予、持有股票的价值变化和变化股票期权持有的价值。所有的敏感性措施都遵循股票和股票期权的价值的更改。4启示这项研究对于我们以不同的方式思考首席执行官的合约有着重大意义。这项研究的结果有一个重要的影响，使我们思考不同的首席执行官合同的数量。一个重要的事实如下股票和股票期权的价
9、值变化完全大于工资和奖金的变化，从工资与奖金的敏感性文件来看，工资和奖金的敏感性仅是冰山的一角与此相关的一个令人意外的结果是“相对薪酬“不显著。CEO股票和股票期权授予是绝对的不是相对的。与整个经济或行业的冲击没有关系。这表明CEO们应该支付一定的报酬以获得相应的市场或行业指数。GIBBONSANDMURPHY1990表示，CEO的工资和奖金的变化与自己的公司回报呈正相关，与市场、行业的回报负相关。4外文文献原文TITLEARECEOSREALLYPAIDLIKEBUREAUCRATSMATERIALSOURCESSRNAUTHORBRIANJHALLANDJEFFREYBLIEBMANABS
10、TRACTTHECOMMONVIEWOFCEOCOMPENSATIONISTHATTHEREISESSENTIALLYNOCORRELATIONBETWEENFIRMPERFORMANCEANDCEOPAYTHISCALLSINTOQUESTIONANIMPORTANTCOMPONENTOFEFFECTIVECORPORATEGOVERNANCETHIS“ZEROCORRELATION”BELIEFISBASEDONTHEWIDELYCITEDRESULTTHATCEOWEALTHRISESBYONLY325FOREVERY1,000INCREASEINFIRMVALUEJENSENANDMU
11、RPHY,1990BANDFINDINGSTHATTHEELASTICITYOFCEOSALARYANDBONUSWITHRESPECTTOFIRMMARKETVALUEISONLY01USINGANEW15YEARPANELDATASETOFCEOSINLARGEUSFIRMS,WEREPORTAVARIETYOFPAYTOPERFORMANCEMEASURESUSINGABROADMEASUREOFCEOCOMPENSATIONTHATINCLUDESCHANGESINTHEVALUEOFCEOHOLDINGSOFSTOCKANDSTOCKOPTIONSWEFINDTHATCEOCOMPE
12、NSATIONISHIGHLYRESPONSIVETOFIRMPERFORMANCEFOREXAMPLE,FORONLYAMODERATECHANGEINFIRMPERFORMANCEMOVINGFROMAMEDIANSTOCKPRICEPERFORMANCETOA70THPERCENTILEPERFORMANCE,THECOMPENSATIONOFTHEMEDIANCEOINOURSAMPLEINCREASESBYALMOST50PERCENT,WHICHREPRESENTSABOUT15MILLIONWEESTIMATETHATTHEELASTICITYOFCEOCOMPENSATIONW
13、ITHRESPECTTOFIRMVALUEIS33ATTHEMEDIANFOR1994THISVALUEIS20TO30TIMESLARGERTHANPREVIOUSELASTICITYESTIMATESTHATIGNORETHEEFFECTSOFCHANGESINTHEVALUEOFSTOCKANDSTOCKOPTIONHOLDINGSWEALSODOCUMENTTHATBOTHTHELEVELOFCEOCOMPENSATIONANDTHESENSITIVITYOFCEOCOMPENSATIONTOFIRMPERFORMANCEHAVEGROWNDRAMATICALLYOVERTHEPAST
14、15YEARSINOURSAMPLE,THECOMPENSATIONOFTHEMEANMEDIANCEOINCREASEDBY207PERCENT146PERCENTFROM1980TO1994THELARGEINCREASEINSTOCKOPTIONAWARDSANDINTHEVALUEOFSTOCKHOLDINGSHASAPPROXIMATELYDOUBLEDPAYTOPERFORMANCESENSITIVITIESOVERTHISPERIOD1INTRODUCTIONINTHISPAPERWEARGUETHATCEOSARENOTPAIDLIKEBUREAUCRATSWEMAKEUSEO
15、FANEW15YEARPANELDATASETOFLARGEUSFIRMSTHATCONTAINSDETAILEDINFORMATIONONCEOHOLDINGSOFSTOCKANDSTOCKOPTIONSANDDOCUMENTTHELARGEINCREASEIN5CEOHOLDINGSOFSTOCKANDSTOCKOPTIONSBETWEEN1980AND1994WEFOCUSONABROADMEASUREOFCOMPENSATION,WHICHINCLUDESCHANGESINTHEVALUEOFSTOCKANDSTOCKOPTIONS,TOMEASURETHESENSITIVITYOFP
16、AYTOPERFORMANCE3WEREPORTAVARIETYOFPAYTOPERFORMANCESENSITIVITIES,ANDFINDTHATCOMPENSATIONISHIGHLYSENSITIVETOFIRMPERFORMANCEALTHOUGHCEOWEALTHCHANGESBYONLYASMALLAMOUNTRELATIVETOCHANGESINFIRMVALUE,THESECHANGESREPRESENTVERYLARGEDOLLARAMOUNTSBECAUSETHESIZEOFTHECOMPANIESISSOLARGEWEARGUETHATTHEONETOONEBENCHM
17、ARKTHATISIMPLICITINJENSENANDMURPHYSANALYSISISNOTTHEAPPROPRIATEBENCHMARKFORSEVERALREASONSFIRST,ONETOONECORRESPONDENCEISNOTFEASIBLEBECAUSEOFFINANCINGCONSTRAINTSMOSTCEOSSIMPLYDONOTHAVEENOUGHWEALTHTOBUYTHELARGEST,PUBLICLYTRADEDCOMPANIESINTHEUSSECOND,CEORISKAVERSIONMAKESCONTRACTSTHATLEADTOLARGESWINGSINWE
18、ALTHSUBOPTIMALTHEREISALEGITIMATECONCERNTHATLARGESWINGSINWEALTHWOULDLEADARISKAVERSECEOTOAVOIDTHEHIGHRISK,HIGHRETURNPROJECTSTHATWOULDBEDESIREDBYWELLDIVERSIFIEDSTOCKHOLDERSTHIRD,ALTHOUGHONETOONESENSITIVITYISNECESSARYTOSOLVESOMEAGENCYPROBLEMS,SUCHSENSITIVITYISNOTNECESSARYTOINDUCEOPTIMALBEHAVIORFORANIMPO
19、RTANTCLASSOFDECISIONSMADEBYCEOSITISIMPORTANTTONOTE,HOWEVER,THATWEDONOTARGUETHATCURRENTCEOCONTRACTSAREEFFICIENTOREVENTHATCURRENTPAYTOPERFORMANCESENSITIVITYISSUFFICIENTSUCHSTATEMENTSWOULDREQUIREUSTOMAKESTRONGASSUMPTIONSABOUTMANYPARAMETERVALUESTHATARENOTEASILYMEASUREDINDEED,OURFINDINGSSUGGESTTHATTHEREA
20、RESOMEPOTENTIALLYSERIOUSFLAWSINCURRENTCEOCONTRACTS,WHICHWEDISCUSSINSECTION7WEDO,HOWEVER,BELIEVETHATOURRESULTSCONTRADICTTHECLAIMTHATTHEREISESSENTIALLYNOCORRELATIONBETWEENCEOPAYANDFIRMPERFORMANCEBYEXTENSION,OURFINDINGSALSOCONTRADICTTHECLAIMTHATCURRENTCONTRACTSARENECESSARILYINEFFICIENTSIMPLYBECAUSEPAYT
21、OPERFORMANCESENSITIVITIESARETOOLOW2MOTIVATINGCEOSSHLEIFERANDVISHNY1995HAVEARGUEDTHATTHECENTRALQUESTIONOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCEISDETERMININGHOWTHE“SUPPLIERSOFFINANCEGETTHEMANAGERSTORETURNSOMEOFTHEPROFITSTOTHEM”SHAREHOLDERSINLARGEPUBLICLYTRADEDCORPORATIONSHAVEEXTREMELYLIMITEDABILITYTOOBSERVETHEACTIONSOFT
22、OPEXECUTIVESORTOJUDGEWHETHERTHOSEACTIONSAREAPPROPRIATEHOWTHENCANSHAREHOLDERSINDUCECEOSTOMAXIMIZERATESOFRETURNRATHERTHANTOCHOOSELOWERRATEOFRETURNACTIVITIESTHATDEMANDLESSEFFORTANDPRODUCEMOREJOBSECURITYHOWCANSHAREHOLDERSSTOPMANAGERSFROM6EMPIREBUILDING,BUYINGEXPENSIVECORPORATEJETS,ANDTAKINGOTHERACTIONST
23、HATHAVELARGEPERSONALBENEFITS21FINANCINGCONSTRAINTTHEOPTIONOF“SELLINGTHEFIRMTOTHECEO”ISAREALOPTIONONLYTOTHEEXTENTTHATCEOSHAVEENOUGHWEALTHTOBUYTHEFIRMSGIVENPERSONALBANKRUPTCYLAWS,ITISUNLIKELYTHATARATIONALLENDERWOULDLOANACEOSUBSTANTIALLYMORETHANTHECEOSWEALTHTOMAKESUCHAPURCHASEHOWMUCHWEALTHDOESTHETYPICA
24、LPOOLOFPOTENTIALCEOSHAVEWHILEWEHAVENOTBEENABLETOOBTAINDATAONTOTALCEOWEALTH,WECANMAKEAROUGHGUESSOFTYPICALCEOWEALTHUSINGOURDATATHEMEDIANCEOINOURDATAHASABOUT75MILLIONINWEALTHTHESUMOFTHEVALUEOFSTOCKANDSTOCKOPTIONSINVESTEDINTHEFIRMIFWEASSUMETHATMEDIANCEOWEALTHISTRIPLETHISFIGURE,ITWOULDAMOUNTTOALMOST23MIL
25、LIONALTERNATIVELY,IFWEASSUMETHATCEOWEALTHISEQUALTOTENTIMESANNUAL,TOTALCOMPENSATION,WEOBTAINAMEDIANESTIMATEOFABOUT15MILLIONTAKENTOGETHER,WESUSPECTTHAT20MILLIONISAREASONABLEESTIMATEOFMEDIANCEOWEALTHFORTHECOMPANIESINOURSAMPLETHEWEALTHOFACEOISLIKELYTOBEANUPPERBOUNDONTHEAMOUNTOFTHECOMPANYTHATTHECEOCOULDP
26、URCHASEITWOULDBEDIFFICULTFORACEOTOOBTAINFINANCINGTOPURCHASEARISKYASSETWITHOUTADDITIONALCOLLATERALGIVENTHATTHEMEDIANMARKETVALUEOFTHESECOMPANIESISABOUT234BILLION,ACEOWITH20MILLIONDOLLARSINASSETSCOULDPURCHASEAMAXIMUMOF085PERCENTOFTHEFIRMTHUS,ANREASONABLEUPPERBOUNDFORTHEAMOUNTOFSTOCKTHATTYPICALCEOSCOULD
27、PURCHASEISONEPERCENTINANYCASE,EVENIFOURESTIMATEOFCEOWEALTHISTOOLOWBYAFACTOROFTWOORTHREE,OURBASICPOINTTHATCEOSCANNOTBUYANYTHINGCLOSETO100PERCENTOFTHELARGESTUSCOMPANIESSTILLHOLDS22SENSITIVITYANDCEODECISIONMAKINGFINANCINGCONSTRAINTSANDRISKAVERSIONLIMITSIGNIFICANTLYTHEAMOUNTOFPAYTOPERFORMANCETHATISFEASI
28、BLE,ATLEASTRELATIVETOTHEJENSENANDMURPHYONETOONEBENCHMARKTHISRAISESTHEISSUEOFHOWMUCHSENSITIVITYISNEEDEDFORCEOSTOMAKECORRECTDECISIONSTHEANSWERTOTHISQUESTIONDEPENDSIMPORTANTLYONWHICHKINDSOFCEOACTIVITIESAREBEINGSTUDIEDTHUS,GIVENTHATFINANCINGCONSTRAINTSANDRISKAVERSIONMAKEITIMPOSSIBLETOESSENTIALLYSELLTHEF
29、IRMTOTHECEO,ITMAYBEOPTIMALTOUSEACOMBINATIONOFMONITORINGANDINCENTIVEBASEDCONTRACTSINCENTIVECONTRACTSCANBEMADEHIGHPOWEREDENOUGHTOINDUCECEOSTOMAKECORRECTDECISIONSWHENCHOOSINGAMONGASMALLNUMBEROFLARGE,DISCRETEPROJECTSTHEN,IMPERFECTMONITORINGCANBE7USEDTOMINIMIZETHEAGENCYPROBLEMSTHATHAVESMALLERCOSTSTOTHEFI
30、RMINSUM,ALTHOUGHWEARENOTMAKINGANYSTRONGCLAIMSABOUTTHEEFFICIENCYOFCURRENTCEOCONTRACTS,THEFAILUREOFCEOWEALTHTOMOVEONEFORONEWITHCHANGESINFIRMVALUEDOESNOTIMPLYTHATCEOCONTRACTSARENECESSARILYINEFFICIENTINASECONDBESTSENSEBEFORETURNINGTOTHEDATA,ITISWORTHNOTINGTHATCEOSARELIKELYTOBEMOTIVATEDBYFACTORSOTHERTHAN
31、THEABILITYTOCONSUMEWEALTHANDTHEIRDESIRETOKEEPTHEIRJOBSGOODPERFORMANCEMAYEARNTHEMTHERESPECTOFTHEIRPEERSINCREASESINWEALTHTHATPRODUCELITTLEMARGINALUTILITYTHROUGHDIRECTCONSUMPTIONCANINCREASETHEIRRANKINGSONLISTSOFTHEWEALTHIESTCITIZENSANDBESTOWUPONTHEMSTATUSANDATTENTIONMANYOFTHESEFACTORSREINFORCETHEIMPACT
32、OFINCENTIVEBASEDCOMPENSATIONONCEOPERFORMANCE3SENSITIVITYMEASURESUSINGCHANGESINTHEVALUEOFSTOCKANDSTOCKOPTIONHOLDINGSWENOWTURNTOESTIMATINGTHESENSITIVITYOFTOTALCEOCOMPENSATIONTOCHANGESINFIRMVALUEOURFOCUSISONCHANGESINCOMPENSATIONGENERATEDBYCHANGESINTHEVALUEOFSTOCKANDSTOCKOPTIONSWEIGNORESENSITIVITYBASEDO
33、NCHANGESINSALARYANDBONUSSINCESUCHCHANGESAREESSENTIALLYINTHEROUNDINGERROROFCHANGESINTHEVALUEOFSTOCKANDSTOCKOPTIONSWHILEINCLUDINGCHANGESINTHEVALUEOFSTOCKANDSTOCKOPTIONSREPRESENTSABROADMEASUREOFCOMPENSATION,ITISALSOTHECORRECTMEASURECEOSPRESUMABLYCAREABOUTCHANGESINTHEIRWEALTHEMANATINGFROMALLSOURCES,NOTJ
34、USTSALARYANDBONUSINDEED,INCREASINGTHERESPONSIVENESSOFPAYTOPERFORMANCEISPRESUMABLYWHYBOARDSGIVECEOSSTOCKANDSTOCKOPTIONS,BOTHOFWHICHTYPICALLYHAVERESTRICTIONSTHATFORCECEOSTOHOLDTHESTOCKANDSTOCKOPTIONS18THUS,OURMEASUREOFTOTALCOMPENSATIONINCLUDESSALARYANDBONUS,RESTRICTEDSTOCKGRANTS,STOCKOPTIONGRANTS,CHAN
35、GESINTHEVALUEOFSTOCKHOLDINGSANDCHANGESINTHEVALUEOFSTOCKOPTIONHOLDINGSALLOFTHESENSITIVITYINTHEMEASURESTHATFOLLOWARETHERESULTOFCHANGESINTHEVALUEOFSTOCKANDSTOCKOPTIONSHOLDINGS4IMPLICATIONSTHERESULTSOFTHISSTUDYHAVEANUMBEROFIMPORTANTIMPLICATIONSTHATMAKEUSTHINKDIFFERENTLYABOUTCEOCONTRACTSONEIMPORTANTIMPLI
36、CATIONFOLLOWSFROMTHEFACTTHATCHANGESINTHEVALUEOFSTOCKANDSTOCKOPTIONSCOMPLETELYSWAMPCHANGESINSALARYANDBONUSTHELARGELITERATURETHATMEASURESPAYTOPERFORMANCESENSITIVITYWITHSALARYANDBONUSELASTICITIESSHOULDBEINTERPRETEDWITHTHEIMPORTANTCAVEATTHATSALARYANDBONUSSENSITIVITYISONLYTHETIPOFTHEICEBERG8RELATEDTOTHIS
37、,ONEDISTURBINGIMPLICATIONOFOURRESULTSISTHAT“RELATIVEPAY”ISNOTSIGNIFICANTTHATIS,GRANTINGCEOSSTOCKANDSTOCKOPTIONSCOMPENSATESTHECEOSONTHEBASISOFABSOLUTE,NOTRELATIVE,PERFORMANCEANIMPORTANTPRINCIPLEOFEFFICIENTCOMPENSATIONISTHATMANAGERSSHOULDBEREWARDEDFOROUTCOMESOVERWHICHTHEYHAVECONTROL,WHILEBEINGINSULATE
38、DBYECONOMYWIDEORINDUSTRYWIDESHOCKSTHISIMPLIESTHATCEOSSHOULDBEPAIDRELATIVETOSOMEMARKETORINDUSTRYINDEXTHISIMPLIESTHATCEOSSHOULDBEPAIDRELATIVETOSOMEMARKETORINDUSTRYINDEXCONSISTENTWITHTHIS,GIBBONSANDMURPHY1990SHOWTHATCEOSALARYANDBONUSCHANGESAREPOSITIVELYRELATEDTOOWNFIRMRETURNSANDNEGATIVELYRELATEDTOMARKET/INDUSTRYRETURNSHOWEVER,OURFINDINGSSUGGESTTHATTHESECHANGES,WHICHDOHAVEARELATIVEPAYCOMPONENT,ARETRIVIALCOMPAREDTOCHANGESINTHEVALUEOFSTOCKANDSTOCKOPTIONHOLDINGS,WHICHDONOTHAVEARELATIVEPAYCOMPONENT
