1、 外文翻译 原文 THE IMPACT OF INCENTIVES ON CEO COMPENSATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE Material Source: RISEC,Volume Author: MAHMOUD M.NOURAYI 1 Introduction A significant component of a management control system is the incentive mechanism and motivational underpinning of compensation contracts. A well-designed
2、 incentive system can deal effectively with both adverse-selection and moral hazard issues in an agency contract. The main objective of this study is to identify the influence of incentive contracts and performance measures on executive compensation. We also assess the sensitivity of CEO pay to cash
3、 incentives as compared to stock-based incentives. The relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance has been extensively studied by researchers from various perspectives. Research has confirmed the positive relation between firm size and executive compensation as well as the
4、 influence of firm performance on executive pay. For the most part, interest has converged on the implications of agency theory with a concentration on the linkages between executive compensation and firm performance. Murphy (2000) indicates that a majority of companies use multiple measures of perf
5、ormance in rewarding their executives. The most popular forms of reward seem to be cash and company stock. Majority of public companies offer stock options or restricted stock in order to assure the congruity of the managers welfare and the owner wealth-maximization objectives. Cash compensation to
6、executives has two predominant components, fixed salary and bonus. Bonuses are generally linked to some performance measures that signal congruence of managerial choices with specific organization objectives. In this study, we concentrate on stock options and bonus incentive plans. Stock grants and
7、stock option grants are intended to reward the executives for choices that influence positive changes in the stock prices and as such may be considered a future-oriented reward system, as opposed to bonuses that are typically based on some accounting measure of profitability. However, it has been ar
8、gued that accounting-based measures are ex-post, historical measures of performance, and are thus conceptually less relevant from the shareholders perspective. Conversely, market return is generated from stock price changes and is not explicitly defined in accounting terms. In theory, market-based m
9、easures are ex-ante, forward-looking measures of performance, as they reflect managerial decisions that induce future profitability. In practice, however, stock prices are a very noisy signal as they are frequently subject to significant market-wide fluctuations that mirror the determinants of the b
10、usiness cycle and the conditions of fiscal and monetary policy, and hence do not exclusively reflect executive performance. 2 Research Hypotheses The amount of compensation realized by the CEO as the result of stock-based incentives such as stock option grants and restricted stock grants, depends on
11、 the contractual restrictions as well as economic variables that affect restricted stock and stock option values. The stock options exercise price, the stock price at the time of grant and exercise, the volatility of stock price, competitive market, the fiscal and monetary policies, as well as varia
12、bles that influence the companys stock price fluctuations between the grant date and the exercise date, all influence the stock-based compensation and are not entirely controllable by the CEO . Therefore, stock-based compensation introduces a significant amount of risk into the agency relationship,
13、Bertrand and Mullaiathan (2000) observe a lower sensitivity of CEO compensation to the rate of return to shareholders as the stock becomes more volatile. Executive compensation research findings to date with respect to the explanatory power of accounting-based versus market-based measures of perform
14、ance are not conclusive. We hypothesize that various performance measures manifest themselves differently depending on the type of compensation. That is, cash components in the compensation package tend to be measured on the basis of accounting metrics, while stock-based components of compensation a
15、re likely to be influenced by stock market returns (Murphy, 2000; Hall and Murphy, 2002). In conjunction with an evaluation of the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance, we examine the impact of popular incentive structures, such as the presence of bonus plans or stock option grants, in
16、our analyses. It is expected that such incentives will have motivational effects on the CEOs decision process that will reflect in the structure and characteristics of the firm. We divide our firms into dichotomies of firms with and without bonus plans or stock option grants Two measure of executive
17、 compensation are used in this study: cash compensation and total (cash and non-cash ) compensation . Cash compensation (CASHCOMP) is defined as the sum of salary and bonus. Total compensation (TOTALCOMP) includes both cash and non-cash compensation. Non-cash compensation is composed of long-term in
18、centive payouts , the value of restricted stock grants, the value of stock option grants and any other compensation item for the year. The most popular incentives offered by the firms in our sample are cash bonus and non-cash stock options Firm performance is modeled using both accounting-based and
19、market -based measures. Market-based performance is measured as the total one-year shareholder return on common stock (TRS), defined as the closing price at fiscal year-end plus dividends divided by the closing price of the prior fiscal year-end. Accounting-based performance is measured by return on
20、 assets (ROA), defined as income before tax, extraordinary items, and discontinued operations divided by average total assets. Finally, the net annual sales (SALES) is the proxy for firm size. 3 Sample Selection, Variable Measurements This section describes the sample, data sources and variable meas
21、urement. All data for this study are drawn from Standard 霍尔和墨菲 2002)。 评价 CEO 薪酬和公司绩效之间的关系，我们研究普遍的激励结构，如高级管理人员的奖金激励或者是股票期权激励。据预 计， 这种激励措施将会在 CEO 的决策过程中产生激励效果，这种效果将会反映在公司结构和公司特征中。我们通过两分法将公司分成两种，一种是有奖金激励或股票期权激励的公司，一种是 没 有奖金激励或股票期权激励的公司。 在我们研究中，高级管理人员的两种报酬是是现金报酬和总报酬（现金和非现金）现金报酬 (CASHCOMP)被定义为固定工资和奖金的总和。
22、总报酬(TOTALCOMP)包含了现金和非现金报酬。非现金报酬是长期 报酬支出， 限制性股票的价值、股票期权的价值和其他的激励项目是按年 的计算的。最受欢迎激励机制是在公司提供现金激励的奖金和非现金的股票期权 企业绩效的评估是同时使用以会计和市场为基础指标的方法。以市场为基础衡量业绩的指标是为期一年的普通股股东回报率（ TRS），其定义是在会计年度结束，公司上一会计年度末收盘价除以红利。以会计基础衡量业绩的指标是资产报酬率（ ROA），其为 息税前净利润除以总资产总额。 最后 ,每年净销售 (销售 )是代理企业的尺寸 3 样本的选择，变量的测量 本节描述了样本，数据来源和变量的测量。本研究的所
23、 有数据都来自标准普尔（ 2004） ExecuComp数据库。样本包括来自 455个美国公司的面板数据，涵盖了 1996-2002年期间。这个样本是从 2394个美国公司的初始样本中选取的，条件是 CEO 任期在 1996至 2002年期间并且任职期间满二年，在 1997-2002年任职满整年，并在 1996年至少任期 6个月 。 有关行业的样本构成的详细资料载于表 1的 B小组。样品包括 25个行业，电气设备行业是最大的样本，约 42个企业，占总样本的百分之 9.2；其次是保险和其他金融服务，约 32公司，占总样本的百分之 7；再次是化学工业， 大约有 31 个公司，占总样本的百分之 6.
24、8；最小样本代表性的行业是采矿业，有 4家企业，约占 0.9 个百分点，其他行业有玩具制造业和建筑业，共 5 个公司，约占 1.1百分点。 4 分析和结果 在本节中，我们建立一个 CEO 薪酬模型，具体的例子在前面介绍过。这现金补偿（ CASHCOMP）和总补偿（ TOTALCOMP）被用来作为因变量在实证检验中。 根据先前的研究 , 在我们所有的分析中，我们将用每年净销售作为企业规模。 我们用两个以会计和市场为基础的指标在我们的模型中。更具体地说，我们的自变量包括以市场为基础的测量指标和以会计 为基础的测量指标，具体为资产回报率（ ROA）和股东回报率（ TRS）。我们使用的模型中，对激励数
25、据和销售数据进行对数变换，以减少误差项的异方差问题。 首先，我们包含的每一个绩效措施在每一个模型中作为独立的表达变量，然后，影响极小措施效果的因素作为解释变量，如下所示： (1) ln(CASHCOMPit) = + ln(SALESit)+ 1 TRSit+ DUMYEARt + it (2) ln(CASHCOMPit) = + ln(SALESit)+ 2 ROAit + DUMYEARt + it (3) ln(CASHCOMPit) = + ln(SALESit) + 1 TRSit + 2 ROAit + DUMYEARt+ it (4) ln(TOTALCOMPit) = + l
26、n(SALESit)+ 1 TRSit+ DUMYEARt + it (5) ln(TOTALCOMPit) = + ln(SALESit)+ 2 ROAit + DUMYEARt + it (6) ln(TOTALCOMPit) = + ln(SALESit) + 1 TRSit + 2 ROAit + DUMYEAR +it 横截面时间序列回归 因变量 ln CASHCOMPit ln TOTALCOMPit 解释变量 模型 1 模型 2 模型 3 模型 4 模型 5 模型 6 系数 4.92794（ 60.70） 5.06984 （ 61.05） 4.97851 （ 60.24） 4.9
27、1277 （ 38.85） 5.05165 （ 39.06） 4.95417 （ 38.71） ln SALESit 0.24960 0.23069 0.24075 0.35017 0.33188 0.34282 （ 21.41） （ 19.12） （ 20.11） （ 19.25） （ 17.63） （ 18.44） TRSit 0.11703 （ 12.01） 0.11279 （ 11.48） 0.11964 （ 7.23） 0.11596 (6.93) ROAit 0.26499 （ 4.61） 0.17899 （ 3.15） 0.25777 （ 2.71） 0.16314 （ 1.71
28、） R2 值 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.23 中间值 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.34 0.32 0.34 所有值 0.37 0.35 0.37 0.31 0.29 0.30 卡方值 概率 1169 0.0000 1016 0.0000 1182 0.0000 1035 0.0000 976 0.0000 1041 0.0000 样本数 3183 3183 3183 3183 3183 3183 平均 CEO 的总报酬数量的增加（减少）从模型 4和五可以得到结论，即一个百分点的增加（减少），则会计基础和市场基础分别增加 9459美元个 17780美 元。而 模
29、型 6产生的效果 ,非常类似于模型 5。现金激励模型的 R2是 0.35-0.37，其中现金激励模型是模型 1到模型 3。而总报酬模型的 R2 是从 0.29-0.31，其中总报酬模型是模型 4到模型 6。观察 Wald 2 可知每一个模型的概率都是 0，所以所有模型都显著。 5 总结 这项研究是对高级管理人员激励和公司业绩之间的关系的研究，其有文献方面的贡献。不同于过去的研究中，在我们的样本中既包括现金激励和总报酬激励，分析他们绩效结构和措施之间的的关系。我们的全现金激励结果表明，样本受会计和市场表现的影响，而总报酬激励 的措施与市场更加密切相关。我们发现，企业规模是决定现金和报酬总额的重要
30、变数。然而，这些结果似乎是与实行奖金或股票期权计划的企业关系更大。我们把过去的研究数据，根据激励结构是否存在奖金和股权激励报酬进行划分。我们发现， CEO 报酬与股票期权合约，受市场为基础的业绩衡量的影响超出了会计为基础的业绩衡量的影响。研究结果还表明，对于没有奖金或股票期权激励的企业，规模似乎并不被视为重要的 CEO 薪酬决定因素。数据表明，没有奖金激励的企业都明显比那些有奖金激励的小。即不是基于市场的措施，也没有会计基础的措施，在没有激励计划 的公司里，总报酬似乎已经没有任何激励意义。为了更具体而言，我们发现公司更大的市场效益不太可能提供市场激励。 这些点值得密切关注。在一个较长时间的研究期间内，对一个公司的 CEO任期的特点和有关奖励的影响可能会产生额外的见解。 CEO 报酬与新经济的企业绩效的关系的评估，就像公司在规范行业里可以产生有用的信息。
