1、 外文翻译 原文 The Local Logic of Informal Finance and Private I vate Sector Development In China Material Source:http:/www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/Conferences/financial _sector/BeyondBanks.pdf Author: Kellee S. Tsai The most vibrant sector of the Chinese economy lacks access to formal sources of credit. O
2、ver 30 million private businesses have been established during the first two decades of reform; yet, as of year-end 2000, only one percent of the loans extended by state banks went to private enterprises. Although some scholars have labeled China as becoming a growth promoting “developmental state”,
3、 following in the footsteps of its East Asian neighbors, private entrepreneurs in China have not directly benefited from allocated credits or centrally mandated preferential treatment by state banks. How, then, has the “miracle” of Chinas private sector development been financed? Drawing on fieldwor
4、k conducted between 1994 and 2001, this paper offers three explanations. First, the vast majority of private businesses in China rely on informal finance, or what economists call the “curb market”, for their start-up and working capital needs. These informal financing mechanisms range from interest-
5、free loans between friends and relatives, to sophisticated financing arrangements that circumvent national banking laws in creative ways. Second and elatedly, a certain degree of leakage from state banks into the private sector has occurred. The consolidated balance sheets of state banks underreport
6、 the amount of formal credit that is actually going into the private sector because local entrepreneurs and officials have devised strategies for obtaining credit through state and collective enterprises. Third, local political and economic conditions fundamentally mediate the emergence of informal
7、financing mechanisms. Local governments are not equally protective or tolerant of curb market practices-even within a particular province. Some localities harbor a tremendous array of informal financial institutions, while others have a much more limited scope of informal financial activity. The cau
8、sal logic underlying the production of informal finance lies at the local, rather than national level. More specifically, I attribute the local variation in informal finance to the orientation of the local government towards private sector development, which reflects in part structural legacies inhe
9、rited from the Mao era. To clarify these propositions, this paper proceeds as follows. The first part discusses the main forms of informal finance used by private entrepreneurs and the extent to which they are considered legitimate and legal fund-raising activities (most are not). The second section
10、 demonstrates the wide range of local variation in informal finance within China by presenting examples of four different developmental contexts. The cases suggest that the more institutionalized forms of private sector finance depend on political bargains struck between financial entrepreneurs and
11、regulators at the local level. This is not to say that centrally mandated policies are ineffectual or irrelevant, but rather, that local actors creatively interpret existing state policies to serve their particular objectives-in this context, the provision of financial services to private entreprene
12、urs through mutually profitable arrangements. The third part analyzes why substantial local variation exists in the scope and scale of informal finance. I argue that the contours of curb market activity at the grassroots level reflect a certain degree of path dependence in local developmental trajec
13、tories. The conclusion considers the broader implications of this contention for our understanding of Chinas transitional political economy. In particular, the differential patterns of local development and informal finance suggest that financial authorities will continue to face challenges in stand
14、ardizing and commercializing the state banking system. Furthermore, even if formal financial institutions become more accessible to private entrepreneurs, the segmentation of local credit markets suggests that informal finance will continue to thrive, and with considerable local variation rather tha
15、n national homogeneity. Classifying China as a whole into a single developmental category would obscure the differing realities that private business owners and aspiring entrepreneurs face at the ground level. Financing the Private Sector Informally (and Illegally) in China The Party School of the C
16、entral Committee of the Chinese Communist Part reported at the beginning of 1999, “self-employed individuals, private business owners ,and entertainers have gained the most benefit from Chinasfirst twenty years of reform. What the report did not mention was that only 0.4 percent of official bank cre
17、dit went to the private sector in 1998.Indeed, 88 percent of the entrepreneurs that I surveyed during 1996-97 indicated they had never borrowed from the formal financial system. Instead, business owners have relied on a wide range of informal financing mechanisms and institutions, most of which are
18、not sanctioned by the state-controlled banking system. Entrepreneurs have been operating in a transitional policy environment where private businesses are legal (though their status was ambiguously defined until the 1999 constitutional revision), but most of their financing mechanisms are not. The e
19、xtremes of “legal” versus “illegal” forms of financing are distinguished by whether or not they are sanctioned by the Peoples Bank of China (PBOC), which depends largely on whether they mobilize savings from the general public and offer/charge interest rates above the repressed interest rate ceiling
20、s. Interpersonal lending and trade credit, for example, are among the most basic strategies that entrepreneurs use to deal with short-term liquidity requirements. Business owners frequently borrow money from friends, relatives, and neighboring shopkeepers. Who leasers may deliver goods to retailers
21、on ten-day or even 30-day credit if they have an established relationship. Such practices are not illegal to the extent that they do no entail interest above the rates of state banks, in contrast to those charged by the proverbial loan shark or private money houses. The latter are clearly illegal by
22、 PBOC standards because they reflect the higher market cost of capital in a financially repress environment. Moreover, with the sole exception of Meshing Bank, private commercial banks are prohibited in China. The Political Economy of Local Variation in Informal Finance Considerable variation is app
23、arent in the extent to which particular areas possess a diversity of financing options versus absence of private finance. For heuristic purposes, four development contexts may be identified. First, at one extreme are impoverished localities in remote areas that have stagnated or further deteriorated
24、 during the reform era. In such places, government and party cells have atrophied, sometimes to the point of abandonment; the local economy consists primarily of subsistence farming; and not surprisingly, private commerce and informal finance is virtually non-existent. Second, local governments in a
25、reas with a strong legacy of commune and brigade institutions during the Mao era have systematically allocated credit towards larger collective enterprises, while small business owners have relied primarily on unregistered forms of informal finance, like trade credit and rotating credit associations
26、 (e.g., Quanzhou). Third, in areas that had an earlier start on decollectivization and private sector development, the local governments are more lenient toward local curb market activities (e.g., Wenzhou). Fourth, localities that now face the task of reforming state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are mor
27、e likely to comply with financial rectification campaigns in curbing informal finance, while subsidizing local SOEs with bank loans (e.g., Zhengzhou). Curbing informal finance, while subsidizing local SOEs with bank loans (e.g., Zhengzhou). Explaining Local Variation in Informal Finance To clarify h
28、ow each of the developmental cases discussed above contrast from one another, the table below summarizes them according to their structural legacy from the Mao era, political orientation towards the local economy (i.e., in relation to the private sector), and resulting curb market environment. It is
29、 also important to note that the four “types” are by no means representative of the full range of developmental contexts within China. Depending on the level of detail, many more patterns of political economic interaction may be discerned. The key here lies in appreciating the diverse ways in which
30、different areas have developed or not developed curb market institutions that tread on the territory of state banks. Although state banks still are not well positioned to engage in commercial lending (as opposed to policy-driven lending), they would at least prefer to maintain a monopoly on savings
31、mobilization. This objective has proved to be difficult not only because official interest rate levels have been artificially repressed, but also because private financial institutions possess the flexibility to provide a wider range of services and have a financial incentive (hard budget constraint
32、) to do so. Furthermore, as suggested above, there are two main political reasons why curb market mechanisms have managed to flourish in certain areas. It is also important to note that the four “types” are by no means representative of the full range of developmental contexts within China. Dependin
33、g on the level of detail, many more patterns of political economic interaction may be discerned. The key here lies in appreciating the diverse ways in which different areas have developed or not developed curb market institutions that tread on the territory of state banks. Although state banks still
34、 are not well positioned to engage in commercial lending (as opposed to policy-driven lending), they would at least prefer to maintain a monopoly on savings mobilization. This objective has proved to be difficult not only because official interest rate levels have been artificially repressed, but al
35、so because private financial institutions possess the flexibility to provide a wider range of services and have a financial incentive (hard budget constraint) to do so. Conclusion Financial institutions do not magically appear even when the market demand for credit clearly exists. They have to be cr
36、eated. And in the case of China financial entrepreneurs have created financial institutions despite state efforts to monopolize the supply of credit in the economy. Private entrepreneurs cannot simply mind their own businesses and raise capital through the most expedient means. They have to deal wit
37、h the staff of the regulatory state on a day-to-day basis. Yet the “state” is not a single entity that devises policies and implements them consistently. The state consists of multiple administrative levels and functional bureaucracies across geographically defined areas. This paper has therefore ar
38、gued that the orientation of the local government towards the private sector is a key indicator in determining the density of informal financial institutions in any given locality. Ultimately, the implementers of “state” policy decide how to carry out their assign .Ultimately; the economic and polit
39、ical realities discussed above complicate the excision-making calculus of reformers in Beijing. On the one hand, informal finance has played an important role in facilitating private sector growth; on the other hand, curb market activities may have destabilizing effects because they fall beyond the
40、regulatory scope of the state banking system. In addition to violating interest rates ceilings, informal financial intermediaries may compete with formal financial institutions banks in savings mobilization and contribute to local financial crises when they are involved in fundamentally unsustainabl
41、e speculative activities. Generally speaking, banking authorities have attempted to ban rather than to legalize and regulate informal finance. 译文 中国当地银行以外的非正式金融和私营企业的发展 资料来源 :http:/www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/Conferences/finanCial -sector/BeyondBanks.pdf 作者：凯利 中国 中小企业发展 缺乏正规信贷来源。在第一个二十年改革，中国有超过3000 万
42、名私营企业建立， 但 中国绝大多数的私营企业主被隔离在正式的金融体系。 1998 年 末 ，国有银行 中 只有 0.4%的贷款 去 了民营 企业。 到了 2000 年末民营企业借贷只占有银行贷款的 1% 。虽然一些学者表明中国已经成为“发展国家”，尾随东亚 ，然而 中国私有企业家没有直接从银行获益，那么中国的民营企业 的发展奇迹是如何发生的？借鉴于 1994 年和 2001 年间的调查基础，给出了以下三种解释。 首先，在中国大陆绝大多数的私人企业依靠非正式金融或是经济学家所谓的“抑制市场”。因为私人企业的启动和流动资金的需求，他们的融资一般从朋友和亲人获得。 第二，国有银行 有 在 一定程度上
43、渗漏到私有部门。国有银行 的 资产负债表错误 的 评估了实际上正规信贷进入私营企业的数量。 虽然 当地企业家和官员一致赞同获得信贷的途径 是通过国有和集体企业，而不是私有企业。但也不是一味的排斥。 第三，从 当地政治和经济状况 上看待非正式融资机制的出现。根据调查 发现地方政府容忍并且有时候保护 不均匀的非正规金融市场。具体地说， 考虑当地的中小企业 结构性的发展 ，正规金融对中小企业提供的服务在总量和结构上是不足的，甚至是稀少的，因此当地政府在某种程度上而言对非正规金融 的态度是容忍或是保护的。 中国私营企业融资的非正式化 中国私营企业 融资方式 的 主要依靠 非正规金融 即所谓的民间借贷
44、，而 这些非正式 金融 主要 来源于 朋友和亲人 。 党中央委员会曾 报道， 1999 年初，个体、私营企业主已经从中国的“二十年改革”得到最大利益。 但 该报告所没有提到的是在 1998 年只有 0.4%的官方银行信贷 资 金 去了私营部门。 然而 事实上在 1996-1997 年间 调查 中 88%的 中小企业主 表示他们从来没有从正式的金融体系借贷。相反， 中小企业用于日常的生产经营的资金主要是 从非正式 融资机构 获得。 融资方式是否是极端的 ？ 是“ 合法 的” 与 “ 非法的” ？这 经由中国人民银行批准 ； 这在很大程度上取决于公众的储蓄存款和费用报价 /利率的上限。人情贷款和信
45、用贷款，例如企业家处理短期流动性 资金 。企业主 可 经常从朋友、亲戚、邻近的店主那儿借到钱。 如果他们 建立业务关系 ， 批发商可以 在 送货 后 的十天 甚至是 60 天后付款 。在某种程度上这种做法不是非法的。 他们不 需要利 率。与以上相比， 众所皆知的鲨鱼或私人金融房子， 后者显然是非法的。 从 政治经济学 角度看待 非正规金融的局部变动 根据 调查结果显示， 各地 地方政府 对于 各地不同的 经营者 来说 不是平等的保护者。 一些地方 有着非常庞大的 非正规金融机构 ， 而 一些地方 非正规金融活动的范围 是 有限。本人 将其 归因于 当地 私营 企业 的发展方向 不同。 这部分
46、变化反映了从毛泽东时代遗留下来的 民间金融 结构性 性的 残留 问题 。具体而言， 一些 国有企业 改革 任务 中 遏制非正式金融， (如郑州 )； 与此相反，地方民政事务总署对私营部门发展的早期开始就比较倾向于 对 当地 (如温州 )的非正规金融 市场活动宽容 对待 。最后， 一些地方 (如泉州 )是 集体企业占主导地位，在第一个十年的经济改革 后 系统地对大企业 进行 信贷分配 ； 而微型企业 主要 依靠未注册的非正规金融形式 获得生存空间 ，如贸易信贷和旋转信贷协会为主。地方发展和非正规金融模式 ， 表明金融当局将继续面临标准化和产业化 以及 国家银行系统的挑战。此外，本地信贷市场表明，
47、 非正规金融将继续蓬勃发展即 指 民营企业家更容易从 非 正规金融获得资金。 显而易见， 特定的地区缺乏多样性的融资选择。非正式金融一共有四个发展脉络。 首先，在一个极端的贫困地区或是偏远地区， 当地经济生活的主要成分是农耕，私人商务和非正规金融的几乎不存在，这一点也不奇怪。第二 ， 一些地区 (如泉州 )，小企业主主要是靠著未注册形式的非正式金融，如贸易信贷和旋转信贷协会 ，大型企业是依靠银行信贷。 第三，在地域的一个更早的开始 ，其 就 倾向于私人部门的发展， 意指 当地政府更宽容当地民间金融市场活动 (如，温州 )。第四、一些地方现在在面临国有企业改革的任务 (soe)， 为了配合整个金
48、融 整改行动， 因此 控制非正规金融市场 (如郑州 )。 解释 非正规金融出现的合理性 在中国，中小企业用于日常生产经营的借贷资金主要来源不是正 规金融机构，而是来自民间金融。我们可以发现 国家银行还是可以从事商业贷款 (相对于policy-driven 贷款 )。 之前关于正规金融在 储蓄动员 方面垄断 市场 这一目标被证实是困难的 。 不仅 是 因为官方利率水平一直 是 被 人工压抑的 ,而且还因为民营金融机构 为中小企业的融资 提供了灵活性 、方便性 以 及 具有更广泛的服务和财务激励 ,有助于某些地区 市场繁荣。 因此非正规金融的出现是正常的，在以后会更加的广泛的存在 在 市场上。 结
49、论 目前政策制定者面对如此一个基本的困境 ： 一方面，在私营企业的发展中 ，民间金融方面发挥了重要作用 ;另一方面， “ 非金融市场 ” 活动可能引起不稳定的效应， 因为非正规金融机构是游离在规制范围以外的借贷机构 。除了违反利率上限 的条件外 ，非正式金融中介机构很可能与本地银行 机构 在储蓄动员方面存在着 相互竞争 的问题 。 作为银行资金渠道 ， 为私营部门提供服务 ， 有助于解决地方财政危机， 权 当他们参与根本不可持续的投机活动。一般来说，银行官方尝试禁止非正规金融，而不是将其合法化 、 规范化。 然 这些行为 被证实 是无效的 ， 因为当地的政府官员和官僚很可能与私有企业家合作 。 不过在某方面来讲 禁止非正规金融有助于 对个人的经济 作出 补偿和提高当地经济的发展。 非正规 金融机构的出现不是魔法，而是 因为市场需求的存在， 他们必须被创造出来。即指中国金融企业家创造了 非正规 金融机构，尽管国家在经济方面努力垄断信贷。 但是 私营企业家 必须正视这么一个问题：国家政府对非正规金融机构的监督问题。私营企业家 不能简单地只去考虑
