1、 外文翻译 原文 The Core Competence of the Corporation Material Source:Harvard Business Review,May-June,1990 P79-93 Author:C.K.Prahalad and Gary Hamel C. K. Prahalad is professor of corporate strategy and international business at the University of Michigan. Gary Hamel is lecturer in business policy and ma
2、nagement at the London Business School. Their most recent HBR article “Strategic Intent“ (May June 1989), won the 1989 McKinsey Award for excellence. This article is based on research funded by the Gatsby Charitable Foundation. The Roots of Competitive Advantage The distinction we observed in the wa
3、y NEC and GTE conceived of themselves a portfolio of competencies versus a portfolio of businesses was repeated across many industries. From 1980 to 1988, Canon grew by 264%, Honda by 200%. Compare that with Xerox and Chrysler. And if Western managers were once anxious about the low cost and high qu
4、ality of Japanese imports, they are now overwhelmed by the pace at which Japanese rivals are inventing new markets, creating new products, and enhancing them. Canon has given us personal copiers; Honda has moved from motorcycles to four wheel off road buggies. Sony developed the 8mm camcorder, Yamah
5、a, the digital piano. Komatsu developed an underwater remote controlled bulldozer, while Casios latest gambit is a small screen color LCD television. Who would have anticipated the evolution of these vanguard markets? In more established markets, the Japanese challenge has been just as disquieting.
6、Japanese companies are generating a blizzard of features and functional enhancements that bring technological sophistication to everyday products. Japanese car producers have been pioneering four wheel steering, four valve-per cylinder engines, in car navigation systems, and sophisticated electronic
7、 engine management systems. On the strength of its product features, Canon is now a player in facsimile transmission machines, desktop laser printers, even semiconductor manufacturing equipment. In the short run, a companys competitiveness derives from the price/performance attributes of current pro
8、ducts. But the survivors of the first wave of global competition, Western and Japanese alike, are all converging on similar and formidable standards for product cost and quality minimum hurdles for continued competition, but less and less important as sources of differential advantage. In the long r
9、un, competitiveness derives from an ability to build, at lower cost and more speedily than competitors, the core competencies that spawn unanticipated products. The real sources of advantage are to be found in managements ability to consolidate corporatewide technologies and production skills into c
10、ompetencies that empower individual businesses to adapt quickly to changing opportunities. Senior executives who claim that they cannot build core competencies either because they feel the autonomy of business units is sacrosanct or because their feet are held to the quarterly budget fire should thi
11、nk again. The problem in many Western companies is not that their senior executives are any less capable than those in Japan nor that Japanese companies possess greater technical capabilities. Instead, it is their adherence to a concept of the corporation that unnecessarily limits the ability of ind
12、ividual businesses to fully exploit the deep reservoir of technological capability that many American and European companies possess. The diversified corporation is a large tree. The trunk and major limbs are core products, the smaller branches are business units; the leaves, flowers, and fruit are
13、end products. The root system that provides nourishment, sustenance, and stability is the core competence. You can miss the strength of competitors by looking only at their end products, in the same way you miss the strength of a tree if you look only at its leaves. (See the chart “Competencies: The
14、 Roots of Competitiveness.”) Core competencies are the collective learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of technologies. Consider Sonys capacity to miniaturize or Philipss optical media expertise. The theoretical knowledge
15、 to put a radio on a chip does not in itself assure a company the skill to produce a miniature radio no bigger than a business card. To bring off this feat, Casio must harmonize know how in miniaturization, microprocessor design, material science, and ultrathin precision casing the same skills it ap
16、plies in its miniature card calculators, pocket TVs, and digital watches. If core competence is about harmonizing streams of technology, it is also about the organization of work and the delivery of value. Among Sonys competencies is miniaturization. To bring miniaturization to its products, Sony mu
17、st ensure that technologists, engineers, and marketers have a shared understanding of customer needs and of technological possibilities. The force of core competence is felt as decisively in services as in manufacturing. Citicorp was ahead of others investing in an operating system that allowed it t
18、o participate in world markets 24 hours a day. Its competence in provided the company the means to differentiate itself from many financial service institutions. Core competence is communication, involvement, and a deep commitment to working across organizational boundaries. It involves many levels
19、of people and all functions. World class research in, for example, lasers or ceramics can take place in corporate laboratories without having an impact on any of the businesses of the company. The skills that together constitute core competence must coalesce around individuals whose efforts are not
20、so narrowly focused that they cannot recognize the opportunities for blending their functional expertise with those of others in new and interesting ways. Core competence does not diminish with use. Unlike physical assets, which do deteriorate over time, competencies are enhanced as they are applied
21、 and shared. But competencies still need to be nurtured and protected; knowledge fades if it is not used. Competencies are the glue that binds existing businesses. They are also the engine for new business development. Patterns of diversification and market entry may be guided by them, not just by t
22、he attractiveness of markets. Consider 3Ms competence with sticky tape. in dreaming up businesses as diverse as “Post it“ notes, magnetic tape, photographic film, pressure sensitive tapes, and coated abrasives, the company has brought to bear widely shared competencies in substrates, coatings, and a
23、dhesives and devised various ways to combine them. Indeed, 3M has invested consistently in them. What seems to be an extremely diversified portfolio of businesses belies a few shared core competencies. In contrast, there are major companies that have had the potential to build core competencies but
24、failed to do so because top management was unable to conceive of the company as anything other than a collection of discrete businesses. GE sold much of its consumer electronics business to Thomson of France, arguing that it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain its competitiveness in this
25、 sector. That was undoubtedly so, but it is ironic that it sold several key businesses to competitors who were already competence leaders Black & Decker in small electrical motors, and Thomson, which was eager to build its competence in microelectronics and had learned from the Japanese that a posit
26、ion in consumer electronics was vital to this challenge. Management trapped in the strategic business unit (SBU) mind set almost inevitably finds its individual businesses dependent on external sources for critical components, such as motors or compressors. But these are not just components. They ar
27、e core products that contribute to the competitiveness of a wide range of end products. They are the physical embodiments of core competencies. How Not to Think of Competence Since companies are in a race to build the competencies that determine global leadership, successful companies have stopped i
28、magining themselves as bundles of businesses making products. Canon, Honda, Casio, or NEC may seem to preside over portfolios of businesses unrelated in terms of customers, distribution channels, and merchandising strategy. Indeed, they have portfolios that may seem idiosyncratic at times: NEC is th
29、e only global company to be among leaders in computing, telecommunications, and semiconductors and to have a thriving consumer electronics business. But looks are deceiving. In NEC, digital technology, especially VLSI and systems integration skills, is fundamental. In the core competencies underlyin
30、g them, disparate businesses become coherent. It is Hondas core competence in engines and power trains that gives it a distinctive advantage in car, motorcycle, lawn mower, and generator businesses. Canons core competencies in optics, imaging, and microprocessor controls have enabled it to enter, ev
31、en dominate, markets as seemingly diverse as copiers, laser printers, cameras, and image scanners. Philips worked for more than 15 years to perfect its optical media (laser disc) competence, as did JVC in building a leading position in video recording. Other examples of core competencies might inclu
32、de mechantronics (the ability to marry mechanical and electronic engineering), video displays, bioengineering, and microelectronics. In the early stages of its competence building, Philips could not have imagined all the products that would be spawned by its optical media competence, nor could JVC h
33、ave anticipated miniature camcorders when it first began exploring videotape technologies. Unlike the battle for global brand dominance, which is visible in the worlds broadcast and print media and is aimed at building global “share of mind,” the battle to build world class competencies is invisible
34、 to people who arent deliberately looking for it. Top management often tracks the cost and quality of competitors products, yet how many managers untangle the web of alliances their Japanese competitors have constructed to acquire competencies at low cost? In how many Western boardrooms is there an
35、explicit, shared understanding of the competencies the company must build for world leadership? Indeed, how many senior executives discuss the crucial distinction between competitive strategy at the level of a business and competitive strategy at the level of an entire company? Let us be clear. Cult
36、ivating core competence does not mean outspending rivals on research and development. In 1983, when Canon surpassed Xerox in worldwide unit market share in the copier business, its R&D budget in reprographics was but a small fraction of Xeroxs. Over the past 20 years, NEC has spent less on R&D as a
37、percentage of sales than almost all of its American and European competitors. Nor does core competence mean shared costs, as when two or more SBUs use a common facility a plant, service facility, or sales force or share a common component. The gains of sharing may be substantial, but the search for
38、shared costs is typically a post hoc effort to rationalize production across existing businesses, not a premeditated effort to build the competencies out of which the businesses themselves grow. Building core competencies is more ambitious and different than integrating vertically, moreover. Manager
39、s deciding whether to make or buy will start with end products and look upstream to the efficiencies of the supply chain and downstream toward distribution and customers. They do not take inventory of skills and look forward to applying them in nontraditional ways. (Of course, decisions about compet
40、encies do provide a logic for vertical integration. Canon is not particularly integrated in its copier business, except in those aspects of the vertical chain that Support the competencies it regards as critical.) 译文 公司的核心竞争力 资料来源 :哈佛商业评论 1990， 5-6， P79-93 作者：普拉哈拉德和哈默尔 编者按： 普拉哈拉德 是美国密歇根大学研究公司策略和国际商务
41、的教授。哈默尔是伦敦商学院研究企业政策和企业管理的讲师。他们最近的哈佛商业评论文章战略意图（ 1989， ,5-6），赢得了 1989 年的麦肯锡卓越奖。这篇文章是在 比慈善基金会 的资助下完成的。 竞争优势的根源 NEC 和 GTE 两家公司的差别在于，前者把自己看成是一些能力的组合，而后者则把自己视为一些业务的组合。这类情形 在很多行业屡见不鲜。从 1980年到 1988 年， 与美国的 施乐与克莱斯勒 相比， 日本的佳能公司增长了 264，本田公司增长了 200。如果说西方的经理们以前是为日本 低价格，高质量的进口货 而担忧 ，那么他们现在恐怕要 惊叹日本 对手在创造新市场、发明新产品和
42、改进提高方面的惊人速度 了 。佳能公司推出了个人复印机，本田把业务从摩托车扩展到了四轮越野车，索尼开发出了 8 毫米的摄像机，雅玛哈推出了数字钢琴，小松公司研制了水下遥控推土机，而卡西欧的最新产品则是一种小屏幕彩色液晶电视机。谁曾预料得到会演化出这样一些前卫产品市场 ? 在 较为成熟的市场上，日本公司的挑战也同样令人不安。它们掀起了一场改进产品特点和功能的风暴，把尖端的技术引入到了人们的日用品中。比如，日本汽车制造商率先尝试了四轮驱动、每缸四汽阀发动机，车内导航系统以及尖端的电子引擎管理系统。佳能凭借其产品的性能，在传真机、台式激光打印机甚至半导体生产设备等市场都谋得了一席之地。 在短期内，一
43、个公司的竞争优势源于现有产品的性价比特性。但是在第一轮全球竞争中存活下来的企业，无论是西方公司还是日本公司，现在都已趋向于采用相似的严格的产品成本和质量标准。达到这些标准实际上已经成为 继续留在竞争队伍中的最低要求，它们对于形成差异化优势的重要性已越来越小。从长期来看，竞争优势将取决于企业能否以比对手更低的成本和更快的速度构建核心竞争力，这些核心竞争力将为公司催生出意想不到的产品。管理层有能力把整个公司的技术和生产技能整合成核心竞争力，使各项业务能够及时把握不断变化的机遇，这才是优势的真正所在。 有些高层经理宣称他们无法打造核心竞争力，因为业务单元的自主性是不可侵犯的，或者因为他们被紧张的季度
44、预算束缚住了手脚。这些人应该反省。在很多西方企业中，问题并不是领导层在能力上逊于日本同行，或者 企业的技术能力比日本公司差一大截，而是这些企业的管理层死抱着一个陈旧的公司概念。这个陈旧的概念，限制了业务部门的能力，使它们无法充分利用很多欧美公司所拥有的技术能力宝藏。 多元化公司就好比一棵大树，树干和几个主要枝杈是核心产品，较纤细的树枝则是业务单元，叶、花与果实则属于最终产品。为大树提供养分和起支撑固定作用的根系就是公司的核心竞争力。如果你只通过看最终产品来评价竞争对手的实力，你就会看走眼，好比你只看树叶来判断树的强壮程度一样。 核心竞争力是组织内的集体学习能力，尤其是如何协调各种生产技能并且把
45、多种技术整合在一起的能力。索尼的微型化能力和飞利浦的光介质专长就是两种核心竞争力。虽然在理论上可以把收音机组装在一个芯片上，但这种理论知识并不能确保公司有能力生产出如名片般大小的微型收音机。为了把设想变为现实，卡西欧必须把公司在微型化、微处理器设计、材料科学和超薄精密封装等方面的技术专长融为一体，这些也正是它在微型名片式计算器、袖珍电视机以及数字手表中所采用的技术。 核心竞争力不仅仅是整合各种技术，同时它还意味着对工作进行组织和提供价 值。索尼公司的核心竞争力之一是微型化。为了使产品实现微型化，索尼必须保证技术专家、工程师和市场营销人员对客户需求达成共识，并了解技术上的可能性。核心竞争力的作用
46、不仅在制造业中表现明显，在服务业中也是。花旗集团率先投资了一套运营系统，这套系统使它能够全天 24 小时介入全世界的市场，由此带来的核心竞争力使花旗脱颖而出，把很多金融服务公司甩在身后。 核心竞争力是沟通，是参与，是对跨越组织界限协同工作的深度承诺。它涉及所有职能部门和很多级别的员工。世界级的研究项目，比如激光或陶瓷的研发工作，能够在公司的实验室中开 展，但是不会对公司的任何业务部门产生影响。因此，组合在一起构成公司核心竞争力的各种技能，必定是汇集在思维开阔的人身上。如果目光狭窄的话，人们就不会意识到他们有机会把别人的专长以新颖的方式与自己的专长结合到一起。 核心竞争力并不会随着使用的增多而减
47、少。有形资产会随着时间的流逝而减损，但核心竞争力却会随着应用和共享的增多而增强。但是，核心竞争力也需要培养和保护，因为知识不用就会消亡。核心竞争力是把现有业务维系在一起的黏合剂。它们也是新业务开发的动力。多元化经营和进军新市场或许也要以它们为依据，而不仅仅是看市 场的吸引力。 以 3M 公司的黏性胶带业务为例。在规划多元化业务 (包括报事贴、磁带、照相胶卷、压敏胶带和砂带 )的过程中，该公司运用了在基底、涂层以及黏合剂等产品中广泛共享的技术能力，并设计了各种方法来组合它们。实际上， 3M 公司对这些技术的投资一直没有间断过。尽管它的业务组合看起来极为分散，但是繁杂表象的背后却是少数几项共享的核
48、心竞争力。 对比之下，有些大公司虽然具有打造核心竞争力的潜能，却没有成功，因为高层管理者仅把公司看做互不相干的业务集合。美国的通用电气公司把很大一部分电子消费品业务卖给了法国的汤姆 森公司，声称在该领域中保持竞争优势已经日益艰难。事实的确如此，然而，令人不解的是，通用电气为这几项关键业务相中的买主竟然是几家在核心竞争力方面早已成了领袖的竞争对手 例如生产小型电机的百得公司和电子厂商汤姆森公司，后者正急于在微电子领域建立自己的核心竞争力，并且在日本公司的启发下，认识到在电子消费晶领域确立地位是打造这种核心竞争力的关键。 那些陷入战略事业部思维模式的管理者们几乎无一例外地发现，公司中的各个业务部门已经离不开外部供应商所提供的必要元件，比如发动机和压缩机。但公司不能把这些产品仅仅看成是 普通元件，而应该将其视为能够给各种最终产品带来竞争力的核心产品，它们是核心竞争力的具体体现。
