1、1硕士学位论文（20 届）人民币升值中的法律问题研究以广场协议的教训为视角姓 名学 科 、 专 业 法 律 硕 士 （ 全 日 制 法 律 硕 士 ）研 究 方 向 国 际 经 济 法指 导 教 师论文提交日期2人民币升值中的法律问题研究以广场协议的教训为视角（硕士论文摘要）近年来，在中国对外贸易持续顺差的良好态势下，以日本、美国为首的国家不断对中国施压，无端指责中国人民币汇率被低估，要求人民币升值。中国政府自 2005 年 7 月 21 日开始实行以市场供求为基础、参考一篮子货币进行调节、有管理的浮动汇率制度，将人民币对美元汇率升值了 2%,这一做法在一定程度上缓解了人民币的升值压力，但是有
2、关人民币汇率问题的指责和刁难并未就此偃旗息鼓。1985 年美国也曾对日本施压，要求日元升值，最终促成了广场协议的签署。至今， 广场协议历经二十余载对日本经济的影响仍然挥之不去，很多日本学者认为广场协议是造成日本经济长年萧条的罪魁祸首。如今，美国将重点转向中国，要求人民币升值，面对与 1985 年日本如出一辙的情形，中国能否顶住压力，坚持货币政策的自主性是众所关注的问题。通过对广场协议的分析与其经验教训的借鉴，对比中日两国所处的不同的时代背景环境，分析美国的压力对人民币汇率的影响程度，同时，运用国际法原理证明美国对人民币汇率问题的指责并没有国际法上的依据，实属必要。本文主要从以下几个方面进行探讨
3、：首先，第一章介绍了中国人民币汇率制度的改革与发展及中美关于人民币汇率法律争端的缘起。其次，第二章则在国际法的视角下审视美国对人民币汇率提出的法律争议，总结出两个法律争议点，也即作为“潜在申诉方”的美国可能提出现行人民币汇率制度和政策的两个“违法点”：一是认为现行人民币汇率制度和政策构成了“操纵汇率” ；二是认为低估的汇率水平构成对出口产品的“财政资助” 。本章通过对 IMF 及 WTO 就汇率问题的相关规定分析得出中国人民币汇率问题是一国主权问题，中国目前的汇率并不如美国所说的被操纵，也不构成所谓的“财政资助” ，美国完全没有权力对中国的人民币汇率问题横加指责与干涉。再次，第三章则通过对日本
4、广场协议的研究，纵观广场协议后日本经济运行的走势及其为应对日3元升值所采取的一些对策，日元的升值不仅没有解决美日之间的贸易问题，相反日本的经济却进入萧条期。但是导致日本经济长久萧条的根本原因并不是汇率升值本身，而是汇率升值过程中日本经济货币政策失当，产业结构调整滞后，银行监管不到位所致。第四章则通过对比中、日应对本国货币升值时所面临的国际压力和国内压力，从而发现中国面对人民币升值的压力远远小于上世纪的日本，中国完全可以根据本国的经济运行势态来自主决定货币政策。最后，第五章则提出为了防范人民币升值重蹈日本覆辙，必须坚持汇率制度的自主性与独立性，建立金融风险防范体系，警惕资本项目的开放，加强资本监
5、管；加快国内的产业结构调整，扩大内需；通过国际与国内两方面修改完善现行的原产地规则制度，减少中美贸易摩擦。关键词 汇率制度管辖权 汇率操纵 财政资助 广场协议1Research on the legal issues during the appreciation of the RMBin the perspective of lessons learned from “Plaza Accord”（Abstract）In recent years, under the good trend of Chinas foreign trade sustained surplus, many coun
6、tries represented by Japan and the United States have put great pressure on China, criticizing the RMB exchange rate had been undervalued, asking for appreciating the RMB. Since July 21, 2005, The Chinese government carried out a managed floating exchange rate system which was based on market supply
7、 and demand with reference to a basket of currencies, the RMB exchange rate against dollar was appreciated by 2%. Such approach to some extent eased the pressure of RMB appreciation, but the criticism on issues of the RMB exchange rate did not stop. In 1985 the United States had also put pressure to
8、 Japan on the yens appreciation, and ultimately led to the signature of “Plaza Accord”. So far, the influence of “Plaza Accord” to the Japans economy is still lingering, many Japanese scholars believe that “Plaza Accord” is the result of Japans economic recession for many years. Today, the United St
9、ates make their focus on China, the RMB appreciation, facing to the case which is exactly as the same as the case in 1985 of Japan, whether China can withstand pressure, insist on the autonomy of monetary policy is a matter of concern to the public.It is necessary for us to analyze “Plaza Accord” an
10、d the experiences and lessons from Japan, compare with different background between China and Japan, analyze the impact of pressure on the RMB exchange rate, and use the principle of international law to illustrate that the criticism on the issues of RMB exchange rate have no basis in accordance wit
11、h international law.The paper is organized as follows.Section First introduces the development of Chinas exchange rate system and 2the origin of the disputes between China and the United State on the issues of RMB exchange rate. Section Analyzes the legal disputes on the issues of RMB exchange rate
12、in perspective of international law and summarizes two points of the legal disputes, in other words, to be a “potential applicant”, the United States may propose two illegal points with relevant to the current RMB exchange rate system and policy, first, the current RMB exchange rate system and polic
13、y constitutes a “currency manipulation”, the second is that the undervalued exchange rate constitute a “financial assistance” for export products. This section wants to clear that RMB exchange rate system is in the jurisdiction of China monetary sovereignty in accordance with the IMF and WTO agreeme
14、nt, the current RMB exchange rate has not been manipulated, neither constitute financial assistance, the United States is not entitled to criticize the RMB exchange rate system.Section Talks about the “Plaza Accord” influences to Japan. Through analyzing the economy and the resolution to Yen appreci
15、ation after the signature of “Plaza Accord”, instead of easing the trade friction between Japan and the United States, the Japanese economy entered to the recession period. The Yen appreciation is not the root cause to the economic recession but improper monetary policy, lagging industrial restructu
16、ring, lacking of bank supervision during the Yen appreciation.Section Through comparing with the pressure coming from domestic and abroad which China and Japan faced, it is concluded that the pressure of RMB appreciation which China faced is far less than Japan faced in the last century, China can w
17、ork out its own monetary policy in accordance with its own economical operation. Section Discusses what kind of measure would be most suitable for China to prevent repeating the mistakes of Japan when facing the currency appreciation, such as upholding the autonomy and independence of the exchange r
18、ate system, establishing financial risk prevention system and guarding against the opening up of 3capital account, strengthening the capital regulation, speeding up the adjustment of domestic industrial structure and expanding domestic demand, revising and improving the existing rules of origin syst
19、em through both international and domestic respects in order to reduce trade friction between China and the United States. Key Words Jurisdiction of Exchange Rate Currency Manipulation Financial AssistancePlaza Accord1目 录导 言 .1第一章 人民币汇率制度概述 .5第一节 人民币汇率制度的发展与改革 .5一、人民币汇率制度的历史演变 .5二、当前我国的人民币汇率制度改革 .6三
20、、中国加入 WTO 时有关汇率方面的承诺 .7第二节 中美关于人民币汇率法律争端的缘起 .8第三节 汇率博弈的本质分析 .11第二章 IMF 框架下人民币汇率主权法律问题 .12第一节 IMF 与 WTO 在汇率方面的管辖权之争 .12一、WTO 关于 IMF 与 WTO 管辖权的法律规定 .13二、IMF 关于 IMF 与 WTO 管辖权的法律规定 .14第二节 IMF 框架下人民币汇率义务 .15一、IMF 的汇率制度规定 .15二、IMF 对汇率的监督 .16第三节 关于“ 汇率操纵” 认定的法律问题 .16一、基于IMF 协定第 4.1（iii）的分析 .17二、基于对会员国政策的双边
21、监督的分析 .17第四节 关于“ 中国汇率构成对中国出口产品财政资助” 认定的法律问题 .19一、所谓人民币汇率构成财政资助的形式 .202二、人民币汇率不构成财政资助 .22第三章 广场协议的历史及其经验教训 .23第一节 广场协议的签订背景及其内容 .23一、 广场协议的签订背景 .23二、 广场协议的内容 .24第二节 广场协议对日本经济的影响 .25一、通货膨胀不断加剧 .25二、经济泡沫破裂 .26三、 “产业空洞化 ”形成 .26第三节 广场协议后日本经济长期萧条的成因分析 .26一、经济货币政策失当 .27二、产业结构调整滞后 .28三、金融监管制度不完善 .28第四章 中日货币升值压力来源比较分析 .31第一节 中日货币升值来源的相同之处 .31一、均承受国外压力 .31二、对美国际收支均持续顺差 .32三、均存在较强升值预期 .32第二节 中日货币升值来源的区别 .33一、利率政策的区别 .33二、贸易顺差成因上的差异 .33三、贸易利益格局差异 .34
