1、Chinas Lonely Fights against Deflation RiskIn early February， a widely cir- culated hedge fund newsletter roiled financial markets by predicting a hard landing for the economy， the collapse of the “shadowbanking” system and the devaluation of the yuan. Stability returned only after Peoples Bank of C
2、hina Governor Zhou Xiao- chuan explained the logic of Chinas exchange-rate policy. But Chinas ability to maintain that stability depends on a multitude of interrelated factors， such as low productivity growth， declining real interest rates， disruptive technologies， excess capacity and debt overhangs
3、， and excess savings. In fact， the current battle over the yuans exchange rate reflects a tension between the interests of the “financial engineers” （such as the managers of dollar-based hedge funds） and the “real engineers” （Chinese policymakers）. Zero-sum Game Foreign exchange markets are， in theo
4、ry， zero-sum games： the buyers loss is the sellers gain， and vice-versa. Financial engineers love speculating on these markets， because transaction costs are very low and leveraged naked shorts are allowed， without the need to hedge an underlying asset. The exchange rate， however， is an asset price
5、that has huge economic spillovers， because it affects real trade and flow of direct investment. Financial engineers are increasingly shaping the exchange rate through financial transactions that may not be linked to economic fundamentals. Because financial markets notoriously overshoot， if the short
6、 sellers win by pushing exchange rates and the real economy into a low-level equilibrium， the losses take the form of investment， jobs and income. In other words， financial engineers gain is real peoples pain. In order to achieve these gains， financial engineers use the media to influence market beh
7、avior. For example， short sellers portray sharp declines in commodity and oil prices as negative factors， even though lower energy prices actually benefit most consumers-and even some producers， by allowing them to compete with their oligopolistic counterparts. It is estimated that lower oil and com
8、modity prices could add some $460 to Chinas trade balance， largely offsetting the loss in foreign exchange reserves in 2015. Supply-side Reform Similarly， Chinas growth slowdown and the rise of non-performing loans are being discussed as exclusively nega-tive developments. But they are also necessar
9、y pains on the path to supplyside reform aimed at eliminating excess capacity， improving resource efficiency and jettisoning polluting industries. The real engineers， excluding those whose judgment is clouded by personal financial interests， should counter this influence， while refusing to succumb t
10、o the temptation of quick fixes. Fortunately， Chinas authorities have long understood that a stable yuan exchange rate is critical to national， regional and global stability. Indeed， that is why they did not devalue the yuan during the Asian finan- cial crisis. They saw what most analysts missed： le
11、aving the US dollar as the main safe-haven currency for global savings， with near-zero interest rates， would have the same deflationary impact that the gold standard had in the 1930s. In the face of todays deflationary forces， however， real engineers in the worlds major economies have been unwilling
12、 or unable to reflate. The United States， the worlds largest economy， will not use fiscal tools to that end， owing to domestic political constraints. Europes unwillingness to reflate reflects Germanys deep-seated fear of inflation （which underpins its enduring commitment to austerity）. Japan cannot
13、reflate because of its aging population and irresolute implementation of Prime Minister Shinzo Abes economic plan， so-called Abenomics. And China is still paying for the excessive reflation caused by its 4 trillionyuan （$586-billion） stimulus package in 2009， which added more than 80 trillion yuan t
14、o its own debt. The consequences of financial engineering are intensifying. Zero and negative interest rates have not only encouraged short-term speculation in asset markets and harmed long-term investments； they have also destroyed the business model of banks， insurance companies， and fund managers
15、. Why should savers pay banks or fund managers 1-2% intermediation costs when prospective returns on investments are zero？ A system in which financial intermediaries can increase profits only by increasing leverage-sustainable only by increasing quantitative easing-is doomed to fail. Indeed， in hind
16、sight， it seems clear that financial engineers outperformed the real economy only with the support of super-financial engineers-that is， central banks. Initially， balance sheet expansion-by $5 trillion since 2009- provided banks with the cheap funding they needed to avoid failure. But bank deleverag
17、ing （brought about by stiffer regulatory requirements） ， together with negative interest rates， caused financial institutions equity prices to fall， leading to further pro- cyclical destruction of value through price deflation， increasing illiquidity and crowded exits. Fight against Deflation Risks
18、Experience has taught Chinas real engineers that the only way to escape deflation is through painful structural reforms-not easy money and competitive devaluation. The question is whether the US and other reservecurrency countries will share the burden of maintaining global currency stability， throu
19、gh an agreement resembling the 1985 Plaza Accord， in which five major economies agreed to depreciate the US dollar against the Japanese yen and the German Deutsche Mark. If not， why would Asias net lenders， especially China， continue funding speculation against themselves？ The US dollar is a safe ha
20、ven， but savers in need of liquidity still lack an impartial lender of last resort. Depositing in reserve currencies at near-zero interest rates makes sense only if the banker is not funding financial speculation against the depositor. But， as it stands， financial engineers have a lot of freedom； in
21、deed， if they are big enough， they cant fail or， apparently， even go to jail. Chinas G20 presidency this year offers an important opportunity to emphasize that the stability of the yuan is important not only for China， but also for the global financial system as a whole. If the US dollar enters into another round of revaluation， the only winners will be financial engineers.
