1、 外文翻译 原文 EQUITY BASED INCENTIVES Material Source: Society Professionals Author: Richard D Stock Incentive System (SIS), is a system a company adopts to incent managers or ordinary employees. In this system, to incent managers or ordinary employees, a company will make them become stockowners by assi
2、gning a sum of stocks or stock options to them. Stock Incentive System Research on Outstanding Achievement, is a research base on the existing Stock Incentive System. This research emphasizes on analyzing the pertinency between system structure and outstanding achievement. By doing the research, the
3、 author tried to set up a pertinence relation between practicing SIS and carrying out outstanding achievement to enhance the efficiency of a Stock Incentive System. In this thesis, the research is focused on the problems of outstanding achievement deviation, capital resource for buying options or st
4、ocks, and short sight of managers. A lot of data and cases have been adopted to find out the bugs from the existing SIS and set up a new model to enhance the efficiency of the SIS. In this thesis, the author demonstrates the following ideas. 1. For the weak pertinence between stock price and outstan
5、ding achievement under the circumstance of the capital market, it is strongly recommended that the stocks from SIS not come into the market, or it will be inefficient for incenting managers, further more, it may cause risks of deceiving to incent market prices, which will ruin the company and share
6、holders utmostly. Then how to price the incentive stocks, and how can the stocks be encashed? In chapter two, a pricing model of EVA has been set up to answer the questions. In this model, there is linearity pertinence between the stock price and EVA. While priced by this model, the increment of sto
7、cks get an only resource of outstanding achievement made by managers, which will incent managers to work hard to increase stock price. In this model, we can also find out that the capital resource for stock encashment is exercise capital and EVA. 2.An favorable exercise capital resource may be built
8、 up on capital bonus, which will enhance the efficient of SIS by forming a benign incentive circle system. This system is named Capital Bonus Exercising System. Since the capital bonus is the only resource for exercise, and we know that managers outstanding achievement is the only resource for capit
9、al bonus, more outstanding achievement cause more bonus, more bonus cause faster and bigger amount exercise, more exercise cause bigger share hold for managers, and bigger share hold will cause more income, which will incent managers to work harder, then a benign incentive circle system is formed. 3
10、. Since an SIS is used to get a long-term incenting, the managers stock holding period must be quite long, and a rule of exercising and encashing batch by batch must be prescribed. Firstly, the holding period must be quite long to realize long-term incentive function of SIS, or it will be not better
11、 than a cash bonus. For the incentive function will vanish once encashed, the stock holding term must be set long. Secondly, options or stocks must be exercised or encashed batch by batch in the holding period. Since the managers are with cash-predilection, in the other word, short-term income favor
12、itism, if managers cannot get income before the end of the long term, their short-term income favoritism cannot be fulfilled, and then incentive function of SIS will be weakened. To get a harmony between long-term and short-term incenting, options or stocks must be exercised or encashed batch by bat
13、ch. Furthermore, this prescription dividing managers stock income into batches will prevent managers from risks of short sight, and then the company can escape from disasters like Enron and WorldCom ever met. This thesis is a pilot study on Stock Incentive System based on outstanding achievement. It
14、 insists that practising a Stock Incentive System should be able to incent managers to carry out outstanding achievement and the incentive term should be quite long. And to get these effects, the key issues are to set up EVA models and built up a balance between short-term and long-term incenting. A
15、nd most of the authors efforts are being taken to settle these two issues. The use of equity as a key component of executive compensation is probably the most difficult and controversial issue or manage by the compensation committee of a corporate hoard of directors. In theory, equity-based compensa
16、tion should drive management to behave in a manner consistent with the wishes of the shareholders. This column focuses on the three most prevalent equity awards. Nonqualified stock options (NSOs) are by and large the most common equity incentive arrangement Executives may buy stock at a specified pr
17、ice (grant) for a given period of time. Compensation derived from the appreciation in the stock price between the option grant date and the option exercise date is taxed or ordinary income tax rates. NSOs can be exercised in any sequence. There is no taxable income to the executive triggered by the
18、option grant Appreciation from the grate price is taxed at ordinary income tax rates upon exercise. For example, a grant price of $50 and an exercise price of $75 create ordinary income of $25. The company is required to withhold an executives taxes at exercise. This can be a problem because the exe
19、rcise of the option itself does not generate cash for the executive. When the executive sells the stock, any future appreciation from the exercise price to the sale price is taxed at capital gain rates. There is no tax deduction for the company as a result of granting an option. The company does rec
20、eive a tax deduction equal to the executives ordinary income when the option is exercised. There is no impact on the company from any subsequent sale of the stork by the executive. Advantageous to users of nonqualified stock options is the idea that such arrangements are an attempt to align executiv
21、e interests with shareholder interests. There are no limitations on the amount that may be exercised nonqualified options are less dilutive than incentive stock options and the nonqualified variety offer potential for long term appreciation as the company grows. The disadvantage of a nonqualified ar
22、rangement is that executive investment is required at two different intervals-First, to acquire the stock and second, to satisfy the tax liability. Also ,NSOs dilute earnings per share through cowman stack equivalents. There is no charge to corporate earnings unless the option price is variable or i
23、s less than 100% of fair market value on the grant date, or unless the company has elected m account for stock options under FASB 123. Where FASB 123 is used, there is a charge to earnings that is calculated based on the estimated fair market value at grant dare using an option pricing mode! Incenti
24、ve stock options (LSOs) are option plans that meet the guidelines of IRC Sec. 422. They must be granted to employees with an exercise period not to exceed 10 years. The grant price cannot be for less than fair market value at the time that the option is granted, and the option cannot be transferable
25、. ISOs with an aggregate value of$1 000000 cannot be granted to be first exercisable in any given year. The executive incurs a tax liability only when stack obtained through an ISO is sold, and not when the option is exercised. Thus, gains are treated at capital gain rates, provided the executive do
26、es not dispose of the stock until the later of two years from the grant of the option or one year from receipt of the stack. As ordinary income tax rates increase, ISOs become more attractive to executives because the tax is deferred until the stock is sold. The company receives no tax deduction upo
27、n exercise, which can make ISOs an expensive equity vehicle to offer from a company point of view .However, if the company is in a low effective tax bracket, the lack of tax deductibility may still be a fair trade for the benefit provided to the executive. A major ISO advantage is char the executive
28、 has control over the timing of the taxable event (sale of stock and not exercise of the option). This provides the executive an opportunity to do better long-term tax planning, including the ability to defer income without taxation and possibly pay taxes at the lower capital gains rates. From a com
29、pany perspective, the main disadvantage of an ISO arrangement is the lack of a company tax deduction when an executive exercises an ISO. From the executives point of view there are two disadvantages. The first one is the holding period of iS0 shares: the longer of two years from grant or one year fr
30、om the receipt of the stuck in order to receive capital gains treatment .The second disadvantage is that the executive is limited to being granted ISOs of up to $I 00,000 that are exercisable for the first time in any given calendar year. Finally, ISOs that have not been exercised are considered com
31、mon stock equivalents and are factored into the determination of earnings per share, and they can have a dilutive cost impact on the companys earnings per share and balance sheet if the stock price appreciates. Restricted stock is an outright grant of shares to executives. This outright transfer of
32、stock has restrictions as to the sale, transfer and pledging of the granted shares that lapse over a period of time .The restrictions can be for three or five years or for whatever time period is desired by the company. As the restrictions lapse, the executive has an unfettered right to sell, assign
33、, pledge, encumber or do whatever he or she desires with the shares. However, if the executive terminates employment all unvested shares are forfeited. During the restriction period, the executive will receive the dividends on the restricted shares and also be able to vote the shares. To the executi
34、ve, no individual income tax liability occurs when the restricted stock is granted. As restricted lapse, the current market value of vested shares is taxed as ordinary income. Dividends received during the restriction period or otherwise are taxed as ordinary income. 译文 股权激励 资料来源： :金融协会 作者： Richard
35、D. 股权激励制度，是指企业采取授予管理人员或普通员工在未来一段时间内以某一事先规定的价格购买本公司一定比例股票的权利，或者直接授予管理人员或普通员工本公司一定比例的股权，从而试图达到激励管理人员或普通员工目的的制度选择。 基于业绩的股权激励制度研究，是在现有股权激励制度的基础上，重点分析各个环节与业绩的相关性，尝试建立制度实施与业绩创造的连动机制，促使股权激励制度更加有效地发挥激励作用。 本文针对股权激励制度实施过程中出现的业绩背离问题、行权资金来源问题、经营者短期行为问题进行深入研究，引用了较多的数据和案例，旨在分析现有股权激励制度的缺陷，尝试建立股权激励制度的业绩相关模型，增强股权激励制
36、度的激励作用。本文论证了以下观点： 1在现有资本市场条件下，由于股票价格与企业业绩弱相关，所以股权激励制度有关激励性股票不宜上市流通， 否则不但起不到激励经营者创业绩的作用，甚至会引发更大的道德危机，促使经营者为提高股价铤而走险，把企业和投资者的未来推向绝境。否定了股票市场，激励性股权的流通定价问题如何解决呢？本文第二章建立了与业绩相关的定价机制， EVA 定价模式。这一模式中，股权兑现价格与业绩 EVA 成线性关系，股权增值部分的唯一来源就是业绩，促使经营者主动为提高股价而努力创造业绩。在这一模式中，同时指明了股权兑现资金的来源，就是经营者的行权资金和业绩增长部分。 2最有利的行权资金来源应
37、是业绩增长部分，以业绩分红作为行权资金来源可以形成良性 循环激励机制，增强激励作用。这一模式称为分红行权机制，行权资金来源于业绩分红，经营者创造的业绩越多，行权的速度越快数量越多，经营者获利越多，从而促使经营者为加速行权而主动努力创造业绩，良性循环激励机制由此形成。 3股权激励制度重在长期激励，应对经营者持股作较长期的锁定，规定较长时期分期分批行权兑现。一方面是规定较长的行权兑现期限，实施股权激励制度目的之一在于实现激励的长期性，否则就与发现金奖励相差不大。股权一经兑现其激励作用即告消失，所以要规定较长时期内行权兑现。另一方面，是规定分期分批行权兑 现，实施股权激励制度的另一目的是实现长期的激
38、励性，由于经营者普遍具有现金利益偏好，也就是短期收益偏好，如果只有在较远的将来才能行权兑现获利，则满足不了经营者的这种短期偏好，制度的激励力度将大为减弱，为了取得短期激励与长期激励的平衡，所以要规定分期分批行权兑现。另外，规定分期分批行权兑现，使经营者每期每批只能实现一小部分 股权收益，可以防范经营者短期行为，企业可以有效地避免像安然、一样的毁灭性风险。 本文是在现有经济环境下基于业绩对股权激励制度的初步研究，强调股权激励制度必须能够实现激励的业绩导向性和长期性，为 此，业绩相关模型的建立和长短期激励平衡是关键。本文的全部努力，重点在于解决这两个问题。 以股权作为行政赔偿的重要组成部分 ,可能
39、是最困难和最有争议的问题或由企业董事薪酬委员会管理。从理论上讲，股票的报酬应是 管理 层 行为方式与股东 的愿望是一致的。本专栏的重点是三个最普遍的股权激 励。 不合格的股票期权（国家统计局）可能由最常见的股权激励安排行政人员在一个指定的价格买入（批）对于给定时间内 的 股票。补偿来自于购股权授出日期之间及期权行使日期为征税或普通收入税率股票价格 的 升值。国家统计局可以行使任何序列。 没有应纳税所得 额的 价格从期权授予升值引发的行政机关在行使时普通收入税率征税。例如，授予价格 50 美元和 75 美元行使价 25 元普通创造收入。该公司是在行使 时 必 须保留执行的税收。这可能是一个问题，
40、因为期权的运动本身并不产生执行现金。当行使 出售股票 时 ，任何行使价未来升值的销售价格是在资本收益税率征税。 没有 公司税前扣除作为给予一选项的结果。该公司没有收 到抵税等于执行的普通收入当期权被行使。没有任何公司产生执行期权 后出售的影响。 有利的是不合格的股票期权用户，这样安排是为了配合执行股东的利益。有可能行使不合格的股权低于股票期 权激励和不合格的品种长期升值随着公司的发展提供潜在摊薄数额没有限制。一个不合格的行政安排的 缺点是，投资是需要在两个不同的时间间隔为先，收购股票为后，以满足税务负担。此外，国家统计局通过稀释每股收益为 等值。 没有在 企业盈利中扣除，除非该期权价格是可变的
41、或者是在授予之日起不少于 100的公平市场价值，或除非该公司根据财务会计准则委员会已选出的股票期权帐户。财务会计准则委员会是在哪里使用，有一个是计算时的估计公平的市场价值授予敢于利用期权定价模式的盈利中扣除！ 激励性股票期权（销售代表处）的股权计划，以满 足体育馆 SEC 的指导方针。他们必须授予雇员行使期不超过 10 年。授予价 格不能变的，且于购股权授出时的公允市场价值，和股权 不能转让。用 1 元的总价值 000000 ISO 文件中规定 不能被授予先在任何一年行使。 行政招致税务责任只有在通过了 ISO 获得的出售，而不是当期权被行使。因此，在资本利得 收益率处理，行政机关不提供股票处
42、理，直至由授出购股权或一个从 收年度后来的两年。作为普通收入税率的提高， ISO 文件变得更有吸引力，因为税收是高管推迟到股票出售。 该公司没有收到因行使 而扣税，它可以使 ISO 昂贵的权益，提供从企业 的角度问题。然而，如果公司在低税率是有效的，在减税 方面可能仍然是个缺乏公平贸易 。 一个主要优点是国际标准组织行政机关拥有的应税事件时序控制（出售股票，而不是行使选择权）。这提供了一个机会，做执行更好的长期税收筹划的能力，包括推迟不征税收入，并可能支付较低的资本利得税税率。从企业的角度看，一个 ISO 安排的主要缺点是缺乏一个企业所得税时扣除长官行使的 ISO。从行政的角度来看有两个弊端。
43、第一个是支持 ISO 股票持有期限：。两年的时间越长，从批地或 坚持以获得资本收益治疗的第二个缺点是，行政机关有限的收年度被授予 ISO 文件的注册通知书 IIR 美元，可用于在任何特定日历年度首次行使。 最后，尚未行使的 ISO 被视为等同普通股，并把每股收益确定的因素，它们可能对每股收益和资产负债表，如果股票价格赞赏公司的盈利摊薄成本的影响。 限制性股票是股份公司主管的直接资助。这已彻底转让的股票，以出售，转让和授予的股票质押，超过一段时间内失效。的限制可用于三，五年时间内，或任何由本公司所需的限制。由于限制失效，执行有不受约束的权利出售，转让，抵押，质押或做任何与他或她的股份的愿望。但是，如果执行终止就业的所有未归属股份被没收。在限制期间，执行 将获得的限制性股票的股息，也可以投票的股份。 向行政机关，没有个人所得税负债发生时，被授予的限制性股票。为受限制的推移，归属的股份目前的市场价值是作为普通收入纳税。已收股息在限制期间或以其他方式为普通收入纳税。
