1、 外文翻译 原文 AVOIDING LABOR SHORTAGES BY EMPLOYER SIGNALING: ON THE IMPORTANCE OF GOOD WORK CLIMATE AND LABOR RELATIONS Material Source:Industrial and labor relation Review.Vol.63,No.2 Author:SimoneNTour Avoiding labor shortages or job vacancies is a key factor in firms competiveness, particularly in in
2、novative, high quality, or labor intensive industries. Few studies,however, whether empirical or theoretical, have considered job vacancy rates and how to avoid them. Our study, novel in its approach, investigates how employers may gain a competitive advantage in reducing their own labor shortage th
3、rough employer signaling1 the reverse of employee signaling as introduced by Michael Spence (1973). We test the implications of our analysis by using a unique company data set that covers a large number of variables on companies workplace characteristics, thus providing innovative and far-reaching r
4、esults. We find that companies are clearly able to reduce job vacancies by signaling the quality of their labor relations through a number of observable company characteristics, ones that have so far been related neither to recruitment success nor to the avoidance of high job vacancy rates. Such a s
5、tudy is warranted for a number of reasons. First, German works councils,the functional analog of workplace unions in other countries, have been extensively analyzed with respect to worker productivity, investment issues, or the well-being of incumbent workers (see for example Addisonetal. (2007) or
6、Addison etal. (2004). Their value to potential employees and their indirect effects on productivity via improved recruitment success, however, have not been studied. Second, although apprenticeship training has been studied innumerable times with respect to earnings, productivity, or skill shortage
7、prevention through skill enhancement, its indirect effect on avoiding job vacancies via improved recruitment success from the external workforce has been neither recognized nor empirically studied. 2 We find that the existence of an apprenticeship training program significantly enhances a firms recr
8、uitment of skilled employees and thereby produces a dual positive effect on its ability to avoid high job vacancy rates: internal skill upgrading (which is what has been studied in the past) and external skill acquisition (which is what we introduce and study here). Thus, the choice for firms does n
9、ot seem to be whether to invest in training or to poach skilled workers on the external labor market; rather, the choice is whether to invest in training and thereby also increase chances of recruiting externally skilled workers, or not to invest in training and therefore decrease chances of recruit
10、ing externally too. A poaching strategy seems particularly dangerous in tight labor markets because our results suggest that simply offering higher wages than ones competitors will usually not be sufficient. We believe therefore that a deeper analysis of employer signaling is an interesting field fo
11、r future research with potentially far-reaching theoretical and empirical implications. Inter-Firm Differences in Job Vacancy Rates: The Empirical Phenomenon Skill shortages and job vacancies are widespread problems that occur whenever the current number of workers with particular skills is lower th
12、an the number of jobs requiring these skills. Given any such skill shortage on the labor market, one of the major challenges for any firm is to fill its own job openings by attracting relatively more workers than others to gain a competitive advantage. And indeed, we observe that firms ability to fi
13、ll job vacancies is not at all evenly distributed. Even when severe labor shortages exist on an aggregate level, there are substantial and stable variations across firms on a disaggregated level, including firms for which there are no job vacancies at all (see Holzer 1994 or Morissette and Zhang 200
14、1). There has been a notable lack of theoretical or empirical work, however, investigating such inter-firm differences in job vacancy rates. Micro- or firm-level empirical analyses of job vacancy rates and their determinants were, to the best of our knowledge, non-existent before our studies. In con
15、sidering reasons for such vacancies, we evaluated what we believed to be obvious economic explanations for inter-firm differences. For example, job vacancies could be the result of mismatches between the skill requirements of single firms and the skills available in the external workforce. Empirical
16、 results do not seem to support such an explanation, however. Differences in inter-firm job vacancy rates are still large when differences in skill requirements are controlled (see, for example, Backes-Gellneret al. 2006).3 Another rather simple economic explanation could be that differences in job
17、vacancy rates occur because of inter-firm wage differentials. But here again, the data do not seem to support the hypothesis. Job vacancies are observed not only in low wage firms but also, and to a similar extent, in high wage firms (see Schmidtke and Backes-Gellner 2002). Higher wages alone obviou
18、sly do not solve the labor shortage problem, at least not during the tight labor market phase of the late 1990s in Germany, the period covered by our data. These results are compatible with what Dey and Flinn (2005) found for the U.S., although they did not directly study job vacancy but rather job
19、mobility rates. In their model, firms make health insurance decisions in a cooperative manner, recognizing its productivity effects to the firm and its nonmonetary value for the employee (Dey and Flinn 2005). The resulting equilibrium is one in which not all employment matches are covered by health
20、insurance. Wages for jobs that do provide health insurance are higher than those for jobs that do not, and workers whose jobs provide such benefits are less likely to leave those jobs even after conditioning on the wage rate. Dey and Flinns argument that health insurance has an additional nonpecunia
21、ry value is similar to what we argue in our employer signaling model, which deals with other workplace characteristics that have an additional non-monetary value. However, Dey and Flinn were not studying inter-firm differences in job vacancy rates. The question of why some firms are able to fill the
22、ir job openings when others are not in the context of a labor shortage is the subject of this paper. Specifically, we study what differentiates one firm from another by investigating the impact of work atmosphere and labor relations. Our basic assumption is that a firms ability to fill job openings
23、does not exclusively depend upon monetary issues such as wages or fringe benefits. We argue, rather, that company or job characteristics that foster individual workplace satisfaction provide additional value because they may offer important comparative advantages in the recruitment process. We conce
24、ntrate on external recruitment in our paper and control for differences in the number of job openings that may result from differences in internal staffing and recruitment success.4 Non-Observable Workplace Characteristics as a Recruitment Problem and Employer Signaling as a Solution Let us assume t
25、hat not all of the job characteristics that workers prefer are directly observable to them as applicants but only become apparent to them after they have worked for a firm for some time. Let us assume, moreover, that firms with high quality workplaces may experience difficulty in reliably communicat
26、ing to prospective employees their superior quality. Finally, let us assume that workers face a considerable risk in their job decisions because if they accept a job without reliable information on non-observable qualities, the decision may become quite expensive for them. Before they can reliably l
27、earn about the true quality of the firm in question, they may have turned down other job alternatives and may have invested in firm-specific human capital, including, for example, relocating, which makes it difficult or costly to reverse the original job decision. Therefore, workers would ostensibly
28、 be interested in finding reliable means to reduce their risk. We argue, in fact, that job applicants, like any other economic agent in any other market with asymmetric information, use signals to reduce the risk resulting from such asymmetric information. Employing Spences theory of labor market si
29、gnaling (1973) and reversing it to explain inter-firm differences in recruitment success, we contend that it is not only employees, as Spence suggested, but also employers who, by means of their observable characteristics, signal their non-observable quality. Job applicants, we believe, prefer to wo
30、rk in firms that send such signals, even if an observable characteristic seems to be of no direct interest to the applicant. For example, for a skilled craftsman who has already completed his apprenticeship training, it may seem irrelevant that a company maintains an apprenticeship program since he
31、himself no longer needs one. However, the existence of such a program may as a signal still be relevant to a skilled craftsman applying for a job because it serves as a reliable signal that other characteristics exist that the worker values but cannot readily observe, including challenging jobs, goo
32、d long-term career prospects for employees, and company longevity. Another signal may be the existence of a works council. Although analyzed extensively with respect to their impact on the incumbent workforce (e.g. Addison et al. 2007; Sako and Jackson 2006; Heywood and Jirjahn 2002; Bellmannand Bli
33、en 2001), we argue that there is a second and perhaps similarly important effect of a works council, namely, its signaling effect to potential employees. In fact, the mere existence of works councils may increase the attractiveness to potential employees and thereby strongly improve recruitment succ
34、ess. Specifically, works councils may signal more job security or a particularly attractive work ethos, just as other human resources (HR) practices and labor relations issues may serve as valuable signals of a positive work atmosphere and thereby help reduce job vacancies and labor shortages.5 译文 通
35、过雇主发出信号来避免劳力短缺：工作环境及劳动关系 的重要性 资料来源 :工业和劳动关系回顾第 63卷第 2期 作者：西蒙尼 N 图尔 避免劳动力短缺 或者职位空缺是公司之间竞争很关键的因素， 特别是在自主创新 、高 品质、劳动密集行业 。少数研究， 然而 ,无论是以经验为根据还是以理论 为根据 ,都要 考虑 如何避免 工作空置率 。 我们的研究新颖 在它 的 方法 ,研究雇主 如何 减少自己的劳力短缺获得竞争优势 通过信号 1 迈克尔 史宾塞介绍雇员 信号 1的背面 。 我们 通过使用一个公司的一组数据集，来 测试 研究分析的其中的联系 ,这组数据 涵盖了大量的变量 从而 对公司的工作特点 ,
36、提供创新、深远的结果。 我们发现企业 明确有能力通过劳动关系的特点信号来 降低职位 的空缺情况， 可观察公司到目前为止有关招聘的成功 ,即 避免高工作空置率。 这种研究方法允许一堆的原因。首先 ,德国工作会议 ,在其他国家模拟职场工会功能 ,就工作者生产力 投资问题 进行广泛的分析 ,或健康的现任人员发现例如艾迪疾病学组 (艾迪孙俐 (2007)或爱迪森 (2004)等）。他们的价值通过提高潜在雇员的生产力直接影响招聘的成功 ,然而 ,未曾被研究。其次 ,虽然学徒培训就生产力收益已经研究了无数次 ,技能短缺或通过提高能力 ,通过避免间接影响改进工作空缺招聘的成功，从外部 的工人不承认也进行了实
37、证研究。 2我们发现了学徒的存在显著提高公司培训招聘的熟练技术工人的效率，从而产生一种积极的影响能力 ,以避免高工作空置率 :内部技能升级 (这是在过去被研究过 )与外部的技能采集 (这是我们介绍这里学习 )。因此 ,公司的选择并不是要么投资培训或者去招聘外部劳动力市场的熟练工人，相反 ,公司既要选择投资培训 ,然而也要增加招聘外部熟练的工人的机会。一个突出危险的策略 ,就好像是在劳动力市场的威胁一样，因为我们在紧张的劳动力市场结果显示 ,仅仅提供更高的一个人的竞争对手的薪资比通常会是不充分的。我们相信 ,因此 雇主信号未来研究进行了比较深入的分析是个有趣的领域，造成深远的理论和实证的影响。
38、公司间不同的职位空缺 评估：以经验为根据的现象。 技能和职位短缺 ,是普遍存在的问题 ,现在许多工人与特定的技能低于工作的数量技能的要求。这样的技能短缺劳动力市场 ,最主要的挑战之一是任何公司通过吸引相对更多的工人来填补自己的工作机会就获得竞争优势。事实上 ,我们观察到公司的能力去填满职位 ,一点也不均匀分布。即总体水平上存在严重的劳力短缺 ,在企业变化有实质性稳定的模块化设计方法水平 ,包括公司是否有职位空缺 (见霍尔茨 1994年或莫 里斯特 ,张 2001年 )。有显著缺乏经验或者工作理论 ,然而调查不同的职位空缺比率。从公司层面分析我们所知的职位空缺的信息比率和其决定因素 ,不存在过在
39、我们的研究中。 在考虑空缺原因 ,我们相信我们评估是显而易见的，经济学解释为企业之间的差异。 例如 ,职位空缺有可能由于公司技能需求和在外部的劳动力技能可利用之间不匹配。 实证结果似乎不支持这样的一个解释 ,可是企业内部的差异职位空缺的信息仍然很大，当不同的技能需求受控制 (见例如 ,Backes-Gellner2006年学组。另一个非常简单的图表 )经济解释便是工作企业上的差异内部空置率发生 ,是因为工资的差别。但在这里 ,这些数据似乎并不能支持这一假设。注意到职位短缺不仅在低工资公司而且在一定程度上还在高工资公司 (见 Schmidtke和Backes-Gellner 2002年出版 )。
40、更高的工资不能单独解决劳动力短缺问题 ,至少不在 20世纪 90年代末劳动力市场阶段涵盖期间的德国。这些结果支持 Dey和Flinn(2005)有利于美国的判断 ,但他们没有直接学习职位空缺的信息而学习工作流动性率。在他们的模型中 ,公司医疗保险决定 ,公司认识到合作的方式其生产力和它的影 响对雇员来说具有非货币价值 (Dey 和 Flinn 2005)。 由此产生的平衡在其中并不是所有的职业被列入健康保险。工作提供健康保险的比没有提供的更加吸引人，工作提供的福利多少决定工人的去留问题。 Dey 和 Flinn 的观点来说 ,在我们的雇主信号模型健康保险拥有一个附加的非经济价值。该模型的交易与
41、其他工作场所的特点额外非货币价值。 然而 ,Dey 和 Flinn来说 ,没有研究公司在 不同的职位空缺的信息率之间的差异。 问题是为何有些公司当 其他人在没有劳动力短缺的情况下 可以提供满足职位空缺 是本论文的主题。具体地 说 ,我们研究从不同的公司调查工作氛围的影响和劳动关系。我们的基本假设是公司填补职位空缺的能力一样并非唯一的依靠货币问题例如工资、福利。我们论证 ,宁可公司或工作特性培养个人工作满意提供额外的价值 ,因为他们在招聘流程可能提供比较重要的优势。我们专注于我们报上外部招聘和控制若干工作岗位短缺可能由于内部编制和招募成功的差异 不可见的工作场所特点、 招聘问题和雇主的信号作为一
42、种解决方案 让我们假定并非所有的工作特征在员工还作为应聘者时就能直接观察出来的，而是需要他们在一个公司工作过一段时间后。让我们进一步假设 ,那些 拥有高品质办公地点的公司可能会 在与预期优良品质的员工的有效交流中 遇到困难 。最后 ,让我们假定工人在他们的工作上面临相当大的风险 ,因为如果他们决定接受没有可靠的信息，品质不可见的工作 ,这一决定会变得非常昂贵的。在他们可以信服地了解到公司的真正的质量之前 ,他们或许已经拒绝了其他的工作机会，并且对公司特定的人力资本投资产生兴趣 ,包括例如 ,重新定位 ,这使得保留最初的工作决定变得更加困难甚至要付出昂贵的代价。因此 ,工人应该要寻找可靠的方法来
43、减少他们的工作风险。事实上 ,我们认为像任何市场中的任何经济主体使用不对称信息一样 ,求职者中利用不对称信息来降低风险。 运 用史宾塞的劳动力市场信号的理论 (1973)并且利用它来解释企业之间在招聘成功上的差异 ,正如史宾塞所说，我们认为不仅是雇员 ,而且还是雇主 ,要通过他们的可见的特点 ,表达他们不可见的品质。我们相信 ,求职者更喜欢在那些传达着这些信号的公司工作 ,即使看起来求职者对这些可见的特征并没有直接的兴趣。例如 ,对一个已经完成培训的熟练的工匠学徒来说 ,因为公司始终保留学徒制看起来似乎无关紧要，因为他自己已经不再需要。然而 , 作为一种信号 ，此类计划的存在仍然与能工巧匠的求
44、职息息相关，因为它 提供了一个可靠的信号，职工所重视的其他品质仍然存在 ,只是目前无法被观察到 ,包括有挑战性的工作、对雇员来说良好的长期工作前景 ,以及公司的长久性。另一个信号就是劳资联合委员会的存在，尽管我们广泛地分析了他们对现任的劳动力的影响 (例如：爱迪森 张。 2007年 ;Sako和杰克逊 2006;海沃德和 Jirjahn 2002;Bellmann和 Blien 2001),我们认为 ,一个劳资联合委员会具有次要的、也许是同样重要作用 ,也就是说，它信号传导对潜在的雇员具有效果。事实上 ,哪怕仅仅是劳资联合委员会的存在 ,这也可以增加对 潜在雇员的吸引并且因此大大提高招聘的成功。具体地说 , 劳资联合委员会可能产生更多的工作保障，或一个特别吸引人的工作风气的信号 ,正如其他的人力资源的实践与劳动关系问题可以作为一个积极有价值的工作氛围信号 ,从而帮助减少职位和劳动力短缺的危机。
