1、 外文翻译 原文 Leverage effect on private financing Material Source: Privately-offered fund, Buy-outs, Leverage and Failure， Credit Management Research CentreLeeds University Business SchoolJ .Nick Wilson，2009(5); Author: Nick Wilson Credit Management Research Centre Leeds University Business School Abstr
2、act We study the determinants of failure, defined as entering the bankruptcy process, in a unique dataset comprising the population of over 8 million company-year observations of companies in the UK over the period 1995-2009, of which over 140,000 had failed. We examine the characteristics of failed
3、 and non-failed companies and build models that predict the likelihood of insolvency for the company population and test for differences in insolvency risk for company types. Specifically, whether the firm involved a management buyout or management buy-ins, and whether the buy-out/buy-in was private
4、 equity backed.Controlling for size, age, sector and macro-economic conditions (base hazard) we find that private-equity backed buyouts post 2003 are not riskier than the non-buyout population. We find that leverage does not distinguish buy-outs that fail from those that survive. We suggest that pri
5、vate equity companies both target better prospects and are in a better position to adjust capital structure over the cycle and, therefore, manage insolvency risk. Research into financial distress and failure in the corporate sector focuses predominantly on listed companies. Yet in most economies, pr
6、ivate companies make up the majority of firms, both in terms numbers, contribution to economic activity and failure. In the UK, for example, of the 1.8 million companies that are currently registered, less than 3,000 are listed on the London Stock Exchange Within the population of private limited co
7、mpanies management buyouts(MBOs) and management buy-ins (MBIs), whether private equity backed or notform an increasingly important element about which there is scant evidence on failure propensity. Unlike previous studies we examine the whole spectrum of buyout types in relation to the corporate pop
8、ulation and over time. Our time period includes two main waves of buyout activity and an economic cycle up to and including the 2007-2009 credit crisis and recession. In terms of representation our non-buyout sample includes a very significant proportion often active limited company population and t
9、he buyout sample has over 22,000 company-year observations and over 1000 instances of insolvency. In contrast to the first wave of private equity and buyouts of the 1980s, the second wave that culminated in mid-2007 was a worldwide phenomenon. The peak years of 2005 to June 2007, accounted for an es
10、timated 30 per cent of all transactions and 43 per cent of total real value of transactions completed in the period 1984 to 2007 worldwide (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009; Stromberg, 2008). This trend was mirrored in the UK market, the focus of this study and the largest European market, where total dea
11、l value in 2007 was at 45.9 billion some six times the value of 7.5 billion in 1989, the peak of the first wave of buyouts (CMBOR, 2008). The rapidity with which the private equity and buyout market came to such prominence, epitomized by the acquisition of Alliance Boots in the UK in a transaction l
12、ed by KKR and the first private equity buyout of a FTSE100 corporation, attracted considerable policy attention regarding the impact of such deals on the economy and the companies involved. This debate centerd upon the sources of gains in private equity deals and their stability and longevity. Parti
13、cular concerns were that the gains were primarily generated from reductions in employment and increases in asset disposals, which would be followed by the resale of the business within a short period of time (e.g. ITUC, 2007; TSC, 2007). Recent reviews of the literature, encompassing both the first
14、and second waves, indicate that private equity buyouts generate significant improvements in financial performance and total factor productivity (Cummings et al., 2007Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). While employment appears to fall initially, there is generally a subsequent significant increase, with pr
15、ivate equity buyouts having a more positive effect than traditional takeovers (Amess, et al., 2008; Davis et al., 2008, 2009). Evidence also suggests that asset disposals are largely confined to a mall number of the largest deals, while the mean time to exit is between five and six years and appears
16、 to be increasing (Stromberg, 2008; Wright et al.,2007). A further strand of the debate has been the potential impact of high leverage on the stability and survival of private equity buyouts (FSA, 2006). The advent of the credit crunch and recession has now brought this issue to the fore. There is c
17、lear evidence that the numbers of failures of private equity buyouts defined as entering receivership or administration, the UKs bankruptcy regime for firms (see Franks and Sussman, 2005), increased sharply in the recession of the early 1990s and again from 2008 (Figure 1). Kaplan and Stromberg (200
18、9) suggest that default will likely be lower than following the 1980s wave as deals concluded at the peak of the recent second wave generally had better coverage ratios and looser covenants than those conducted at the peak of the first wave. Although leverage levels increased, they were generally lo
19、wer than in the first wave (Wright et al., 2007). Nevertheless, the subsequent failure rates of buyouts and especially private equity backed buyouts, completed during the market peak of the first buyout wave in the 1980s were significantly greater than for deals concluded on either side of this peak
20、 (Figure 2). However, most failures relate to smaller non private equity backed deals. Insert Figures 1 and 2 here. Studies relating to the first wave of private equity buyouts identified high leverage, in a period of high interest rates, as a significant contributory factor to failure (Kaplan and S
21、tein, 1993; Andrade and Kaplan, 1998; Wright et al., 1996). In the wake of the financial crisis it is apposite to examine the determinants of 3 failure of private equity buyouts in the second wave. Further, previous studies have failed to compare the determinants of failure among private equity buyo
22、uts in the context of other firms that have not gone through the buyout process. Stromberg (2008) estimates an annual default rate of 1.2% of private equity backed buyouts completed in the period January 1970 to June 2007 and compares this with an annual default rate of 0.6% for public firms and of
23、corporate bonds of 1.6% in the US. Guo, Hotchkiss and Song (2009) find evidence from public to private PE-backed buyouts in the US of value creation and lower leverage, particularly post-80s.Acharya, Hahn and Kehoe (2009) find support for the value creation hypothesis in UK PE transactions 1996-2004
24、. Papers by Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Hackbarth et al (2006) argue that firms should adjust their capital structure in response to economic conditions. The implication is that leverage increases the risk of insolvency for those firms that cannot adjust capital structure prior to/during the down
25、turn. However, firms backed by private equity investors may be particularly proactive in negotiating restructurings of portfolio companies that become distressed. Acharya et al (2009) emphasize active ownership and governance and greater intensity of engagement in PE-backed companies. Moreover, cove
26、nant-loose debt agreements negotiated by many private equity managers with their banks make it very easy to inject new funds into distressed investments to keep them solvent (Financial Times, 3/05/2010). There is an absence of direct evidence relating to whether buyouts and buy-ins, private equity b
27、acked or not, are more or less likely to fail than other firms and how this varies over the economic cycle. Addressing this issue holds particular importance both for the policy debate surrounding private equity buyouts and for academic researchers. We build a unique, hand-collected dataset comprisi
28、ng the population of over 8 million firm-year observations of public and private firms in the UK over the period 1995-2009, of which over 140,000 had failed1 (see Table 1). We track firm-level characteristics and performance and build a generic failure prediction model that isolates the key determin
29、ants of failure, including company type and incorporates changes in prevailing economic conditions via a macro dependent base line hazard. Given our unique dataset we believe this to be the most comprehensive study of bankruptcy among buyouts to date. Kaplan and Stein (1993) considered a sample of 1
30、24 large LBOs, 23 of which had defaulted on their debt, while Andrade and Kaplan (1998) examine 28 LBOs that had entered Chapter 11 proceedings. Wright et al. (1996) examine a sample of 110 UK buyouts, of which 53 had entered bankruptcy proceedings (i.e. receivership in UK terminology). Stromberg (2
31、008) examines longevity in a sample of 21,397 private equity transactions worldwide of which 570 had entered bankruptcy restructurings but did not include non-LBOs. We focus on three broad areas. First, we provide some descriptive statistics on our buy-out sample both pre and post buyout and compare
32、 the characteristics of buyouts and non-buyouts (failed and non-failed). Second, we examine, in a multivariate context, whether the failure rate of buyouts differs from that of the corporate population when we control for company size, sector, competition (industry concentration), economic condition
33、s and company ownership type. Third, we study whether firms that have undergone a management buyout or management buy-in are significantly more likely to fail than other firms. Within this analysis we consider whether private equity backed buyouts are more or less likely to fail than other buyout ty
34、pes andnon-buyouts. Fourth, we estimate failure prediction models inclusive of a wider range of financial and non-financial characteristics. The non-financial data is used to construct measures of regulatory compliance, operational and financial risk pecific to individual companies. In this context
35、we isolate the impact of leverage on failure propensity and whether this is more acute for buy-outs. The size of our dataset facilitates the building of separate models for sub-samples of companies. Thus, we construct models for the whole company population using the abridged accounts that even smal
36、ler private companies are required to submit, and separate models for those larger, companies that submit full accounts, inclusive of profit, debt and debt servicing data. Our buyout sample is large enough to facilitate the estimation of similar models using the buyout sample only. This facilitates
37、testing for differences in the failure propensity of buy-out type and, by way of comparison with the generic models, to see if the determinants of buy-out failure are the same as those of other companies. Moreover, as the dataset comprises the population of UK limited companies, estimation problems
38、surrounding selection bias are less relevant than in other studies. Finally we provide a comprehensive analysis of the prediction accuracy of the estimated models by applying them to a 2009 hold-out sample of 1.7 million companies of which over 21,000 became insolvent in 2009. Controlling for a rang
39、e of risk factors, we find that buyouts have a higher failure rate than non-buyouts with MBIs having a higher failure rate than MBOs which in turn have a higher failure rate than private equity backed buyouts/buyins. Our findings indicate a default rate for UK private equity backed buyouts of 4.8% (
40、6% for all buyouts) lower than Stromberg (2008) who found an 8% bankruptcy ratefor the UK firms in his sample 译文 杠杆作用对私募融资的影响 资料来源 : 私募基金，融资收购，杠杆作用和失败 J诺丁汉大学商学院， 2009；作者： 尼克威尔森 ， 信用管理研究中心利兹大学管理学院 摘要 在英国， 我们 的公司从 1995-2009 共 接到了 包括 8 百万以上个不同人的意见， 其中有 140,000 已经证明是失败的。经过 研究，我们发现私募融资收购失败的决定因素，在于对破产过程的理
41、解。 我们通过检查失败和没有失败的公司的特征以及建设模型时预测公司破产的大部分人的意见来测试在破产风险中各破产类型的差异。特别的，该公司是否涉及一个管理层收购 或管理认同买进，和一些收购型基金支持 /认同买进以及其控制部门的大小，年龄和宏观经济学条件（最低风险）有重大影响。我们发现在 2003 年用私人资产净值来支持买断职位的风险比进行收购的人风险低得多。我们建议那些私募基金公司要同时具有远大的目标和优越的位置来调整资本结构上面的的周期，由此得出，这就是私募基金的管理破产风险。 就上市公司财务危机和收购失败公司部门的主要焦点的研究，在经济非常时期，多数 私营公司组成的公司，都在谈判中造成经济活
42、动的失败。例如，在英国， 180 万当前注册的公司，在伦敦证券交易所上市的不到 3000 家，多数为私营有限责任公司的管理层收购和管理买进（市场手段）。无论私人资本支不支持，这些证据充分证明有失败倾向。不同于以往的研究，我们此次探讨有关人口和企业在一段时间内整体买断型谱的关系。我们的时间段包括两个收购活动和经济周期 ,并包括 2007-2009 年的信贷危机和经济衰退 ,直到高潮。在代表性方面我们在超过 1000 例的破产事件选择了一些非常重要的非买断样本即公司人口超过 22000 的收购公司的样品。 与此相反的，私募基金从 八十 年代开始对股本的收购的第一波，第二波收购，以及在 2007 年
43、年中达到高潮是一个特殊现 象。其中 2005 年至 2007 年 6月为高峰年，估计占 1984 年至 2007 年期间世界各地完成的交易的真正价值的百分之 30 和 43（ Kaplan 和斯特罗贝格， 2009;斯特罗贝格， 2008），这一趋势反映主要在英国市场上，也是本研究在欧洲市场最大的焦点。其中， 2007 年总交易额是在四百五十九亿英镑，其六倍于 1989 年的 7.5 亿英镑，是第一波收购的高峰（ CMBOR， 2008）。 与该市场的收购公司相比，其特点是快速性，集中体现在对 Alliance Boots的收购即在英国由 KKR 和 FTSE100 指数下的第一个由私募基 金
44、投资公司所率领的交易，这种公司参与的交易使得有关政策对经济的影响备受关注。这次交易后私人股权交易和稳定收益的来源以及时间成为了焦点。特别关注的是，该收益主要是从就业减少和资产处置中所产生的增加。这将使转售业务在较短的时间内增加（国际工会联合会， 2007; TSC， 2007）。通过最近的文献回顾，包括第一次和第二次收购高潮，表明私募基金收购产生的财务表现和总要素生产率有着显着的改善（卡明斯等， 2007;Kaplan 和斯特罗贝格， 2009）。尽管就业出现下降时期，但是私人股本有显着增加，具有比传统的收购兼并更 积极的影响（阿米斯等， 2008;戴维斯等人， 2008 年， 2009 年）
45、。这些证据还表明，资产处置基本上局限在一个市场的最大交易数量，同时买断的平均时间是 5 至 6 年，似乎是有所增加的趋势（斯特罗贝格， 2008;赖特等人， 2007 年）。 一个更深远的话题是高杠杆在私募基金和残余买断的稳定性的潜在影响 (消防安全大使 ， 2006)。由于信贷紧缩和经济衰退的出现，是现在提出这一问题的重要原因。有明确的证据表明，私募基金为加速进入接管或管理方面，使得收购失败的案例急剧增加，因此在 90 年代初期的经济衰退时英国对企业破产制度（见弗兰克斯和 Sussman， 2005），在 2008 年再次实施。卡普兰和斯特罗贝格（ 2009）表明，于近期完成的第二个波峰交易
46、将可能比 20 世纪 80 年代后那波有更好的覆盖比率。虽然杠杆水平上升，但是他们的收购率普遍比第一波较低（赖特等人， 2007 年）。然而，收购后的失败率，尤其是私募基金支持的收购，即在上世纪 80 年代的第一个市场高峰期完成收购浪潮显着高于此峰。虽然，大多数失败涉及到较小的非私人股本支持的交易。 通过对有关私募基金收购第一波已确定的高杠杆作用的分析，发现高利 率是一个重要的促成因素（卡普兰和 Stein， 1993;安德拉德和 Kaplan， 1998;赖特等人， 1996 年）。第二次浪潮的私募基金收购失败的决定因素是在金融危机之后没有进行适当审查，此外，以往的研究都未能在收购其他公司的
47、过程中进行比较也是一个重要因素。斯特罗贝格（ 2008）估计 1970 年 1 月至 2007 年 6 月私募基金支持的收购 1.2 的年拖欠率高于 0.6 的年均速度，低于 1.6 的美国公司债券。霍奇基斯 .宋（ 2009）发现私人 PE支持的收购，在美国创造的价值拥有更低的杠杆作用，尤其是 80 年以后的。阿查里雅， 哈恩和基霍伊（ 2009）发现在 1996-2004 年在英国体育事务中的价值创造学说。而 Shleifer 和 Vishny（ 1992）和哈克巴特（ 2006 年）等认为企业应该调整其资本结构，以回应经济条件的转变。其含义是，杠杆作用为那些在低迷时期不能调整资本结构的那
48、些公司提高破产风险。然而，私募基金投资支持的公司可能为投资公司重组谈判而烦恼。阿查里雅等人（ 2009）强调积极的所有权和治理和 PE 支持的公司应提供更多地参与力度。此外，宽松的债务谈判使得许多私募基金与银行签订协议，可以非常容易的投资注入新的资金（金融时报， 2010 年 3 月 5 日）。 有证据证明，在经济周期变化时，对于是否收购和买进，私募基金的支持，都或多或少比其他公司更加不容易失败。解决这一问题对周边的私募融资政策研究特别重要。 我们建立了一个独特，手工采集的数据集，其中包括 1995-2009 年期间在英国的企业 所获得的 800 万以上的公共和私人机构的意见。其中有超过 14
49、 万的意见将导致失败案例。我们不间断地分析企业的特点和性能，并建立一个通用的故障预测模型，分析失败的关键因素，包括公司类型以及吸收了当时通过宏观依赖底线和危害经济环境的变化。由于我们独特的数据集，我们 相信这是迄今为止私募基金在收购破产方面的最全面的研究。卡普兰和 Stein（ 1993）研究发现在 124 个杠杆收购中，其中有 23 家对它们的债务拖欠的样本，而安德拉德和 Kaplan（ 1998）发现已有 28 个已进入杠杆收购程序。赖特等人（ 1996 年）研究了 110 个英国收购，其中 53 个已进入破产程序（即接管，英国术语）样品。斯特罗贝格（ 2008）研究中的 21397 全球私募融资交易，其中 570 已进入破产重组，但不包括非杠杆收购样品。我们把以下四大领域作为研究焦点。 首先，我们提供的一些前买断和后买断描述性统计和比较买断 和非买断（失败和非失败）的特点。其次，我们将考察，在一个多元的背景下，收购失败率是否与公司的规模，行业，竞争（产业集中度），经济状况和公司控制，不同所有制类型的关系。 最后 ，我们估计失败预测的财务及非财务特征模型的包容性是否广泛。非财务数据是用来对个别公司构建业务和财务风险是否合规的措施。在这方面，我们找出失败的杠杆倾向的影响，这是否更适合赎买。
