1、 外文翻译 原文 International trade and industrial upgrading in the apparel commodity chain Material Source: Department of Sociology, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708-0088, USA Author: Gary Gereffi* 4. The evolution of the apparel commodity chain in Asia Industrial upgrading within the apparel commodity c
2、hain in Asia involves the use of networks to create new sources of national and regional competitive advantage. We trace this process through four stages: the building of locally integrated manufacturing and marketing networks, involving close ties with foreign buyers; the internationalization of th
3、e apparel commodity chain to encompass new tiers of low-cost suppliers in Asia, in response to a combination of supply-side constraints and external pressures; the coordination of these buyerdriven chains through different types of trade networks; and the completion or regionalization of the apparel
4、 commodity chain within Asia. This industrial upgrading cycle in Asia is locally rooted, but it has important repercussions on how the apparel industry is organized in other regions of the world, such as North America and Europe. 4.1. Building commodity chains: OEM and OBM in East Asia The East Asia
5、n NIEs are generally taken as the archetype for industrial upgrading among developing countries. They made a rapid transition from the initial assembly phase of export growth (typically utilizing export-processing zones located near major ports) to a more generalized system of incentives that applie
6、d to all export-oriented factories in their economies. The next stage for Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore was OEM production. The OEM model has the following features: the supplying firm makes a product according to the design specified by the buyer; the product is sold under the buyers
7、 brand name; the supplier and buyer are separate firms; and the supplier lacks control over distribution. East Asian firms soon became full-range package suppliers for foreign buyers, and thereby forged an innovative entrepreneurial capability that involved the coordination of complex production, tr
8、ade, and financial networks (Gereffi,1995). The OEM export role has many advantages. It enhances the ability of local entrepreneurs to learn the preferences of foreign buyers, including international standards for the price, quality, and delivery of export merchandise. It also generates substantial
9、backward linkages in the domestic economy because OEM contractors are expected to develop reliable sources of supply for many inputs. Moreover, expertise in OEM production increases over time and it spreads across different types of activities. The OEM supplier learns much about the downstream and u
10、pstream segments of the apparel commodity chain from the buyer. This tacit knowledge can later become a powerful competitive weapon. Particular places such as the East Asian NIEs thus retain an enduring competitive edge in export-oriented development. However, East Asian producers confront intense c
11、ompetition from lower-cost exporters in various parts of the Third World, and the price of their exports to Western nations has been further elevated by sharp currency appreciations during the past decade. Under these circumstances, it is advantageous to establish forward linkages to developedcountr
12、y markets, where the biggest profits are made in buyer-driven commodity chains. Therefore, a number of firms in the East Asian NIEs that pioneered OEM are now pushing beyond it to the original brand name manufacturing (OBM) role by integrating their manufacturing expertise with the design and sale o
13、f their own branded merchandise. South Korea is the most advanced of the East Asian NIEs in OBM production, with Korean brands of automobiles (Hyundai), electronic products (Samsung), and household appliances (Samsung and Goldstar), among other items, being sold in 8 North America, Europe and Japan.
14、 Taiwanese companies have pursued OBM in computers, bicycles, sporting equipment, and shoes, but not in apparel. In Hong Kong, clothing companies have been the most successful in making the shift from OEM to OBM. The womens clothing chain Episode, controlled by Hong Kongs Fang Brothers Group, one of
15、 the foremost OEM suppliers for Liz Claiborne in the 1970s and 1980s, has stores in 26 countries, only a third of which are in Asia. Giordano, Hong Kongs most famous clothing brand, has added to its initial base of garment factories 200 stores in Hong Kong and China, and another 300 retail outlets s
16、cattered across Southeast Asia and Korea. Hang Ten, a less-expensive line, has 200 stores in Taiwan, making it the largest foreign-clothing franchise on the island (Granitsas, 1998). There have been significant reversals in the OBM experience, however. Mitac Corporation, the main competitor to Acer
17、in Taiwans personal computer market, reduced its own-brand computers from 70% of its total sales in 1990 to 40% in 1993 (Selwyn, 1993). Daewoo, Koreas third-largest appliance and consumerelectronics company (after Samsung and Goldstar), moved from years of brandbuilding back to the OEM game (Asiawee
18、k, 1995). Why has the OEM role proved so resilient? To a large degree, the answer lies with core competencies and networks. C.S. Ho, the president of Mitac, says that his firm was more profitable when it concentrated on its core competencies: We asked ourselves: What functions are we best at? Our st
19、rengths are in R&D, design and manufacturing.We are now focusing on designing and supplying products and key components for major OEM customers, whose brands are better-known but which have withdrawn from fully integrated manufacture (Selwyn, 1993, p. 24). S.H. Bae, Chairman and Chief Executive Offi
20、cer of Daewoo, says, Our strength is in manufacturing. If our margins are adequate, we dont mind making products for others (Asiaweek, 1995, p. 56). Bae expects a shakeout in appliances and consumer electronics by the year 2000, and concludes that companies will have to become dominant producers in
21、core products. To keep OEM profitable under conditions of intense wage competition among developing countries and protectionism in Western markets, East Asian NIE companies have set up elaborate offshore production networks. Daewoo, for example, has 16 offshore plants in China, Vietnam, Central Asia
22、, Europe and Mexico. Through worker-training programs, Bae claims that Daewoos Vietnam plant is almost as efficient as local ones (Asiaweek, 1995, p. 57). Thus, the key to profitability in OEM production for East Asian NIEs seems to be manufacturing expertise (including substantial spending in resea
23、rch and development), and learning how to flexibly manage overseas production networks. This can be seen in Hong Kongs apparel manufacturers, Taiwans footwear companies, and Singapores computer firms. Network flexibility thus has become one of the major organizational assets utilized by the NIEs in
24、their internationalization strategies. 译文 国际贸易和产业升级的服装价值链 资料来源 : Department of Sociology, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708-0088, USA 作者： Gary Gereffi* 4.亚洲服装产业链的演变 亚洲服装产业链的升级表现于使用网络 来创造国家和地区间竞争优势的新来源。我们把这一过程分为四个阶段：建立本地集成制造和销售网络，继而密切联系外国买家；国际化服装产业链，包括在亚洲发展更低成本的供应商，以应对各种供应方面的制约和外部压力；在不同类型的贸易网络间协调买方的需
25、求；并在亚洲范围内完成服装产业链的区域化。这种产业的升级循环是在亚洲生根发芽的，但它对世界其他地区服装业的发展有极其重要的影响，比如北美和欧洲。 4 1.建立产业链：东亚的 OEM 和 OBM 东亚的发展中国家普遍以新工业化经济体作为工业升级的原型。他们迅速从最初以装配为主要形式的粗 放型的出口增长方式（通常是利用位于主要港口的出口加工区）过度到一个以更宏观的经济效益来引导所有外向型工厂的集约型出口方式。台湾，韩国，香港和新加坡接下来的阶段是 OEM 制造。 OEM 模型有以下的特点：供应商严格按照买方的要求设计制造产品；产品以买方的品牌名称出售；供应商和买房是两家独立的公司；供应商对产品的销
26、售缺乏控制。东亚的许多公司很快成为国外买家的全方位供应商，从而形成了一种全新的，参与协调复杂的生产，贸易和金融网络的能力（ Gereffi,1995） OEM 出口方拥有许多优势。它提高了本地企业迎合外国买家喜 好的能力，包括出口商品在价格，质量和运输方面的国际标准。它还会对国内的经济产生大量的后续联系，因为 OEM 开发商需要为各种输入开发出可靠的供应来源。此外，随着时间的推移， OEM 的生产技术越来越高，而且会向各个不同领域延伸。OEM 生产商能通过购买者在服装产业链的上游和下游学习到很多知识。这种隐性知识可以在以后成为一个强大的竞争武器。 一些特别的地方比如东亚的新型工业化经济体从而能
27、在以出口为导向的发展上保持持久的竞争优势。然而，东亚生产商在第三世界国家的许多地区面对着来自低成本出口商的激烈竞争。并且他们出口到西方 国家的货物的价格因为货币的大幅升值而得到了进一步提高。在这种情况下，向发展中国家的市场建立前向联系是非常有利的。因为在那里，最大的利益来自于买方驱动的商品链。因此，一些在 OEM 制造方面领先的东亚新型工业化经济体企业正在取代它原来的品牌制造商（自创品牌）的作用，将它们在制造方面的优势和设计结合起来，从而销售他们自有品牌的商品。 韩国式东亚新兴工业化经济体在自创品牌生产中做得最好的。韩国品牌的汽车（现代），电子产品（三星），家用电器（三星和金星），与其他产品不
28、同，在北美，欧洲和日本均有销售。台湾企业推行了自创品牌的电脑，自行车，运动器材，和鞋子，却没有服装。而在香港，服装企业是在从 OEM 到自创品牌转变中坐的最成功的。由香港方氏兄弟集团控股的女装连锁店 Episode，是 70 年代至 80 年代间 Liz Claiborne 最主要的供应商之一。他们在 26 个国家有商店，其中在亚洲的只有三分之一。佐丹奴，香港最有名的服装品牌，已经在它最初的服装制造 基地外，在香港和中国大陆增加了 200 家店面，另外还有 300 家零售店铺遍布东南亚和韩国。 Hang Ten，一个平价休闲品牌，在台湾拥有 200 家店面，在岛内形成了最大的外国服装垄断 (G
29、ranitsas, 1998). 然而，也有自创品牌转型的例子。 Mitac Corporation，宏基在台湾个人电脑市场上的主要竞争对手，在 1990 到 1993 年之间，把其自有品牌电脑销售额占总销售额的比例，从 70%降到了 40% (Selwyn, 1993).大宇，韩国第三大家电和消费电子公司（仅次于三星和金星），在多年的品牌塑 造后，又回到了 OEM制造的路上 (Asiaweek, 1995). 为什么 OEM 的角色表现得如此坚韧？在很大程度上，答案在于核心能力和网络。 C.S.Ho， Mitac 集团的主席表示，当他的公司更专注于他们的核心能力时，更加容易盈利：“我们问自己
30、：哪一部分是我们最在行的？我们的优势是研发、设计和制造。我们现在把重点放在品牌更知名，但已经完全退出集成制造的 OEM客户身上，并为他们提供设计，产品和核心部件” (Selwyn, 1993, p. 24). S.H. Bae，大宇公司的董事长兼首席执行官说，“我们的优势在 制造业。如果我们有足够的利润，我们不介意为其他公司制造产品” (Asiaweek, 1995, p. 56).Bae 预计在 2000 年在家电和消费电子产品也会有一次淘汰，而且得出结论，届时其公司将不得不成为占主导地位的核心产品生产者。 为了让 OEM 在发展中国家激烈的工资竞争和西方市场的贸易保护主义下保持盈利，东亚新兴工业的公司已经建立了详细的海外生产网络。比如说，大宇，在中国，越南，中亚，欧洲和墨西哥一共有 16 个海外工厂。通过工人培训计划，Bae 声称“【大宇】越南工厂的效率几乎与当地工厂相同” (Asiaweek, 1995, p. 57).因此，东亚新型工业化经济体 OEM 生产的盈利能力的关键似乎是制造业的专业知识（包括在研究和发展上的大量开支），并学习如何灵活地管理海外的生产网络。这个我们在香港的服装制造商，台湾的制鞋公司和新加坡的电脑公司都能看到。网络的灵活性，已经成为新型工业化国家们国际化战略的一个重要组成部分。
