1、 外文翻译 原文 SME Export Performance in Indonesia After the Crisis Material Source: S mall Bus iness Economics (2006) 26: 25 37 A u t h o r : E d g a r d R o d r i g u e z 1. Introduction The nancial crisis hit several Asian countries in the late 1990s. Among the hardest hit economies, Indonesia experien
2、ced a decline of its GDP by 13% in 1998 and a large devaluation of its local currency that soared from 2,500 rupiah to the dollar to above 10,000 in the years after the crisis.Economic observers expected this sudden devaluation to bring a large surge in exports so that the economy would quickly boun
3、ce back from the crisis. However, the export sector dominated by large corporations has yet to lead the country out of the crisis. In fact, 5 years after the crisis, Indonesias industrial structure has yet to show signs of a vibrant economic recovery. In 1999, Indonesias GDP grew modestly less than
4、1%. In 2000,growth climbed to 4.8, and slowed down to 3.3% in 2001, and again in 2002. Under dierent scenarios, all forecasts reveal a very low probability of growth rates above 6% for the following years.High growth rates are considered important to reduce poverty signicantly in Indonesia, where al
5、most one fth are classied as poor. Large enterprises (LEs) and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) responded dierently to the Asian crisis. Whereas the former contracted and reduced their exports, the latter grew and expanded their exports. SMEs weathered the crisis better than larger rms, though ma
6、ny have been hit hard too (Berry et al., 2002; The Asia Foundation, 2002). One of the reasons why large exporters underperformed was that they were simply too dependent on a large proportion of imported inputs.Hence, when the rupiah sank, they also saw their input prices in dollars increase dramatic
7、ally, making a swift recovery dicult. Moreover, decades of easy access to nance and imprudent banking practices towards corporate Indonesia had left a large burden of non-performing loans in the banking system, and nally aected the recovery of these rms and the conglomerates they belonged to. Most o
8、f these conglomerates were establishedas family businesses. In 1996, about 175 groups that originated from family businesses controlled more than half of total assets of the top 300 Indonesian conglomerates. On average, families controlled 67.1% of publicly listed companies in Indonesia, while one s
9、ingle family controlled 16.6% (Zhuang et al., 2001: 4546). These gures show the extent of power wielded over the corporate sector, and the extent of the disruption when the nancial crisis nally hit Indonesias corporate sector in the late 1990s. The crisis brought a rather unexpected windfall for SME
10、s. With a depressed local market and a higher local price for their products, SMEs had to nd new markets and many switched to international markets. Their low import requirements reinforced their competitiveness abroad. The SME sector, usually regarded in need of Government support, grew during the
11、crisis despite the collapse of a highly regulated economy like Indonesias.Being less reliant on formal credit was a bonus in the short term. Because only one in ve SMEs had formal bank loans according to several enterprise surveys by technical assistance from the Asia Foundation and the Asian Develo
12、pment Bank,Indonesian SMEs had a small exposure to a banking sector in disarray, and could respond more quickly and exibly than their larger counterparts burdened by bad debts. The export response of SMEs corroborates the fact that the new and small rms are important participants in international tr
13、ade (Reynolds, 1999). Despite their resilience, export-oriented SMEs still face a number of challenges for long term growth. While their start from a low base, compared to their ASEAN counterparts where SMEs are responsible for more than one-quarter of exports, Indonesian SME exporters represent onl
14、y less than 14% of non-oil and gas exports.The empirical SME literature has noted the above-average disparity in productivity performance between small and large Indonesian rms (Berry and Mazumdar, 1991), let alone their disparity in export performance. The larger the gap, the larger the gain in clo
15、sing it. So, for example, in Indonesia, an increase in the productivity of SMEs could have important consequences for total exports. If SMEs were to attain the same value of exports per unit of labor as the large sector, total industrial exports would increase by 14%. In comparison, over the period
16、of 19992002, total merchandise exports from Indonesia grew on average a meager 4%. It is therefore warranted to examine the factors that explain export success among Indonesian small and large rms. In this paper we concentrate on exports because they represent the hallmark of productivity, because p
17、otential SME exports may contribute signicantly to total export growth, and because export performance could allow for the formulation of clear policy measures to help reduce the gap between the actual and the potential capacity of small rms. The increase in exports among SMEs during one of Indonesi
18、as most dramatic economic episodes helps to highlight the reasons why growth in the sector should be supported by economic policies that do not promote SMEs per se, but that promote a business environment where vibrant small private enterprises have better chances to survive and ourish into larger,
19、more productive enterprises. 2. The Indonesian industrial sector The paper uses the latest available data for more than 20,000 industrial enterprises in Indonesia from the Annual Manufacturing Survey of 1996 and 2000 produced by the Central Bureau of Statistics. The crisis occurred towards the end o
20、f 1997 and peaked in 1998. If one takes the ve-year span between 1996 and the year 2000 to examine the impact of the crisis, one allows for some time to adjust after the unprecedented contraction of 1998. The Asian Crisis caused a large turmoil in Indonesias industrial structure, even though in the
21、aggregate the number of rms appeared to be almost unaected. The surveys recorded 22,997 rms in operation in 1996 and 22,174 in 2000, i.e., an apparently modest decline of 3.5% in the number of rms. However, the rst impression when one compares these two snapshots, hides the fact that 6,100 rms (26.5
22、% of all rms in 1996) closed down between 1996 and 2000, and that 5,277 new rms started operations during the same period. These gures serve to show the turmoil in the industrial sector caused the Asian Crisis in the highly regulated environment of Indonesia. Starting a new formal business remains a
23、 lengthy and costly undertaking in Indonesia. A World Bank study of 111 countries places Indonesia in 110th place with about 160 days to follow all necessary steps to formalize a new business.Other international rankings also point to the need of reducing the control over new businesses. The surveys
24、 exclude manufacturing microenterprises with fewer than 20 workers, and,hence, reduce our ability to learn more about the very small enterprise sector in terms of their survival strategies and government interventions in the sector. Our focus will be on SMEs and large enterprises, not these micro-en
25、terprises. First, despite their large contribution to employment,data on micro-enterprises tend to be unavailable in a comparable format to those of more structured businesses, so this, unfortunately, precludes any further comparative work between the very small enterprises and the rest. More import
26、antly, omitting micro-enterprises tends to exclude the impact of their survival characteristics and government protection. First, some micro enterprises tend to be more survival activities than high return economic activities, such as exporting.As Liedholm and Mead (1999) point out, the great majori
27、ty of micro enterprises are indeed non-growing enterprises that remain fully reliant on unpaid family labor. Hence, many micro-enterprises are established during economic crises as the result of the lack of better employment opportunities elsewhere so that many of the micro-enterprises started durin
28、g crises are likely to close down during the economic recovery. Further, omitting micro enterprises vis-a-vis other rms tends to reduce the chance of observing the eect of government interventions in the sector. Access to special promotion programs, such as Indonesias reservation scheme for micro en
29、terprises,depends on the denition used, which are biased in favor of micro enterprises. At present, various ministries apply dierent denitions for their own promotion of micro enterprises and cooperatives, and revisions to the current legal denitions based on total sales are far from settled. In ord
30、er to examine the manufacturing data in greater detail we subdivide our sample by six worker-based size categories.The emerging view conrms a highly dynamic SME sector with many exits and entries. When one denes a ner size breakdown of rms, one observes that,among the smallest rms, 35.7% were forced
31、 to close, and the out-of-business percentage declines with industry size. Only 6.7% of the largest rms closed between 1996 and 2000.While SMEs recorded the most closures, the SME sector also showed the most vigorous response to the new opportunities presented in the ve-year period (see Appendix 1A)
32、. 译文 中小企业在印尼危机后的出口表现 资料来源 : 小型企业经济学（ 2006） 26： 25-37 作者： 埃德加德瓦罗德里格斯 20 世纪 90 年代末金融危机冲击了几个亚洲国家。其中受灾最严重的经济体 印尼 ， 1998 年 其国内生产总值下降 了 13 并且其当地货币大幅贬值的飙升从2500 卢比对美元在未来数年以上 10,000 在经济危机以后 。 经济观察家预计，突然贬值带来的出口猛增 ， 使得 经济将迅速反弹从危机。然而， 出口部门占主导地位的大企业还没有领导国家走出危机。 事实上， 经济危机后的 5 年里 ，印尼的工业结构还没有迹象显示一充满活力的经济复苏。 1999 年，
33、印尼的国内生产总值增长不到 1。 2000 年，增长攀升至 4.8， 2001 年和 2002 年又 放缓至 3.3。 根据不同的情况，揭示了以上所有预测为 6，随后几年的增长率的可能性非常小。要想减少贫困在印尼高增长率是被认为相当主要的 ， 在印尼几乎 五分之一 的人是穷人。 大型企业（ LE） 和中小型企业（ SME） 对 亚洲金融危机 的反应是不同的 。 前者 收缩 和 降低其出口，后者增长和扩大出口。中小企业抵御金融危机比大企业强，尽管 中小企业也 受到重创（贝里等人， 2002 年 ;。亚洲基金会， 2002） 。 为何大出口商的表现不佳的原因之一是， 他们只是过分依赖了进口。因此，
34、当印尼盾贬值，他们也看到他们的投入价格在美元急剧增加，使得难以迅速复苏。 此外，几十年来容易获得融资和银行对企业印度尼西亚不谨慎的做法留下了不良贷款的银行系统 造成 很大 的 负担，并最终影响了这些公司和企业集团他们 的 恢复。这些集团大多 成立于 家族企业。 1996 年，约 175 家企业集团，控制了印度尼西亚 300 强企业集团总资产超过一半 。平均而言，家庭控制 占 印尼上市公司的 67.1，而单一家族控制的 占 16.6（ Zhuang et al， 2001：。 45-46）。这些数字表明， 当金融危机冲击于 90 年代末印尼的企业部门时， 在权力范围内发 挥起企业部门，以及时的干
35、扰 ，在一定 程度上打击了金融危机 造成的不良影响 。 这场危机对中小企业带来了一个相当意外的财富。随着当地市场低迷和较高的地方为他们的产品价格，中小企业必须寻找新的市场，许多国际市场转向。它们的低进口需求增强他们的 竞争力国外。中小企业部门，通常需要在政府的支持下把，增长了尽管像印度尼西亚的高度管制的经济崩溃的危机。作为对正规信贷的依赖较少是在短期内资金。由于中小型企业只有五分之一接受过正规的银行贷款，根据来自亚洲基金会和亚洲开发银行的技术援助，几个企业的调查，印度尼西亚的中小型企业有一个小暴露于银行界一片混乱，广告可以更快，更灵活地作出反应比同行背负着更大的坏账。中小企业的出口的反应证实了
36、事实，即新公司和小公司在国际贸易（雷诺， 1999 年）的重要参与者。 尽管他们的应变能力，以出口为导向的中小企业仍面临着长期经济增长 的挑战。虽然他们从一开始的基数较低， 但与 东盟同行相比，他们在中小企业超过三分之一的产品出口的四分之一，印度尼西亚中小企业出口只占不到 14%非石油和天然气 出口。 中小企业已经注意到高于平均水平的生产力之间的小型和大型（贝里和 Mazumdar， 1991 年）印度尼西亚公司的业绩差距，更不用说他们在出口业绩差距。差距 越大 ，增益 越大 。因此，例如，在印度尼西亚，在中小企业的生产率的提高可能对整体出口的重要后果。如果中小型企业要想达到每劳动部门为单位的
37、大型出口值相同，占工业出口将增加 14。相比之下，超过了 1999-2002 年期间，印尼商品出口总额的平均增长只有区区 4。因此，保证审查的因素，说明在印度尼西亚小型和大型企业的出口成功。 在本文中，我们集中出口，因为它们代表了生产力的标志，因为潜在的可能大大促进中小企业出口占出口增长，因为出口表现可能允许对明确的政策措施的制定，以帮助缩小与实际的差距小企业的潜在能力。在纺织品出口的中小企业增加在印尼的最引人注目的经济事件之一，有助于突出的原因，该部门的增长，应该是由经济政策，不促进中小企业本身的支持，但可以促进营商环境，充满活力的小型民营企业更好的生存和繁荣的机会将更大，更多的 生产企业。
38、 2.印度尼西亚工业部门 本文使用的工业企业 2 万多名在印尼现有的最新数据 。危机发生在 1997 年年底实现， 1998 年达到顶峰。如果把 1996 年至 2000 年五年跨度审查危机的影响，一个人有一段时间，调整后的 1998 年前所未有的收缩。亚洲金融危机导致了印尼的工业结构大动荡，尽管在总的企业数量似乎是几乎不受影响。在 1996 年的调查记录， 2000 年 22997 和 22174 运营公司，即一个温和的 3.5，显然在企业数量下降。然而，当一个人的第一印象比较这两个快照，隐藏一个事实，即6100 家（ 26.5， 1996 年所有公司）关闭 1996 至 2000 年，而
39、5277 新的企业在同一时期开始运作。这些数字足以说明，在亚洲金融危机所造成的高度规范的环境，印尼工业界风暴。 新的 业务的 正式启动印尼仍然是一个漫长和昂贵的事业。 世界银行对 111 个国家学额约 160 天印尼遵循所有必要步骤，形成一套完整的新业务的 110 处。其他国际排名还指出，减少对新业务的控制需要。 该调查不包括制造业少于 20 人的微型企业，并因此，减少我们的能力，学习他们的生存战略和部门的政府干预条款关于非常小的企业部门更多。我们的重点将是中小企业和大企业，而不是这些微 型企业。 首先，尽管他们对就业的贡献大，对微型企业的数据往往是在一个比较的格式无法获得更多的结构化业务的，
40、所以这一点，不幸的是，排除企业之间很小，其余的任何进一步的比较工作。更重要的是，省略微型企业倾向于排除他们生存特性和政府保护的影响。首先，尽管他们对就业的贡献大，对微型企业的数据往往是在一个比较的格式无法获得更多的结构化业务的，所以这一点，不幸的是，排除企业之间很小，其余的任何进一步的比较工作。 因此，许多小型企业都在为建立更好的就业机会的缺乏，造成经济危机的其他位置，这样，该微型危机期间，很多企业开始有可 能在经济复苏期间关闭了。此外，省略微型企业面对面其他公司往往会减少政府干预观察该部门的作用的机会。使用特殊的促销计划，如印度尼西亚的微型企业预留机制，取决于所用的定义，它是偏向微型企业。目前，各部委申请自己的微型企业和合作社，推广和修改自己不同的定义，以总销售额为基础的现行法律定义是远远没有解决 。 为了更详细研究我们的细分我们的制造业数据由六个工人的大小类别的样本。新兴的观点证实了许多出口及入口高度动态的中小企业部门。当一个定义了一个更好的企业规模划分，一个人观察的是，在最小的公司， 35.7被迫关闭，而 外同行业的规模企业 跌幅。只有 6.7的大型企业在 1996 年和 2000年关闭。而中小型企业录得最封闭，中小企业部门还表明，在五年期间提出了新的机遇最有力的回应。
