1、本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文OVERINVESTMENTOFFREECASHFLOWTHISPAPEREXAMINESFIRMINVESTINGDECISIONSINTHEPRESENCEOFFREECASHFLOWINTHEORY,FIRMLEVELINVESTMENTSHOULDNOTBERELATEDTOINTERNALLYGENERATEDCASHFLOWSMODIGLIANIANDMILLER,1958HOWEVER,PRIORRESEARCHHASDOCUMENTEDAPOSITIVERELATIONBETWEENINVESTMENTEXPENDITUREANDCASHFLOW
2、EG,HUBBARD,1998THEREARETWOINTERPRETATIONSFORTHISPOSITIVERELATIONFIRST,THEPOSITIVERELATIONISAMANIFESTATIONOFANAGENCYPROBLEM,WHEREMANAGERSINFIRMSWITHFREECASHFLOWENGAGEINWASTEFULEXPENDITUREEG,JENSEN1986ANDSTULZ1990WHENMANAGERSOBJECTIVESDIFFERFROMTHOSEOFSHAREHOLDERS,THEPRESENCEOFINTERNALLYGENERATEDCASHF
3、LOWINEXCESSOFTHATREQUIREDTOMAINTAINEXISTINGASSETSINPLACEANDFINANCENEWPOSITIVENPVPROJECTSCREATESTHEPOTENTIALFORTHOSEFUNDSTOBESQUANDEREDSECOND,THEPOSITIVERELATIONREFLECTSCAPITALMARKETIMPERFECTIONS,WHERECOSTLYEXTERNALFINANCINGCREATESTHEPOTENTIALFORINTERNALLYGENERATEDCASHFLOWSTOEXPANDTHEFEASIBLEINVESTME
4、NTOPPORTUNITYSETEG,HUBBARDANDPETERSEN1988ANDHUBBARD,1998THISPAPERFOCUSESONUTILIZINGACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONTOBETTERMEASURETHECONSTRUCTSOFFREECASHFLOWANDOVERINVESTMENT,THEREBYALLOWINGAMOREPOWERFULTESTOFTHEAGENCYBASEDEXPLANATIONFORWHYFIRMLEVELINVESTMENTISRELATEDTOINTERNALLYGENERATEDCASHFLOWSINDOINGSO,THI
5、SPAPERISTHEFIRSTTOOFFERLARGESAMPLEEVIDENCEOFOVERINVESTMENTOFFREECASHFLOWPRIORRESEARCH,SUCHASBLANCHARDANDVISHNY1994,DOCUMENTEXCESSIVEINVESTMENTANDACQUISITIONACTIVITYFORELEVENFIRMSTHATEXPERIENCEALARGECASHWINDFALLDUETOALEGALSETTLEMENT,HARFORD1999FINDSUSINGASAMPLEOF487TAKEOVERBIDS,THATCASHRICHFIRMSAREMO
6、RELIKELYTOMAKEACQUISITIONSTHATSUBSEQUENTLYEXPERIENCEABNORMALDECLINESINOPERATINGPERFORMANCE,ANDBATES2005FINDSFORASAMPLEOF400SUBSIDIARYSALESFROM19901998THATFIRMSWHORETAINCASHTENDTOINVESTMORERELATIVETOINDUSTRYPEERSIEXTENDTHESESMALLSAMPLEFINDINGSBYSHOWINGOVERINVESTMENTOFFREECASHFLOWISASYSTEMATICPHENOMEN
7、ONACROSSALLTYPESOFINVESTMENTEXPENDITURETHEEMPIRICALANALYSISPROCEEDSINTWOSTAGESFIRST,THEPAPERUSESANACCOUNTINGBASEDFRAMEWORKTOMEASUREBOTHFREECASHFLOWANDOVERINVESTMENTFREECASHFLOWISCASHFLOWBEYONDWHATISNECESSARYTOMAINTAINASSETSINPLACEANDTOFINANCEEXPECTEDNEWINVESTMENTSOVERINVESTMENTISDEFINEDASINVESTMENTE
8、XPENDITUREBEYONDTHATREQUIREDTOMAINTAINASSETSINPLACEANDTOFINANCEEXPECTEDNEWINVESTMENTSINPOSITIVENPVPROJECTSTOMEASUREOVERINVESTMENT,IDECOMPOSETOTALINVESTMENTEXPENDITUREINTOTWOCOMPONENTSIREQUIREDINVESTMENTEXPENDITURETOMAINTAINASSETSINPLACE,ANDIINEWINVESTMENTEXPENDITUREITHENDECOMPOSENEWINVESTMENTEXPENDI
9、TUREINTOOVERINVESTMENTINNEGATIVENPVPROJECTSANDEXPECTEDINVESTMENTEXPENDITURE,WHERETHELATTERVARIESWITHTHEFIRMSGROWTHOPPORTUNITIES,FINANCINGCONSTRAINTS,INDUSTRYAFFILIATIONANDOTHERFACTORSUNDERTHEAGENCYCOSTEXPLANATION,MANAGEMENTHASTHEPOTENTIALTOSQUANDERFREECASHFLOWONLYWHENFREECASHFLOWISPOSITIVEATTHEOTHER
10、ENDOFTHESPECTRUM,FIRMSWITHNEGATIVEFREECASHFLOWCANONLYSQUANDERCASHIFTHEYAREABLETORAISE“CHEAP”CAPITALTHISISLESSLIKELYTOOCCURBECAUSETHESEFIRMSNEEDTOBEABLETORAISEFINANCINGANDTHEREBYPLACETHEMSELVESUNDERTHESCRUTINYOFEXTERNALMARKETSJENSEN,1986ANDDEANGELO,DEANGELOANDSTULZ,2004CONSISTENTWITHTHEAGENCYCOSTEXPL
11、ANATION,IFINDAPOSITIVEASSOCIATIONBETWEENOVERINVESTMENTANDFREECASHFLOWFORFIRMSWITHPOSITIVEFREECASHFLOWFORASAMPLEOF58,053FIRMYEARSDURINGTHEPERIOD19882002,IFINDTHATFORFIRMSWITHPOSITIVEFREECASHFLOWTHEAVERAGEFIRMOVERINVESTS20PERCENTOFITSFREECASHFLOWFURTHERMORE,IDOCUMENTTHATTHEMAJORITYOFFREECASHFLOWISRETA
12、INEDINTHEFORMOFFINANCIALASSETSTHEAVERAGEFIRMINMYSAMPLERETAINS41PERCENTOFITSFREECASHFLOWASEITHERCASHORMARKETABLESECURITIESTHEREISLITTLEEVIDENCETHATFREECASHFLOWISDISTRIBUTEDTOEXTERNALDEBTHOLDERSORSHAREHOLDERSFINDINGANASSOCIATIONBETWEENOVERINVESTMENTANDFREECASHFLOWISCONSISTENTWITHRECENTRESEARCHDOCUMENT
13、INGPOORFUTUREPERFORMANCEFOLLOWINGFIRMLEVELINVESTMENTACTIVITYFOREXAMPLE,TITMAN2004ANDFAIRFIELD,WHISENANTANDYOHN2003SHOWTHATFIRMSWITHEXTENSIVECAPITALINVESTMENTACTIVITYANDGROWTHINNETOPERATINGASSETSRESPECTIVELY,EXPERIENCEINFERIORFUTURESTOCKRETURNSFURTHERMORE,DECHOW,RICHARDSONANDSLOAN2005FINDTHATCASHFLOW
14、SRETAINEDWITHINTHEFIRMEITHERCAPITALIZEDTHROUGHACCRUALSOR“INVESTED”INFINANCIALASSETSAREASSOCIATEDWITHLOWERFUTUREOPERATINGPERFORMANCEANDFUTURESTOCKRETURNSTHISPERFORMANCERELATIONISCONSISTENTWITHTHEOVERINVESTMENTOFFREECASHFLOWSDOCUMENTEDINTHISPAPERTHISSECTIONDESCRIBESINDETAILTHEVARIOUSTHEORIESSUPPORTING
15、APOSITIVERELATIONBETWEENINVESTMENTEXPENDITUREANDCASHFLOWANDTHENDEVELOPSMEASURESOFFREECASHFLOWANDOVERINVESTMENTTHATCANBEUSEDTOTESTTHEAGENCYBASEDEXPLANATIONINAWORLDOFPERFECTCAPITALMARKETSTHEREWOULDBENOASSOCIATIONBETWEENFIRMLEVELINVESTINGACTIVITIESANDINTERNALLYGENERATEDCASHFLOWSIFAFIRMNEEDEDADDITIONALC
16、ASHTOFINANCEANINVESTMENTACTIVITYITWOULDSIMPLYRAISETHATCASHFROMEXTERNALCAPITALMARKETSIFTHEFIRMHADEXCESSCASHBEYONDTHATNEEDEDTOFUNDAVAILABLEPOSITIVENPVPROJECTSINCLUDINGOPTIONSONFUTUREINVESTMENTITWOULDDISTRIBUTEFREECASHFLOWTOEXTERNALMARKETSFIRMSDONOT,HOWEVER,OPERATEINSUCHAWORLDTHEREAREAVARIETYOFCAPITALM
17、ARKETFRICTIONSTHATIMPEDETHEABILITYOFMANAGEMENTTORAISECASHFROMEXTERNALCAPITALMARKETSINADDITION,THEREARESIGNIFICANTTRANSACTIONCOSTSASSOCIATEDWITHMONITORINGMANAGEMENTTOENSURETHATFREECASHFLOWISINDEEDDISTRIBUTEDTOEXTERNALCAPITALMARKETSINEQUILIBRIUM,THESECAPITALMARKETFRICTIONSCANSERVEASASUPPORTFORAPOSITIV
18、EASSOCIATIONBETWEENFIRMINVESTINGACTIVITIESANDINTERNALLYGENERATEDCASHFLOWTHEAGENCYCOSTEXPLANATIONINTRODUCEDBYJENSEN1986ANDSTULZ1990SUGGESTSTHATMONITORINGDIFFICULTYCREATESTHEPOTENTIALFORMANAGEMENTTOSPENDINTERNALLYGENERATEDCASHFLOWONPROJECTSTHATAREBENEFICIALFROMAMANAGEMENTPERSPECTIVEBUTCOSTLYFROMASHARE
19、HOLDERPERSPECTIVETHEFREECASHFLOWHYPOTHESISSEVERALPAPERSHAVEINVESTIGATEDTHEIMPLICATIONSOFTHEFREECASHFLOWHYPOTHESISONFIRMINVESTMENTACTIVITYFOREXAMPLE,LAMONT1997ANDBERGERANDHANN2003FINDEVIDENCECONSISTENTWITHCASHRICHSEGMENTSCROSSSUBSIDIZINGMOREPOORLYPERFORMINGSEGMENTSINDIVERSIFIEDFIRMSHOWEVER,THEEVIDENC
20、EINTHESEPAPERSCOULDALSOBECONSISTENTWITHMARKETFRICTIONSINHIBITINGTHEABILITYOFTHEFIRMTORAISECAPITALEXTERNALLYANDNOTNECESSARILYANINDICATIONOFOVERINVESTMENTRELATEDEVIDENCECANALSOBEFOUNDINHARFORD1999ANDOPLER,PINKOWITZ,STULZANDWILLIAMSON1999AND2001HARFORDUSESASAMPLEOF487TAKEOVERBIDSTODOCUMENTTHATCASHRICHF
21、IRMSAREMORELIKELYTOMAKEACQUISITIONSANDTHESE“CASHRICH”ACQUISITIONSAREFOLLOWEDBYABNORMALDECLINESINOPERATINGPERFORMANCEOPLERETALFINDSOMEEVIDENCETHATCOMPANIESWITHEXCESSCASHMEASUREDUSINGBALANCESHEETCASHINFORMATIONHAVEHIGHERCAPITALEXPENDITURES,ANDSPENDMOREONACQUISITIONS,EVENWHENTHEYAPPEARTOHAVEPOORINVESTM
22、ENTOPPORTUNITIESASMEASUREDBYTOBINSQPERHAPSTHEMOSTDIRECTEVIDENCEOFOVERINVESTMENTOFFREECASHFLOWISTHEANALYSISINBLANCHARD,LOPEZDISILANESANDVISHNY1994THEYFINDTHATELEVENFIRMSWITHWINDFALLLEGALSETTLEMENTSAPPEARTOENGAGEINWASTEFULEXPENDITURECOLLECTIVELY,PRIORRESEARCHISSUGGESTIVEOFANAGENCYBASEDEXPLANATIONSUPPO
23、RTINGTHEPOSITIVERELATIONBETWEENINVESTMENTANDINTERNALLYGENERATEDCASHFLOWHOWEVER,THESEPAPERSAREBASEDONRELATIVELYSMALLSAMPLESANDDONOTMEASUREOVERINVESTMENTORFREECASHFLOWDIRECTLYTHUS,THEFINDINGSOFEARLIERWORKMAYNOTBEGENERALIZABLETOLARGERSAMPLESNORISITDIRECTLYATTRIBUTABLETOTHEAGENCYCOSTEXPLANATIONMOREGENER
24、ALLY,ACRITICISMOFTHELITERATUREEXAMININGTHERELATIONBETWEENINVESTMENTANDCASHFLOWISTHATFINDINGAPOSITIVEASSOCIATIONMAYMERELYINDICATETHATCASHFLOWSSERVEASANEFFECTIVEPROXYFORINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESEG,ALTI,2003MYAIMISTOBETTERMEASURETHECONSTRUCTSOFFREECASHFLOWANDOVERINVESTMENTBYINCORPORATINGANACCOUNTINGBASED
25、MEASUREOFGROWTHOPPORTUNITIES,ANDTESTWHETHERTHERELATIONISEVIDENTINALARGESAMPLEOFFIRMSINADDITIONTOPRIOREMPIRICALWORKONAGENCYBASEDEXPLANATIONSFORTHELINKBETWEENFIRMLEVELINVESTMENTANDINTERNALLYGENERATEDFREECASHFLOW,THEREEXISTSASTREAMOFRESEARCHDEDICATEDTOEXAMININGTHEROLEOFFINANCINGCONSTRAINTSEG,FAZZARI,HU
26、BBARDANDPETERSEN,1988,HOSHI,KASHYAPANDSCHARFSTEIN1991,FAZZARIANDPETERSEN1993,WHITED1992ANDHUBBARD1998MYERSANDMAJLUF1984SUGGESTTHATINFORMATIONASYMMETRIESINCREASETHECOSTOFCAPITALFORFIRMSFORCEDTORAISEEXTERNALFINANCE,THEREBYREDUCINGTHEFEASIBLEINVESTMENTTHUS,INTHEPRESENCEOFINTERNALLYGENERATEDCASHFLOW,SUC
27、HFIRMSWILLINVESTMOREINRESPONSETOTHELOWERCOSTOFCAPITALSOMEEARLYWORKINTHISAREAEXAMINEDTHESENSITIVITYOFINVESTMENTTOCASHFLOWFORHIGHVERSUSLOWDIVIDENDPAYINGFIRMSFAZZARI,HUBBARDANDPETERSEN,1988,COMPARINGDIFFERINGORGANIZATIONALSTRUCTURESWHERETHEABILITYTORAISEEXTERNALFINANCEWASEASIER/HARDERHOSHI,KASHYAPANDSC
28、HARFSTEIN,1991,WITHJAPANESEKEIRETSUFIRMSANDDEBTCONSTRAINTSWHITED,1992THESEPAPERSFINDEVIDENCEOFGREATERSENSITIVITYOFINVESTMENTTOCASHFLOWFORSETSOFFIRMSWHICHAPPEAREDTOBEFINANCIALLYCONSTRAINEDEG,LOWDIVIDENDPAYINGFIRMS,HIGHDEBTFIRMSANDFIRMSWITHLIMITEDACCESSTOBANKSHOWEVER,MORERECENTRESEARCHCASTSDOUBTONTHEE
29、ARLIERRESULTSSPECIFICALLY,KAPLANANDZINGALES1997,2000,FINDTHATTHESENSITIVITYOFINVESTMENTTOCASHFLOWPERSISTSEVENFORFIRMSWHODONOTFACEFINANCINGCONSTRAINTSTHEYCONSTRUCTAMEASUREOFEXANTEFINANCINGCONSTRAINTSFORASMALLSAMPLEOFFIRMSANDFINDTHATTHESENSITIVITYOFINVESTMENTTOCASHFLOWFORFIRMSISNEGATIVELYASSOCIATEDWIT
30、HTHISMEASURE,THEREBYCASTINGDOUBTONTHEFINANCINGCONSTRAINTHYPOTHESISTHISPAPERPRESENTSEVIDENCEONFIRMLEVELOVERINVESTMENTOFFREECASHFLOWTHEEMPIRICALANALYSISUTILIZESANACCOUNTINGBASEDFRAMEWORKTOMEASURETHECONSTRUCTSFREECASHFLOWANDOVERINVESTMENTACOMPARATIVEADVANTAGEOFTHEACCOUNTINGRESEARCHERISINMEASURINGCRITIC
31、ALCONSTRUCTSFROMTHEFINANCIALECONOMICSLITERATURETHEANALYSISOFOVERINVESTMENTANDFREECASHFLOWISBUTONEEXAMPLEOFHOWACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONCANBEBETTERUTILIZEDINACADEMICRESEARCHTHEEVIDENCEINTHEPAPERSUGGESTSTHATOVERINVESTMENTISACOMMONPROBLEMFORPUBLICLYTRADEDUSFIRMSFORNONFINANCIALFIRMSDURINGTHEPERIOD19882002,TH
32、EAVERAGEFIRMOVERINVESTS20PERCENTOFITSAVAILABLEFREECASHFLOWFURTHERMORE,THEMAJORITYOFFREECASHFLOWISRETAINEDINTHEFORMOFFINANCIALASSETSFOREACHADDITIONALDOLLAROFFREECASHFLOWTHEAVERAGEFIRMINTHESAMPLERETAINS41CENTSASEITHERCASHORMARKETABLESECURITIESTHEREISLITTLEEVIDENCETHATFREECASHFLOWISDISTRIBUTEDTOEXTERNA
33、LSTAKEHOLDERS,THEREBYCREATINGTHEPOTENTIALFORRETAINEDFREECASHFLOWTOBEOVERINVESTEDINTHEFUTURESUPPLEMENTALANALYSISFOUNDONLYWEAKEVIDENCETHATGOVERNANCESTRUCTURESAREEFFECTIVEINMITIGATINGTHEEXTENTOFOVERINVESTMENTTHESEFINDINGSCORROBORATERECENTWORKTHATHASFOUNDSIGNIFICANTNEGATIVEFUTURESTOCKRETURNSFROMCAPITALI
34、NVESTMENTANDSIGNIFICANTGROWTHINNETOPERATINGASSETSEG,TITMAN,WEIANDXIE2004ANDFAIRFIELD,WHISENANTANDYOHN,2003INDEED,LI2004FINDSTHATFUTUREOPERATINGPERFORMANCEISLOWERFORFIRMSENGAGINGININVESTMENTEXPENDITUREANDTHATTHISNEGATIVERELATIONISINCREASINGINCONTEMPORANEOUSFREECASHFLOWANATURALEXPLANATIONFORTHISPOORFU
35、TUREPERFORMANCEISFREECASHFLOWRELATEDAGENCYCOSTSTHEFRAMEWORKDEVELOPEDINTHEPAPERTOMEASUREOVERINVESTMENTANDFREECASHFLOWCANEASILYBEEXTENDEDTOCONSIDERABNORMALINVESTMENTMOREGENERALLYINDEED,SOMERECENTRESEARCHHASSTARTEDTOUSETHISFRAMEWORKTOEXAMINETHEIMPACTOFACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONSYSTEMSONINVESTMENTDECISIONSAN
36、DTHEEFFICIENTALLOCATIONOFCAPITALEG,GOODMAN,2005,BUSHMANANDSMITH,2005SOURCESCOTTRICHARDSON,2006“OVERINVESTMENTOFFREECASHFLOW”REVIEWOFACCOUNTINGSTUDIES,FEBRUARY,PP17译文自由现金流的过度投资本文检测企业存在自由现金流情况下的投资决策。理论上，企业的投资水平应与内部创造的现金流无关（莫蒂里安尼和米勒，1958）。然而，以前的研究证明投资支出与现金流正相关（例如，哈伯德，1998）。对二者间的正向关系有两种解释。第一，这种正向关系是代理问题
37、的表现，即掌控自由现金流的经理人浪费开支（例如，詹森1986；史图斯1990）。当经理人的目标与股东不一致时，内部创造的现金流除了维持现有资产运营以及为净现值为正的项目提供经费外，剩余部分有被浪费的可能性。第二，这种正向关系反映了资本市场的不完善，即昂贵的外部融资为内部创造的现金流扩大可行的投资机会集提供了可能性（例如，哈伯德和皮特森1988；哈伯德1998）。本文致力于使用会计信息来更好的衡量自由现金流与过度投资的结构，从而在解释企业投资与内部创造的现金流二者关系的基础上对代理问题作更为有效地检验。本文是首个对自由现金流的过度投资问题提供大样本证据的文献。以前的研究，例如布兰查德和维什尼（1
38、994），证明通过协议获得了一大笔现金横财的十一家企业均有过度投资和收购行为，哈佛德（1999）以487家投标公司为样本进行研究，发现现金充裕的企业更有可能进行收购而随后其经营业绩则异常下降，贝茨（2005）以400家子公司19901998年间的销售额为样本进行研究，发现留存现金的公司比业内同行更倾向于投资。我将这些小样本的研究结果进行扩展，以表明自由现金流的过度投资在各类投资支出中是一个系统性现象。实证分析分两个阶段。第一，本文使用会计框架来衡量自由现金流和过度投资。自由现金流是除去维持现有资产正常运转及新项目的投资经费后剩余的部分。过度投资是除了维持现有资产正常运转及投资净现值为正的新项目
39、之外进行的那些投资。为了衡量过度投资，我将总的投资支出分为两部分（1）维持现有资产正常运转的必要投资支出；（2）新项目的投资支出。进一步把新项目的投资支出分为对净现值为负的项目进行的过度投资和预期的投资支出，后者随着企业的成长机会、融资限制、所属行业等其他因素而有所不同。根据代理成本的解释，管理层只有当自由现金流为正的情况下才存在浪费的可能性。相应地，自由现金流为负的企业只有在增加“廉价”资金的情况下才会浪费现金。这种情况很少发生，因为这些公司扩大融资数量将使自己受到外部市场的严格监察（詹森，1986；迪安吉洛和史图斯，2004）。与代理成本的解释相一致，我发现在自由现金流为正的企业过度投资与
40、自由现金流呈现正相关。以19882002年间的58053家企业为样本，我发现自由现金流为正的企业中平均每家企业有20的自由现金流被用于过度投资。我进一步证实大多数自由现金流以金融资产的形式被留存。在我选取的样本中平均每家企业将自由现金流的41以现金或有价证券的形式留存。几乎没有证据表明自由现金流被分配给外部债权人或者股东。近期研究表明企业的投资活动伴随着未来业绩的恶化，研究自由现金流与过度投资的关系也是在此背景下展开的。例如，特曼（2004），费尔菲德、惠瑟南特和约翰（2003）指出存在大量资本投资行为且净经营资产增加的企业，其未来股票收益不容乐观。此外，理查森和斯隆（2005）发现留存在企业
41、的现金流（通过收益资本化或投资金融资产）与较差的未来经营业绩和股票收益有关，这与本文证实的自由现金流过度投资的绩效是一致的。这部分详细叙述各种认为投资支出与现金流正相关的理论，并扩展自由现金流与过度投资的衡量尺度，使其能够用来检测代理问题。在完善的资本市场上企业的投资活动和内部创造的现金流并没有联系。如果一家企业需要额外的现金来支持投资活动，它会很容易地从外部资本市场获得现金。如果这家企业在投资可行的净现值为正的项目后现金仍有剩余，它会把这笔自由现金流投放到外部市场上。然而现实中这种经营环境是不存在的。各种资本市场的摩擦阻碍了管理层从外部资本市场获取现金的能力。除此之外，确保自由现金流被投放到
42、外部资本市场而产生的监督管理层的交易成本十分昂贵。从均衡角度来看，这些资本市场摩擦是企业投资活动与内部创造的现金流正相关的一个支撑点。由詹森（1986）和史图斯（1990）引入的代理成本的解释表明，某些项目从管理层角度来看是有利的但从股东角度来看则是高昂的，监管困难增加了管理层花费这些项目创造的内部现金流的可能性（自由现金流假说）。一些论文已经研究了自由现金流假说对企业投资活动的意义。例如，拉蒙特（1997）、伯格和汉恩（2003）发现在各种企业中都存在用现金盈余弥补不利业绩的情况。然而，这些论文也表明市场摩擦抑制了企业从外部获得资金的能力，但不存在必然的过度投资迹象。相关的证据在哈福德（19
43、99），欧普乐、史图斯和威廉姆斯（1999和2001）的研究中也能找到。哈福德以487家投标公司为样本证实现金充裕的企业更有可能进行收购。欧普乐等人发现持有额外现金（以资产负债表中的现金信息衡量）的公司存在更高的资本支出，甚至投资机会不佳时仍然在收购上花费较多（利用托宾Q衡量）。可能有关自由现金流过度投资的直接证据源于布兰卡德、洛佩斯和维什尼（1994）的分析。他们发现十一家通过协议获得横财的公司存在支出浪费。以前的研究基于投资和内部创造的现金流正相关的解释，共同暗示了代理问题的存在。然而，这些论文选取的样本相对较少，且没有直接衡量过度投资或自由现金流。因此，早期文献的研究结果可能无法归纳较多
44、的样本或者不能直接用代理成本来解释。现在检验投资和现金流关系的文献资料普遍批判二者的正相关性，指出这种正相关性仅仅表明现金流是投资机会的一个有效表示。我的目的在于用加入成长机会的合并报表对自由现金流和过度投资进行更好的衡量，并检验二者的关系在大样本中是否显著。除了以前有关代理问题的实证研究解释了企业的投资水平和内部创造的自由现金流之间的关系，还有许多研究致力于检验融资限制的影响（例如，哈伯德和皮特森（1988），沙尔夫斯坦（1991），皮特森（1993），怀特（1992）和哈福德（1998）。梅耶斯（1984）指出信息不对称增加了企业的外部融资成本，因而在资本成本较低时企业会投资较多。这一领域
45、的一些早期文献检验了股利支付高低两种情况下企业的投资活动和现金流的敏感性（哈伯德和皮特森，1988），从而比较不同的组织结构对外部融资能力难易的影响以及债务约束。这些论文发现存在融资限制的企业其投资活动对现金流更为敏感（例如，低股利支付企业，高负债企业以及银行设限的企业）。然而，近期的研究对早期成果提出了质疑。特别是卡普兰（1997,2000）发现投资对现金流的敏感性在没有融资约束的企业中仍然存在。他们对一些小样本公司构建了一种事后的融资约束，发现投资对现金流的敏感性与测量方法无关。因此对融资约束假说提出了质疑。本文对公司自由现金流的过度投资提供了证据。实证分析使用会计框架来衡量自由现金流和过
46、度投资的结构。会计研究人员的相对优势在于能从金融经济学文献中找出关键性的结构。在如何更好地将会计信息用于学术研究上，对过度投资和自由现金流的研究是一个很好的例子。文中的证据表明过度投资在公开交易的美国公司当中是很普遍的。在19882002年间的非金融企业中，平均每家企业可利用的自由现金流中有20就用于过度投资。此外，大量的自由现金流被以金融资产的形式留存在企业中。样本中平均每家公司的每一美元额外的自由现金流中有41美分被以现金或有价证券的形式留存。几乎没有证据显示自由现金流被分配给外部利益相关者，因此增加了留存的自由现金流在未来被过度投资的可能性。补充的分析发现仅有微弱迹象显示股权结构可以减弱过度投资的程度。这些研究结果证实了近期文献发现的资本投资导致未来股票收益大幅下降及净营运资产显著增加。的确，李（2004）发现有投资支出的企业未来经营业绩较差，并且这种负相关关系随着同期的自由现金流而递增。对这种糟糕的未来业绩有一个固有的解释，即与代理成本有关的自由现金流。本文用来衡量过度投资和自由现金流而扩展的框架，普遍在异常投资活动中同样适用。并且一些近期的研究已经开始使用这种框架来衡量会计信息系统对投资决策和资金有效配置的影响（例如，古德，2005；布希曼和史密，2005）。出处斯科特理查森，自由现金流的过度投资，会计研究评论20062P17
