1、 外文翻译 原文 The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and practice Material source： Working paper from library Author： Maitreesh Ghatak, Timothy W. Guinnane Scholars and development practitioners have in recent years devoted consider- able attention to specialized lending institutions that
2、use unconventional methods to lend successfully to poor people. Most of these institutions work in developing countries, but some have been transplanted from poor countries to work with poor people in wealthy countries such as the USA. Considerable evidence now shows that in many circumstances, an u
3、nconventional lender such as the Grameen Bank can lend to poor people no ordinary commercial lender would want as a customer and do so with a reasonable degree of financial self-sufficiency and repayment rates that are significantly higher than for comparable loans by conventional. Lending instituti
4、ons see Hossain, 1988; Morduch, 1999. The literature identifies. Two distinct but complementary reasons for this success. First, many but not all of these lending programs ask borrowers to form a group in which all borrowers are jointly liable for each others loans. These joint-liability lending ins
5、titutions which we abbreviate JLLI, and which are often called more loosely micro- lenders have a long history, and although modern institutions such as the Grameen Bank may be the most famous operating today, credit cooperatives using similar methods date back to the mid-19th century. Second, most
6、micro-lenders engage in intensive monitoring of clients, and rely heavily on the promise of repeat loans for borrowers who perform well. We do not address these efforts systematically in this paper, but that is a matter of focus and not meant as a suggestion that such efforts are unimportant. This p
7、aper provides an economic analysis of joint-liability lending, drawing on and extending recent research, and provides concrete illustrations by discussing actual institutions. The burgeoning literature on JLLIs today suggests several reasons why group lending helps an institution such as the Grameen
8、 Bank operate successfully. Many writers mention efforts to reduce transactions costs, which can be relatively large for borrowers who take only small loans. Others highlight peer pressure, social capital, or similar terms that capture the general idea that people with connections of shared locality
9、 or other bonds based on kinship and occupation may be able to support credit contracts that would be impossible with conventional banking practices. More recently, economists have applied notions taken from the economics of information and contracts to show how joint liability performs . . . the ap
10、parent miracle of giving solvency to a community composed almost entirely of insolvent individuals. These economic models of JLLIs are efforts to formalize the idea that a well-structured JLLI can deal effectively with the four major problems facing lenders by utilizing the local information and soc
11、ial capital that exist among borrowers. These problems are: （ a ） to ascertain what kind of a risk the potential borrower is（ b ） to make sure she will utilize the loan properly, once made, so that she will be able to repay it。 （ c）to learn how her project really did in case she declares her inabili
12、ty to repay（ d） to find methods to force the. borrower to repay the loan if she is reluctant to do so enforcement 。 JLLIs can do better than conventional bankers in some social contexts for two distinct reasons. First, members of a community may know more about one another that is, each others types
13、, actions and states, as suggested by points a c above than an outside institution such as a bank. Second, a major source of market failure in credit markets is that a bank cannot apply financial sanctions against poor people who default on a loan, since by definition they are poor. And in most soci
14、eties, there are restrictions on the application of non-financial sanctions such. as violence. Poor peoples neighbors, on the other hand, may be able to impose powerful non-financial sanctions at low cost. An institution that gives poor people the proper incentives to use information on their neighb
15、ors and to apply non-finance- cal sanctions to delinquent borrowers can out-perform a conventional bank. Many studies of JLLIs refer in a genera l way to information problems while most economic analyses deliberately focus on one of these four issues. The literature on micro-finance, like the instit
16、utions themselves, is still new. A recent paper by Aghion and Morduch 1998 correctly points out that most studies have focused on the joint-liability aspects of institutions such as the Grameen Bank, and ignored the other program features, such as direct monitoring by the lender, that also promote h
17、igh repayment rates. Thus far, there is little empirical evidence on the relative importance of joint liability as opposed to other program. Features. Recent works by Wenner 1995 and Wydick 1999 provide preliminary evidence that joint liability works as thought. In their analysis, variables that pro
18、xy for social cohesion and better information flow among group members imply improved repayment rates. But these studies are not conclusive because of difficult econometric problems. Moreover, these studies cannot assess the importance of joint liability in comparison to, for example, monitoring by
19、the lending institution. In addition, we abstract from the problems associated with inducing the lender, a financial intermediary, to monitor borrowers. In his contribution to this issue, Conning shows that these problems pose a constraint to the expansion of microfinance through increased leverage
20、and other means. There is also the related but distinct question of whether joint-liability lending, or for that matter any type of micro-finance, really helps the poor. As a logical matter, the Grameen Bank could function very well in terms of repayment rates but have little impact on poverty. This
21、 question is also an area of active research. Pitt and Khandker 1998 find, using data from three programs in rural Bangladesh, that borrowing from group-lending schemes increased consumption of poor house-. Holds. However, Morduch 1998b has argued that Pitt and Khandkers result reflects program sele
22、ction effects rather than the impact of borrowing per se. Coleman, in his contribution to this issue, studies the question of program impact in northeast Thailand. The quasi-experimental design of his survey allows him to use more straightforward estimation techniques than either Pitt and Khandker o
23、r Morduch to econometrically identify the impact of these programs. Section 2 below uses simple economic models to show how joint liability can overcome information and enforcement problems. Section 3 discusses various institutional implementations of joint liability to highlight how it works in pra
24、ctice, and illustrates some of the practical problems that arise in the design of these lending programs. In conclusion, we offer some remarks on the key policy question facing supporters of JLLIs today. Our discussion stresses the use of simple economic models to understand broadly how joint liabil
25、ity ameliorates information and enforcement problems. Our discussion does not comprehensively review the entire literature in this active area of research. In analyzing JLLIs, economists have focused on either the effects of joint liability on the pool and behavior of borrowers, or on the fact that
26、lending to groups as opposed to individuals is a way to reduce transactions costs. While we only discuss the joint-liability aspect of these lending programs, our argument is complementary to the transactions-costs argument. According to the transactions-costs argument, under many circumstances, it
27、is only slightly more expensive to administer a group of n loans than to administer a single loan, so group lending enables a reduction in transactions costs per loan. If the projects to be funded are simple and similar in terms of their characteristics, the time path of their returns, and the geogr
28、aphic location of their activities, then coordinating the lenders dealings with these borrowers by putting them together in a group can save on pro cost-based theories and joint-liability-based theories can be combined, as we do in cussing, screening and loan collection costs. Put this way, transact
29、ion- Section 2.3 where we show that the bank can avoid the cost of performing a costly audit every time an individual borrower claims she has low output by inducing her partner to undertake liability for her and audit only when the whole group declares inability to repay. Joint liability alleviates
30、the four main problems faced by formal credit institu- tions that lend to poor borrowers who cannot offer much in the way of collateral: adverse selection, moral hazard, costly audits and enforcement. We will illustrate these benefits using a simple model of lending. Our model shows how joint liabil
31、ity affects group formation, induces group members to influence the way other members select their projects, helps the lender avoid costly audits, and gives encourages borrowers to repay their loans without the lender imposing costly sanctions. 译文 联保信贷经济体系的理论与实际研究 资料来源 : 图书馆 工作文件 作者： Maitreesh Ghata
32、k, Timothy W. Guinnane 学者和发展实践者在近几年在致力于研究能否有专门的贷款机构运用非常规的方法对穷人进行成功地贷款。这些机构的大多数是在发展中国家工作，但一些已经从贫穷国家移植到了穷人的工作的地方就如美国。 现在相当多的证据表明，在许多情况下，非常规的贷款人如乡村银行可以成功 的借钱给穷人，而常规银行如普通的商业银行都面对的和希望的都是一个财政自给率和还款合理程度等方面明显高于可比贷款客户。（见侯赛因贷款1988 年， Morduch， 1999） 对于乡村银行的成功现在说明两个 两个不同但互补的原因。 首先，许多但不是所有这些贷款方案要求借款人的，形成一个组，其中所有
33、借款人共同为彼此的贷款负责。 这些连带责任贷款机构，我们缩写 JLLI，并通常被称为 较为松散的微型贷款 它有着悠久的历史，虽然在目前现代机构中如 孟加拉乡村银行 可能是最时兴的经营，但信用社使用类似的方法贷款可追溯到 19 世纪 中叶了。 再者，大多这种微型贷款人对客户进行密集的监测，并依靠重复贷款表现和借款人承诺。我们在这里不分析这些系统作用，这是一个焦点问题但也没有暗示这种作用是不重要的意思。 本文提供了连带责任贷款的经济分析，借鉴最新的研究和对其研究进行发散，并提供了实际的机构讨论具体的例子，现在有不少连带责任贷款机构的新兴文献表明有集体帮助贷款，就如乡村银行机构的成功运作。 许多学者
34、提到努力降低交易成本，因为对于那些借取小额贷款的人成本相对较大。 其他突出的如“同行压力 ， 社会资本”，或者类似条款来分析总体思路，或是 地方共享或基于血缘和占领其他债券连接上的人们也许能支持信贷合联保同，但是不可能的与传统的银行业务相比较。 最近，经济学家已申请从信息经济学和采取合同的约定的概念来说明如何执行 连带责任 “对于一个将近破产的个人用组团的形式来解决偿还能力的问题，几乎是一个奇迹” 这些连带责任经济模式的贷款机构正努力使它们正规化，那就是良好的JLLI 结构即通过利用本地信息和社会资本来实现贷款人在借款人之间存在的有效性可以有效的处理面临的四大问题，这些问题包括： 1. 能否确
35、定潜在的借款人风险的种类（贷款选择） 2.以 确保她将利用适当的贷款，一经作出，因此，她将有能力偿还。（道德风险） 3 去了解她的贷款用途可行性以防她最后无力偿还（交易费用） 4. 找到方法来强制 借款人偿还贷款，如果她不愿意 还款（执行力度） 连带责任贷款机构 对于传统银行在这样的背景下有两个原因证明它可以比它可以做得更好 第一，社区成员可以更多地进行彼此了解，了解彼此的类型，操作和状态，考虑以上提出的如 A-C 问题，不仅仅作为银行一个机构。 第二，在信贷市场上的信贷资源缺失的主要原因是因为他们一旦定义为穷人，银行不能申请对拖欠贷款穷人的金融制裁。在大多数情况下， 对非金融制裁有着诸多限制
36、如暴力。 一个机构，给穷人提供适当的激励来运用他们联盟的信息，并运用非金融制裁拖欠借款人可以在性能与传统的银行相比。 另一方面穷人的联盟，也能以较低的成本施加强大的非金融制裁。许多研究的连带责任贷款机构一般的方式为时大多数经济学家有意分析这四个重点问题之一的 信息问题 。 对这种小额度的信贷的研究，就像它们自身的机构一样是一个全新的概念。 按 1998 年 Aghion 和 Morduch 最近的一篇文章精确地指出，大多数研究侧重于机构的连带责任等方面如孟加拉乡村银行，而忽略了其他程序的功能，如 通过贷款人直接监测，这也能进一步推动还贷率的提高。 到目前为止，很少有关于联合的经验证据责任的相对
37、重要性，而不是其他程序功能。 近些年来研究如 Wenner 1995 年 Wydick 1999 年工程提供初步证据表明，连带责任的工作程序。在他们的分析，变量，更好地为社会凝聚力和群体成员之间的信息流的代理都能提高还款率。 但这些研究并没有定论，因为还有些问题难以计量。 此外，这些研究不能评估比较的连带责任的重要性，例如，贷款机构的监管。我们从抽象的诱导银行，金融中介机构，监督借款有关的问题。康宁在这个问题上所作的贡献在 于分析这些问题对小额信贷构成的了杠杆作用，其他手段扩张约束的放松。关于联保贷款相关但不同的问题或与小额信贷相关的类型在于分析是否真正帮助了穷人。 逻辑分析，孟加拉银行功能相
38、当不错，在还款方面对贫困的压力也不大。这个问题也是一个活跃的研究领域。 1998 年，皮特和 Khandker 发现，利用三个方案在孟加拉国农村联户借贷计划增加贫困家庭的消费数据。然而，Morduch1998 下半年进行反驳，皮特和 Khandker的结果受了方案选择的影响，而不是借贷本身的影响。科尔曼，他在这个问题上的贡献，就是研究了在泰国东北部的 方案影响结果的问题。他的调查，准实验设计，让他用比任何皮特和Khandker 或 Morduch更直接的经济计量估计技术来确定这些方案的影响。 再者使用简单的经济模型，以展示连带责任克服信息和执法问题。 然后讨论这种体制的联保连带责任，强调它是如
39、何在工程实践中实现的，并说明了在这些贷款方案的设计中出现的实际的一些问题。 总之，我们提供的主要政策面临连带责任贷款机构支持者今天的问题发表一些看法。我们的讨论强调了使用简单的经济模式，以了解如何连带责任大致可改善信息和执法问题。我们的讨论并不全面检讨这活跃的研究领域的整个 文学。 在分析 JLLIs，经济学家们主要依据的共同作用在集资和借款人承担的连带责任，或者贷款的相对于个人组成的团体，是一种减少交易成本的事实， 虽然我们只讨论这些贷款方案连带责任方面主要是关注是互补的交易间接成本的说法。 据交易间接成本的说法，在很多情况下，对多种贷款的管理绝对比单一的贷款管理昂贵，所以集体贷款使每一个贷
40、款交易成本的降低。如果项目得到资助的简单和相似的特点而言，时间路径他们的回报，以及他们活动的地理的位置，然后协调这些贷款人借款人的交易通将他们分类在一组可节省加工，筛选和贷款托收费用。 这样说来 ，交易基于成本的理论和共同责任为基础的理论相结合起来，为我们做 2.3 节，我们表明，银行可避免每一次审计高昂的执行成本代价，个别借款人声称她和她的合作伙伴有她 破 产时，在整个集团宣布无力偿还时承担责任和审责任 。 联合连带责任通过正规信贷企业缓解所面临的四个主要问题，给不能提供抵押物的穷人的方式很多：逆向选择，道德风险，昂贵的审计和执法。我们将运用简单模型说明这些贷款使用效益，我们的模型显示了联合负债如何影响群体的形成，全体成员组团的方式来影响其他成员对他们项目选择，有助于避免高昂的贷款人审核代价，并给出鼓励借款 人对没有偿还贷款的贷款人施加昂贵制裁。
