1、原文THEEFFECTSOFFIRMANDCOUNTRYLEVELGOVERNANCEMECHANISMSONDIVIDENDPOLICY,CASHHOLDINGS,ANDFIRMVALUEACROSSCOUNTRYSTUDYINTRODUCTIONTHISSTUDYEXAMINESTHEEFFECTSOFFIRMANDCOUNTRYLEVELCORPORATEGOVERNANCEMECHANISMSONDIVIDENDSANDCASHHOLDINGPOLICIESANDTHEIRJOINTIMPACTONFIRMVALUEUSINGASAMPLEOFOVER3,000LISTEDFIRMSF
2、ROM21COUNTRIESFIRMSOUTSIDETHEUSAREOFTENCONTROLLEDBYALARGESHAREHOLDERFOREXAMPLE,CLAESSENS,DJANKOV,ANDLANG2000TRACETHEULTIMATEOWNERSOF2,980PUBLICLYTRADEDFIRMSFROMNINEEASTASIANECONOMIESANDFINDMORETHANTWOTHIRDSOFTHEMHAVECONTROLLINGOWNERSFACCIOANDLANG2002CARRYOUTASIMILARTASKFOROVER5,000FIRMSFROM13WESTERN
3、EUROPEANCOUNTRIESTHEYFINDTHATOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONSAMONGTHESEEUROPEANSFIRMSAREEVENHIGHERTHANTHOSEOFASIANFIRMSTHEPRIMARYAGENCYPROBLEMFORFIRMSWITHHIGHOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONISTHECONFLICTBETWEENTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSANDTHOSEOFMINORITYSHAREHOLDERSWITHDEFACTOCONTROL,COUPLEDWITHINSUFFICIENTLEGALPROTEC
4、TIONOFINVESTORRIGHTSINMANYCOUNTRIES,THECONTROLLINGOWNERSOFTENENGAGEINACTIVITIESTHATINCREASEPRIVATEBENEFITSATTHEEXPENSEOFMINORITYSHAREHOLDERSTHESEAGENCYCONFLICTSAREFURTHEREXACERBATEDWHENTHECONTROLLINGOWNERSHAVEEXCESSCONTROLRIGHTS1THISPAPERCONTRIBUTESTOTHELITERATUREONINTERNATIONALCORPORATEGOVERNANCEIN
5、FOURWAYSFIRST,ITPROVIDESADDITIONALEVIDENCEONTHELINKAGEBETWEENEXCESSCONTROL,DIVIDEND/CASHHOLDINGPOLICIES,ANDFIRMVALUE,RESPECTIVELYITALSODIRECTLYTESTTHEVALUATIONEFFECTSOFDIVIDENDANDCASHHOLDINGPOLICIESSECOND,THISSTUDYEXTENDSTHESTRANDOFLITERATUREONTHEIMPORTANCEOFINVESTORPROTECTIONINCORPORATEGOVERNANCETH
6、EEMPIRICALANALYSISREVEALSTHATTHECOUNTRYLEVELINVESTORPROTECTIONMITIGATESTHE1EXCESSCONTROLRIGHTSARECOMPUTEDASTHEDIFFERENCEBETWEENTHEVOTINGRIGHTSANDTHECASHFLOWRIGHTSHELDBYTHELARGESTOWNERTHECOMMONUSEOFPYRAMIDALSTRUCTURE,CROSSSHAREHOLDINGS,DUALCLASSSHARES,ANDOTHERCONTROLENHANCINGMECHANISMSRESULTINTHELARG
7、ESTOWNERSHAVINGCONTROLBEYONDTHEIROWNERSHIPSTAKESEECLAESSENS,DJANKOV,ANDLANG2000ENTRENCHMENTEFFECTOFEXCESSCONTROLBYFORCINGTHEINSIDERSTODISGORGECASHFURTHERMORE,THEVALUATIONEFFECTSOFDIVIDENDANDCASHHOLDINGSPOLICIESAREALSODEPENDENTONTHELEGALENVIRONMENTAFIRMOPERATESINTHIRD,ITDEMONSTRATESTHATHOWTHEPOLICYCH
8、OICESAFFECTFIRMPERFORMANCEDEPENDSONFIRMANDCOUNTRYLEVELGOVERNANCEMECHANISMSFOURTH,ITEXPLICITLYCONSIDERSTHEINTERDEPENDENCEAMONGPOLICIESANDFIRMVALUEBYADOPTINGASIMULTANEOUSEQUATIONSAPPROACHTHERESULTSINDICATETHATDIVIDENDPAYOUT,CASHHOLDINGS,ANDFIRMVALUESAREINTERRELATEDTHEREMAINDEROFTHEPAPERISORGANIZEDASFO
9、LLOWINGSINTHENEXTSECTION,IPRESENTSOMETHEORETICALANDEMPIRICALRESULTSONTHERELATIONSBETWEENDIVIDEND/CASHHOLDINGPOLICIESANDCORPORATEGOVERNANCEMECHANISMSANDDISCUSSSTUDIESEXAMININGTHEEFFECTSOFTHECORPORATEGOVERNANCEONFIRMVALUETHEEFFECTSOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCEMECHANISMSONFIRMPOLICIESANDPERFORMANCETWOEFFECTSOF
10、HIGHOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONTWOEFFECTSAREHYPOTHESIZEDTOCOEXISTINFIRMSWITHHIGHOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATION1APOSITIVEINCENTIVEEFFECT,IE,THELARGESHAREHOLDERSHAVEINTERESTSANDPOWERTOENGAGEINVALUEMAXIMIZATIONACTIVITIESGIVENTHEIRHIGHOWNERSHIPSTAKE2ANEGATIVEENTRENCHMENTEFFECTASPOINTEDOUTBYDENISMCCONNELL2002,“IFLARG
11、ESHAREHOLDERSBENEFITONLYFROMPROPORTIONATECASHDIVIDENDSANDAPPRECIATIONINTHEMARKETVALUEOFTHEIRSHARESTHEREISNOCONFLICTBETWEENLARGESHAREHOLDERSANDMINORITYSHAREHOLDERS”HOWEVER,PRIVATEBENEFITSOFCONTROLDOEXISTANDAREQUITESUBSTANTIALINSOMECASESWITHDEFACTOCONTROL,LARGESHAREHOLDERSMIGHTDIVERTCORPORATERESOURCES
12、TOTHEMSELVESATTHEEXPENSEOFMINORITYSHAREHOLDERSMORERECENTSTUDIESPROVIDEAMPLEEVIDENCESUPPORTINGTHISENTRENCHMENTEFFECTTHISADVERSEEFFECTISEXACERBATEDWHENTHELARGESTOWNERSCONTROLRIGHTSAREFURTHERENHANCEDTHROUGHTHEUSEOFPYRAMIDALSTRUCTURE,CROSSSHAREHOLDING,ORSUPERVOTINGSHARESUNDERTHESECIRCUMSTANCES,THELARGES
13、TOWNERSOFTENHAVECONTROLRIGHTSINEXCESSOFTHEIRCASHFLOWRIGHTS,WHICHGIVESTHEMSTRONGINCENTIVESTOEXPROPRIATEMINORITYSHAREHOLDERSLLSV1998,2000ESTABLISHTHEIMPORTANCEOFLEGALPROTECTIONOFINVESTORRIGHTSASACOUNTRYLEVELCORPORATEGOVERNANCEREGIMETHEYDISCOVERTHATTHEREEXISTSSIGNIFICANTDIFFERENCESACROSSCOUNTRIESINTHED
14、EGREEOFINVESTORRIGHTSPROTECTIONFIRMSINCOUNTRIESWITHSTRONGINVESTORPROTECTIONHAVELOWOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONANDBETTERACCESSTOEXTERNALFINANCINGTHANTHOSEINCOUNTRIESWITHPOORINVESTORPROTECTIONTHEPRIMARYAGENCYCONFLICTFORFIRMSWITHCONCENTRATEDOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREISBETWEENTHECONTROLLINGOWNERSANDMINORITYSHAREHOLDE
15、RSTHEINVESTORSLEGALRIGHTSANDENFORCEMENTOFLAWMITIGATESTHISAGENCYCONFLICTTHEREFORE,ANYCROSSCOUNTRYGOVERNANCEANALYSISMUSTCONTROLFORTHECOUNTRYLEVELGOVERNANCEEFFECTDIVIDENDPOLICYEASTERBROOK1984PROPOSESTHATDIVIDENDPAYMENTSFORCEFIRMSTORAISEFUNDFROMCAPITALMARKETSWHICHPROVIDEMONITORINGOFMANAGERSTHEREFORE,THE
16、MANAGERIALAGENCYPROBLEMCANBEMITIGATEDTHROUGHDIVIDENDPOLICYJENSEN1986POSITSTHATMANAGERSMAYUSELOWERDIVIDENDSINORDERTORETAINRESOURCESWHICHCANBEUSEDFOREXCESSIVESALARY,PERQUISITECONSUMPTION,ORINVESTINGINPROJECTSTHATBENEFITTHEMSELVESATTHEEXPENSEOFSHAREHOLDERSFACCIO,LANG,ANDYOUNG2001PRESENTADIFFERENTVIEWON
17、THEUSEOFDIVIDENDSUSINGASAMPLEOFOVER5,000FIRMSWITHCONCENTRATEDOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURE,THEYDOCUMENTTHATDIVIDENDPAYMENTISPOSITIVELYNEGATIVELYASSOCIATEDWITHTHEEXCESSCONTROLHELDBYTHELARGESTSHAREHOLDEROFFIRMSTHATARETIGHTLYLOOSELYAFFILIATEDWITHBUSINESSGROUPSTHEYCONTENDTHATOUTSIDERSPERCEIVEFIRMSTHATARETIGHTLYAFF
18、ILIATEDWITHBUSINESSGROUPSHAVEHIGHAGENCYCOSTSANDTHEREFOREDISCOUNTFIRMVALUEEXANTEINFEAROFVALUEDISCOUNT,THECONTROLLINGOWNERSUSEDIVIDENDSASABONDINGDEVICEHOWEVER,OUTSIDERSSEEMTOBELESSALERTTOTHEAGENCYPROBLEMSINFIRMSLOOSELYAFFILIATEDWITHGROUPSTHEREFORE,THECONTROLLINGOWNERSAREABLETORETAINDIVIDENDSFORASAMPLE
19、OFOVER4,000FIRMSFROM33COUNTRIES,LLSV2000FINDTHATFIRMSOPERATINGINCOUNTRIESWITHBETTERSHAREHOLDERPROTECTIONPAYHIGHERDIVIDENDSTAKENTOGETHER,BOTHFIRMANDCOUNTRYLEVELCORPORATEGOVERNANCEMECHANISMSAREIMPORTANTDETERMINANTSOFDIVIDENDPOLICYCASHHOLDINGSCASHHOLDINGSAREASSOCIATEDWITHBOTHBENEFITSANDCOSTSINTHECONTEX
20、TOFAGENCYTHEORYTHEEXISTINGLITERATUREPRESENTSTWOMAJORMOTIVESOFHOLDINGCASH1THETRANSACTIONCOSTSMOTIVEAND2THEPRECAUTIONARYMOTIVEACCORDINGTOTHESETWOMOTIVES,FIRMSSHOULDHOLDHIGHCASHBALANCESIFTHECOSTSOFRAISINGEXTERNALFUNDSORTHECOSTSOFCASHSHORTFALLSAREHIGHTHEPECKINGORDERTHEORYPRESENTEDINMYERSANDMAJLUF1984SUP
21、PORTSTHEVIEWOFHOLDINGCASHFORTRANSACTIONALAND/ORPRECAUTIONARYMOTIVESRESEARCHERSFINDSUBSTANTIALEVIDENCESUPPORTINGTHESEARGUMENTSFOREXAMPLE,USINGALLFIRMSONTHECOMPUSTATOVERTHEPERIODOF1952THROUGH1994,OPLER,PINKOWITZ,STULZ,ANDWILLIAMSON1999FINDTHATSMALLERFIRMS,FIRMSWITHGOODINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIES,FIRMSWITH
22、MOREVOLATILECASHFLOWSHOLDMORECASHALMEIDA,CAMPELLO,ANDWEISBACH2003TESTTHEEFFECTOFFINANCIALCONSTRAINTSONCORPORATECASHHOLDINGSBYCONTRASTINGTHEPROPENSITYOFHOLDINGCASHBETWEENFINANCIALLYCONSTRAINEDANDUNCONSTRAINEDFIRMSTHEYFINDTHATTHESENSITIVITYOFCHANGESINCASHHOLDINGSTOCASHFLOWSISPOSITIVEONLYFORFINANCIALLY
23、CONSTRAINEDFIRMS,CONSISTENTWITHTHEPRECAUTIONARYMOTIVEOFHOARDINGCASHINANTICIPATIONOFFUTUREINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESANALTERNATIVEVIEWOFCORPORATECASHHOLDINGISPRESENTEDINOPLERETAL1999WHICHCONTENDSTHATCASHHOLDINGSISSIMPLYANOUTCOMEOFFINANCINGANDINVESTMENTDECISIONSFIRMSGENERATINGLARGECASHFLOWSWOULDPAYOFFDEBT
24、,MAKEDIVIDENDPAYMENT,ANDHAVEHIGHCASHBALANCESFIRMSWITHLOWCASHFLOWSDRAWDOWNTHEIRCASHBALANCESANDUSEHIGHLEVERAGEMORERECENTSTUDIESONCASHHOLDINGSFOCUSTHEIRATTENTIONSONTHECOSTSOFHOLDINGHIGHLEVELSOFCASHFOREXAMPLE,DITTMAR,MAHRTSMITH,ANDSERVAES2003EXPLORETHERELATIONBETWEENCASHHOLDINGSANDSHAREHOLDERRIGHTSFORAB
25、OUT11,000FIRMSACROSS45COUNTRIESTHEYFINDANEGATIVERELATIONBETWEENFIRMLEVELCASHHOLDINGSANDTHEDEGREEOFLEGALPROTECTIONOFSHAREHOLDERSINTHEIRCROSSCOUNTRYSTUDYONTHEDETERMINANTSOFCASHHOLDINGS,LINSANDKALCHEVA2004FINDTHATWHENTHEMANAGEMENTISENTRENCHEDANDTHEINVESTORSARENOTWELLPROTECTED,CASHHOLDINGSHASANINCREMENT
26、ALNEGATIVEEFFECTONFIRMVALUETAKENTOGETHER,THESEFINDINGSSUGGESTTHATTHECOSTSOFHOLDINGCASHISPARTICULARLYHIGHWHENTHEFIRMORCOUNTRYLEVELCORPORATEGOVERNANCEMECHANISMSDONOTOFFERSUFFICIENTPROTECTIONTOMINORITYSHAREHOLDERSEMPIRICALANALYSISCOUNTRYRANDOMEFFECTMODELSAREUSEDINALLTHEREGRESSIONANALYSESTOCONTROLFOROVE
27、RALLCOUNTRYEFFECTSANDTOTESTTHEEFFECTOFCOUNTRYLEVELINVESTORPROTECTIONONDIVIDENDPAYMENT,CASHHOLDINGSANDTOBINSQTHEHAUSMANTESTRESULTSSUGGESTTHATTHERANDOMEFFECTSESTIMATORDONOTDIFFERSYSTEMATICALLYFROMTHOSEESTIMATEDUSINGAFIXEDEFFECTMODELTHEREFORE,THERANDOMEFFECTMODELISMOREAPPROPRIATEFORMYANALYSISICONTROLFO
28、RTHEINDUSTRYEFFECTSBYINCLUDINGINDUSTRYGROUPDUMMIESUSINGTHECAMPBELL1996CLASSIFICATIONDIVIDENDPOLICYANDCORPORATEGOVERNANCEFIRST,IEXAMINETHEEFFECTOFFIRMLEVELGOVERNANCEONDIVIDENDPOLICYBYREGRESSINGDIVIDENDPAYOUTRATIOAGAINSTTHEEXCESSCONTROLWHILECONTROLLINGFOROTHERFIRMANDCOUNTRYSPECIFICFACTORSTHATHAVEBEENS
29、HOWNTOBEVARIOUSDETERMINANTSOFDIVIDENDRATIOONTHEONEHAND,THECONTROLLINGOWNERSWITHEXCESSCONTROLRIGHTSHAVESTRONGINCENTIVESTORETAINDIVIDENDSFORPERQUISITECONSUMPTIONORTOINVESTINPROJECTSTHATINCREASEPRIVATEBENEFITSOFCONTROLHOWEVER,FACCIOANDLANG2001FINDTHATEXCESSCONTROLISPOSITIVELYRELATEDTODIVIDENDWHENTHEOUT
30、SIDEINVESTORSPERCEIVEFIRMSWITHEXCESSCONTROLTOBEVULNERABLETOEXPROPRIATIONPROBLEMSWHETHEREXCESSCONTROLINCREASESORDECREASESDIVIDENDPAYMENTSBECOMESANEMPIRICALISSUETHATWILLBEADDRESSEDINMYREGRESSIONANALYSISILATERINVESTIGATETHEPOLICYEFFECTSONFIRMVALUETODIRECTLYTESTWHETHERDIVIDENDPAYMENTSCOULDPREVENTVALUEDI
31、SCOUNT,AVIEWPRESENTEDBUTNOTTESTEDINFACCIOANDLANG2001LLSV2000ADOCUMENTAPOSITIVERELATIONBETWEENCOUNTRYLEVELSHAREHOLDERPROTECTIONANDCORPORATEDIVIDENDPAYMENTTOCONTROLFORTHISEFFECT,IADOPTTWOLEGALPROTECTIONMEASURESCOMMONLYUSEDINPREVIOUSSTUDIESTHEFIRSTLEGALPROTECTIONMEASUREISTHELEGALORIGINDUMMYCOMMONLAWSET
32、TO1IFAFIRMISOPERATINGINACOUNTRYHAVINGACOMMONLAWLEGALORIGINANDZEROOTHERWISESEELLSV1998LLSV1998FINDTHATCOMMONLAWCOUNTRIESGENERALLYOFFERBETTERINVESTORPROTECTIONRELATIVETOCIVILLAWCOUNTRIESANALTERNATIVEMEASUREISTHEANTIDIRECTORRIGHTSINDEXTAKINGONAVALUERANGINGFROM0TO5SEELLSV1998ANOTHERCOUNTRYLEVELDETERMINA
33、NTOFDIVIDENDPAYMENTISTHERESERVEREQUIREMENTWHICHISTHEMINIMUMPERCENTAGEOFTOTALSHARECAPITALTHATTHEHOSTCOUNTRYSCORPORATELAWSMANDATEFORCORPORATIONSTOHOLDTOPREVENTTHEIRDISSOLUTIONUNDERTHISRESTRICTION,CORPORATIONSAREREQUIREDTORETAINAPROPORTIONOFTHEIRANNUALEARNINGSUNTILTHETHRESHOLDISREACHEDTHISRESTRICTIONPR
34、EVENTSFIRMSFROMDISTRIBUTINGALLITSEARNINGSASDIVIDENDIEXPECTANEGATIVERELATIONBETWEENRESERVEANDDIVIDENDRATIOFIRMVALUEANDCORPORATEGOVERNANCETOASSESSTHEVALUATIONIMPACTOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCEREGIMES,IFIRSTEXPLORETHEENTRENCHMENTEFFECTOFEXCESSCONTROLTHECOEFFICIENTONEXCESSCONTROLISNEGATIVEANDSIGNIFICANTATTHE5L
35、EVEL,INLINEWITHTHEFINDINGSOFCLAESSENS,DJANKOV,FAN,ANDLANG2002LEVERAGEHASANEGATIVEEFFECTONFIRMVALUEHIGHGROWTHFIRMSRECEIVEHIGHVALUATIONSLARGEFIRMSHAVELOWVALUES,POSSIBLYBECAUSETHESEFIRMSAREMATUREINTHEIRINDUSTRIESANDHAVEFEWERGROWTHOPPORTUNITIESSUMMARYANDCONCLUSIONSTHISSTUDYEXAMINESTHEEFFECTSOFCORPORATEG
36、OVERNANCEMECHANISMSATBOTHFIRMANDCOUNTRYLEVELONDIVIDENDANDCASHHOLDINGPOLICIESASWELLASTHEIRINTERRELATIONSHIPSTHEREGRESSIONANALYSESSHOWTHATEXCESSCONTROLISNEGATIVELYRELATEDTODIVIDENDPAYMENTANDPOSITIVELYRELATEDTOCASHHOLDINGS,CONSISTENTWITHTHENOTIONTHATTHEENTRENCHEDSHAREHOLDERSHAVETHEPROPENSITYTORETAINCAS
37、HFORPRIVATEBENEFITSIALSOTESTWHETHERTHECOUNTRYLEVELSHAREHOLDERPROTECTIONINFLUENCESTHEBEHAVIOROFCONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSPOLICYDECISIONSBYINCLUDINGINTERACTIONTERMSBETWEENEXCESSCONTROLANDANTIDIRECTORRIGHTSINDEXANDFINDTHATSTRONGINVESTORPROTECTIONPARTIALLYOFFSETTHENEGATIVEEFFECTOFEXCESSCONTROLONDIVIDENDPAY
38、OUTINTHEANALYSISOFGOVERNANCEEFFECTSONFIRMVALUE,MYRESULTSSUPPORTTHEFINDINGSOFCLAESSENS,DJANKOV,FAN,ANDLANG2002THATEXCESSCONTROLHASANEGATIVEVALUATIONEFFECTASWELLASTHERESULTSREPORTEDINLLSV2002THATCOUNTRYLEVELINVESTORPROTECTIONHASAPOSITIVEEFFECTONFIRMVALUEIALSOFINDTHATBOTHDIVIDENDPAYMENTSANDCASHHOLDINGS
39、AREPOSITIVELYRELATEDTOFIRMVALUEHOWEVER,THEVALUATIONEFFECTSOFTHESEPOLICIESDEPENDONTHEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREWHENTHECONTROLLINGOWNERSHAVEEXCESSCONTROL,INCREMENTALDIVIDENDPAYMENTBECOMESACREDIBLESIGNALTOOUTSIDERSTHATTHEYWILLBELESSLIKELYTOBEEXPROPRIATEDINCONTRAST,THEINCREMENTALLEVELOFCASHHOLDINGSHASANEGATIVEE
40、FFECTONFIRMVALUEWHENTHECONTROLLINGOWNERSHAVEEXCESSCONTROLRIGHTS,INDICATINGTHEPOSSIBILITYFORMISUSEOFFREECASHFLOWISHIGHWHENTHEOWNERSBECOMEENTRENCHEDGIVENTHEPOTENTIALENDOGENEITYOFTHESEPOLICYCHOICESANDFIRMPERFORMANCE,IEMPLOYASIMULTANEOUSEQUATIONSMODELTOACCOUNTFORTHEIRINTERDEPENDENCETHERESULTINDICATETHAT
41、CASHHOLDINGSSUPPORTSDIVIDENDPAYOUTBOTHDIVIDENDPAYMENTSANDCASHRESERVESHAVEPOSITIVEEFFECTSONFIRMVALUEAFTERCONTROLLINGFORPOTENTIALENDOGENEITYTAKENTOGETHER,MYFINDINGSINDICATETHATFIRMSWITHENTRENCHEDSHAREHOLDERSHAVEHIGHAGENCYCOSTSMANIFESTEDASHAVINGLOWDIVIDENDPAYMENTSAND/ORHIGHCASHHOLDINGSTHESEPOLICYCHOICE
42、SDIRECTLYAFFECTFIRMPERFORMANCETHELEGALPROTECTIONOFSHAREHOLDERRIGHTSPLAYSANIMPORTANTROLEINDETERRINGEXPROPRIATIONACTIVITIESATTHEFIRMLEVELFIRMSTHATAREPRONETOEXPROPRIATIONPROBLEMSDUETOTHEIROWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREMAYUSEDIVIDENDANDORCASHHOLDINGPOLICIESASBONDINGDEVICESTOPRESENTVALUEDISCOUNTSOURCEZHANG,RONGRONG,
43、2005“THEEFFECTSOFFIRMANDCOUNTRYLEVELGOVERNANCEMECHANISMSONDIVIDENDPOLICY,CASHHOLDINGS,ANDFIRMVALUEACROSSCOUNTRYSTUDY”GEORGIASOUTHERNUNIVERSITYJANUARYPP18译文企业和国家层面的结构治理机制对企业股利政策、现金持有量和企业价值的影响一个跨国企业研究简介本文通过研究来自21个国家超过3000家上市公司样本来探讨企业股息和现金持有政策及其对企业治理机制的影响。美国之外的许多公司往往受控于控股股东。例如克拉森、杰尼科夫和郎（2000）分别对九个东亚经济体
44、2980个公开上市公司的所有者进行调查，发现其中三分之二的所有者是控股股东。他们发现，在这些亚洲公司的所有权甚至比欧洲公司更高。有关所有权问题是企业控股股东和小股东的主要矛盾。事实上对这些矛盾的控制并没有完善的法律来保护投资者的权利，在许多国家，控股股东经常从事增加少数股东私人利益的活动。这些冲突进一步加剧时，控股股东会产生超额的控制权。本文摘列了国际上公司结构治理的四种方式。第一，超额控制、股息/现金持有政策和公司价值，能够直接测试汇价变动对现金股利政策的影响。第二，本研究阐述了投资者保护公司治理的重要性。事实表明，国家应保护投资者，迫使业内人士交出侵占的剩余股利。此外，股息和现金持有政策与
45、汇价变动有关，也应创造公司经营的良好法律环境。第三，研究表明，国家和企业应制定良好的企业绩效政策。第四，研究表明公司政策和公司业绩有着相互依存的关系。在下一节中，我将对股息/现金持有政策和公司治理机制进行讨论研究，提出公司治理对公司价值影响的一些理论和实证结果。高度股权集中的两方面影响假设两种效应是共存在股权集中度较高的公司1一个是激励作用，即以大股东的最大利益和权力去从事价值最大化的活动；2另一个是负侵占效果。正如丹尼斯和麦康奈尔（2002）认为，“如果大股东的利益只能从现金分红中按比例提取，在其股票的市场价值之间就不存在大股东与小股东的冲突。”但是，私人利益控制权确实存在，在某些情况下是相
46、当多的。事实上，大股东可能控制自己公司的资源并将费用转嫁到少数股东上。最近的研究提供了充分的证据来支持这一侵占效果。这种不利影响加剧时，有用最大控制权的人，进一步通过金字塔结构进行交叉持股，或对具有超级表决权股份增强使用。在这种情况下，最大的业主往往通过他们的现金流权，使他们拥有控股股东的超额控制权。拉波塔、洛配兹西拉内斯、安德烈施莱弗和罗伯特维什尼（1998）认为，作为国家，实行企业管治制度、制定保护投资者权利的法律是非常重要的。他们发现，各个国家之间对投资者权益的保护程度存在着明显的差异。在拥有雄厚资产的国家中，对投资者的保护程度往往较低；在企业所有权集中程度较低的国家，则会更多的去保护投
47、资者的利益。集中的股权结构与公司的主要机构之间的冲突往往是控股股东和少数股东的冲突。监管机构应缓解合法权益投资者与其的矛盾。因此，任何跨国公司的治理分析必须控制在国家层面的治理效果上。公司治理机制对公司的股利政策和业绩的影响股息分配政策伊斯特布鲁克（1984）建议应用派发股息的方法使企业从资本市场筹集的资金能得到管理机构的监测。因此，管理机构的问题可以通过分红政策得到缓解。詹森（1986）假定，管理人员可以通过较低的股息，保留更多的薪水、额外消费补贴、或在受益于股东的项目牺牲自己的投资。年轻的法齐鸥，郎（2001）提出了股息使用的不同看法。通过研究超过5,000家股权集中结构的企业集团与附属，
48、他们得出，股息正（负）是和各公司最大的控股股东所持超额控制相关联的。他们争辩说，外界认为这是紧密联结企业集团和下属企业时产生的较高成本，因此公司价值会打折扣。在价值折扣恐惧前，作为一个企业所有者会控制红利。然而，外界似乎不那么警觉公司与集团下属结构松散的问题。因此，控股股东能保持股利。通过研究4000多个来自33个国家的公司，LLSV（2000）发现，企业经营是为了更好的保护股东，付更高的红利。综上所述，公司治理机制是股利政策的重要决定因素。库存现金现金持有量在理论中与代理成本既有益处。现有的文献提出了两个主要的动机持有现金（1）交易成本的动机，（2）预防动机。根据这两种动机，企业应持有较高的
49、现金余额，如果外部资金成本提高或现金短缺的成本很高。优序融资理论在迈尔斯和麦吉罗夫提出（1984）支持持有现金交易和/或预防动机的看法。研究人员发现大量的证据支持这些论点。例如，使用过1952年至1994年期间COMPUSTAT所有企业，OPLER，PINKOWITZ，STULZ，与WILLIAMSON（1999）发现，规模较小的公司，具有良好的投资机会的公司，更多的现金流量不稳定的企业持有更多的现金。阿尔梅达和魏兹巴赫（2003）对比测试之间举行的企业财务约束和非约束倾向的现金对公司现金持有的金融限制因素的影响。他们发现，现金持有量的变化对现金流量的敏感度是积极财政约束的企业，在囤积现金的预期未来的投资机会只有预防动机一致。一个企业现金持有另一种观点，OPLER（1999）声称，现金持有量只是一个简单的融资和投资决策的结果。企业产生大量的现金流量将还清债务，支付债款，并具有较高的现金余额。企业现金流量低吸引了他们的现金余额和使用高杠杆。现金持有量较近期的研究集中在持有的现金水平较高费用的关注。例如，迪特马尔，MAHRT史密斯和SERVAES（2003）探讨与股东之间的现金持有权关系的企业约11000家跨越了45个国家。他们发现一间公司现金持有水平和对股东的法律保护程度呈负相关。在他们的跨国现金持有量，林氏和KALCHEVA的决定因素（2004）发现，当管理是根深蒂固的，
