1、 外文翻译 原文 PORTERS COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS : TIME FOR THE FINAL JUDGEMENT? Material Source: Journal of Management Studies; Dec2000, Vol. 37 Issue 8, p1189-1213, 25p Author: Ellis, Paul1 COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE VERSUS COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE One of the most ambitious claims made for CAN by Porter
2、(1990,p. 20) and others (Ettlinger, 1991; Grant, 1991) was that it rendered economic analysis more relevant by replacing the simplistic precepts of classical and neo-classical microeconomics (Magaziner, 1990, p. 189). Central to that claim was the assertion that a new paradigm was created by replaci
3、ng the outdated concept of comparative advantage with the more dynamic concept of competitive advantage. The former was described as providing a static explanation for international trade on the basis of relative endowments of basic factors, while the latter put forward a more useful dynamic explana
4、tion based upon up-grading and innovation. If this were true, it would represent a major setback for the economics profession. The principle of comparative advantage is so central to mainstream economic thought that one Nobel Laureate in Economics (Samuelson, 1969) declared it to be the only proposi
5、tion in the whole of social science to be both true and non-trivial! Fortunately for the economists, Porters claim does not bear scrutiny. Indeed, four points become clear. First, Porter misunderstood comparative advantage in CAN and reverted to a more primitive and long-rejected explanation for tra
6、de. Second, his claim to have introduced new elements to the theory of international trade was unfounded because economists had been aware of them for decades. Third, the elisions which arose as Porter championed competitive against comparative advantage led others to misinterpret his position on go
7、vernment intervention. Finally it is clear that, having rejected comparative advantage, Porter then relied heavily on its logic in constructing his stages model of development. These four points may be taken in turn. Porters attack on comparative advantage demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding
8、, located in a confusion between the roles of absolute and relative productivity in the determination of trade, set out on page 8 of CAN. Porter argues there that in order to meet competition from abroad, and to export, an industry must meet absolute productivity standards. America is described as h
9、aving a growing trade deficit . in automobiles because the level of productivity in the German and Japanese industries has been even higher. That is the absolute advantage theory of trade, put forward by Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1776). However, the absolute advantage theory contai
10、ns a logical error and cannot explain the observed pattern of trade because it predicts that countries with lower productivity will be unable to export. The comparative advantage perspective, first formulated by Ricardo (1817), resolved that difficulty by demonstrafing that if one country has higher
11、 absolute productivity than another in every sector, the two countries will still trade with each other to mutual advantage. Both nations can export if they specialize in the products where the opportunity cost is lowest. Some industries in the low productivity country will be able to compete succes
12、sfully and export to other countries, even if their absolute productivity is very low. In China, for instance, the absolute productivity of the toy industry and the machine tool industry are both very low compared to their counterparts in America. However, China has a comparative advantage in toys,
13、which it exports to the US, while the US has a comparative advantage in machine tools, which it exports to China. The comparative advantage perspective explains that Chinese toy manufacture is not competitive because of its higher absolute level of productivity but because toys are cheaper in China
14、when measured in terms of the number of machine tools which could be produced with the same resources. America is competitive in machine tools for the converse reason. America does not have a growing trade deficit in toys with China because Chinas productivity is higher than Americas in that sector.
15、 Exasperatingly enough, Porter concedes this point, apparently without noticing. He points out that Korea has been able to export cars to the US, despite higher American absolute productivity in car production because American productivity has also not been sufficiently greater than that of Korean f
16、irms to offset lower Korean wages (p. 8). Korea can export (relatively obsolescent) cars to the US because its abundant labour and low wages give it a comparative advantage in such cars, precisely as predicted by Vernons (1966) international product life cycle model, which is a dynamic version of th
17、e principle of comparative advantage. Korean car exports are not determined by high absolute levels of productivity nor is the ability to export in general. As so often in CAN, Porter generalized from the American experience to the world as a whole, leading him to invalid conclusions. Up-grading is
18、necessary for US firms wishing to export, because wages are high and their comparative advantage lies in that direction. CAN was simply exhorting them to do what comparative advantage suggests they should and will do. But one countrys comparative advantage is by definition its trading partners disad
19、vantage. To encourage firms in many of Americas trading partner nations (especially developing countries) to adopt the same up-grading strategy is to encourage them to shift away from comparative-advantage-based trade into products where they will not be able to compete without government interventi
20、on. Having misunderstood comparative advantage, Porter claimed that a new paradigm had been put in its place. On the other hand, The Economist (1990) noted that every proposition in the theoretical part of CAN is a commonplace and only one of the major academic journals in economics bothered even to
21、 review it. That disdain is explained by the fact that Porter and his supporters appeared to believe that the economics of international trade ended with the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem (Grant, 1991, p. 240). In fact more recent trade theory, building on the comparative advantage perspective, had alread
22、y taken into account most of the supposedly new elements raised in CAN. Trade based upon technological gaps has been well understood since Posners (1961) paper and Vernon (1966) provided a dynamic extension of comparative advantage theory in the international product life cycle model. The importance
23、 of factor mobility has been recognized since Mundell (1957) and the implications of different consumer preferences for trade have been part of the standard model since Leontief (1933). Deardorff (1984), Ethier (1984), and Krueger (1984) provide survey articles demonstrating the pursuit of these iss
24、ues by international economists over decades. In so far as Porter popularized their work he did the economists a service, just as his earlier work (Porter, 1980) popularized the economics of industrial organizaton. However, the claim to have invented a new paradigm is not supported. The theory of co
25、mparative advantage does well in the explanation of inter-industry trade. It does not provide an explanation for intra-industry trade between countries with similar factor endowments, which Porter cites as one of its central weaknesses (p. 12). However, modern trade theory has recognized that point
26、for many years (Helpman and Krugman, 1985) and explains such trade as the outcome of scale economies. The claim that CAN brought a new paradigm to trade theory is so easily dismissed that the economics profession hardly bothered to respond, pace Waverman (1995). Nevertheless, in the broader discussi
27、on of international business and national policies, the focus on competitive advantage or competitiveness and the exhortation to up-grade have become sufficiently commonplace to be described as an obsession (Krugman, 1994) and to justify closer attention. As Warr (1994) points out, the attempt to su
28、bstitute competitive advantage for comparative advantage rests on a misunderstanding and a false analogy. The comparative advantage theorem explains which goods should be produced and exported, and which should be imported. It explains to which industries a countrys resources should be allocated if
29、they are to be used efficiently and national income is to be maximized. It also predicts which industries will be successful exporters if trade barriers are absent. Competitive advantage concerns the way in which firms located in the industrially advanced countries compete with each other. The elisi
30、on of the two, and the resulting emphasis placed on the need for nations to compete on a basis other than cost, leads to policy recommendations whereby countries are exhorted to change their product-mix towards more differentiated and high-tech products, even when their current resource endowments a
31、re inappropriate. As Warr (1994,p. 2) puts it: The new literature on competitive advantage contains much that is sensible and even useful at the level of industry competition policy but it also contains a theme that is dangerous. Through its emphasis on the importance of high-technology production o
32、f differentiated products as the sources of the competitive advantage of firms operating in advanced countries, and its devaluation of the importance of comparative costs, it appears to legitimize wasteful forms of public expenditure and/or protection policies designed to promote the premature devel
33、opment of high-technology industries. This interpretation of the competitive advantage message, while possibly not intended by its protagonists such as Porter, threatens to encourage policies which will squander the scarcest resources of developing countries. Nowhere in CAN does Porter espouse the v
34、iew that governments should use public expenditure, protection or administrative fiat to shift resources towards an upgraded mix of industries. Indeed, he is consistently opposed to government intervention (Porter and Takeuchi, 1999). In that sense it is incorrect to assert that CAN encouraged gover
35、nment intervention. On the other hand, governments and industry leaders in countries as diverse as Finland (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1993), Hong Kong (Berger and Lester, 1997; Enright et al., 1997), Venezuela (Enright et al., 1996), Switzerland (Enright and Weder, 1995), New Zealand (Trade De
36、velopment Board, 1990), and Indonesia (Habibie, 1993) have embraced industrial policy initiatives founded on Porters assertion that they must develop their competitiveness through the adoption of up-grading strategies. It is not difficult to see why CAN should be misinterpreted in this way. Porter d
37、enied that competitiveness could be achieved on the basis of comparative advantage and insisted that firms must produce up-graded products in order to compete. That was a valid assertion for American firms. However, the continuing elision of nation with firm and trade with prosperity combined with i
38、nappropriate generalization from the American case, led many to interpret that as a call for nations in general to take action to up-grade their economies away from their comparative advantage in order to reach prosperity. As nations act through their governments CAN unintentionally invited public s
39、ector intervention. 译文 波特的国家竞争优势：为最后的决策 时间吗？ 资料来源 : 管理学杂志 ; Dec2000, Vol. 37 Issue 8, p1189-1213, 25p 作者： 埃利斯，保罗 比较优势与的竞争优势” 由波特 (1990 年 ,第 20 页 )和其他 (Ettlinger,1991,格兰特 ,1991) 所做的最雄心勃勃的声称是它提供更多相关的经济分析取代简单的西班牙古典及新古典微观经济学” (Magaziner,1990,第 189 页 )。声称的中心意思是 :“陈旧的比较优势概念被更新的竞争优势概念所取代”。前者被形容为在提供一 个静态的原因
40、的基础上 ,是与国际贸易基本因素相对的 ,而后者提出了一种基于动态解释的更有用于创新。 如果这是真的 ,将是一个重大的经济挫败。比较优势原理 ,是那么重要的思想，主流经济学家之一的诺贝尔经济学家 (萨缪尔森 ,1969)宣布将命题在唯一的整个社会科学，既真实和非平凡 !幸运的是 ,对于经济学家而言 ,波特的要求已经是不结的审查了。事实上 ,很清楚。首先 ,被波特误解的比较优势 ,更原始的解释为贸易。第二 ,他声称已经介绍了的国际贸易理论新的元素是没有理由的 ,因为经济学者意识不到这所谓的新元素已经几十年了。第三 ,迈克尔摩 尔的支持 ,导致其他学者都起来怀疑波特在国家比较竞争优势理论中的领导地
41、位。最后 ,很显然 ,比较优势 ,由于波特在很大程度上依赖于其逻辑上建构的阶段发展模式。这四点可能是依次出现的。 波特的比较优势的攻击演示了其一个根本的误解 ,混淆了绝对和相对生产率贸易的测定。波特认为 ,为了满足来自海外的竞争 ,出口和工业必须符合绝对生产力标准。美国被形容为具有日益增长的贸易逆差。因为具有更高生产力水平的汽车制造商公司在德国和日本公”。这是“：亚当斯密在他的国富论中提出了绝对优势的贸易理论 (史密斯 ,1776)。然而 ,绝对优势的贸易 理论包含了逻辑错误 ,无法解释观察到的贸易摩擦现象 ,因为它预测 ,生产能力低的国家将不可能出口。从比较优势的角度来看 ,第一办法由里卡多
42、提出 (1817),如果一个国家的生产力比另一个更高领域占优势 ,这两个国家还将拥有互相比较的优势。两国都可以出口他们专业的产品 ,而机会成本最低。即使他们的绝对生产力是很低的，某些国家的产业生产力低下还是能够成功的竞争 ,并且出口到其他国家。例如，在中国，具有绝对生产力优势的玩具产业 ,但是其它像机床行业却是非常低于美国的。不过 ,中国具有相对优势 ,所以玩具出口到美国 ,而美国则具有其他相对 优势 ,所以它的机床设备出口给了中国。从比较优势的角度解释说 ,中国的玩具制造是没有竞争力的 ,不是因为它的绝对生产力水平高 ,而是因为玩具比较便宜 ,而从美国来的机床数量可由相同的资源优势，这也就是
43、美国的机床有竞争力的原因。美国日益增长的贸易逆差，是由于中国在玩具行业的生产效更力高。更为令人气愤的是很显然波特并没有注意到这一。他指出 ,韩国已能出口汽车到美国 ,尽管美国在汽车生产方面具有绝对的生产力 ,但是美国的生产力不够充分，竞争不过韩国厂 商以抵消低工资 (第 8 页 )。韩国可以出口 (相对落后 )汽车到美国因为其丰富的劳动和低工资给了它比较优势，弗农的 (1966 年 )国际产品生命周期模型 ,是动态版的比较优势的原理，可以进行较准确的预测。韩国汽车出口并不是取决于绝对高水平的生产力也不是出口能力一般。就如波特常常所说 ,可以从美国把全世界都作为一个整体的经验 ,让他成为无效的结
44、论。“对我们来说是很希望美国公司出口 ,是因为那边工资高以及相应的优势在于那一方。可能只是劝勉他们去做比较优势的建议 ,他们也会做得更好。但是一个国家的比较优势也可以被定义为自己的贸易伙伴的 劣势。鼓励美国公司在许多美国的贸易伙伴国家 (尤其是发展中国家 )采取同样的策略，就是鼓励他们的贸易产品出口到那里 ,在那里 ,人们看的是竞争能力而不是政府干预。 在误解了比较优势的情形下 ,波特声称的一个新典范 ,被关进了他自己的位置。另一方面 ,在经济学家 (1990)指出 ,每一个命题的理论的一部分 ,只会是一个主要学术期刊在经济困扰方面老生常谈。事实上 ,最近的贸易理论 ,建立在比较优势的角度上
45、,已经考虑了大部分的新元素。基于技术差距的贸易已经很好理解 (1961)来自波斯纳纸和弗农 (1966 年 )提供的动态比较优势理论的 延伸在国际产品生命周期模型。流动性因素的重要性已经得到认可，因为蒙代尔 (1957)以及有关贸易偏好不同消费者已经认可一部分标准模型 (1933 年 )。克鲁格(1984)提供文章调查显示这些问题由国际经济学家研究了数十年。然而 ,波特声称已经发明了一种新的范式并没有得到支持。主要是比较优势理论擅长产业内贸易的解释。不提供解释国与国之间的产业内贸易具有相似的要素禀赋 (第 12页 )。然而 ,现代贸易理论已经认识到点 ,许多年前 (克鲁曼 1985 年 )也解
46、释了这种贸易规模经济的结果。 声称如此轻易解雇可以带来一项新的贸易理论范式 ,经济行业几乎费心去回应 , (1995 年 )。然而 ,在更广泛的讨论国际商务和国家政策时 ,著重于竞争优势或比较优势 ,鼓吹的已经变的越来越普遍且被描述为一个“困扰” (克鲁曼1994)。 Warr(1994)指出 ,尝试竞争优势替代比较优势是基于一种误解和虚假的类比。比较优势理论解释产品出口和进口。一个国家的产业资源分配应该是要高效的国民收入使用最大化。它也预测那些成功的出口行业，如果没有贸易壁垒，竞争优势的担忧是那些公司位于工业发达国家互相竞争。这两钟解释 ,导致强调“国家的需要竞争 ,导致成本以外的政策建议 ,国家鼓励 改变他们的产品比例越来越趋向于分化和“高科技产品的活动 ,甚至他们当前的资源禀赋都是不适当的。 Warr(1994 年第 2 页 )所说 : 新元素的竞争优势有很多 ,甚至是一个明智的产业层次有用竞争政策但它也含有一个主题 ,这是很危险的。他的重要性 ,强调的是高新技术生产的差异化产品竞争优势的来源的公司经营 ,在发达国家 ,和它的货币贬值的重要性 ,比较成本 ,它看起来像是合法化浪费形式的公共支出和 /或贸易保护政策为了促进高新技术产业发展不成熟。这个解释“竞争优势的信息 ,而可能是无意的主角 ,如波特 ,威胁使鼓励政策 ,会浪费我国目前最紧 缺的资源。
