1、 1 外文翻译 原文 Insider ownership and corporate performance: evidence from Germany Material Source: http:/ /fulltext.html Author: Christoph Kaserer and Benjamin Moldenhauer In this paper we address the question whether insider ownership affects corporate performance. Evidence from studies dealing with An
2、glo-Saxon countries is rather inconclusive, especially because results seem to be significantly affected by endogeneity. Economically, this is due to the fact that in these countries insider ownership seems to be mainly driven by managements compensation contracts. We argue that Germany is different
3、 in this regard, as insider ownership is often related to family control, stock-based compensation is less widespread, and the market for corporate control used to be less developed. Starting from this presumption, our data allows an unbiased observation as to whether insider ownership affects firm
4、performance. Using a pooled data set of 648 firm observations for the years 2003 and 1998, we find evidence for a positive and significant relationship between corporate performanceas measured by stock price performance, market-to-book ratio and return on assetsand insider ownership. This relationsh
5、ip seems to be rather robust, even if we account for potential endogeneity by applying a 2SLS regression approach. Furthermore, the results hold for a sub-sample of firms that did not have a stock-based compensation program in place. Moreover, we find outside block ownership as well as more concentr
6、ated insider ownership to have a positive impact on corporate performance. Overall, the results indicate that ownership structure might be an important variable explaining the long term value creation in the corporate sector. Since Berle and Means (1932) and, more importantly, Jensen and Meckling (1
7、976), a whole branch of research has evolved investigating into the effects of the separation of ownership and control. Actually, the studies of Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) were among the first to empirically test the effects of managerial equity ownership (i.e., insider own
8、ership) on firm value. Since then 2 several studies have been published on this issue. Two important results emerge from this branch of literature. First, most of these studies provide evidence that insider ownership actually affects firm value, although the relationship does not seem to be monotoni
9、c. A positive impact of insider ownership on firm value can be explained by the so-called convergence-of-interest hypothesis, stating that larger equity shares of insiders should be associated with higher market valuations due to lower agency costs. In contrast, a negative relationship can be explai
10、ned by the so-called entrenchment hypothesis, predicting that insider ownership above a certain threshold will have a value destroying effect due to the inherent conflict between large blockholders (in this case the management) and the dispersed shareholders. These two hypotheses serve as an explana
11、tion for the bell-shaped relationship between insider ownership and firm value found by McConnell and Servaes (1990) or the piecewise-linear relationship discovered by Morck et al. (1988) in their previous study. However, a serious theoretical objection to the approach used in these studies has been
12、 put forward by Demsetz (1983). He argues that insider ownership is endogenously determined and, hence, cannot be a determinant of firm value. His arguments are supported by the evidence presented in Demsetz and Lehn (1985), where firm size, volatility, return on assets and industry affiliation are
13、found to be relevant explanatory variables for the ownership structure of US corporations. Hence, it may well be that low levels of managerial ownership turn out to be an optimal incentive arrangement in those firms whose value tends do be lower than in other companies, in which higher levels of ins
14、ider ownership are optimal. As long as one cannot control for the variables being responsible for this relationship, i.e., there is unobserved firm heterogeneity, the detected correlation between ownership and firm performance might just be spurious. For this reason, more recent studies have paid sp
15、ecial attention to this problem of endogeneity. In fact, the second important result emerging from the pertinent literature indicates that more advanced econometric methods that allow to partially control for endogeneity reveal that firm performance does not seem to be affected by managerial ownersh
16、ip. However, doubts remain preventing these results from being accepted as conclusive. Evidently, in a perfect frictionless capital market competitive forces would ensure that every company puts a value maximizing ownership structure in place. By definition, insider ownership would be endogenous and
17、 presumably determined by, among other factors, the companys performance. 3 Under such a theoretical perspective the question of whether firm performance depends on the ownership structure, is irrelevant. As has been mentioned, the first studies investigating the relationship between insider ownersh
18、ip, as measured by top-managements shareholdings, and firm value are those of Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990). Both papers found a significant, non-monotonic relationship. The most important theoretical objection to the approach used in these studies has been put forward by Dems
19、etz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Basically, they argue that in a competitive capital market environment market forces will make sure that every company chooses its value maximizing ownership structure. Hence, inside ownership is an endogenously determined variable and any observed correlation
20、 of ownership and firm value is, basically, meaningless. In fact, the relationship of inside ownership and firm value might be due to some firm characteristics that are unobservable for the econometrician. As a consequence, an endogeneity problem arises, because ownership structure and firm value ar
21、e determined simultaneously. In fact, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) show that the ownership structure of US companies is plausibly determined by firm size, stock price volatility, industry affiliation, and some other variables. According to their view, this corroborates the understanding that ownership st
22、ructure is endogenously determined. Himmelberg et al. (1999) extend Demsetz and Lehns results by using a fixed effects panel data model and instrumental variables to control for possible unobserved firm heterogeneity. They conclude that most variation in managerial ownership is explained by unobserv
23、ed firm heterogeneity and that managerial ownership does not affect firm performance to an econometrically observable extent. Research presented by Loderer and Martin (1997) points in the same direction. They construct a simultaneous equation system for a set of companies involved in acquisitions th
24、at handles performance and insider ownership as endogenous variables. As a result, insider ownership does not have a predictive effect on performance in their model, but vice versa, performance has a negative effect on insider ownership. However, pondering the vast corporate governance literature th
25、at emerged over the last decade gives raise to several questions, challenging this theoretical perspective. First of all, do corporate governance regimes really allow market forces to put value maximizing ownership structures in place? Isnt it true that in many countries, including the US, several e
26、xisting mechanisms allow managers to shelter themselves from the market for corporate control? And isnt it true that ownership 4 structure often is rather inert, making a flexible adjustment to changing market conditions unlikely? From these questions, which are not directly addressed in this paper,
27、 it follows immediately that more evidence on the ownershipperformance relationship is needed, especially under different corporate governance regimes. This study makes a contribution to the literature exactly under this perspective. First, as a code law country, Germany has a corporate governance r
28、egime that is very different from the regimes governing common law countries. As a stylized fact, in code law countries investor protection is regularly lower and the market for corporate control is more hampered. This is particularly true for Germany, as Franks and Mayer (1990) or Wenger and Kasere
29、r (1998) have pointed out. Therefore, ownership structure may not flexibly adapt to pressures from investors searching for value gains. It is interesting in this regard that, according to a recently evolving branch of literature that pays particular attention to a special case of insider ownership b
30、y looking at the impact of family ownership on firm performance, new evidence has been found corroborating the presumption that ownership structure matters for performance. From this it follows that the performanceownership relationship in Germany might be less affected by endogeneity than is the ca
31、se with data from Anglo-Saxon markets. In fact, our findings are in accordance with this presumption. The second contribution of this paper is more technical. Almost all papers investigating the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance aim to measure the latter by Tobins Q, i.e.
32、, by putting the market value of a company in relation to the replacement value of its assets. In practice, however, Tobins Q is approximated by a firms market-to-book ratio. Evidently, there might be some reservations as to whether the market-to-book ratio can really be taken as a proxy for firm va
33、lue, especially in a continental European accounting context, where historical cost accounting is still important, at least for the period under consideration in this paper. Therefore, we use a broader approach by measuring corporate performance not only by the market-to-book-ratio, but also by a lo
34、ng-run buy-and-hold stock return as well as by the return on assets. As we obtain rather robust results, our findings are less prone to methodological objections to the way how corporate performance is measured. Our results indicate that there is a significantly positive relationship between insider
35、 ownership and firm performance as measured by stock price performance over a 5 year period. These findings are confirmed when using market-to-book ratio 5 or return on assets as performance measures. In order to account for potential endogeneity, we employ an instrumental variable two-stage least s
36、quares regression approach. In addition, we test the relationship for a subset of companies that did not have stock based compensation programs in place. It turns out that results seem not to be driven by endogeneity. Moreover, we also find outside block ownership as well as more concentrated inside
37、r ownership to have a positive impact on corporate performance. Hence, the paper corroborates the assertion that ownership may have an autonomous influence on firm performance. In this study, we use two cross-sections and a pooled sample of German listed companies to examine current shareholder stru
38、ctures and the phenomenon of insider ownership. Though being aware of the problems arising from the use of primarily cross-sectional data, we decided in favor of using them for the following reasons: first, since insider ownership in Germany attracted little reserach interest until now, we thought t
39、hat it is still necessary to better understand shareholder structures at large and to learn more about the appropriate measurement of insider ownership before going into a deeper analysis. Second, since the historical availability of shareholder structure data in Germany is rather limited, the const
40、ruction of a large and comprehensive panel data set would take enormous effort. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief review of the literature. Section 3 explains the research design as well as the data set, while Sect. 4 presents the results. Section 5 conclude
41、s. 译文 内部所有权和 公司绩效 :从德国的证据 资料来源 : http:/ /fulltext.html 作者 ： Christoph Kaserer and Benjamin Moldenhauer 在本文中，我们解决内部所有权是否影响公司绩效的问题。 从盎格鲁撒克逊国家 获得的 研 究证据是相当不确定的，特别是因为结果似乎 受内生性 的影响。经济上，这是由于在这些国家 的 内部所有权 似乎主要 是 由管理层薪酬契约 而 驱6 动的事实。我们认为德国在这方面 是 不同 的 ， 因为 内部人持股往往与家 族 控制 、股票补偿 的较不普遍和 市场对企业所使用的控制不那么发达 有关 。从这个假
42、设出发，我们的数据可以作为内部人持股是否影响公司绩效 的 无偏观察。 利用1998 和 2003 年 648 家公司的数据 ，我们找到 了 一个 股权结构与公司绩效两者关系的 积极和重要的证据， 以此来 衡量股价 、 市场 与 账面价值比率和资产所有权的回报 。 这种关系似乎是相当强劲 稳健的 ， 即使我们对潜在的 内生性 帐户 的衡量也 通过应用 2SLS 回归方法。此外，结果 表明，子公司并 没有建立一套基于股票的补偿方案。此外，我们发现 块状 所有权以及内部人持股比较集中的 股权结构 对公司绩效产生积极影响。总的来说，结果表明，股权结构可能是一个可以用来 解释在企业部门 可以长期创造 价
43、值 的 重要的变量 。 自从伯利和米恩斯 (1932)，更重要的是詹森和梅克林 (1976)的研究， 一整个分支的研究已演变成 为调查 所有权和控制权分离 的 影响。 实际上，莫克等人（ 1988）和麦康诺、 瑟维斯（ 1990） 是第一批实证检验股权管理对公司价值（即内部人持股）的影响。从那时起数项研究已经发表 了 这个问题。 两 个重要结果从 文献的 分支涌现。 首先，这些研究提供的证据表明，大多数内 部 所有权 能够 真正影响公司价值，但这种关系似乎并不是单调的。一 种观点认为， 内部人持股对公司价值产生积极的影响 ， 可以解释为所谓的 利益收敛假说， 其 指出由于较低的代理成本 ， 较
44、大的内部股权应具有较高的市场估值。与此相反， 另一种观点认为内部所有权和公司价值之间 呈负相关，可以解释为所谓的 利益掠夺 假说， 其 预测 为 ，由于大股东（在这种情况下，管理）和分散的 小 股东之间的内在冲突，超过一定 限度 内 部 所有权将 会 有价值破坏的效应 。这两个假设可以作为对内部交易所有权与公司价值之间关系的解释，麦康奈尔和瑟维斯（ 1990）发现内部交易所有权与公司价值之间呈钟形关系，莫克等人（ 1988）在他们以前的研究中发现了内部交易所有权与公司价值之间呈分段线性关系 。 然而，德姆塞茨（ 1983）提出了严 格 的理论 来 反对在 上述 研究中所用的方法。他认为，内部人
45、持股是 内生 决定的，因此，不能是一个公司价值的决定因素。德姆塞茨和莱恩（ 1985） 提出的证据支持他的论据 ，其中 从 公司规模，波动性，资产报酬率和行业隶属关系发现 了 美国公司的股权结构相关解释性 变量。因此，它很可能是因为低水平的管理权 转变成一个最佳激励并安排在一些 价值往往比在其他公司低 的公司里 ， 因而 中 、 高层次的内部人持股是最佳的激励安排。 只要你无法控制的变量是负责这个关系的 ,那么发现异质性的时候公司所有权和绩效相关性可能仅仅是伪造的。 出于这个原因，最近的研究也给予了这种内生性问题特别 的 关注。 事实上，相关文献中出现的第二个重要结果表明， 更 加 先进 的
46、计量经济学的方法 允许部7 分控制内生性，从而揭示出公司的业绩似乎不受管理所有权的影响。 然而， 很多研究为了 防止被怀疑仍然接受了这些结果作为最后定论。显然，在一个 完美的资本市场 ， 竞争 的力量 将确保每家公司把价值最大化 转变为 所有制结构。根据定义，内 部 的所有权将取决于内源性和公司的业绩。 根据这种理论的角度，探讨企业绩效是否取决于所有制结构的问题是无关紧要的。 正如 前面 已经提到的，第一个研究 通过对高级管理层的持股的计量， 莫克(1988)等人和麦康奈尔 、瑟维斯 (1990)提出的公司价值的衡量 调查 了股权结构与公司绩效之间的关系。 这两 篇论文 找到了一个显 著的 ，
47、非单调的关系。 对这些理论提出的最重要的异议是反对 这些研究中所用的方法， 这是由 德姆塞茨（ 1983）和德姆塞茨和莱恩（ 1985） 提出的 。 基本上，他们认为，在竞争激烈的市场环境下资本市场的力量将确保每家公司选择其价值 最大化的所有权结构。 因此，所有权是内生决定的变量，任何 对 所有权和公司价值 的相关性观察 ，基本上是毫无意义的。事实上，内部所有权与公司价值关系可能是由于一些企业的特点 所决定的 ，这对于计量经济学家 来说的 不可观 测的 。 因此，一个 内生性 问题出现， 是 因为股权结构和公司价值的同时测定。 事实上，德姆塞茨和莱恩（ 1985）表明，美国公司的所有权结构是按
48、 照 企业 的 规模，股票价格的波动，行业隶属关系和其他一些变量 而 确定的。据他们认为，这证实了股权结构是内生决定的理解 。 Himmelberg（ 1999）等 人沿用 德姆塞茨和莱恩 的结论，通过 使用固定效应面板数据模型和工具变量，以控制可能 没有 观测到 的 企业的异质性。他们得出结论，管理所有权 的最大 变化 被解释为 是没有观察到 公司 的异质性，而管理公司的所有权，不影响公司业绩的计量 和 观察程度。 Loderer 和 马丁（ 1997） 提交的研究 在同一方向 上 。 他们为一组相关的公司在收购中处理性能和内部所有权作为内生变量而构建了一个联立方程系统。 因此，内部人持股并
49、没有 对 他们的模型性能 产生一种 预测 性的 效果，但反之， 性能对 内 部 所有权产生负面影响。 然而，在过去十年中 ，广大公司治理文献中 出现的几个问题 正在 挑战这一理论观点。首先 ，真正的企业 治理 制度将允许市场力量在价值最大化的 地方进行 所有制结构 转变吗 ？在许多国家，包括美国在内的一些现有的机制允许 经理从公司控制权市场 方面保护 自己 ，这 是不是事实 呢 ？ 股权结构往往是相当活跃的 ，使 其 灵活 地 调整， 以适应 不断变化的市场条件 ，是 不可能 的 吗？这些问题都没有 直接 地 在本文 中 解决，但更多的所有制关系的证据是必要的，特别是在不同的公司治理制度 中 。 这项研究对 根据这个角度研究的文献做出了 贡献。 首先，作为一个法治国家，德国的公司治理制度不同于政权统治的英美法系国家。 作为一个程式化的国家，投资保障经常降低 ，公司控 制权市场更 是 受到阻碍。 在德国 这是真实的，8 弗兰克斯和 迈耶 （ 1990） 、 温格和 Kaserer（ 1998）都指
