1、本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文TRANSFERPRICINGINVERTICALLYINTEGRATEDINDUSTRIESABSTRACTTAXOFFICIALSJUDGEWHETHERAMULTINATIONALSTRANSFERPRICEISCONSISTENTWITHTHEARMSLENGTHSTANDARD,THEPRICEATWHICHTWOINDEPENDENTFIRMSWOULDCARRYOUTASIMILARTRANSACTION,BYUSINGDATAFROMCOMPARABLEBUTINDEPENDENTTRANSACTIONSINVERTICALLYINTEGRATE
2、DINDUSTRIES,THEONLYSOURCEOFCOMPARABLEDATAMAYBEFROMCONTROLLEDNONINDEPENDENTTRANSACTIONSCONVENTIONALWISDOMASSERTSTHATSTANDARDARMSLENGTHMETHODSCANNOTPERFORMWELLINSUCHMARKETSBECAUSETHECOMPARABILITYRULESENCOURAGETHEINTEGRATEDFIRMSTOCOLLUDETACITLYONTRANSFERPRICESINAWAYTHATAMPLIFIESTAXDIFFERENTIALINCENTIVE
3、SINTHISPAPER,WESHOWTHATSTRATEGICLINKAGESBETWEENVERTICALLYINTEGRATEDFIRMSOPERATINGINTHESAMEFINALGOODMARKETMODERATE,ANDCANPOSSIBLYREVERSE,TAXDIFFERENTIALINCENTIVESIFTHECORRECTCOMPARISONMETHODISUSEDTHECOSTPLUSMETHODTURNSOUTTOBETHEMOSTEFFECTIVEINLIMITINGTHEEQUILIBRIUMAMOUNTOFPROFITSHIFTINGOUTOFTHEHIGHTA
4、XCOUNTRYANDITYIELDSTHEHIGHESTTAXREVENUESFORTHEHIGHTAXCOUNTRYTHESEBENEFITSARESHOWNTOSTRENGTHENWHENTHEFIRMSHAVEPRIVATECOSTINFORMATIONKEYWORDSTRANSFERPRICINGVERTICALINTEGRATIONINCENTIVECOMPARABILITYINTRODUCTIONATRANSFERPRICEISUSEDTOVALUETHEEXCHANGEOFANASSETORSERVICEBETWEENTWOSUBSIDIARIESOFTHESAMEMULTIN
5、ATIONALWHENTHESUBSIDIARIESAREINCORPORATEDINCOUNTRIESWITHDIFFERENTTAXRATES,THEMULTINATIONALHASANINCENTIVETOSETTHETRANSFERPRICETOSHIFTPROFITSINTOTHELOWTAXCOUNTRYTOMITIGATETHISINCENTIVE,OECDCOUNTRIESAUDITMULTINATIONALTRANSFERPRICESTODETERMINEWHETHEREACHTRANSFERPRICEMEETSTHEARMSLENGTHSTANDARDTHETRANSFER
6、PRICEEQUALSTHEPRICETWOARMSLENGTHORINDEPENDENTFIRMS,FIRMSNOTCONTROLLEDBYTHESAMEMULTINATIONAL,WOULDTRADEWHENANAUDITDETERMINESTHATATRANSFERPRICEDOESNOTMEETTHEARMSLENGTHSTANDARD,THETAXAUTHORITYIMPUTESANAPPROPRIATETRANSFERPRICE,CALCULATESANEWTAXLIABILITY,ANDASSESSESPENALTIESTODETECTDEVIATIONSFROMARMSLENG
7、THPRICINGINPRACTICE,TAXAUTHORITIESTESTWHETHERATRANSFERPRICEMEETSTHEARMSLENGTHSTANDARDBYCOMPARINGDATAFROMTHEAUDITEDFIRMTODATAFROMCOMPARABLETRANSACTIONSBETWEENINDEPENDENTBUYINGANDSELLINGFIRMSTHEGENERALIDEAISTHEDATAFROMTHEINDEPENDENTFIRMSWILLAPPROXIMATEACOMPETITIVEPRICERELIANCEONTRANSACTIONSBETWEENINDE
8、PENDENTFIRMSSEEMSOBVIOUSSUPPOSEINSTEADTHECOMPARABLEDATACOMESFROMCONTROLLEDTRANSACTIONS,TRANSACTIONSWHEREEVERYBUYERANDSELLERPAIRISCOMMONLYOWNEDBYSOMEOTHERMULTINATIONALEACHMULTINATIONALACTIVEINTHESAMEPRODUCTMARKETSNOWHASANEXPECTATIONOFBEINGPARTOFITSCOMPETITORSCOMPARABILITYGROUPTHISEXPECTATIONAMPLIFIES
9、EACHMULTINATIONALSPROFITSHIFTINGINCENTIVESBYCREATINGANINCENTIVEFORMULTINATIONALFIRMSOPERATINGINTHESAMEMARKETSTOTACITLYCOLLUDEINSETTINGTHEIRTRANSFERPRICESHOWTHENSHOULDTAXOFFICIALSAUDITTRANSFERPRICESINVERTICALLYINTEGRATEDINDUSTRIESFORWHICHNOINDEPENDENTTRANSACTIONSEXISTINTHEUNITEDSTATES,482OFTHEINTERNA
10、LREVENUECODE1994REPEATEDLYMANDATESTHENEEDTO“LOCATETWOUNRELATEDPARTIESTHATAREEACHCOMPARABLETOONEOFTHECONTROLLEDTAXPAYERS”ANDASSUCHOFFERSNOGUIDANCEFORDEALINGWITHINDUSTRIESINWHICHNOCOMPARABLEUNCONTROLLEDTRANSACTIONSEXISTOECDGUIDELINESONTHEOTHERHANDACKNOWLEDGETHAT“EVIDENCEFROMENTERPRISESENGAGEDINCONTROL
11、LEDTRANSACTIONSWITHASSOCIATEDENTERPRISESMAYBEUSEFUL”BUTDONOTPROVIDESPECIFICGUIDANCEONHOWBESTTOUSESUCHINFORMATIONOECD2001,PARAGRAPH170THEPURPOSEOFTHISPAPERISTWOFOLDFIRST,WESEEKTOCHALLENGETHECONVENTIONALWISDOMDISCOURAGING/PROHIBITINGTHEUSEOFDATAFROMCONTROLLEDTRANSACTIONSTOAUDITAMULTINATIONALSTRANSFERP
12、RICESSECOND,WEWILLIDENTIFYTHEBESTPROCEDUREFORANALYZINGCONTROLLEDDATAINORDERTOMINIMIZEHARMFULPROFITSHIFTINGINCENTIVESTHEFOLLOWINGEXAMPLEFROMTHEOILANDNATURALGASINDUSTRYINNORWAYILLUSTRATESTHERELEVANCEOFOURFOCUSONVERTICALLYINTEGRATEDINDUSTRIESBECAUSEOFTECHNICALDEMANDS,DRILLINGINTHENORTHSEAISLIMITEDTOASM
13、ALLNUMBEROFLARGEMULTINATIONALCOMPANIESTHESPECIALNATUREOFDEEPSEADRILLINGMEANSTHEMARKETFORPROPERTYANDLIABILITYINSURANCEISQUITETHINANDRISKCHARACTERISTICSCANVARYFROMONEPLATFORMTOANOTHERLIKEMOSTLARGECORPORATIONS,OILANDGASCOMPANIESSELFINSURETHEIRRISKINACAPTIVEINSURANCESUBSIDIARYANDTHENREINSUREAPORTIONOFTH
14、EIRRISKWITHINDEPENDENTINSURERSTHEDIFFICULTTASKFORREVENUEAUTHORITIESISFINDINGCOMPARABLEINSURANCERATESONTHERETAINEDRISKS3INADDITION,DIFFERENCESINTHETAXTREATMENTOFINSURANCEPROFITSANDOILANDGASPROFITSCREATEANINCENTIVETOSHIFTPROFITSINTOTHEINSURANCESUBSIDIARIES4BECAUSEOFTHETHINMARKETANDIDIOSYNCRATICRISKFEA
15、TURES,SIMILARYETINDEPENDENTDATAFORCOMPARABILITYCALCULATIONSISNOTAVAILABLEONTHEOTHERHAND,THEPRESENCEOFSEVERALMULTINATIONALCOMPANIESINTHENORTHSEAGENERATESGOOD,ALBEITCONTROLLED,COMPARABLEDATATOBETTERUNDERSTANDWHYITISDESIRABLETOUSETRANSFERPRICEDATAFROMINDEPENDENTPARTIES,CONSIDERHOWREVENUEAUTHORITIESCOND
16、UCTTRANSFERPRICEAUDITSDATAFROMTRANSACTIONSBETWEENINDEPENDENTPARTIESISCOLLECTEDANDCOMPAREDTOTHEAUDITEDPARTYSDATAREGULATIONSFROMOECDCOUNTRIESSPECIFYSEVERALDIFFERENTMETHODSFORANALYZINGTHISDATATHECOMPARABLEUNCONTROLLEDPRICEMETHODCOMPARESTHEAUDITEDTRANSFERPRICETOTHECOMPARABLETRANSACTIONPRICES,THECOSTPLUS
17、METHODCOMPARESCOSTMARKUPSOFTHESELLINGFIRMS,ANDTHECOMPARABLEPROFITMETHODALLOWSTAXOFFICIALSTOCOMPAREPROFITABILITYRATIOSEGOPERATINGPROFIT/SALESANDGROSSPROFIT/OPERATINGEXPENSESTHERESALEPRICEMETHODCOMPARESTHEMARKUPOVERTHETRANSFERPRICEREFLECTEDINTHEFINALGOODPRICESOFTHEBUYINGFIRMSFINALLY,THEPROFITSPLITMETH
18、ODCOMPARESPROFITSHARESBETWEENTHEBUYINGANDSELLINGPARTIESIFTHEVALUEOFTHEAUDITEDPARTYSDATAIMPLIEDBYONEOFTHESEMETHODSFALLSWITHINTHE25THANDTHE75THPERCENTILEOFTHEDATAFROMTHEINDEPENDENTTRANSACTIONS,THETRANSFERPRICEISDEEMEDACCEPTABLEWHENTHETESTEDTRANSFERPRICEFALLSOUTSIDETHISRANGE,THETESTEDPARTYSPRICEISADJUS
19、TED,ANEWTAXLIABILITYISCALCULATED,ANDPENALTIESAREIMPOSEDASLONGASTHEAUDITEDFIRMCANNOTINFLUENCETHECOMPARABLETRANSACTIONS,THEDATAFROMALLFIVEMETHODSSHOULDAPPROXIMATEACOMPETITIVEPRICEONEKEYWAYTHEAUDITEDFIRMCANINFLUENCETHEINDEPENDENTTRANSACTIONPRICESISIFTHEAUDITEDMULTINATIONALANDTHEINDEPENDENTFIRMSOPERATEI
20、NSIMILARMARKETSANDTHEMULTINATIONALHASSOMEMARKETPOWERSAMUELSON1982WASTHEFIRSTTOARGUETHATEQUILIBRIUMMARKETPRICESAREPARTIALLYDETERMINEDBYTHETAXMOTIVESOFANINTEGRATEDFIRMHALPERINANDSRINIDHI1996EXTENDEDTHISANALYSISBYEXPLICITLYINCORPORATINGFEATURESOFTHECOMPARABILITYMETHODSCODIFIEDINTHE1994REGULATIONSBOTHAR
21、TICLESENSUREDTHEEXISTENCEOFINDEPENDENTTRANSACTIONSBYASSUMINGONLYONEACTIVEMULTINATIONALINTHEINTERMEDIATEGOODMARKETNONETHELESS,THEUSEOFCOMPARABLEDATAWASSHOWNTORESULTINEQUILIBRIUMTRANSFERPRICESTHATAREDISTORTEDFROMEFFICIENT,COMPETITIVELEVELSWITHNOINDEPENDENTTRANSACTIONS,ONEMIGHTEXPECTTHESEDISTORTIONSTOB
22、EMAGNIFIEDDUETOTHECOORDINATINGEFFECTCREATEDWHENEACHMULTINATIONALFIRMRECOGNIZESTHATITSTRANSFERPRICEHELPSESTABLISHACOMPARISONBASISFORAUDITINGTHETRANSFERPRICESOFTHEMULTINATIONALFIRMSWITHWHICHITCOMPETESWHILETHISEXPECTATIONISCORRECTFORSOMEOFTHEMETHODSOUTLINEDABOVE,ITISNOTTRUEFORALLOFTHEMETHODSWESHOWINTHI
23、SPAPERTHECORRECTMETHODCANACTUALLYINDUCETACITCOORDINATIONCONSISTENTWITHATAXAUTHORITYSINTERESTSREGARDLESSOFWHETHERFINALGOODPRODUCTIONORINTERMEDIATEGOODPRODUCTIONISLOCATEDINAHIGHTAXCOUNTRY,THECOSTPLUSMETHODSHIFTSTHELEASTPROFITOUTOFTHEHIGHTAXCOUNTRYANDMAYRESULTINPROFITSBEINGSHIFTEDINTOTHEHIGHTAXCOUNTRYT
24、HECOSTPLUSMETHODALSOGENERATESTHEMOSTTAXREVENUEFORTHEHIGHTAXCOUNTRYTHEADVANTAGEASSOCIATEDWITHTHECOSTPLUSMETHODCOMESFROMTHEECONOMICLINKAGEBETWEENAFIRMSTRANSFERPRICEONINTERMEDIATEGOODSANDITSFINALGOODPRODUCTIONFORTHEPURPOSESOFTHISINTRODUCTION,WEEXPLAINTHISLINKAGEFORTHECASEINWHICHFINALGOODPRODUCTIONISLOC
25、ATEDINTHEHIGHTAXCOUNTRYFIRMSHAVETWOOPTIONSFORINCREASINGTHEPROFITITSHIFTSOUTOFTHEHIGHTAXCOUNTRYINCREASEITSTRANSFERPRICEANDINCREASEITSFINALGOODOUTPUTWHICHREQUIRESMOREOFTHEINTERMEDIATEGOODASAFIRMINCREASESITSTRANSFERPRICE,ITSPROFITMARGINONFINALGOODPRODUCTIONINCREASESWHICHMEANSEACHFIRMHASANINCENTIVETOINC
26、REASEITSTRANSFERPRICEANDITSOUTPUTTOGETHERIFFINALGOODPRODUCTIONAMONGTHEFIRMSARESTRATEGICSUBSTITUTES,THENACOMBINEDINCREASEINTRANSFERPRICESANDOUTPUTWILLNOTONLYRESULTINANINCREASEINPROFITSSHIFTEDOUTOFTHEHIGHTAXCOUNTRY,ITCANALSORESULTINADECREASEINFINALGOODPROFITSVIAADECREASEINTHEFINALGOODPRICETHECOSTPLUSM
27、ETHODCREATESTHESTRONGESTTRADEOFFBETWEENFINALGOODPROFITSANDTRANSFERPRICEPROFITS,ANDTHUSRESULTSINTHELOWESTLEVELOFPROFITSHIFTINGOUTOFTHEHIGHTAXCOUNTRYANDTHELARGESTTAXREVENUESFORTHEHIGHTAXCOUNTRYWITHENOUGHFIRMSINTHEFINALGOODMARKET,THENEGATIVEPRICEEFFECTWILLACTUALLYSWAMPTHEPOSITIVEPROFITEFFECTFROMHIGHTRA
28、NSFERPRICESANDCREATECOORDINATIONINCENTIVESTHATRESULTINLOWERTRANSFERPRICESTHANONEWOULDEXPECTBASEDSOLELYONTAXDIFFERENTIALSINSECT2,WEPRESENTACOMPLETEINFORMATIONMODELOFTRANSFERPRICINGWITHOLIGOPOLISTICMULTINATIONALSTHATCANACCOMMODATEALLSTANDARDTRANSFERPRICEMETHODSEACHMULTINATIONALPRODUCESANINTERMEDIATEGO
29、ODINONECOUNTRYANDAFINALGOODINANOTHERCOUNTRYINSECT3,WECONFIRMTHEEXTANTINTUITIONTHATTACITCOORDINATIONOFTRANSFERPRICESARISESUNDERANYOFTHESEMETHODSMOREOVER,THECOMPARABILITYSTRUCTUREOFARMSLENGTHMETHODSCREATESMULTIPLEEQUILIBRIUMSTHATCANBEINDEXEDBYTHETRANSFERPRICEONWHICHTHEFIRMSCOORDINATEASINALLESANDDATAR1
30、998ANDNARAYANANANDSMITH2000,P501,SCOPEFORTACITCOORDINATIONARISESBECAUSETRANSFERPRICESANDTAXDIFFERENTIALSHELPSHAPEPRODUCTMARKETCOMPETITIONINBOTHPAPERS,TRANSFERPRICESSERVEANINTERNALMANAGERIALCOMMITMENTFUNCTIONVIASALESDIVISIONINCENTIVESASINFERSHTMANANDJUDD1987SINCENEITHERPAPERMODELSTHEREGULATIONOFTRANS
31、FERPRICES,THEQUESTIONOFHOWTHESPECIFICREGULATORYMETHODCONTRIBUTESTOTHEPRODUCTMARKETCOMPETITIONISNOTADDRESSEDASINHALPERINANDSRINIDHI1996,WEABSTRACTAWAYFROMTHEINTERNALMANAGERIALEFFECTSOFTRANSFERPRICESANDFOCUSONTHEIMPACTOFTHECHOICEOFREGULATIONOURPAPERDIFFERSFROMHALPERINANDSRINIDHI1996INTHATWEALLOWFORCOM
32、PETITIONBETWEENMULTINATIONALSWHEREASTHEYONLYALLOWCOMPETITIONBETWEENAMULTINATIONALSSUBSIDIARYANDALOCAL,UNINTEGRATED,DOMESTICCOMPETITORTHISCOMPETITIONBETWEENMULTINATIONALSGENERATESTACITCOORDINATIONNOTSEENINHALPERINANDSRINIDHI1996BECAUSEOFTHECOMPARABILITYSTRUCTUREOFTRANSFERPRICEREGULATIONSOURMAINRESULT
33、SREGARDINGTHEADVANTAGESOFTHECOSTPLUSMETHODAREDEVELOPEDINSECT3INSECT4,WEINTRODUCECOSTHETEROGENEITYAMONGTHEUPSTREAMSUBSIDIARIESTOASSESSTHEEXTENTTOWHICHOURRESULTSDEPENDONTHEBASEMODELSSYMMETRYRATHERTHANINCREASINGTHESETOFEQUILIBRIUMS,WEIDENTIFYANINCENTIVECONDITIONWEREFERTOAS“INCENTIVECOMPARABILITY”THATLI
34、MITSTHEABILITYOFMULTINATIONALSINAVERTICALLYINTEGRATEDINDUSTRYTOTAKEADVANTAGEOFPROFITSHIFTINGINCENTIVESWHENTHEYHAVEPRIVATECOSTINFORMATIONSECTION5OFFERSCONCLUDINGCOMMENTSCONCLUDINGREMARKSUNITEDSTATESTRANSFERPRICEREGULATIONSSPECIFICALLYPROSCRIBETHEUSEOFDATAFROMCOMPETINGMULTINATIONALSTOAUDITEACHOTHERSTR
35、ANSFERPRICESFORFEAROFINDUCINGTACITCOORDINATIONTHATFACILITATESEXTREMETAXINDUCEDPROFITSHIFTINGOECDGUIDELINESACKNOWLEDGETHATTHEREMAYBESOMEBENEFITTOUSINGDATAFROMSUCH”CONTROLLED”TRANSACTIONS,BUTDONOTOFFERANYGUIDANCEONHOWBESTTOUSETHISINFORMATIONBOTHPOSITIONSLEAVETAXAUTHORITIESWITHNOSYSTEMATICPROCESSFORAUD
36、ITINGTRANSFERPRICESINVERTICALLYINTEGRATEDINDUSTRIESOURPAPERSTUDIESTHEEQUILIBRIUMINCENTIVESCREATEDBYSTANDARDTRANSFERPRICEMETHODSINAVERTICALLYINTEGRATEDINDUSTRYTODETERMINEWHICHENCOURAGEAGGRESSIVETAXINDUCEDTRANSFERPRICINGANDWHICHDISCOURAGESUCHBEHAVIORWHILETHETACITCOORDINATIONINCENTIVESOFCONCERNAREPRESE
37、NTINOURMODEL,WESHOWEACHOFTHESTANDARDMETHODSPRODUCESDIFFERENTCOORDINATIONINCENTIVESBASEDONTHEECONOMICRELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHETAXSAVINGSAMULTINATIONALEARNSVIAPROFITSHIFTINGANDTHEOPERATINGPROFITITEARNSINITSPRODUCTMARKETONTHEMARGIN,AMULTINATIONALWILLPRODUCETHEQUANTITYFORWHICHITSAFTERTAXDOWNSTREAMOPERATING
38、PROFITPLUSITSMARGINALTAXSAVINGSFROMSHIFTINGPROFITOUTOFTHEHIGHTAXCOUNTRYEQUALSITSAFTERTAXUPSTREAMPRODUCTIONCOSTSAHIGHERTRANSFERPRICEINCREASESTHEMARGINALTAXSAVINGSANDENCOURAGESMOREFINALGOODPRODUCTIONWHENEACHMULTINATIONALOPERATINGINTHEFINALGOODMARKETBEHAVESTHESAMEWAY,EACHFIRMSINCREASEDOUTPUTIMPOSESAREV
39、ENUEDESTRUCTIONEXTERNALITYONITSCOMPETITORSIFTHEREVENUEDESTRUCTIONEFFECTISLARGEENOUGH,INEQUILIBRIUMITWILLOFFSETANYTAXSAVINGSFROMAHIGHERTRANSFERPRICEOURANALYSISREVEALSTHATTHECOSTPLUSMETHODGENERATESTHESTRONGESTREVENUEDESTRUCTIONINCENTIVESANDTHUSDISCOURAGESTHEMULTINATIONALSFROMCOORDINATINGONTRANSFERPRIC
40、ESTHATSHIFTALOTOFPROFITOUTOFTHEHIGHTAXJURISDICTIONSURPRISINGLY,THISISTRUEREGARDLESSOFWHETHERTHEUPSTREAMDIVISIONSORTHEDOWNSTREAMDIVISIONSFACETHEHIGHERTAXRATEMOREOVER,OURANALYSISREVEALSTHATTAXREVENUESARETHELARGESTWHENTHEHIGHTAXCOUNTRYUSESTHECOSTPLUSMETHODWECONCLUDETHATTHECONVENTIONALINTUITIONREGARDING
41、THEUSEOFSTANDARDTRANSFERPRICEREGULATIONSINTHEABSENCEOFINDEPENDENTCOMPARABLEDATAISINCOMPLETEBECAUSEITIGNORESTHESTRATEGICEXTERNALITIESTHATCANEXISTBETWEENANINTEGRATEDFIRMSUPSTREAMANDDOWNSTREAMMARKETSALLOWINGFORPRIVATECOSTINFORMATIONONLYSERVESTOREINFORCETHEATTRACTIVENESSOFTHECOSTPLUSMETHODOURANALYSISIDE
42、NTIFIESANEQUILIBRIUMPROPERTYOFCOMPARABILITYMETHODSAPPLIEDTOVERTICALLYINTEGRATEDCOMPETITORSWHICHWEREFERTOAS“INCENTIVECOMPARABILITY”THISEQUILIBRIUMCONDITIONSTRENGTHENSTHESTRATEGICEFFECTSOFTHECOSTPLUSMETHODBEYONDTHOSEIDENTIFIEDINOURCOMPLETEINFORMATIONANALYSISBYLINKINGTHEMARKUPVALUESOFLOWCOSTFIRMSTOTHEM
43、ARKUPVALUESOFHIGHCOSTFIRMSWITHTWOMULTINATIONALSANDTWOCOSTTYPES,THELOWCOSTANDTHEHIGHCOSTMARKUPSWILLBEEQUALWITHTWOMULTINATIONALSANDMORETHANTWOCOSTTYPES,THELOWCOSTANDHIGHCOSTMARKUPSWILLSATISFYANINEQUALITYCONDITIONINEITHERCASE,THEPRIVATEINFORMATIONINCENTIVEPROPERTIESOFTHECOSTPLUSMETHODSTRENGTHENAHIGHTAX
44、COUNTRYSABILITYTOLIMITOUTBOUNDPROFITSHIFTINGWELEAVETHECASEOFTHREEORMOREFIRMSFORFUTURERESEARCHSOURCETHOMASPETTER,2007“TRANSFERPRICINGINVERTICALLYINTEGRATEDINDUSTRIES”SPRINGERSCIENCEBUSINESSMEDIA,LLC26APRILPP231255译文转让定价的行业垂直整合摘要税务人员判断一个跨国公司的转让价格是否符合保持距离的标准，可以通过与之可比的两个独立的公司进行类似交易在交易价格上的数据进行比较来判断。在垂直一体
45、化的行业，从受控制（非独立）的交易获取数据是可比数据的唯一来源。过去的经验表现保持标准距离的方法不能很好的执行，因为在市场可比性规则鼓励的综合事务所串通默许这种通过转让价格的方式来放大税收差分奖励。在本文中，我们显示，在同样的最终良好的市场经营纵向一体化的企业，可以扭转公司的战略联系，比较不同方法是否正确使用从而导致税收优惠差别。成本加成方法证明能够最有效地限制并平衡利润移出高税国家，它会为高税收的国家产生最高的税收收入。这些优势都在公司有私人成本资料时表现突出。关键词转让定价；垂直整合；激励可比性简介转让价格适用于不同国家的两家子公司之间的资产和服务价值交换。当子公司在不同税率的国家注册成立
46、，跨国公司通过奖励设置转移价格将利润转移到低税国。为了缓解这种激励，国家经合组织在审计跨国公司转让价格确定转让价格是否符合每个都保持公平方式标准符合国家的保持公平方式标准转移价格或由不是同一跨国公司控制，贸易独立的企业交易价格。当审计确定转让价格不符合公平方式标准时，税务机关确定一种适当的转让价格，计算出一个新的税务负担和评估处罚。为了检测公平方式标准在实践中的定价偏差，税务机关通过比较审计公司的数据和独立公司之间类似买卖交易数据来测试转让价格是否符合保持公平方式标准。总的想法是独立的公司中的数据将是近似具有竞争力的价格。独立企业之间的交易的凭据是显而易见的。假设相反，可比数据来自受控交易，交
47、易中的每个买家和卖家由跨国公司拥有。在同一产品市场，跨国公司活动对其竞争对手的可比性组的部分有一个积极期盼。这个期盼通过对在相同市场经营的多国公司创建一种鼓励和默许通过设置其转让价格从而放大每个跨国公司的转移利润的方式。那么，税务人员如何在没有独立的交易垂直一体化的行业审计其转让价格呢在美国，国内税收法典（1994）第482的重复任务指出，需要“找到两个各自非关联方，双方都具有一个控制的纳税人”，因为在行业内没有可比性不能提供交易指导；另一方面经合组织存在不受控制的交易准则，“从关联企业从事受控交易获得的数据是有用的”，但不提供如何最好地利用这些资料的具体指导。（经合组织，2001，第170页
48、）本文的目的是双重的首先，寻求挑战传统智慧劝阻，审核一个跨国公司转移价格控制交易禁止使用的数据。第二，找出最佳程序分析控制的数据，以尽量减少有害的利润转移的激励。在挪威的石油和天然气工业的案例中阐释我们重点行业垂直整合的相关性。由于技术要求，在北海钻探仅限于少数大型跨国公司。深海钻井的特殊性质意味着物业市场及责任保险是很薄，风险特征可以从一个平台到另一个更改。如同大多数大型企业，石油和天然气公司自保其在保险子公司的风险，然后再保险是保险公司风险的独立部分。税务机关的艰巨任务是找到可比对保留的风险保险费率。此外，在保险方面，石油和天然气利润利得税的差别待遇创造一个激励转入保险子公司的利润。由于稀
49、薄市场及独特性风险的特点，具有可比性的类似独立数据计算是不可用。另一方面，在北海多家跨国公司的内部存在产生良好的尽管受控制的可比数据。为了更好地理解为什么最好使用的转让价格由独立人士的数据提供，税收当局又是如何进行转移价格的审计。独立人士之间交易的数据是通过收集和比较，经审核缔约方的数据。自经合组织国家法规规定对这些数据进行分析几种不同的方法。可比非受控价格法适用于经审计的转让价格和可比交易价格进行比较，成本加成法适用于承销公司的成本加成、而可比利润方法允许税务官员进行比较盈利比率（如营业利润/销售毛利/营业费用）。转售价格法比较在最终产品的购买价格中反映出来的转让价格溢价。最后，利润分割方法比较买卖各方之间的股票利润。如果由其中一个方法所隐含的审计缔约方由独立的交易的数据值在25到75百分值之间，被认为是可以接受的转让价格。当被测试的转让价格超出此范围内，被测试的价格需要进行调整，计算新的应纳税额，并实施处罚。只要经审核的公司不能影响类似交易，所有五种方法中的数据应近似具有竞争力的价格。经审计的公司可以影响独立的交易价格的一个关键是经审核的跨国公司和独立的公司在类似的市场运作中并且该跨国公司有一定市场力量。萨缪尔森（1982）是第一个认为跨国公司的平衡市场价格取决于纳税动机。肯尼和萨拉瑞德（1996）加以明确并被纳入1994年规例
