1、本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文CAPITALSTRUCTURE,PAYOUTPOLICY,ANDFINANCIALFLEXIBILITYFINANCIALFLEXIBILITYISTHESINGLEMOSTIMPORTANTDETERMINANTOFCAPITALSTRUCTUREACCORDINGTOCFOSSEE,EG,GRAHAMANDHARVEY2001,YETTHEONLYPROMINENTTHEORYTORECOGNIZEITSVALUEMYERSANDMAJLUFS1984PECKINGORDERMODELHASSERIOUSEMPIRICALSHORTCOMINGSINFAC
2、T,FAMAANDFRENCH2005CONCLUDETHATTHEPECKINGORDERIS“DEAD”ASASTANDALONETHEORYOFCAPITALSTRUCTUREBECAUSEOFITSINABILITYTOEXPLAINWHYEQUITYISSUESARECOMMONPLACE,ANDARENOTEXCLUSIVELYTHEFINANCINGVEHICLEOFLASTRESORTEXTANTTRADEOFFTHEORIESOFCAPITALSTRUCTUREFARENOBETTEREMPIRICALLY,SINCETHEYFAILTOEXPLAINIWHYFIRMSDON
3、OT“LEVERUP”AFTERLARGESTOCKPRICEINCREASES,IIWHYMANYPROFITABLEFIRMSMAINTAINLOWDEBT,THUSFOREGOINTERESTTAXSHIELDSAVAILABLEATLITTLEDISTRESSRISK,ANDIIIWHYLEVERAGEREBALANCINGISDIFFICULTTODETECTAND,WHENDETECTED,WHYITOCCURSWITHADELAYTHATISNOTPLAUSIBLYEXPLAINEDBYADJUSTMENTCOSTSTHEEMPIRICALCORPORATEFINANCELITE
4、RATUREWHICH,ASFAMAANDFRENCH2005,PP580581NOTE,INRECENTYEARSHASLARGELYFOCUSEDONRUNNINGA“HORSERACE”BETWEENTHEPECKINGORDERANDTRADEOFFTHEORIES,ISNOWLEFTWITHNOEMPIRICALLYVIABLETHEORYOFCAPITALSTRUCTURETHISPAPERARGUESTHATFINANCIALFLEXIBILITYISTHECRITICALMISSINGLINKFORANEMPIRICALLYVIABLETHEORY,BUTTHATTHEPECK
5、INGORDERFAILSTODELIVERTHATTHEORYBECAUSEITSNUMEROUSRESTRICTIVEASSUMPTIONSNARROWITSFOCUSSUFFICIENTLYTOPRECLUDEAMEANINGFULANALYSISOFTHEIMPACTOFFINANCIALFLEXIBILITYONCORPORATEFINANCIALPOLICIESSPECIFICALLY,THEPECKINGORDERTHEORYFALLSSHORTBECAUSEITIFOCUSESONA“ONESHOT”FINANCINGDECISION,THUSITRULESOUTTHEINTE
6、RTEMPORALTRADEOFFSTHATARECENTRALTOFIRMSDEBTCAPACITYUTILIZATIONDECISIONS,IIASSUMESTHATASYMMETRICINFORMATIONALLOWSSELFINTERESTEDMANAGERIALBEHAVIORATSECURITYISSUANCE,BUTATNOOTHERTIME,THUSITIGNORESTHEFACTTHATASYMMETRICINFORMATIONALSOENGENDERSAGENCYCOSTS,IE,ITALLOWSMANAGERSTOBENEFITTHEMSELVESATOUTSIDESTO
7、CKHOLDERSEXPENSEBYOVERRETAININGCORPORATERESOURCES,IIIASSUMESAWAYANYEFFECTOFCORPORATETAXESONOPTIMALCASHBALANCESANDDEBTLEVELS,WHICHISLIKELYTOBENONTRIVIAL,ANDIVIGNORESTHEINHERENTINTERDEPENDENCEOFCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDEQUITYPAYOUTPOLICIES,AFACTORWHICHWESHOWHASIMPORTANTIMPLICATIONSFORHOWFIRMSBUILD,PRESERVE,
8、ANDDRAWDOWNFINANCIALFLEXIBILITYOVERTIMETAX/DISTRESSCOSTTRADEOFFTHEORIESFALLSHORTBECAUSETHEYIGNORETHEIMPORTANCEOFFINANCIALFLEXIBILITY,EVENTHOUGHDISTRESSCOSTSAREULTIMATELYCAUSEDBYTHESAMEINFORMATIONALASYMMETRYTHATUNDERLIESTHEPECKINGORDERSSECURITYVALUATIONPROBLEMSINDIRECTANDDIRECTDISTRESSCOSTSOCCURONLYW
9、HENFIRMSTHATCANNOTMEETEXTANTPROMISESTOCREDITORSAREUNABLETOACCESSCAPITALMARKETSATTERMSACCEPTABLETOBOTHMANAGERSANDOUTSIDEINVESTORSIFMANAGERSANDOUTSIDEINVESTORSHADIDENTICALINFORMATION,THUSCOULDREADILYAGREEONTHEVALUESOFTHEFIRMSCURRENTANDPOTENTIALLYISSUEDSECURITIES,THEYWOULDALWAYSRECAPITALIZETHEFIRMTOREP
10、LACEDEBTWITHEQUITYANDAVOIDALLDIRECTORINDIRECTDISTRESSCOSTSCOASE1960,HAUGENANDSENBET1978IMPORTANTLY,THESAMEINFORMATIONASYMMETRYTHATENGENDERSDISTRESSCOSTSTHATEXANTEREDUCEOPTIMALLEVERAGEALSOCREATESANEXANTEVALUETOFINANCIALFLEXIBILITY,WHICHREDUCESTHOSECOSTSBYIGNORINGTHISLINKAGE,DISTRESSCOSTTHEORIESFAILTO
11、RECOGNIZETHATMANAGERSWILLSELECTEXANTEFINANCIALPOLICIESTHATPROVIDETHEEXPOSTFLEXIBILITYTOMITIGATETHEREALRESOURCECOSTSCAUSEDBYSECURITYVALUATIONPROBLEMS,BOTHINFINANCIALDISTRESSANDINHEALTHYFIRMSTHATREQUIREOUTSIDECAPITALASWESHOW,RECOGNIZINGTHISLINKAGELEADSTOCAPITALSTRUCTUREDECISIONSTHATDIFFERRADICALLYFROM
12、THOSEOFTRADITIONALTRADEOFFTHEORIESTHISPAPERREMEDIESTHEDEFICIENCIESOFTHEPECKINGORDERANDTRADEOFFTHEORIESBYRELAXINGTHEIRRESTRICTIVEASSUMPTIONSTODEVELOPANINTERNALLYCONSISTENTTHEORYINWHICHFIRMSFACEAGENCYCOSTSANDCORPORATETAXESONCASHHOLDINGS,WHICHMANAGERSWEIGHAGAINSTSECURITYVALUATIONCOSTSTODETERMINEOPTIMAL
13、FINANCIALPOLICIESWITHAGENCYCOSTSANDTAXES,INTERNALFUNDSARECOSTLY,THUSMANAGERSCANNOTRELYONCASHBALANCESTOFUNDUNANTICIPATEDNEWINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESANDEARNINGSSHORTFALLS,BUTMUSTNOWCULTIVATEACCESSTOEXTERNALCAPITALMARKETSDEBTNOLONGERDOMINATESEQUITYISSUANCESIMPLYBECAUSEITISEASIERTOVALUE,SINCEWITHMULTIPLEU
14、NCERTAINFINANCINGNEEDSARRIVINGOVERTIME,UTILIZATIONOFDEBTCAPACITYTODAYRISKSFUTUREINVESTMENTDISTORTIONSBECAUSEITCANLEAVEAFIRMHAMSTRUNGFORCAPITALTOMORROWFIRMSTHUSHAVELOWLEVERAGETARGETS,ANDSOTHOSETHATGENERATEFCFCANNOTRELYONDEBTPAYMENTSALONETOLIMITTHEIRCASHBALANCES,RATHERTHEYMUSTSUBSTITUTEINTOEQUITYPAYOU
15、TSTOCONTROLAGENCYCOSTSANDAVOIDTAXESONCASHHOLDINGSEQUITYPAYOUTSALSOHELPCONVINCEOUTSIDEINVESTORSTHATMANAGERSWILLMAKESUBSTANTIALFUTUREPAYOUTS,ANDTHEREBYREDUCETHEFIRMSSECURITYVALUATIONPROBLEMSIMPORTANTLY,FIRMSEXANTEOPTIMALFINANCIALPOLICIESPROVIDEFLEXIBLEEXPOSTACCESSTOBOTHDEBTANDEQUITYMARKETSTOMEETFUTURE
16、FUNDINGNEEDSCAUSEDBYUNANTICIPATEDEARNINGSSHORTFALLSORNEWINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESMATUREFIRMSLIMITINTERNALFUNDSBYPAYINGSUBSTANTIALDIVIDENDSRATHERTHANMAKINGHIGHDEBTPAYMENTS,BOTHBECAUSELOWLEVERAGEPROVIDESUNUSEDDEBTCAPACITYWHICHCANBETAPPEDTOMITIGATEINVESTMENTDISTORTIONS,ANDBECAUSEFIRMSWITHSTRONGDIVIDENDRE
17、CORDSDEVELOPREPUTATIONSFORGENEROUSPAYOUTS,ENABLINGTHEMTOSELLEQUITYATPRICESCLOSERTOINTRINSICVALUESHLEIFERANDVISHNY1997,LAPORTAETAL2000OPTIMALFINANCIALPOLICIESFORMATUREFIRMSTHUSCONSISTOFLOWLEVERAGE,SUBSTANTIALONGOINGDIVIDENDS,ANDLIMITEDCASHHOLDINGSLOWLEVERAGEISALSOOPTIMALFORGROWTHFIRMS,WHICHIDEALLYHAV
18、EHIGHERCASHBALANCESTHANMATUREFIRMSANDPAYLOWERORNODIVIDENDSLOWLEVERAGEREMAINSTHELONGRUNTARGETFORMANYBUTNOTALLFIRMSWHENINTERESTISTAXDEDUCTIBLE,SINCEFIRMSCANNOTCAPTURECORPORATETAXBENEFITSWITHOUTREDUCINGCASHBALANCESANDUTILIZINGDEBTCAPACITY,ACTIONSTHATSACRIFICEFINANCIALFLEXIBILITYANDTHEREBYRISKFUTUREINVE
19、STMENTDISTORTIONSINOURTHEORY,TODAYSBORROWINGCOSTISTHEOPPORTUNITYCOSTOFANINABILITYTOBORROWTOMORROWWHENTHEFIRMMAYNEEDTOISSUEDEBTTOAVOIDINVESTMENTDISTORTIONSBECAUSEMANAGERSWITHSUPERIORINFORMATIONARERELUCTANTTOSELLSTOCKATTHEMARKETPRICETHATMANIFESTSTOMORROWALTHOUGHTHISOPPORTUNITYCOSTISANEXANTEIMPEDIMENTT
20、OLEVERAGE,ITEMBODIESANINTERTEMPORALDEPENDENCEINBORROWINGTHATDISTINGUISHESITFROMTHEEXPOSTDEADWEIGHTCOSTSOFDEBTINTRADITIONALTRADEOFFTHEORIES,ANDWHICHISRESPONSIBLEFORGENERATINGENTIRELYNEWLEVERAGEREBALANCINGPREDICTIONSSIMPLYPUT,LOWLEVERAGEISDESIRABLETODAYBECAUSEITPROVIDESTHEOPTIONTOBORROWTOMORROWANDDEVI
21、ATETEMPORARILYFROMTHELONGRUNTARGETHENCELOWLEVERAGEISEXANTEOPTIMAL,BUTMANAGERSFULLYEXPECTTODEVIATEDELIBERATELYFROMTARGETEXPOSTASCIRCUMSTANCESDICTATEANDTOREBALANCEBACKTOTARGETASFIRMSPECIFICANDMARKETCONDITIONSPERMITTRANSACTIONSCOSTSOFADJUSTMENTAREZEROINOURTHEORY,THUSTHEYHAVENOIMPACTONTHETIMEPATHOFDEVIA
22、TIONSFROMANDREBALANCINGTOTARGETLEVERAGE,APATHTHATISDETERMINEDBYTHEEXPOSTSEQUENCEOFREALIZEDCAPITALNEEDSANDMARKETPRICINGCONDITIONSLEVERAGEDYNAMICSUNFOLDASFOLLOWSDEPENDINGONFIRMSPECIFICANDMARKETCONDITIONS,FIRMSISSUEDEBTOREQUITYWHENFACEDWITHANEARTERMNEEDFOREXTERNALCAPITAL,ANDMARGINALFINANCINGDECISIONSDO
23、NOTFOLLOWTHESTRICTORMODIFIEDPECKINGORDERFIRMSDONOT“STOCKPILE”ISSUANCEPROCEEDSBECAUSE,ABSENTOBVIOUSLYPROFITABLEINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESTHATCANBEEXECUTEDONLYWITHALAG,THATSTRATEGYISFUNCTIONALLYEQUIVALENTTOVISIBLEEXCESSFCFRETENTIONDEBTISSUANCESAREDELIBERATE,TEMPORARYDEPARTURESFROMTHELOWLEVERAGEOPTIMUM,AN
24、DNOTMOVEMENTSTOWARDAHIGHERLEVERAGEOPTIMUMASINTAX/DISTRESSCOSTTHEORIESFIRMSDONOT“LEVERUP”AFTERASHAREPRICEINCREASE,UNLESSTHATINCREASEREFLECTSANUNANTICIPATEDNEEDFOREXTERNALCAPITALANDDEBTISMOREATTRACTIVELYPRICEDTHANEQUITY,WHICHISNOWLESSLIKELYUNLESSTHESHAREPRICEINCREASEISEXCEEDEDBYAGREATERCONCOMITANTINCR
25、EASEININTRINSICVALUEREBALANCINGTOTHELOWLEVERAGETARGETOCCURSWITHALAG,EVENTHOUGHADJUSTMENTCOSTSAREZEROTHESPEEDOFREBALANCINGDEPENDSONTHEFIRMSSUBSEQUENTEARNINGS,INVESTMENTNEEDS,ANDTHECURRENTANDEXPECTEDFUTURERELATIONBETWEENMARKETANDINTRINSICVALUESBECAUSEOPTIMALCAPITALSTRUCTURE,PAYOUTPOLICY,ANDCORPORATECA
26、SHHOLDINGSAREJOINTLYDETERMINED,THEREAREMULTIPLEMOVINGPARTSTOOURANALYSIS,THUSWEINITIALLYIGNORETAXESANDDEVELOPINSECTIONS2AND3THEFINANCIALPOLICYIMPLICATIONSOFSECURITYVALUATIONANDAGENCYCOSTSSECTION4DISCUSSESDEPARTURESFROMANDREBALANCINGTOTARGETLEVERAGE,ANDEXPLAINSWHYOURPREDICTEDLEVERAGEDYNAMICSDIFFERFROM
27、THOSEOFEXTANTTRADEOFFTHEORIESSECTION5ADDSCORPORATETAXESTOTHETHEORY,ANDIDENTIFIESADDITIONALTESTABLEIMPLICATIONSOFTHISGENERALIZATIONSECTION6CONCLUDESCONCLUSIONOPTIMALFINANCIALPOLICIESLIMITCASHBALANCESANDPROVIDEFLEXIBLEACCESSTOEXTERNALDEBTANDEQUITYCAPITALWHENIFIRMSFACESECURITYVALUATIONCOSTS,AGENCYPROBL
28、EMS,ANDCORPORATETAXES,ANDIICAPITALSTRUCTURE,PAYOUTPOLICY,ANDCASHBALANCESAREJOINTLYDETERMINEDABSENTTAXES,LOWLEVERAGEANDSUBSTANTIALONGOINGDIVIDENDSAREEXANTEOPTIMALFORFCFGENERATINGFIRMSBECAUSETHEYENABLEMANAGERSTOACCOMPLISHTHREEOBJECTIVESTHEYCANNOTJOINTLYACCOMPLISHTHROUGHANYOTHERMEANSFIRST,SUBSTANTIALON
29、GOINGDIVIDENDSLIMITCASHBALANCES,THEREBYREDUCINGAGENCYCOSTSSECOND,THEYFACILITATEFUTUREACCESSTOEQUITYCAPITALATADVANTAGEOUSTERMSBECAUSETHEYDEMONSTRATEMANAGERSCOMMITMENTTOCONTINUEDHIGHEQUITYPAYOUTSTHIRD,USINGDIVIDENDSINSTEADOFDEBTPAYMENTSTOCONTROLCASHACCUMULATIONPRESERVESDEBTCAPACITYFORFUTUREBORROWINGTH
30、EEXANTEOPTIMALFINANCIALSTRATEGYBUILDS/PRESERVESTHEOPTIONTOISSUEEITHERDEBTOREQUITYWHENANEEDFORCAPITALMATERIALIZES,WHILETHEEXPOSTCHOICEBETWEENDEBTANDEQUITYTRADESOFFDEBTSRELATIVEEASEOFVALUATIONAGAINSTTHELOSSOFFUTUREFINANCIALFLEXIBILITYFROMUSINGDEBTCAPACITYNOWLOWLEVERAGEREMAINSOPTIMALFORMANYBUTNOTALLFIR
31、MSWHENINTERESTISTAXDEDUCTIBLEBECAUSEFIRMSCANNOTCAPTURETAXBENEFITSWITHOUTCARRYINGPOSITIVE“NETDEBT”ANDTHEREBYSACRIFICINGFUTUREFINANCIALFLEXIBILITYOURANALYSISSHARESWITHEXTANTTRADEOFFTHEORIESTHEPREDICTIONOFATARGETLEVERAGEOPTIMUMBUT,BECAUSEFINANCIALFLEXIBILITYPERSEISVALUABLE,OURPREDICTEDLEVERAGEDYNAMICSD
32、IFFERRADICALLYFROMTHOSEOFSUCHTHEORIES,INWHICHDEBTISSUANCESALWAYSMOVEAFIRMTOWARDITSLEVERAGETARGET,WHEREASAFAILURETOISSUEDEBTAFTERANEXOGENOUSLEVERAGEDECREASEREFLECTSEITHERPROHIBITIVEADJUSTMENTCOSTSORREJECTIONOFTHETHEORYINOURTHEORY,DEBTISSUANCESAREINTENTIONALMOVEMENTSAWAYFROMTHELONGRUNLOWLEVERAGEOPTIMU
33、M,ANDAFAILURETOISSUEDEBTAFTERASTOCKPRICEINCREASEREFLECTSADELIBERATEMANAGERIALDECISIONTOREBALANCELEVERAGETOWARDTHETARGETLOWLEVERAGEISEXANTEOPTIMALPRECISELYBECAUSEITPROVIDESTHEOPTIONTOTEMPORARILYDEVIATEEXPOSTFROMTHATIDEALBYISSUINGDEBTWHENCAPITALNEEDSARISEEVENWHENTRANSACTIONSCOSTSOFADJUSTMENTAREZERO,SU
34、BSEQUENTADJUSTMENTSBACKTOTARGETARENEVERINSTANTANEOUS,RATHERTHEYBECOMEPOSSIBLEANDATTRACTIVEFOLLOWINGPOSITIVEFCFREALIZATIONSANDCHANGESINCAPITALMARKETCONDITIONSOURTHEORYYIELDSANUMBEROFOTHERNEWTESTABLEHYPOTHESES,FIVEOFWHICHWEBRIEFLYNOTEHEREASTOPICSFORFUTURERESEARCHFIRST,WITHCORPORATETAXESANDSECURITYVALU
35、ATIONPROBLEMS,FIRMSLONGRUNLEVERAGETARGETSAREINVERSELYRELATEDINCROSSSECTIONANDTIMESERIESTOTHEINVESTMENTDISTORTIONREDUCINGVALUEOFFINANCIALFLEXIBILITYSECOND,FIRMSISSUEDEBTANDEQUITYINRESPONSETOEARNINGSANDINVESTMENTSHOCKSTHATCREATEANEARTERMNEEDFORFUNDSAND,UNLESSAGENCYCOSTSARETRIVIAL,NEVERTOSTOCKPILECASHA
36、BSENTCONVINCINGEVIDENCEOFPROFITABLEINVESTMENTSTHATREQUIREFUNDINGWITHALAGTHIRD,SIGNIFICANTNEGATIVEEARNINGSSHOCKSOFTENLEADMANAGERSTOISSUEDEBT,THEREBYREINFORCINGRATHERTHANOFFSETTINGTHELEVERAGEINCREASEFROMTHEEQUITYVALUEDECLINEASSOCIATEDWITHTHEEARNINGSSHOCKFOURTH,THEPOSTBORROWINGADJUSTMENTBACKTOTARGETLEV
37、ERAGEISSLOWERONAVERAGEIFTHEFIRMENCOUNTERSFURTHEREARNINGSPROBLEMSORDISCOVERSADDITIONALNEWINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESFIFTH,FORFIRMSWHOSELEVERAGETARGETSAREPOSITIVE,REBALANCINGTOTHELONGRUNTARGETOCCURSMORERAPIDLYAFTEREXOGENOUSLEVERAGEDECREASESTHATMOVETHEFIRMBELOWTARGETTHANAFTERENDOGENOUSDEBTISSUANCESTHATMOVE
38、THEFIRMABOVETARGETINCONCLUSION,WEHIGHLIGHTONEFEATUREOFOURANALYSISTHATDISTINGUISHESITFROMTHEPECKINGORDERANDTRADEOFFTHEORIES,ANDWHICHUNDERLIESITSNOVELLEVERAGEDYNAMICSINOURTHEORY,TODAYSBORROWINGCOSTISTHEOPPORTUNITYCOSTOFANINABILITYTOBORROWTOMORROWWHENTHEFIRMMAYNEEDTOISSUEDEBTTOAVOIDINVESTMENTDISTORTION
39、SBECAUSEMANAGERSWITHSUPERIORINFORMATIONARERELUCTANTTOSELLSTOCKATTHEMARKETPRICETHATMANIFESTSATTHATTIMEALTHOUGHTHISOPPORTUNITYCOSTISANEXANTEIMPEDIMENTTOLEVERAGE,ITEMBODIESANINTERTEMPORALDEPENDENCEINBORROWINGTHATISABSENTFROMTHEPECKINGORDERTHEORYANDTHATALSODISTINGUISHESITFROMTHEEXPOSTDEADWEIGHTCOSTSOFDE
40、BTINEXTANTTRADEOFFTHEORIESSOURCEHARRYDEANGELO,LINDADEANGELO,2007“CAPITALSTRUCTURE,PAYOUTPOLICY,ANDFINANCIALFLEXIBILITY”MARSHALLSCHOOLOFBUSINESSWORKINGPAPERNOFBE0206,OCTOBER译文资本结构，支出政策，理财柔性根据首席财务官（见，例如，格雷厄姆和哈维（2001年）所述，财务柔性是最重要的资本结构决定因素，但迈尔斯和麦吉罗夫（1984年）的啄食顺序模型只突出了其理论价值，在实证方面还存在着严重不足。事实上，法玛和弗伦奇（2005年）
41、得出这样的结论，作为资本结构的独立理论，啄食顺序是僵化的，因为它无法解释为什么公平问题是很常见的，而且它只是最后融资工具理论的一部分。现存的权衡资本结构理论没有更好的实证，因为他们无法解释（1）为什么大型股票价格上涨后，企业不“杠杆”，（2）为什么许多盈利企业保持较低的负债，从而放弃在压力风险下的利息税盾作用，（3）为何杠杆平衡很难检测，而当检测到时，为什么会同时出现一个调整成本无法合理解释的滞后性。企业融资的实证文献，如法玛和弗伦奇（2005年，PP580581）注意到，近年来已基本上运行的一个介于啄食顺序理论和权衡理论的“赛马”理论，但现在还没有实证可行的资本结构理论。本文认为，财务柔性是
42、实证可行理论的一个关键环节，但啄食顺序理论没有提供这种理论，因为它的许多假设足以限制对企业财务政策有意义的财务柔性影响的分析。具体来说，啄食顺序理论的不足是，因为它（1）关注于“一杆”融资决策，因此它排除的跨时权衡是企业负债能力利用率的决策核心，（2）但在任何时间，假定信息不对称使企业在证券发行时采取利己管理行为，因而它忽略了一个事实，即信息不对称也滋生代理成本，也就是说，它使管理人员在外部投资者费用超过企业本身资源时能够受益于其自身，（3）假定远离任何关于最佳现金余额和债务水平的企业税的效果，这很可能是不现实的，以及（4）忽视了资本结构和股权分配政策的相互依存关系，一个我们证明了对企业如何建
43、立，维护和随着时间的推移动用财务柔性具有重要意义的因素。税收/困境成本的权衡理论功亏一篑，因为他们忽视了财务柔性的重要性，即使财务困境成本最终还是由信息不对称，基础啄食顺序的安全评估问题引起的。直接和间接困境成本只有当公司不能满足现存的承诺，在管理者和外部投资者双方都能接受的条款下，债权人无法进入资本市场时发生。如果管理者和外部投资者都有相同的信息，从而可以欣然同意公司当前和潜在发行的证券的价值，他们总是对公司进行资产重组，以取代权益债务，并避免任何直接或间接的困境成本（科斯（1960年），豪根和森博尔特（1978年）。重要的是，同样的信息不对称，滋生了困境成本，这事前减少的最佳杠杆还创建了一
44、个事前的财务柔性价值，从而降低了这些成本。由于忽略了这种联系，困境成本理论没有认识到，在财务困难和需要外部资金的健康公司，管理者将选择提供事后柔性的事前财务政策，以减轻由安全评估问题引起的实际资源成本。正如我们的结果显示，认识到这种联系会导致资本结构决策，从根本上不同于传统的权衡理论。本文对啄食顺序理论和权衡理论的缺陷的补救措施是，放宽其严格的假设，在面临着代理成本和关于现金持有量的企业税的企业中，建立一个内部一致理论，企业管理人员会权衡安全评估费用，以确定最佳的财务政策。与代理成本和税收相比，内部资金成本高昂，因此管理者不能依靠现金结存为未预料到的新的投资机会和收益不足提供资金，但现在必须努
45、力进入外部资本市场。债务在股票发行中不再占主导地位，只是因为它更容易估价，因为有多个不确定的融资需求随着时间到达，今天的债务的能力利用率使未来的投资面临偏失风险，因为它可以削弱公司的未来资本。企业有低杠杆的目标，因此那些产生自由现金流不能仅仅依靠债务偿还来限制其现金余额，而他们必须替换成股权支付，以控制代理成本和避免关于现金持有量的税收。股权支付也有助于说服外部投资者，管理者将作出实质性的未来支付，从而减少企业的安全评估问题。重要的是，公司的事前最佳财务政策提供了灵活的事后债券和股票组合，以应付意外的盈利不足或新的投资机会引起的未来的资金需求。成熟期的公司通过支付大量股息来限制内部资金，而不是
46、采取高债务偿还，一方面是因为低杠杆提供未使用的可挖掘的债务的能力，以减轻投资的偏失，另一方面是由于具有较强的分红记录的企业因慷慨支付提升了声誉，使他们出售股票时价格能够接近内在价值（歇雷弗和维西里（1997年），LA波尔塔ETAL（2000年）。因此对成熟期的企业而言，最佳的财务政策是由低杠杆，大量持续分红和有限的现金持有量构成的。低杠杆对于比成熟期的企业有更多的现金结余和支付较低（或无）股息的成长期的企业而言也是最佳的。当利息可以抵税时，低杠杆仍然是许多（但不是全部）公司的长期目标，因为公司只有通过减少现金余额和利用债务的能力，才能获得企业税收优惠，从而这些牺牲了财务柔性的行为，使企业面临未
47、来投资偏失的风险。在我们的理论中，当公司可能需要发行债券时，以避免投资的偏失（因为拥有大量信息的管理人员都不愿在体现明天的市场价格下出售股票），今天的借贷成本是一个明天无力借贷的机会成本。尽管这个机会成本对杠杆作用是个事前障碍，它在区别于传统的权衡理论中事后债务自重成本的借贷上体现了一个跨时的依赖，同时它也是对产生全新的平衡杠杆预测的负责。简单地说，今天的低杠杆是可取的，因为它提供的选项是占用未来借贷和暂时偏离长期目标。因此，低杠杆是事前最优的，但管理者充分预期了事后视情况而故意偏离目标和视企业特定和市场条件的允许而重新平衡恢复目标的情况。调整交易成本在我们的理论中为零，因此，他们不会对从目标
48、杠杆出发到重新平衡的目标杠杆的偏差路径产生影响，这条路径是由已实现的资本需求序列和市场定价条件而决定的。杠杆动态展开如下。根据具体企业和市场条件，当面对外部资金的内部需求和边际融资决策不遵循（严格或修改）啄食顺序理论时，企业发行债券或股票。企业没有“储备”发行的收益，因为缺席显然是有利可图的带有滞后性的可执行的投资机会，那个战略功能相当于可见的过剩自由现金流保留。债务发行是故意的，暂时的偏离最佳的低杠杆，而不是向着最佳的高杠杆运动，如税收/困境成本理论。股价上升后企业没有“杠杆”，除非股价的上升影响了外部资本的意外需求，而且债务的定价比股票更有吸引力，而这现在是不太可能的（除非该股票价格上涨是
49、随着内在价值增加的额外增长）。重新平衡的低杠杆目标的发生有滞后性，即使调整费用为零。平衡的速度取决于公司的后续盈利，投资需求，以及市场与内在价值（目前和未来预期）的关系。由于最佳的资本结构，股利政策，与企业持有现金共同决定的，我们的分析有多个运动部分，因此我们最初忽略税收和发展（在第2节和第3节）安全评估及代理费用的财务政策的影响。第4节讨论偏离和重新平衡目标杠杆，并解释了为什么我们预测的杠杆动态不同于现存的权衡理论。第5节在理论中加入了企业所得税，并指出这一概括附加检验的影响。第6节总结。结论当（I）公司面临安全评价费用，代理问题，和企业所得税，以及（II）资本结构，股利政策，现金结余等统筹问题时，最佳财务政策限制了现金结余，并提供了柔性的引入外部（债务和股本）资本。缺失税收，低杠杆和大量的持续股息对产生自由现金流的公司是事前最优的，因为他们使管理人员能够实现三个通过任何其他手段无法共同实现的目标。首先，大量持续股息限制了现金结余，从而降低了代理成本。其次，他们促进在未来获得有利条件的股权资本，因为他们表现出的管理者对持续高股利支付的承诺。最后，使用股利而不是偿还债务以控制现金积累，为未来借款保持债务容量。事前的最佳财务战略建立/维持的选择是有资金实现的需求时发行债券或股票，而事后在债务与股权中的选择，权衡了债务估值，以便从现在使用的债务容量中抵制
