1、 外文翻译 原文 A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial Institutions Material Source: Cato Institute, Washington, DC Author: Luigi Zingales When it comes to “saving capitalism,” dealing with the “too big to fail” doctrine is a top priority. This doctrine has increasingly become the government policy o
2、n this issue, and it is probably the most dangerous policy for capitalism we can imagine. It undermines capitalism in many ways: not only does it make the system less stable, but it also undermines the moral basis of capitalism. If you have a sector or a set of institutions where losses are socializ
3、ed but where gains are privatized, then you destroy the economic and moral supremacy of capitalism. Either we deal with the perverse incentives created by this doctrine or we undermine the long-term sustainability of capitalism. So it is really important to think what we can do against this too-big-
4、to-fail policy . What to Do about Too Big to Fail I have spoken with many members of Congress and the best intentioned ones want to legislate the too-big-to-fail policy away by introducing enough constraints that will make it impossible in the future to do what the government has done in the recent
5、crisis. In spite of their good intentions, I do not think that these members of Congress understand the essence of the problem. Let me use an analogy. As parents we know that we should let our children learn from their mistakes. We should not be too interventionist and bail them out, because they wo
6、nt learn. However, when they get into Cato Journal, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Fall 2010). Copyright . Cato Institute. All rights reserved. Luigi Zingales is the Robert C. McCormick Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. This article draws on his work w
7、ith Oliver Hart (Hart and Zingales 2009).536 Cato Journal real, serious trouble, when their life is in danger, it is impossible for us as parents not to intervene. It would be against nature not to intervene. And no matter how we can try to commit not to intervene because we know that this has good
8、incentive effects on our children, when our son or daughters life is in danger, we will intervene. And thats a little bit like the situation we are in with large financial institutions. No matter how much we try to tie our hands, when a major crisis comes it is impossible to stop the politicians fro
9、m intervening. Part of the reason is that during a banking crisis a government intervention can actually create value (or at least avoid that value is dissipated) ex post. Politicians find it difficult not to intervene even in situations where they destroy value; imagine when they can create some va
10、lue because they stop a bank run! As with the children example, however, this beneficial intervention has perverse incentive effects. For this reason, we need to introduce mechanisms to minimize the damage that this incentive will create in the system. If we ignore it, if we live under the illusion
11、that we can legislate this away, were making the problem only bigger. The Rationale for Too Big to Fail Why do we think that GM can go under with no problem but Citigroup cannot go under with no problem? The answer is that whenever there is the possibility of bankruptcy, there are two effects on com
12、petitors. One is a substitution effect: When GM goes under, Ford celebrates because it can grab a larger market share, so that is beneficial to Ford. Then there is a sort of complementary effect: If the failure of GM brings down suppliers of GM, then this will also impact the survival of Ford, to th
13、e extent they share the same suppliers (as they do). In addition, there is an information spillover: If you see GM going under, you start doubting whether the car industry is viable in the long term, and that has a negative effect on Ford as well. Now, what is unique about financial institutions is
14、that the complementary effect is much, much bigger. They have a lot of interlinking contracts so that when Citigroup goes under the probability that other banks will go under at the same time is very large. And while we can afford to live without Citigroup, we can-537 Market-Based Regulatory Policy.
15、 Not afford to live without a banking sector. So the risk is what I call “the fear of Armageddon.” Whether this fear is a realistic possibility or not, it is too powerful: no policymaker will take this risk when faced with a choice. No matter what your ideology is, you dont want to go down in histor
16、y as the Treasury secretary or the Federal Reserve chairman who was watching as the U. S. financial system went down. So even if it is not rational, you are going to intervene no matter what. Another reason this course of action is so irresistible to policymakers is that we know that there are bank
17、runs and that in a bank-run situation there is inefficiencysome assets are liquidated too fast and too soon, and some value is dissipated. So there is some value to be created in avoiding a bank run. There are very few situations, if any, when the government can create value, but I think this is act
18、ually one in which it can create value. Yet, the government has a huge tendency to intervene even when it destroys value, so it is very hard to prevent intervention when it can create some value. It seems like a free lunch and is irresistible. This situation is actually very similar to the time inco
19、nsistency that policymakers have studied so much for monetary policy. When push comes to shove, a Treasury secretary or a politician wants to increase the money supply to try to buy a little bit of employment today, at the cost of much higher inflation in the future. The same is true here. When you
20、are close to a financial meltdown you want to intervene, even if this will have dramatic costs in the future. Trying to legislate this incentive away is unrealistic. We need to find a solution because the cost of inaction is skyrocketing. In 1998 it took the Fed only coffee and donuts to organize th
21、e rescue of Long-Term Capital Management. In 2008 it took the federal government more than $700 billion to organize the rescue of the financial system. I dont want to think about what the bill will be in 2018. The Debt Problem We need to act and act now to stop the perverse incentives created by the
22、 too-big-to-fail policy. The moral hazard is not only that managers invest excessively in risky activity, it is also that creditors lend to financial institutions too cheaply because they factor in the 538 Cato Journal government guarantee. If you are a manager of a large bank and you see that you c
23、an issue debt at extremely attractive prices, you will find it irresistible to leverage up as much as possible. The first thing that needs to be done to solve this problem is to find a way to recreate the proper market incentives for creditors to pay attention to risk. In a normal situation creditor
24、s limit debtors risk taking by introducing covenants and by restricting the amount they lend. Once the creditors know that they will be bailed out by the government they have no incentive to do so. How do we recreate creditors incentives to monitor when they know that in the worst situation the gove
25、rnment will intervene? By creating a regime that distinguishes between systemic and nonsystemic obligations. A Solution to Systemic Debt There is no reason why long-term debt of financial institutions should be systemic. Pension funds, mutual funds, and foreign investors who hold long-run debt can a
26、bsorb losses just as they did during the Internet bubble. So there is no reason to bail banks out. The only reason to bail them out is that we do not have in place a procedure to differentiate between systemic and nonsystemic obligations. And of course, when you start to bail out a group, there is a
27、 huge queue of people who say, “I want to be bailed out too. I belong to the same group. Im no different. Why dont you bail out me too?” So the first mechanism we need is a resolution system that, while protecting in full the systemic obligations, is able to impose losses on the nonsystemic ones. Wi
28、thout any additional provision this will be a recipe for disaster, since the private sector will abuse this guarantee. To avoid this from happening, however, Oliver Hart and I have devised a market-based mechanism that will avoid any costly bailout. This mechanism is based on two layers of protectio
29、n for systemic obligations. One layer is represented by equity and one layer by a mandatory buffer of long-term junior debt. To ensure that these layers will never be fully exhausted we have thought of a mechanism that mimics the margin call system used by banks with their clients. When you borrow o
30、n the margin, your broker is no fool. He updates the position every day on the basis of the market price and 539 Market-Based Regulatory Policy If the collateral is too low, he makes a margin calleither you put down more collateral, or your assets are liquidated so the broker gets his money back. We
31、 need a similar system for banks. The equity of banks is like the collateral in a margin call. What we need to do is to devise a system that makes this margin call timely. egulator cannot be trusted to intervene on time. So the system that Oliver Hart and I have in mind is a system that piggybacks o
32、n junior long-term debt, using prices of credit default swaps on this debt to provide a timely market-based signal. If the holders of junior long-term debt actually can be penalized, then the price of CDSs on that debt would be a very credible signal that the equity buffer is running thin. Regulator
33、s would then intervene and do a stress test, and if the financial institution is indeed in trouble, start to unwind itpaying off in full the systemic obligations but penalizing the long-term junior debt. If an institution were deemed “safe,” then no action to unwind the institution would be taken. T
34、o avoid the risk that when they perform a stress test the regulators are too forgiving in judging the risk, we require the regulator to invest some money (in the form of junior long-term debt) in the institution when she deems it to be safe. If an institution is only facing a liquidity crisis, this
35、investment would be enough to calm the market. If the regulator incorrectly assess that the institution is safe when it is not, the CDS rate will go up and the regulator will be forced to intervene again, increasing the political cost of declaring it safe. A Balanced System This system is very balan
36、ced. We dont give too much power to regulators because we know two things: (1) they will abuse it, and (2) they will be late to the game, as regulators always are. For this reason we rely on a market triggernamely, the CDS price of an institutions junior long-term debt. When that price reaches a cer
37、tain threshold, regulators should intervenemake a margin calland wind down the failed institution. We dont want to abuse the ma rket trigger either, because we are afraid of what are called “ self-fulfilling prophecies”the market gets very worried, regulators intervene, penalize the debt, and this f
38、ulfills the prophecy. For this reason we have introduced the stress test as a circuit breaker to prevent this escalation. This circuit breaker, however, 540 Cato Journal can create perverse incentives for the regulators. So we need a system to penalize them if they make mistakesnamely, the loss of t
39、heir investment in junior long-term debt. This system should apply only to very large financial institutions, because other institutions can and do fail, subjecting them to the normal market discipline. Will I be costly? Yes, it will, and it should be costly. 译文 以市场为基础的监管政策 避免金融危机 资料来源 :美国卡托杂志 作者 ：路
40、易吉津加勒斯 当谈到节约资本主义， “ 太大而不能倒闭 ” 原则是当务之急。 这一学说 觉得 这个问题 已越来越 成为政府的政策，这可能是 最危险的资本主义政策， 它 的不足 显而易见 。 资本主义在许多地雷的方式：它不仅使系统 不太稳定，同时也破坏了资本主义的道德基础。 如果 一个机构设置造成 了 损失的社会化 ， 且 收益是私有化，那么你摧毁的 是 经济和 道德至上的资本主义。 我们处理有害 和 激励创造的这一学说或削弱我们的长远 的 可持续发展。 因此，真正 要 考虑 的 是 面对“大到不能倒闭”的政策我们可以做些什么 。 如何处理大而失败问题 我曾与国会和许多成员 探讨“如果 太大而失
41、败 该怎么办”这个问题 的最佳答案， 善意 地 希望 通过 立法 对于“ 大到不能 失败 ” 政策 引入足够的约束，这将使 政府在危机中置若罔闻的现象不复出现。 尽管他们 怀着 良好意愿， 但 我不认为这些 国会 成员 真正了解 问题的本质。 让我用一 个 比喻 来做说明 。 作为父母，我们知道，我们应该让我们的孩子 从 自己 的错误 中学习 。 我 们不应该过于干预和保 护 他们，因为 这样 他们 就 不会 认真地去 学习 。然而当他们 遇到真正 严重的麻烦 之时 ，当他们的生命 处于 危险 之际， 我们作为父母 是不可能不进行 干预 的。这是很自然的道理。 无论怎样，我们可以尝试承诺不跨
42、越 监管权限， 因为我们知道，这 是 对我们很好 的激励效应 。 但当 我们的儿子或女儿的生命 处于 危险 之中时 ，我们 理所当然地 会 进行 干预。 这是一个情况有点像我们 如何处理 与 大型金融机构 的关系 。无论我们如何努力，以配合我们的 手中有一个大危机到来时就不可能停止波利蒂 西安斯式 的干预。部分原因是 政府干预危机实际上可以创造价值（ 至少避免该值消散）。 政治家感到困难，因 为 不干预的情况下，他们甚至在摧毁价值 ； 想象 一下 他们可以创造一些价值，因为他们 能够阻止 银行挤兑 ！就像 孩子的例子，但是，这种有利 的 干预， 会导致 有害的激励效果。出于这个原因，我们 要引
43、入机制，以最大限度地减少损失， 这奖 励将创建在系统中。 如果我们忽视它，如果我们生活在 幻想 之中 ，我们可以立法 如此立法 ，但如此一来我们只是在将问题带来的后果放大！ 太大而不能失败的基本原理 为什么我们认 通用汽车 倒下 问题 不大 ， 但 花旗集团 却做 不能倒 ，这究竟是为什么 ？ 答案是 每当有破产的可能性，有两个 对竞争对手。 一个是替代效 应：当通用汽车公司 倒 去下，福特庆祝，因为它可以抓住一个更大的市场 份额，使有利于福特。 然后有一个补码样的 提询效果：如果通用汽车公 司的失败带来了通用汽车供应商 的倒闭， 那么这也将影响福特生存 。（如果他们 的供应商 是同一家） 此
44、外，还有一个 信息溢出 效应：如果你看到通用汽车会下，你开始怀疑从长远来看 汽车行业是否 有发展前景 ， 无疑这一效应也会对 福特 产生 负面影响 。 当今金融机构的明显特征 是 公司间的竞争越来越大 。他们 之 间 有许多相互联系的 合约 。这样一来一旦花旗集团倒闭，其他银行同时倒闭的 概率是非常大的。虽然我们可以没有花旗银行但我们不能没有整个银行业。 所以风险就是我所说的 “ 世界末日的恐惧 ” 。 无论这种恐惧是现实 存在的 或没有， 但由于其危害太大， 决策者将不会冒这个 险的。 当面对一个选择。 不管你 持什么样的态度 ，你都不会希望像美国历史上的 财政部长或美国联邦储备委员会主席
45、那样， 看着美国金融 系统 崩溃而无所作为 。 因此，即使是不 合情理， 你 无论如何都得介入干预。 这一行动 之所以如此 不可抗拒的 原因是 政策 制定者们 知道有银行 挤兑 和在银行经营效率低下的情况出现，部分资产 被冻结得 太快，太早，有的 资产则迅速 消散。 因此 ，一些价值被创造出来以后避免被 银行 挤兑。在 很少数情况下，如果有的话，政府 的确 可以创造价值，但我认为 也只有在极少数情况下 它 才 可以 真正 创造价值。 然而，政府有巨大的倾向进行干预，即使它破坏 原有 的价值，因此很难 说 干预时 不能 创造一些价值。 这似乎是一个免费的午餐， 而且是 不可抗拒的。这种情况其实
46、和 决策者们 在不合时宜地 研究货币政策 十分相似。这种政策一再推行，是因为 财政部长或政客 试图通过 增加货币供应 量来尽可能多地增加现在的就业，但其成本是将造成未来更大的通货膨胀。 同样的道理，即使知道未来可能付出巨大的成本，当你面临 金融危机的时候，你还是会采取 干预政策。 试图 通过 立法 来规定 这一激励措施是不现实的。 我们需要找到一个解决办法，因为不采取行动的成本也在急速上升。 1998年美联储只 用了 咖啡和甜甜圈，就 组织 了 抢救长期资本 的 管理 机构 。 在 2008年 联邦政府花费了 超过 7,000亿美元的 金融救援 体系。 我不敢去想象年的账单。 债务问题 我们必
47、须采取行动，并立即采取行动，制止 被过大而不能倒闭政策所创造出来的 不正当奖励 制度。奖励制度 的道德风险不仅在于管理者在风险投资 领域过度 投资 ， 也在于债权人无序向金融机构贷款（ 由于政府的担保，他们向金融机构贷款所付的利息很低）， 如果你是一 家大型 银行 的 经理 ， 你可以 用 非常有吸引力 价格出售你 的债务，你 会发现 通过杠杆原理尽可能得吸收资金具有不可抗拒的力量。 第一 个 需要解决的 问题是找到一种方法来重新 创造出合适的市场 激励 机制使 债权人 关注风险。 在正常情况下债权人通过引入风险承担公约和金额限制 来 限制债务人 。 一旦债权人知道 他们将会被政府排除在外，他
48、们将不会再这么做 。 当最坏的情况来临时，即债权人知道政府即将干预时， 我们如何 重新建立起 债权人 激励机制以便于监督市场？答案是通过建立一种制度来区别系统义务和非系统义务。 解决系统性的债务 没有任何理由 负有 长期债务的金融机构应该是系统性。 养老基金，共同基金，和 持有长期债券 的 国外投资者可以吸收损失， 只是 在网络泡沫时期。所以没有理由来拯救银行。 唯一 来拯救他们 的理由是，我们没有在 一个有 程序区分系统性和 非系统性义务的地方。 当然，当你开始拯救一 个群体时会有更多的群体站出来说我们属于同一个群体，我们并没有什么不同 ， 为什么不拯救我们呢？因此，我们需要的是一个机制的
49、解决机制，在 充分保护的 系统 义务 的同时 ， 可以减小非 系统性 的损失 。 如果 没有任何附加条款 ， 这将是一个灾难 性 的处方，因为私营部门将滥用这种保证。 为了避免这种情况发生 ， 奥利弗 、 哈特和我设计了一个基于市场的机制，避免任何昂贵的救助。 这种机制是基于两个保护层 来保护系统 义务 的 。 一层为代表公平 ，另 一层 则保证 次级债务 长期 强制缓冲。 为确保这些层将永远不会被完全耗尽，我们 想到一种 模仿保证金机制， 客户 通过银行使用 呼叫系统。 当你保证金借用，你的经纪人不是傻瓜。 他 以 市场价格为基础 更新 标价的位置 。如果抵押品价格太低，他会提出追加保证金的通知，否则你的资产将被冻结，以便于经纪人拿到他所应得的钱。 银行 业也需要 类似的系统。 如 该银行的股票，调用的是保证金抵押品。 我
