1、 外文翻译 原文 Joint Ventures as an Internationalisation Strategy for SMEs Material Source: Surrey European Management School, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 5XH United Kingdom and University of South Australia Author: David A. Kirby and STEFAN kaiser Case 1 is a limited partnership located
2、in South Germany. For over a 100 years it has been man-ufacturing high technology mechanical components for the chemical and petrochemical, crude oil, machine building, coal refining, power generation, shipping and marine engineering, pulp, sugar production, etc., industries. It claims to be the sec
3、ond most important manufacturer of mechanical components worldwide with a market share of 13 per cent. In the financial year 1995, the firm generated 57 per cent of its turnover overseas and had subsidiaries on all continents except Africa. It established its Chinese Joint Venture in 1995 as the fir
4、st step in establishing itself as the leading supplier of high-quality mechanical components in China. Prior to so doing, however, Case 1 had established in 1982 a“know-how” transfer agreement with a Chinese customer, a State Owned Enterprise based in North East China. For a payment of 0.6 million (
5、US$0.95 million) the Chinese enterprise had received the right to produce three different types of mechanical components, together with training. The agreement was due to expire in 1992 and Case 1 was not very keen to continue, largely because the German managers who had to visit China did not enjoy
6、 the local living conditions. However, by the early 1990s these were improving and the firm began to explore opportunities for contracting with a local partner. At the same time, one of its German customers (a leading manufacturer of Engineering Products) was involved in negotiations with a Chinese
7、state Owned Enterprise in East China to establish a Joint Venture to manufacture engineering products. The prospective Chinese partner had a mechanical components division in which the German partnerhad no interest. Accordingly, it alerted Case 1 to the opportunity and proposed that the Chinese ente
8、rprise should be split to form two Joint Ventures manufacturing Engineering Products and Mechanical Components, respectively. Following a detailed, month-long investigation of the firm and the market opportunities, Case 1 decided to proceed. Its primary reason for establishing a plant in China was t
9、o gain access to the potential market that China afforded. However, Case 1s goal was to become not only the best but also the biggest manufacturer of mechanical components. It saw China, therefore, as a strategic opportunity to develop and penetrate other markets, enabling it to develop its operatio
10、ns on a worldwide scale. Its decision to establish a joint venture with a local Chinese company, instead of a wholly foreign owned enterprise, was influenced by one of its major German customers. Case 1, as it indicated in its Newsletter of January 1996, believed it important to follow its internati
11、onal customers as, by so doing, its market would be created auto-matically. The firm saw this as a means of minimising the risk involved in entering the Chinese market as secured volumes would be sought by its German client, which would help it develop a cost-effective means of producing high qualit
12、y components to develop further the Chinese market. The Joint Venture partner was a large, integrated state owned enterprise with in excess of 2,000 employees of which 200 worked in its mechanical components division. When the Equity Joint Venture was created it took the form of a limited liability
13、company, according to Chinese Law and employed 95 staff. With its formation the Chinese enterprise ceased to exist as a manufacturer of engineering products and mechanical components, but in September 1996 the municipal government decided to revive it in order to provide alternative employment for s
14、taff not taken on by the joint ventures. In October 1996, therefore, it sold its shares in the two joint ventures to a holding company, closely linked to the municipal government, comprising a conglomerate of three dozen firms, both Chinese and Sino-foreign, engaging some 60,000 staff. Although the
15、official documentation states that Case 1 agreed to the acquisition as it could provide access to new customers and markets, in reality it had no choice and only heard about the transfer of shares after it had happened. Subsequently the original joint venture partner became a service provider, cater
16、ing for the workforce of the two joint ventures and operating a fleet of buses that transport the workforce to and from the factories. Additionally it has an operational division that takes on contract manufacturing and acts as a sub-contractor to the joint venture. When it commenced operation in Ja
17、nuary 1995, the Joint Venture was housed in an old building owned by the Chinese partner, but from June 1996 it moved into new purpose-built accommodation funded largely by Case 1, which holds a 51 percent share in the venture. Initially offered a 60 percent share by the Chinese partner, Case 1 reje
18、cted this because it wanted a strong, active partner not one that regarded the joint venture as a portfolio investment. Its strategy was to minimise its risk but to maximise its control. Although Case 1 held a 51 per cent share in the venture, it insisted that the General Manager should be a Chinese
19、 and that, initially at least, he should have responsibility for sales. The General Manager reports to a Board of 4 Directors (2 German and 2 Chinese) chaired by Case 1s Director of Overseas Affairs. The Vice Chairman is Chinese, which is not uncommon in Sino-foreign joint ventures with approximatel
20、y equal ownership. In addition to the four directors, the meetings of the Board, which take place every six months and last for one or two days, are attended by all of the other managers. In these meetings everything is discussed openly, including the policy of the venture for the next six months. T
21、he whole point of involving the managers is to ensure information is shared and to obtain their input into the decision-making of the general manager. Although Case 1 holds a majority interest in the venture, consensus decisions are sought and according to the Production and Quality Assurance Manage
22、r they had not had a major crisis in decision-making. Day-to-day decisions are made by the individual line managers. Every Monday morning all departmental managers meet with the managers in the General Managers office to consider any problems facing the joint venture. In addition, the individual dep
23、artments meet separately to discuss department-specific issues. The role of the expatriot German Production and Quality Assurance Manager was fundamental to the success of the venture. Since the General Manager did not speak English, he became the intermediary between the Chairman of the Board, prop
24、osing to the General Manager what the Chairman would like to happen. However, as a second tier manager he had no decision-making power and could not issue directives. He could only propose actions to the General Manager and although he “nearly always decided the way I wanted it”, Case 1 considered t
25、his to be a weakness and created a new position for the Production and Quality Assurance Manager. Early in 1997 he became Assistant General Manager with the authority to issue directives to other managers. This way, the problem was resolved and the Chinese managers could accept his authority “withou
26、t losing face”. According to Case 1s Director for Overseas Affairs, the Joint Venture “is a good success”. He had planned for two loss-making years with profits generated in year three on. While the Joint Venture did make losses in the first two years of operation, they were lower than had been anti
27、cipated and sales volumes were, in fact, 25 percent higher than predicted. Even so, the Joint Venture was facing numerous difficulties including problems with production and quality, with the quality of local sourcing, with low productivity standards, with foreign exchange restrictions, with commu-
28、nication, with sales and marketing, with pricing and with security (concern about copyright and patent infringement). Interestingly, none of these appeared to have been foreseen in the negotiation process. Here the main issue had been agreeing the product programme. However, other issues included th
29、e planning o f operations in subsequent years, the business plan, the distribution of equity share and, particularly, the valuation of both partners contributions, such as drawings (the German partner) and machinery (the Chinese partner). Initially this was a major problem for both parties but event
30、ually agreement was reached and the German partner was offered, and accepted, a sixty per cent equity share in the venture. As the Director for Overseas Affairs pointed out, he had a clear idea of what would be acceptable as the outcome of the negotiations and he “was prepared to withdraw from the p
31、roposal if I had not felt comfortable with an issue”. Even so, the German partner had to accept certain compro- mises. For example, Case 1 normally commits itself to project durations of 10 to 15 years. In this case it agreed to a 50-year commitment since the Chinese party “liked such long durations
32、”. Again, although the German partner had entered China “in order to serve the Chinese market”, it had agreed to purchase a certain quantity of the Joint Ventures output for export markets and to the con- dition that by the end of the fifth year of opera- tion, the venture would export 30 per cent o
33、f its annual production. Despite this, the negotiations proceeded quickly. On 14th July 1994, a Chinese delegation visited Germany for talks. This was followed, on 2529th July, 1994, by a delegation to China from the prospective German partner. During this visit, a “letter of intent” was signed. In
34、August 1994, the German Director of Overseas Affairs went to China to sign the contract and the Joint Venture started operation on 2nd January, 1995. The speed with which the negotiations were concluded stemmed in part from the professionalism and determination of the German partner and the close li
35、nks which the Chinese partner had with the municipal government. However, it seems likely that the negotiations were not protracted, also, because the Chinese partner wanted the deal, not least because it did not wish to lose the com- plementary deal to create an engineering products joint venture.
36、译文 合资企业作为开拓国际市场的策略（节选） 资料来源 : 萨里欧洲管理学院，萨里大学，吉尔福德，萨里，英国 ；南澳大学，英国 作者： David A. Kirby， Stefan Kaiser 案例 1 中该公司是位于德国南部的合伙有限企业， 在过去 100 年里，它一直制造高科技的化工和石化机械部件，原油，机械制造，煤炼油，发电，航运及海洋工程，纸浆，制糖等行业，它自称是第二个最重要的有 13%的全球市场份额的机械部件制造商。在 1995 年财政年度中， 除非洲外该公司的生产总量相当于其海外营业额的 57%，并在所有大陆拥有了子公司。该公司于 1995 年建立了中外合资公司，作为供应商，它
37、确立了在中国高品质的机械部件的领先地位。在此之前这样做，然而案例 1 中，该公司在 1982 年成立了一个与中国客户有“窍门”的转让协议，一家在中国东北的国有企业。由于支付了 60 万英镑（约合为95 万元），中国企业因而取得了生产 3 种不同类型机械部件的权利，以及培训的权利。 这项协议是在 1992 年到期，案例 1 中也是不热衷于继续这项协议，最主要是因为德国经理曾访问中国没有享受 到当地的生活条件。 然而，这些都是在 20 世纪 90 年代初改善， 公司开始探索与当地合作伙伴签约的机会。 与此同时， 其德国客户之一（一机械产品的领先制造商）参与了与中国国有企业在中国东部 谈判建立一个合
38、资生产机械产品的合资企业。未来的中国合作伙伴有一个机械元件部门，其中德国的合伙人对此不感兴趣。因此，这提醒了案例 1 中，应该抓住机遇，并建议中国企业应该分立成两个合资企业分别制造工程产品和机械部件。经过详细的，为期一个月的企业和市场机会的实证调研，案例一该公司决定坚持下去。 在中国设厂的主要原因是为了获得中国提供的潜在市场 ，然而，案例一的目标是不仅要成为最好，还要成为最大的机械部件制造商。 它看到了中国，因此，作为一个战略机遇期去发展和渗透这市场，使之能够制定一个全球范围的业务。它吸引德国的客户的主要原因之一是，它与中国本土的公司合作设立中外合资企业，而不是一家外商独资企。案例 1 中，它
39、在 1996 年 1 月的简报中表示，认为遵循国际客户的要求是很重要的，它的市场就会自动产生。 该公司认为，这将是德国客户寻求担保来减少进入中国市场所涉及的风险的一种手段，这也是它在进一步发展中国市场中提高成本效益，生产高品质的元件的一种手段。合营伙伴是一 个大型的，综合性国有企业，其中在 2000 名员工中有 200个在机械部件部门工作。 当股份式合营企业成立时，依照中国法律，它将采取股份有限责任公司的形式并且聘用 95 名员工 。随着这项政策产生， 中国企业就不在作为工程产品和工程机械零部件制造商存在，但在 1996 年 9 月，市政府决定恢复这项政策给那些未被合资企业继续聘用的员工提供另
40、一项工作。 因此，在 1996 年的 10 月，该公司将两家合资企业的股份卖给了一家控股公司，通过和市政府的密切联系，成立了一个拥有三十几家企业的大集团，该集团既有国企也有中外合资企业，并且雇佣了大约 60000 名员工 。 虽然官方文档指出案例1 同意收购，因为它可以提供获得新客户和市场得渠道。而实际上，我们也没有别的选择，因为它在发生后，听说只有转让股份这条渠道。后来，原合资企业合伙人成为一个服务提供者，提供着两个合资企业的劳动力，以及经营总的一个船队在各企业间运输劳动力。 此外， 有一个操作呈现合同制造 ,并充当分包商的合资企业。 1995 年 1 月，当这个合资企业开始运行时，它坐落在
41、一个较旧的建筑里。是一个中国合伙人所拥有。但在 1996 年 6 月，案例 1 中它搬进了一个由拥有其51%股份，主要出资为其专门建筑的新住处 。 最初由中国的合作伙伴提供 一个60%的份额，案例 1，因为它拒绝了这一需要一个强大的，不是一个积极的伙伴视为有价证券投资的合资企业。它的策略是尽量减少其风险，但最大限度地发挥其控制力。虽然案例 1 在该合资企业百分之五十的份额，它坚持认为，总经理应该是一个中国，而且，至少最初，他应该有销售的责任。总经理报告 4 董事会（ 2 个德国和 2 个中国）的案例一的海外事务总监主持。 副主席是中国人，这在中外合资企业中并非不常见的。因为中外合资企业有平等的
42、所有权。 除了四名董事，董事会会议，这些会议每半年举行一次，最后一两天，都参加了所有 的其他管理人员。一切都是在这些会议上公开讨论，包括企业对未来六个月的政策。那些涉及到管理的关键是确保信息共享和获得进入决策总经理使他们的投入。虽然案例 1 持有该合资企业的多数股权，是寻求协商一致的决定，并根据生产和质量保证经理，他们没有在决策重大危机。日常的决策都由各部门经理作出决定。每个星期一上午会见所有部门经理在总经理办公室的管理人员考虑任何合资企业所面临的问题。 此外，个别部门分别开会，讨论部门的具体问题。 该角色的外籍德国生产和质量保证经理是至关重要的创业成功。由于总经理不会讲英语，他成为之间的董事
43、会主 席中介，向总经理提出主席接下来要说的。然而，作为第二层的经理，他没有决策权，不能发出指令。他只能建议行动以总经理，虽然他“几乎总是我想要的方式决定它“，案例 1 认为这是一个弱点，创造了生产和质量保证经理的新职位。早在 1997 年，他成为与管理局助理总经理，其他管理人员发出指令。 这样一来，问题是解决， 中国管理人员可以接受“不丢脸“他的权威。 根据案例 1 的海外事务，合资公司董事“是一个很好的成功案例“。他本来打算两个亏损的第三年，在对利润产生年。 虽然合资企业确实在第一个两年之营运亏损，他们一直低于预期和销售量的，事 实上，比预期高出 25%。 即使如此，合资企业正面临着包括生产
44、和质量问题重重困难，在当地采购质量，生产效率低标准与外汇的限制，沟通，与销售和营销定价，并与安全（关注版权和专利侵权）。 有趣的是，这些都不似乎已经预见到在谈判过程中。 这里的主要问题已经达成一致的产品项目。 但是，其他问题还包括在随后几年的经营计划，业务计划，分配和股权份额，特别是 男女双方的贡献价值，如图纸（德国合作伙伴）和机械（中方合作伙伴）。最初，这是一个重大问题为双方最终达成了协议，但与德国的合作伙伴是提供和接受，在合资企业一百分之六十的股权。作为 侨务办公室主任指出，他将是一个什么样的作为谈判的结果可以接受的，他“准备从提案中退出，如果我没有觉得和舒适的问题“清晰的概念。即便如此，
45、德国合作伙伴不得不接受某些妥协。 例如， 案例 1 通常致力于项目 10 至 15 年的工期。在这种情况下，同意在 50 年以来，中方承诺“喜欢这么长的持续时间”。 同样，虽然德国的合作伙伴进入中国“，以服务于中国市场“，它已同意购买出口市场的合资企业的产量一定的数量，而且由操作第五个年头结束的条件，该合资企业将其 30 年出口产量。尽管如此，谈判进展迅速。在 1994 年 7 月 14日，一个中国代表团访 问德国举行会谈。其次，在 7 月 25 号到 29 日通过向中国代表团，来自德国的潜在合作伙伴。在这次访问中，“意向书“上签字。 1994年 8 月，海外事务德国主任到中国签署合同，合资公司开始在 1995 年 1 月 2日的操作。与该谈判缔结的专业水平和德国合作伙伴的决心和中方合作伙伴是与市政府有密切的联系部分源于速度。然而，这很可能是旷日持久的谈判没有，同时，由于中方希望该协议，不只是因为它不希望失去的补充协议，创建一个工程产品的合资企业。
