1、 外文翻译 原文 EMPIRICS OF CHINAS OUTWARD DIRECT INVESTMENT Material Source: Pacific Economic Review, 2009.8, 312-341 Author: YIN-WONG CHEUNG, XINGWANG QIAN Abstract： We investigate the empirical determinants of Chinas outward direct investment (ODI).It is found that Chinas investments in developed and de
2、veloping countries are driven by different sets of factors. Subject to the differences between developed and developing countries, there is evidence that: (i) both market-seeking and resource-seeking motives drive Chinas ODI; (ii) Chinese exports to developing countries induce Chinas ODI; (iii) Chin
3、as international reserves promote its ODI; and (iv) Chinese capital tends to agglomerate among developed economies but diversify among developing economies. Similar results are obtained using alternative ODI data. We do not find substantial evidence that China invests in African and oil-producing co
4、untries mainly for their natural resources. 1. Introduction Whether it is entirely true or apocryphal, the emergence of China in the global economic stage has engendered a strong feeling of dj vu. China was estimated to have had a per capita GDP higher than that of Europe before 1280, and accounted
5、for 23.232.4% of world output from 1700 to 1820 (Maddison1998). Indeed, China was one of the major trading centers in the world. During the 16th and 17th centuries, China ran a substantial trade balance surplus and was referred to as the sink for silver, the vehicle currency of international trade i
6、n the de facto silver standard era (Sakakibara and Yamakawa2003a,b). There is little doubt that the re-emergence of China is changing the landscape of the global economy; the question is, in what direction? There is a plethora of analyses of Chinas economic prowess in terms of, say, its ballooning t
7、rade surplus and international reserves, and its ability to draw in foreign direct investment (FDI).1 The role of China as an outward investor has seldom been discussed, and has only been the subject of attention. Compared with inows, Chinas outward direct investment (ODI) is quite small. According
8、to the United Nations statistics, Chinas FDI inow and ODI ratio was 6.4:1 in 2005. However, since the beginning of the new millennium, Chinas direct investment abroad has surged apace. During the 1994 1999 period, Chinas outward investment amounted to US$2.2bn (annual average) and accounted for 3.4%
9、 of outows from developing countries. In 2005, Chinas outward investment jumped vefold to US$11.3bn and accounted for 9.6% of outows from developing countries. With its burgeoning trade surplus and international reserves, China is expected to enhance its role as a signicant provider in the internati
10、onal capital market. Indeed, China ranks fourth in the list of expected leading sources of FDI (UNCTAD 2005). One interesting feature of Chinas outward investment is its concentration in developing countries. The 2007 United Nations report, for example, points out that China is a major capital provi
11、der for developing countries in Africa (UNCTAD 2007). Chinas outward investment, therefore, has substantial implications for the economic development of the world economy in general and for developing countries in particular. Furthermore, together with capital inows, capital outows offer a balanced
12、way for China to integrate into the global economy. Against this backdrop, we examine Chinese investment in overseas markets. To be sure, we are hardly walking in fresh snow and there are already a few studies on Chinas ODI. However, the extant studies are mostly descriptive in nature and policy-ori
13、ented.2 The current study empirically analyzes the evolution of Chinas ODI and its determinants. To anticipate the results, Chinas outward investment displayed a steady increase in the 1990s and a surge early in the new millennium. There has also been a discernable change in the composition of the h
14、ost countries and the industry mix of Chinas overseas investment. The estimation results lend support to the conjecture that China has different motivations in deploying its capital to develop and developing countries. In addition to the usual economic explanatory variables, we examine the motive of
15、 servicing exports, the role of international reserves, and the agglomeration effect. These factors are found to have varying degrees of explanatory power across developed and developing countries. In examining the data from African and oil-producing countries, we nd only limited evidence that expor
16、ts of natural resources from these countries attract some additional amount of Chinas ODI. In the next section, we briey describe Chinas outward investment policy and present some preliminary descriptions of Chinas ODI data. Section 3 contains the main empirical results. Some additional analyses are
17、 provided in Section 4. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 2. preliminary discussion 2.1. A brief history Arguably, the open door policy initiated in 1978 was, and remains, a key dening event in contemporary Chinese economic history.3 The change in FDI policy accompanying economic reform prog
18、rams has greatly altered the economic scene. Indeed, there are two prongs of Chinas FDI policy: one is to attract FDI inow and the other is to place capital in overseas markets. Until recently, the success of attracting inows has overshadowed the outward investment strategy. Indeed, the ODI activity
19、 in the 1980s was quite minimal. Direct investment abroad in this period is perceived to have been driven by political rather than economic considerations. Before 1985, only state-owned and local-government- owned enterprises were allowed to invest overseas. After 1985, private enter- prises were pe
20、rmitted to apply for ODI projects. By 1990, the stock of ODI amounted to US$1.2bn. Although the activity is negligible, the period can be viewed as a period for authorities to design and develop procedures and policies for ODI. Between 1991 and 1997, there was a ux of ODI, to Hong Kong in particular
21、. The track record of these investment projects was not good. Because of the lack of investment know-how, ignorance about the rule of law in overseas markets, and corruption, there were instances of substantial losses from ODI projects. Therefore, the period witnessed an upsurge of ODI activity foll
22、owed by a tightening of approval procedures. At the end of 1997, the stock of ODI amounted to US$2.4bn. During this period China got a reality check on making commercial overseas investment. The 1997 Asian nancial crisis changed the global economic landscape. In 1999, in adjusting its ODI strategy,
23、China issued a directive to encourage direct investment abroad that promotes Chinas exports via processing trade investment. The directive signied an important shift of Chinas policy: from promoting overseas investment to directing ODI. In 2002, the Chinese authorities pushed the going global or ste
24、pping out strategy to sustain the economic reform process and to promote global industry champions in the wake of the WTO accession.4 On July 16, 2004, the authorities made another change in their ODI policy stance: in addition to processing applications, they supervise and provide services. With th
25、ese changes in the going global strategy, Chinese enterprises became quite aggressive in the international capital market. Indeed, Chinese outward investment has been subject to scrutiny following some recent attempts to secure natural resources in developing countries and following large-scale acqu
26、isition activities in the USA. In sum, since China opened up in 1978, the ODI policy has evolved together with other economic reform policies. Specically, the ODI strategy has been transformed from a purely political devise to a more market-oriented operation. In terms of the group of players, it ha
27、s expanded from mainly state-owned enterprises to a mix of state-owned and commercial entities. Nevertheless, there is still a heavy state involvement in ODI activity; at least, this is what is perceived by the rest of the world. Although the absolute magnitude of Chinas ODI is quite small compared
28、with other sources of FDI, China is expected to be among the top 5 leading FDI exporters in both the 2004 and 2005 UN surveys (UNCTAD 2004, 2005). 2.2. Chinas outward direct investment Figure 1. Chinas Overseas Direct Investment Figure 1 plots Chinas ODI. The value of ODI was relatively stable in th
29、e 1980s, increased steadily in the 1990s, and displayed a sharp upward momentum in the new millennium. As a share of the world total FDI, Chinas ODI is quite small, despite its twofold increase from 0.27% in 1991 to 0.54% in 2005. However, Chinese capital accounted for a steadily increasing proporti
30、on of total FDI from developing countries, excluding offshore nancial centers, during the sample period. In a word, the size of Chinas ODI is quite small, but its trajectory is promising. Figure 2. The Distribution of Chinas Overseas Direct Investment among Developing and Developed Countries Figure
31、2 plots the shares of Chinas ODI stock in developed and developing countries. Although ows to both developed and developing countries are increasing over time, the shares of the stock of ODI to developing countries show a clear trend. In 1999, the proportion of Chinas ODI in developing countries ove
32、rtook that in developed countries. Since then, an increasingly large proportion has been directed towards developing countries. This observation is in accordance with the usual belief that China is intensifying its economic involvement in developing countries. Chinas ODI covers a wide geographic dis
33、tribution. As of 2005, China invested in 163 countries and engaged in an extensive range of economic activities, including information technology, nance, retail, sh processing and forestry. These overseas investments, however, are fairly concentrated in a few economies, such as Australia, Hong Kong,
34、 Korea, Macau, Russia and the USA. Indeed, according to the ofcial approval data from various issues of the Almanac of Chinas Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, the top 50 recipient countries on average received over 90% of Chinas ODI during the 19912005 periods. Figure 3. The geographic distribu
35、tion of Chinas stock of Overseas Direct Investment Snapshots of the geographic distributions in 1991, 1998 and 2005 are given in Figure 3. There is a discernable change in the geographic distribution of Chinas ODI over time. For instance, Asia is hosting an increasing share of Chinas ODI: its share
36、has increased from 16% (1991) to 47% (2005). Latin America and Europe are the other 2 regions that experienced an increase of Chinas capital inow, with the former showing a more noticeable increase than the latter. These gains are re gistered at the expense of the ows to North America and Oceania. D
37、uring these 15 years, Canada, the USA and Australia account for a decreasing share of Chinas ODI stock. Specically, these countries together hosted over 40% of Chinese capital in 1991, but less than 10% in 2005. Africa is the only region that has experienced an increase followed by a decrease in its
38、 share of Chinas ODI. In general, these numbers attest to the growing importance of Asia and Latin America and the declining role of North America and Oceania in hosting the Chinese capital. In passing, we note that the evolution of the geographic distribution is qualitatively the same if Hong Kong
39、and Macau, which are Chinas two special administration regions that have attracted a disproportionately large share of Chinas capital, were excluded from Figure 3. Figure 4. The Sectoral Distribution of Chinas Stock of Overseas Direct Investment The sectoral distribution of Chinas ODI is graphed in
40、Figure 4. Two observations stand out: the growth of the trade and trade services sector and the fading importance of the manufacturing sector. Starting from a level below 20% in 19931995, the share of the trade and trade services sector increased to above 60% in 2005. However, the share of the manuf
41、acturing sector dropped from a high 60% to the low teens during the same period. The proportion of Chinas ODI that goes to the resources exploration section in the new millennium is higher than that in the 1993 1995 period. Nonetheless, the increase may not match the recent hype about Chinas aggress
42、iveness in securing natural resources around the world. In fact, the percentage of ODI in the resources exploration section is slightly above 15.1% in 2005 and is smaller than the level in 2001! 译文 中国对外直 接投资的经验主义 资料来源 : 太平洋经济评论 ， 2009.8， 312-341 页 作者： 张银汪， 钱兴旺 摘要：我们研究了中国的对外直接投资（ ODI 值）的影响因素。结果发现，中国的
43、投资在发达国家和发展中国家是由不同的因素驱使的。除发达国家和发展中国家之间的差异，有证据还表明：（一）双方寻找共同市场和资源驱使中国的向外直接投资；（二）中国向发展中国家出口所引起的中国对外直接投资；（三）中国的国际外汇储备 促进其向外直接投资；（四）除了在发展中经济的多样化，中国资本还促使发展经济的凝聚。 相似的结果是用选择性的对外直接 数据获得的。我们发现并没有实质性的证据能表明中国在非洲和石油产油国的投资主要是为了他们的自然资源。 1.介绍 无论是完全正确或未经证实，中国在全球经济舞台上的兴起已让人产生了似曾相识的强烈感觉。中国估计人均 GDP 总值比欧洲 1280 年之前还高，占世界
44、1700 年至 1820 年产量的 23.2 32.4%（麦迪森 1998）。事实上，中国是世界上主要的贸易中心之一。在 16、 17 世纪期间， 中国趋向于实质性的贸易收支顺差，被称为“下沉银”， 事实上是银本位时代的国际贸易媒介货币 （神原英资和山川 2003 年 a， b）。毫无疑问，中 国的重新崛起正在改变全球经济景观，问题是会朝哪个方向改变？ 就中国的经济实力而言 有些分析的过多，如 其膨胀的贸易盈余和国际储备，及其吸引对外直接投资（ FDI）的能力。中国作为对外投资的角色已经很少被讨论了， 只是一直是人们关注的话题。 相对于资本流入，中国的对外直接投资（ ODI 值）是相当小的。据
45、联合国统计， 2005 年中国的 FDI 流量和 ODI 的比是 6.4： 1。 然而，自从新千年伊始，中国的对外直接投资已迅速上升。 在 1994-1999 年期间，中国的对外投年平均总额为 22 亿美元，占发展中国家资本流出的 3.4%。 2005 年，中国的对外投资增长了五倍达到 113 亿美元， 占发展中国家资本流出的 9.6%。 凭借其快速增长的贸易盈余和国际储备，中国期望可以提升其在国际资本市场中重要供应商的角色。事实上，中国在对外直接投资预期的最重要来源名单（贸发会议 2005年）中排名第四。 中国对外投资的一个有趣特性是集中在发展中国家。 2007 年联合国报告指出，在非洲 中
46、国是发展中国家资金最主要的提供者（ 贸发会议 2007 年） 。 因此，中国的对外投资，对整个世界的经济发展尤其是发展中国家有着重要的影响。此外，资本的流入和流出为中国融入全球经济提供了一个 平衡的方式。 在此背景下，我们研究中国在海外市场的投资。可以肯定的是，在已经有一些中国对外投资的研究的前提下，我们很难再走出一条新路。 但是，现存的研究大多是描述性和政策性。目前的经验分析了中国的向外直接投资及其影响因素的演变。 为了预测结果 ,中国有的对外投资在 20世纪 90年代呈现了平稳的增长并在新千年的初期激增。在东道国的组成和中国海外投资的行业组合方面都有着有迹可循的变化。中国在发达国家和发展中
47、国家的资本部署存在着不同的动机的猜想也被证实了。 除了通常的经济变量，我们考察了服务出口的动机，国际储备的作用， 以及集聚效应。这些因素在发达国家和发展中国家间有不同程度的解释力度。 在研究非洲国家和石油生产国的数据中，我们发现只有有限的证据表明，从这些国家出口的天然资源的吸引了中国对外投资的额外总量。 在下一节中，我们简要介绍中国的对外投资政策和目前中国的向外直接投资的一些数据初步说明。第三节包含了最主要的实证结果。第四节会提供一些额外的分析。第五节是结束语。 2.初步讨论 2.1 简史 可以说， 1978 年的开放政策仍然是界定当代中国经济历史事件的一个关键。随着经济改革，对外直接投资政策
48、的变化极大地改变了经济格局。事实上 ，中国的对外直接投资政策有两个极端：一个是吸引 FDI 的流入，另一个是在海外市场投资。 直到最近，吸引资金流入的成功掩盖了对外投资的战略。 事实上， 20 世纪 80 年代的对外直接投资活动是相当少的 。 在此期间的对外直接投资已经被认为是政治的驱动，而不是经济上的考虑。 1985 年前，只有国有和当地政府拥有的企业才允许在海外投资。 1985 年后，私有企业允许申请对外直接投资项目。 到 1990 年，向外直接投资存量总额为 12 亿美元。尽管投资活动很微不足道，但这时期被认为是政府设计、发展对外直接投资程序和政策的时期。 1991-1997 年间，向外
49、直接投资不断变动，特别是香港。这些投资项目的纪录并不好。因为缺乏投资知识，忽视海外市场的法规和腐败，有很多对外直接投资项目失败的实例。因此这一时期见证了对外直接投资活动的高潮随之而来的审批程序的严格。截至 1997 年底，向外直接投资存量达 24 亿美元。在此期间，中国也获得了海外商业投资的通行证。 1997 年亚洲金融危机改变了全球经济格局。 1999 年，对外直接投资战略的调整使中国发布指令：鼓励对外直接投资来促进通过加工贸易的中国出口。 该指令标志着中国政策从促进对外投资到对外直接投资的重要 转变。 2002 年，中国政府推动的“走出去”战略维持了经济改革进程，并成为了入世后全球性的行业冠军。 2004 年 7 月 16 日，政府作出了在对外直接投资的政策立场上的另一个变化： 除了处理申请，他们监督并提供服务。随着 “走出去”战略的变化，中国企业在国际资本市场里变得十分积极。事实上，中国的对外直接投资已受到审查来试图确保在发展中国家的自然资源以及在美国的大规模的收购活动的安全。 总之，自 1978 年中国改革开
