1、 外文翻译 原文 Globalization of the Auto Parts Industry Material: Journal of International Marketing Author: Marc Santucci Over the past 15 years the auto industry has shifted from a regional industry to a global industry. As a result of this shift the original equipment supplier base has been pulled in t
2、he same direction. The globalization process has paralleled the consolidation of the supplier base that has taken place. These two trends have brought new challenges and opportunities to the supplier community. ELM Internationals database of tier-one suppliers in the United States contains approxima
3、tely 1,500 companies. Of these companies, 86 are owned or controlled by European parents, and 292 are owned or controlled by Japanese parents. Several others are owned or controlled by Canadian, Australian, and Brazilian companies. For most of this century the auto industry was a local industry. Wit
4、h the exception of Ford and GM and for a period of time, Chrysler design, engineering, and non-CKD (complete knock down) production by each of the automakers took place in the home region. There were instances where CKD production developed into full production such as Fiat and Volkswagen in Brazil
5、and Volkswagen in Mexico. Globalization beyond Ford and CM began taking hold in the 70s and increased rapidly in the 80s and 90s. Honda and Nissan were the first Japanese automakers to become active in both Europe and North America. Toyota has very aggressively followed the lead and now has assembly
6、 plants spread throughout the world. Suzuki, although much smaller than the above-mentioned automakers, has been very active in regions where their small cars and trucks are in demand. They went in early to India and Hungary and are active in other parts of Asia and Eastern Europe. Fiat and Volkswag
7、en have been active in Eastern Europe and Latin America as well as China. Mercedes and BMW, long wedded to their German operations, are now building plants in the United States, Brazil, and Mexico. Even Chrysler, which sold its European operations a number of years ago, now has a joint venture (JV)
8、in Austria and China and is setting up other JVs in Southeast Asia and Brazil. In the past, the overseas operations of the Big Three either produced CKDs or produced cars with entirely different designs As a result, the supplier base was primarily made up of indigenous suppliers. The very large supp
9、liers such as automakers captive operations, TRW, Allied Signal, Dana, and Rockwell usually followed the Big Three overseas, but the thousands of medium-size or small suppliers usually stayed away. By the early 80s the automakers were looking to “globalize.“ Ford made an early attempt at a world car
10、, the Escort. It resulted in two cars with the same name but a different chassis and power train. The Volkswagen Beetle and Golf were the first world cars where the chassis and engines were of the same design. The Japanese automakers used a similar approach with their overseas built vehicles. By usi
11、ng the same design and engineering for vehicles built in different counfries, the advantages of using the same supplier for common parts became evident. Even though the Volkswagen Golf and Beetle produced in the Americas were similar to those produced in Europe, Volkswagen did not encourage its supp
12、liers to set up in the Americas. Thus only a few of the larger suppliers came over. The Japanese automakers and parts suppliers took a different tack. By the time Toyota had announced that it was building an assembly plant in Kentucky, more than 100 Japanese suppliers had either built or announced t
13、hey were building manufacturing facilities in the United States. Before it expanded its operations in Mexico, Volkswagen studied the Japanese original equipment (OE) supplier relationship in the United States. As a result they began encouraging their German suppliers to locate facilities in Mexico a
14、nd secondarily in the United States. With its Mondeo, Ford has made a second stab at a world car. This time the chassis and engine are the same and Ford has utilized the same suppliers for both the U.S. and European models. In some cases this has resulted in component exports, while in other cases t
15、he suppliers have built plants in the region where the car or engine is assembled. Ford has now taken this process one step further. In 1994 it announced that it will continue to trim its supplier base and preference will be given to those suppliers that build facilities in locations where Ford has
16、assembly operations. On the one hand. Ford is giving suppliers the opportunity to supply its worldwide operations, while on the other hand, the cost of entry will require the suppliers to locate facilities in many different countries. This does not necessarily mean the facilities have to be 100 perc
17、ent owned and operated by the supplier. They could be joint ventures or technology tie-ups. Other automakers appear to be following Fords lead, at least in part. What does this mean for suppliers? The larger suppliers will continue to build facilities in new markets, to follow existing customers, an
18、d to obtain new ones. The past two years has seen the top 50 U.S. suppliers acquiring companies in Europe, building new plants in Mexico, and most recently negotiating joint ventures in China. For example, Johnson Controls has plants, joint ventures, or licenses in the United States, Canada, Mexico,
19、 Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, The United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Czech Republic, Belgium, Austria, Thailand, Taiwan, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Africa. Smaller companies with only U.S. or North American operations will face the most change. This change will require them
20、 to be financially and managerially strong. In the past the requirement to become a tier-one supplier was the ability to produce a part that could meet the automakers design and specifications requirement at the lowest cost. This could be done by any company with as few as 10 employees and a bank wi
21、lling to factor receivables. Now all automakers require you to meet certain quality requirements such as QS9000 and to have in-house design capability. They also are trimming the number of suppliers for each part. Thus, where once suppliers may have been successful supplying only one car model, now
22、suppliers must be able to supply a number of models. As a result, companies with less than $75 million in OE sales are finding themselves optimized out of business. This has created a lot of activity in the mergers and acquisitions market recently as companies either buy their way in to a particular
23、 customer or sell out to someone else. Now with the bar being raised higher, it appears that any company with less than $300 million in sales will not remain a tier-one supplier. The exceptions will be for those components or systems that either are low priced or whose application rates are low. Hin
24、ges would be an example of the former and electro chromatic mirrors of the latter. On the managerial side, the automakers are pushing down more and more responsibility, while companies of all stripes are trying to lop off layers of management. Operating overseas facilities will require more manageme
25、nt and new skills. Regardless of how the overseas operations are structured, design and production engineering support from the home operation will be necessary, at least in the early stages. Dealing with different cultures and different laws will also require additional knowledge and interpersonal
26、skills on the part of existing management. Each country will be unique in these terms. Expanding overseas will require more and more careful planning than expanding in the home market. The cost of failure is likely to be higher as well. At first blush it appears that the small and medium-size firms
27、will not be able to compete in this new environment. While the bar has been raised, the equipment to help the smaller supplier get over it has been improved and its price lowered. In the past, only the automakers and the large suppliers had the financial resources and depth of personnel to undertake
28、 product design and engineering tasks. An expensive minicomputer and expensive computer-aided-design system were the minimum requirements. Now, for a fraction of the cost and fewer personnel, more can be accomplished with work stations and rapid prototyping equipment than could be accomplished just
29、10 years ago with the other tools. The same is true in communications. In the past, operating an overseas facility required a large operation to justify the cost of communication. Now airline travel is less expensive, telecommunication is faster and less expensive, and new technologies such as the f
30、ax machines, televideo, and the internet are within the price range of even the smallest companies. The advent and exploitation of the microchip has taken away the advantage of size. The future of global parts suppliers includes more than what some of the automakers envision. The automakers want to
31、cut their product engineering and purchasing overhead by working with fewer and larger suppliers. While this no doubt gives them economies of scale, it flies in the face of existing trends. The economies of scale are shrinking and the requirements for flexibility are increasing. The automakers are t
32、rying to decrease the number of suppliers with whom they do business. They are also increasing the use of the same parts on different car models. All of this is occurring at a time when the customer is looking for more variety. To the extent each model is unique, how much does the automaker save by
33、working with fewer suppliers, if the cost of delivering the product is the same from a large supplier as from a small supplier? The product engineering effort does not decrease. Only in the purchasing area is there a potential for savings. It takes fewer purchasing people to work with fewer supplier
34、s. While those savings are real, they may be offset by the decreased competition. The best way for companies with less than $300 million in sales to continue as tier-one suppliers and meet Fords and other automakers requirement to be global, is to partner with other firms overseas. However, the type
35、 of partnership could be different from what most people traditionally think of when partnership is discussed. The automaker does not want to work with five different companies with five different systems. Therefore a seamless structure needs to be put in place. The problem with the old style joint
36、venture was that the JV partners were only partners for a particular operation in a particular location. They still could be competitors in any market including the market where the JV existed. Also, the traditional JV usually only shares a manufacturing technology there is no coordination of market
37、ing, engineering, or other management practices. In order to meet the automakers requirement for a global supplier, companies that work together will have to present a common face. This will require sharing more than a manufacturing processes or jointly owning a facility. Design and engineering resp
38、onsibilities will have to be shared; administrative functions will have to be integrated; marketing activities must be complementary; and market areas clearly delineated. All of these activities can now be accomplished at reasonable costs thanks to the technological improvements and effects of dereg
39、ulation mentioned earlier. In the past 15 years, the auto industry has moved from a region- based industry to a global industry. The automakers were the first to “globalize.“ As long as there was a significant difference between vehicle models produced in different countries, there was no imperative
40、 for the suppliers to follow. Now that the automakers are building similar vehicles in a variety of regions, it makes economic sense to work with the same supplier for a particular component or group of components. Some tier-one suppliers are now following the automakers lead. The question is no lon
41、ger whether other suppliers should participate, but rather how and how soon. Suppliers will have to sort out the opportunities both in terms of new markets and customers. The shift to a global market will put new strains on management. The rewards will be higher rates of growth in revenues and poten
42、tial profits. Those who understand and are prepared for these new challenges will have the best chance for success. 译文 全球化的汽车零部件产业 资料来源： 国际营销杂志 作者： Marc Sentence 在过去的 15年中，汽车产业已经从一个区域工业向全球性产业转移。这种转变使得设备供应商基地被拉到同一个方向。全球化进程已经巩固了平行的供应商基础。这两种趋势带来了新的挑战和对供应商团体的机会。 美国的榆林国际公司的数据库中有大约 1500家一级供应商。这些公司中，86家由欧洲
43、拥有或控制 292家由日本拥有或控制其他几家是由加拿大澳大利亚和巴西的公司所拥有或控制。 在本世 纪，大部分的汽车业是当地的产业。随着福特和通用汽车的异常和今后一个时期时间内，在本地，由克莱斯勒设计、建设和非散件组装（完整击倒）生产了每辆汽车。在散件组装的的情况下，诸如菲亚特、巴西大众汽车公司和墨西哥大众汽车公司已经能够完整的生产汽车。 70年代，福特和 CM超前的开始了全球化战略并在 80和 90年代迅速发展。本田和尼桑日产汽车第一家在欧洲和北美活跃的企业。丰田具有非常积极循线组装厂，目前已经遍布世界各地。铃木，虽然在他们的小型汽车和卡车的需求上远小于上述活跃地区的汽车制造商 。但是他们在印
44、度、匈牙利、部分 亚洲和东欧等地区都积极的开展了。菲亚特和大众汽车公司一直积极在东欧和拉丁美洲以及中国行动。奔驰和宝马，长期执着于自己的德国业务，正在 在美国，巴西和墨西哥建设厂区。即使，一直在致力于欧洲的业务的克莱斯勒，目前也在奥地利和中国创办了合企业（合资），并在东南亚和巴西了设置了其他合资企业。 在过去，三巨头的海外业务、生产 CKDs或生产的汽车拥有完全不同的设计，因此，主要是由当地供应商作为主要供应商基地。这些非常大的供应商，如汽车制造商的圈养行动， TRW公司，联合信号， Dana和罗克韦尔 -通常跟随着三大海外企业，但 成千上万的中型或小型供应商却被忽略了。 由早期的 80年代的
45、汽车制造商在探索 “全球化”。福特在世界汽车界作出了早期尝试。结果是导致了具有相同名称的两辆车但却有着不同的机箱和传动系统。大众甲壳虫和高尔夫是第一批拥有相同的底盘和发动机设计的世界汽车。日本汽车制造商使用了与海外制造的汽车类似的方法。 通过在不同的国家使用相同的设计制造的汽车和工程，使用同一供应商的优势对于共用部分变得十分明显。即使是大众高尔夫和甲壳虫这些类似产于美洲和欧洲的汽车，大众并不鼓励其供应商建立在美洲。因此，只有一些规模较大的供应 商走了过来。日本汽车制造商和零部件供应商采取了不同的策略。在丰田的时候曾宣布，它将在肯塔基州建立一个组装厂， 100 多个日本供应商已已建立或宣布，他们
46、正在美国建造生产设施。 之前，它扩大了在墨西哥的 业务，大众汽车学习日本在美国的原始设备（ OE）的供应商关系。因此，他们开始鼓励他们德国供应商在墨西哥设施定位，其次在美国建立。凭借其蒙迪欧，福特已经做了第二次在世界汽车的刺探。这一次，底盘和发动机是一样，福特汽车使用了美国和欧洲这两个相同的供应商的模式。在某些情况下，这导致了组件的出口，而在其他情况下，供应商在汽车 或发动机装配地区建立基地。 福特已经更进一步采取了这一进程。在 1994年公布它将继续削减其供应商基地，将优先考虑那些设施建设在福特装配业务地点的供应商。在一方面，福特是给供应商提供其全球业务的机会，而另一方面，成本入境将要求供应
47、商在许多不同的国家建立设备。这并不一定意味着该设施要百分之百地由供应商拥有和经营，他们可以是合资或技术方面的联系。其他汽车制造商在某些部分似乎是跟随着福特这个领头企业。 这对于供应商意味着什么？较大的供应商将继续建立新的市场设施，按照现有的客户，并取得新的顾客。在过去的两年里在看到了 前 50名美国供应商在欧洲收购公司，在墨西哥建设新工厂，以及最近在中国的合资企业的谈判。例如，约翰逊控制拥有厂房、合资企业，或着在美国，加拿大，墨西哥，巴西，阿根廷，委内瑞拉，英国，西班牙，葡萄牙，德国，捷克共和国，比利时，奥地利，泰国，台湾，中国，印度，印度尼西亚，马来西亚和南非经营。只有规模较小的美国或北美公
48、司业务将面临最多的变化。 这一变化将要求他们在财政和管理上变得更强。在过去的规定里，成为一线供应商的标准是在最低的成本内 有能力生产的部件能满足汽车制造商设计和规范要求。要做到这一点的任何公司，尽可能少为 10名员工和收款银行的应收账款因素。现在，所有汽车制造商要求你达到一定的质量要求如 QS9000认证，并有内部设计能力。他们为每个部分还削减供应商的数目，因此，如果以前的供应商可能已成功为一个汽车提供模型，那么现在的供应商必须能够提供多个型号。 因此，公司低于 75万美元的销售额在 OE发现自己的业务进行了优化。这创造了大量的兼并和收购市场活动，作为一个公司，要么购买一个特定的方法客户要么出
49、售给别人。现在门槛被提到了更高，任何公司少 于 300碗美元的销售额将不再是一个一线供应商之一。例外情况将这些组件或系统要么是低价或应用率很低。关键将是前者的一个例子和电致反映了后者。 在管理方面，汽车制造商降低越来越多的责任，而这一类的企业正试图抬高理层次。海外经营设施将需要更多的管理和新的技能。不管如何，从本地来的海外业务的结构、设计和生产操作技术支持将是必要的，至少在初期阶段。对现有部分的管理的交易具有不同文化和不同的法律，也需要更多的知识和人际关系技巧。在这些条款里每个国家都将是唯一的。海外扩张相比于国内市场的扩张将需要更多，更谨慎的规划。失败 的代价很可能更高。 乍一看，似乎小型和中型公司将无法在这个新的环境竞争。虽然门槛已经提高，帮助小供应商的设备已得到改进，设备的价格已经下调。 在过去，只有汽车制造商和大供应商，有财政资源和人员的企业才能开展产品设计和工程任务。昂贵的小型机和昂贵的电脑辅助设计系统是进行的最低要求。现在，一小部分费用和少量人员，与十年前用其他工具的工作站和快速原型设备相比，能够更快的完成。这些信息都是真实的。在过去，海外经营设施需要一个大的操作才能完成沟通。现在航空旅行更便宜，电信更快，更便宜，和新技术如传真机，电视和互联网在
