1、 外文翻译 原文 Financial Development, International Trade and Welfare Material Source: Dauphine University Paris Author: Blanchard Michel Peltrault Frdric MICROECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INNOVATIVE CHOICE The link between macroeconomic financial systems and the individual managerial microeconomic decision to
2、 invest in innovative activities can be captured by the concept of entrepreneur. According to Schumpeter (1911), the entrepreneur breaks the stationary state by introducing innovations into the economic system. But, motivation of entrepreneurs is not pecuniary but glory. Entrepreneur is a kind of ro
3、mantic and irrational hero. So, microeconomic foundations of his behavior are irrelevant. For Frank Knight (1921), entrepreneur is rational. Uncertainty bearing is the true function of his entrepreneur. Then a manager becomes an entrepreneur if he chooses an uncertain activity rather than a routine
4、one. To make up his mind, a manager has to anticipate the price of the final product which depends on the decision of other managers and on the demand conditions. Then for Knight, the level of entrepreneurship is resulting from a rational decision making process in a context of true uncertainty. In
5、this paper we build the decision to innovate on microeconomic foundations in a context of risk rather than true uncertainty (in the Knights sense). We consider that a manager has to choose between a risky activity and a routine one. He compares the expected gains of each alternative following the Vo
6、n Neumann-Morgenstern decision theory. By definition, managers become entrepreneurs when they choose the innovative activity. It seems reasonable to assume that entrepreneurs have lower risk aversion than non entrepreneurs. The question is to examine if empirical studies support this statement. Cons
7、ider that entrepreneurs invest only a part of their wealth in their business which is very risky compared to other equities. Then if entrepreneurs were as risk averse as others, they should invest the remainder of their wealth in less risky assets. For Gentry and Hubbard (2001), this is not the case
8、 so entrepreneurs seem to have lower risk aversion. Another salient characteristic of entrepreneurs is documented by Moskovitz and VissingJorgensen (2002) who point out that entrepreneurial investment is very concentrated. In fact, they find that “about 75% of all private equity is owned by househol
9、d for whom it constitutes at least 50% of their net total worth”. This lack of diversification is very puzzling because the return of entrepreneurship tends to be low when controlling for risk. Lower risk-aversion, over-optimism, non-pecuniary benefits partly explain why entrepreneurs accept a low r
10、eturn compared to risk. In this paper, we connect the microeconomic entrepreneurial foundations of an innovative choice and the macroeconomic domestic financial system by the managers risk aversion. We capture institutional differences by assuming a countrys specific measure of constant risk relativ
11、e aversion of its managers. Within one given country, all managers have the same measure of risk aversion depending on the domestic financial system of the country in which they operate. Between countries, risk aversion measures can be different: the more the domestic financial system is risk friend
12、ly, the more the countries managers have, ceteris paribus, a small measure of their constant risk relative aversion. Managers of one country are assumed to be more risk averse than the managers of the other country. This is consistent with empirical study of Nakagawa and Shimizo (1999) which shows t
13、hat Japans households are two or three times as risk averse as those in the United States: that is an average relative risk aversion around 2 in USA and 6 in Japan since 60s years to 90s. STYLIZED FACTS Domestic financial systems have different characteristics between countries. For instance, in Jap
14、an, banks play a crucial role since they are closely linked with firms. The firms which are members of a keiretsu are both financed and monitored by their main bank4. The American firms prefer the financial markets when they seek external financing.5 So, stock markets are well developed, and pension
15、 funds are important actors. The monitoring is less efficient in such a market oriented financial system, but the budgeting constraint is surely stronger than in a bank oriented system. So, following the arguments of Qian and Xu (1995), risky innovations will be more promoted in the decentralized sy
16、stem. Start-up firms and innovative projects will be numerous and market will only select and refinance the more efficient ones. In the bank centralized system, the weaker budgeting constraint prevents to stop bad firms or bad projects. So, in order to avoid this difficulty to stop inefficient proje
17、cts, the famous “Concord Effect”, firms are more prudent in the screening and financing of innovative projects. So, following those theoretical predictions, the stylized facts should confirm those predictions. Prior to this verification, some data and indicators are needed. FIGURES In order to compa
18、re nations, it is useful to build a quantitative measure of the financial systems. Block (2002), have build, by using principle components analysis, a composite index incorporating several financial structure variables: bank concentration, an index of accounting standards, ownership concentration, t
19、he ratio of assets of deposit money bank over GDP, the stock market capitalization, the availability of company information. This composite index reveals the diversity in the size and the character of national financial systems. The financial systems which are well developed and market oriented are
20、called by Block (2002) the outsider systems (high value of the index). The poorly developed financial systems and bank oriented ones are called the insider systems. Outsider systems, (small value of the index) are characterized by lower bank and ownership concentration as well as better accounting s
21、tandards and greater stock market orientation relative to insider systems. Figure 1 shows the values of the Outsider/Insider index for the 17 OECD countries. We verify that, US and UK, countries who have a market oriented financial market are ranked on the top. The case of Japan is less intuitive bu
22、t the share of financial markets in the global source of funds of firms has grown rapidly during the 90s. According to Mayer (1998), countries characterized by the continental system of finance, that is, Germany, Italy, are revealed to be endowed with insider systems. France seems to be in an interm
23、ediate situation. If our intuition is correct, countries endowed with relative risk friendly institutions (outsider systems) must have a higher proportion of innovations than countries endowed with relative risk averse institutions (insider systems). 译文 金融发展，国际贸易和福利 资料来源 :巴黎第九大学学位论文 作者： 布兰查德 米歇尔 派陶特
24、 弗雷德里克 微观经济基础的创新选择 创新活动中的宏观金融体系与微观的个人管理投资决定之间的联系可以从企业家的概念中捕捉到。 根据熊彼特（ 1911），企业家通过引进经济体制的革新打破了其静止状态。但是，企业家的动机是荣耀而非金钱。企业家就像一个浪漫的和非理性的英雄。所以，其行为是微观经济基础是不相关的。对于弗兰克奈特（ 1921），企业家是理性的。不确定性行为是他的企业家的 真正功能。当一个管理人员抛却固有模式选择不确定性行为，那么他就变成了企业家。为了下定决心，一个经历必须根据其他经理的决定，在需求状况的基础上预计其最终产品的价格。此外，奈特认为，企业家精神的水平是产生于真实的不确定性背景
25、下的理性决策过程。本文所建立的创新决策是建立在风险背景下的微观经济学基础上，而非真实的不确定性（在泰特的意义上）。我们认为，一个经理人必须在风险行为和例行行为间作选择。冯诺依曼摩根斯坦的决策理论认为经理需要比较每个选择的预计收益。根据定义，管理人员选择创新活动时即成为企业家。 根据熊彼特 （ 1911），企业家通过引进经济体制的革新打破了其静止状态。但是，企业家的动机是荣耀而非金钱。企业家就像一个浪漫的和非理性的英雄。所以，其行为是微观经济基础是不相关的。对于弗兰克奈特（ 1921），企业家是理性的。不确定性行为是他的企业家的真正功能。当一个管理人员抛却固有模式选择不确定性行为，那么他就变成了
26、企业家。为了下定决心，一个经历必须根据其他经理的决定，在需求状况的基础上预计其最终产品的价格。此外，奈特认为，企业家精神的水平是产生于真实的不确定性背景下的理性决策过程。本文所建立的创新决策是建立在风险背 景下的微观经济学基础上，而非真实的不确定性（在泰特的意义上）。我们认为，一个经理人必须在风险行为和例行行为间作选择。冯诺依曼摩根斯坦的决策理论认为经理需要比较每个选择的预计收益。根据定义，管理人员选择创新活动时即成为企业家。 Moskovitz 和 Vissing Jorgensen 则证明了企业家另一个突出的特点，企业家投资的集中性。事实上他们发现，“大约 75%的私人产权归家族拥有，而至
27、少 50%的净产值由这些人组成”。这 种多样化的缺乏令人费解，因为风险控制下的创业回报趋于下降。低风险规避，过度乐观，非金钱利益或许可以部分解释为什么企业家相较于风险愿意接受低回报。 在本文中，我们通过管理者的风险规避将创新选择的微观经济基础和国内宏观金融系统联系起来。我们通过假定一国管理者的恒量风险相关规避性的具体措施来获取制度性差异。在一个特定的国家，所有管理者根据其所在国家的国内金融体系采取相同的风险规避措施。国家之间，风险规避措施是不同的：其他条件不变，越是国内金融体系的风险小，这些国家的管理者对其有关恒量风险规避的措施越少。 假定一个 国家的管理者比其他国家的管理者更反对风险。 这与
28、 Nakagawa和 Shimizo（ 1999）的实证研究结果一致，该研究表明，日本的家族企业的风险规避是美国的两倍或三倍： 60年代到 90年代美国的平均相对风险规避度为 2，日本的平均相对风险规避度为 6。 程式化 事实 不同国家间的国内金融体系具有不同的特点。例如，在日本，银行引起与企业的密切联系而发挥着至关重要的作用。 Keiretsu 的成员公司都是由他们的银行出资并受其监控。美国公司在寻求外部筹资来源时则更倾向于金融市场。因此，美国股票市场发达，养老基金是重要的角色。 在这样一个以金融系统为导向的市场里监管效率较低，但相较于银行导向型市场其预算限制肯定更强 因此，在钱和徐的论证中
29、，在分散型体系中更推广高风险创新。创业公司和创新项目将变成大多数，市场将只选择那些更为有效的进行再融资。在银行集中体系中，较弱的预算限制阻止了不良企业和不良项目的停止。因此，为了避免长生这种停止低效项目的困难，所以，为了避免这种困难停止低效项目，企业将更为审慎地筛选和投资创新项目，这也就是著名的“协和效应”。 因此，根据这些理论预计，程式化事实应证实这些预计。在此之前，需要一些数据和指标。 数据 为了比较不同国家，建立一个金融体系量化测量很有用。 布洛克 （ 2002 年），个合并金融利用主成分分析，建立了一个合并金融结构变量的综合指数：银行集中，一个涵盖会计准则，所有权集中度，国内生产总值中
30、存款的资产比率，股市资本额，公司信息的可用性的综合指数。 该综合指数显示了国家金融体系的规模和特征的差异。发达的、以市场为导向的金融体系被布洛克称之为外部型体系（该指数呈现高值）。不发达的、以银行为导向的金融体系被称之为内部型体系。外部型体系，（该指数呈小值）的特点是较低的银行与股权集中度以及更好的会计标准和更完善的 股市导向，相对于内部型体系。图 1 显示了 17 个 OECD 国家的外向型 /内向型指数。 我们证实，拥有市场导向型金融市场的国家，美国和英国，排名靠前。日本的情况是不太直观，但在 90 年代，金融市场在全球企业资金来源中所占的份额迅速增长。 根据梅耶（ 1998 年）的研究，德国、意大利这些大陆金融体系特色的国家，都显示被赋予内部型体系。法国则显示处于中间状况。
